

# **AFRO** **BAROMETER**

Afrobarometer Paper No. 25

## **DEMOCRACY, MARKET REFORM, AND SOCIAL PEACE IN CAPE VERDE**

by Barry Ames,  
Lucio Renno, and  
Francisco Rodrigues

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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AFROBAROMETER WORKING PAPERS

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**March 2003**

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## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Cape Verde is an exception to recent African political developments. Since independence, the island nation has had no wars; its levels of corruption and urban violence are low by African standards; and power has alternated between two parties.

Between 1980 and 1991, the African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV) held power in a one-party government. In 1991 the regime democratized, moving to multiparty competition. The PAICV's principal opposition came from the Movement for Democracy (MPD), an opposition party composed of dissidents from the PAICV and individuals unhappy with the absence of political competition in Cape Verde. Campaigning on an agenda of economic liberalization and neo-liberal reform, the MPD won the elections of 1991 and 1995. In 2001, the PAICV regained power in an extremely close election.

The Afrobarometer survey was administered in 2002 to a sample of 1289 individuals on the four major islands. The survey utilized essentially the same Afrobarometer Round 2 questionnaire implemented in fourteen other African nations. This report traces the relationship of historical, economic, and demographic factors on Capeverdean evaluations of democracy and market reforms.

### *Attitudes Toward Democracy*

To analyze the mass public's attitudes towards Cape Verde's political system, we distinguish between diffuse support and specific support for democracy. Diffuse support relates to the legitimacy of the regime; specific support refers to evaluations of the performance of institutions. Capeverdeans think their country is a democracy, but they see it as a democracy with problems. They see democracy as the best option when compared to other, authoritarian forms of government. In addition, Capeverdeans support democratic practices. They want to choose leaders through elections, maintain a multiparty system, keep term limits for presidents, and utilize the national assembly as the main formulator of laws. Nonetheless, one-third of the respondents tends not to trust most of the democratic institutions, and another one-third trust them only "a little." Despite these low levels of trust in institutions, citizens think the current multiparty system is better than the previous one-party regime in terms of improvements in freedom of speech, choice and association, and law enforcement practices. The population is basically satisfied with democracy, although most respondents are only "a little" satisfied. One-third of the population seems pleased with the government's performance regarding economic issues and its ability to enforce the law. Government fares better when it comes to the administration of health, education, and housing.

Most of the population thinks the government can solve most of the country's problems. In addition, about one-half of the population positively evaluates the new government's capacity to enforce the law and deliver services. In general, positive evaluations of the current government, when compared to the previous one, tend to prevail.

Capeverdeans affirm that they are interested in public affairs, and they do pay close attention to media news. However, this high level of interest in politics only moderately crystallizes into concrete political behavior such as discussion of politics, attendance at community meetings, and meeting with others to raise issues. When it comes to participating in organized associations, participation is even lower. Low levels of civic engagement are understandable when placed in the light of citizens' feelings of political efficacy and their propensity to contact political actors. Most citizens feel they cannot affect political decisions at any level in the country, they feel quite incapable of influencing the functioning of the political system, and they rarely contact their elected representatives.

The ability of the state to enforce the law tends to be a central deficiency in newly democratized countries. In Cape Verde, the law appears to be respected in everyday life, and institutions enforcing the law -i.e., police and courts- are trusted. Levels of violence are low. Most of the population have not been victimized by crimes, their houses have not been burglarized, they do not feel unsafe at home, and they have not been physically attacked. In addition, the police and courts are among the population's most trusted institutions. Finally, citizens believe that the courts, police and tax departments have the right to conduct their jobs as prescribed in the constitution and that the constitution reflects Capeverdean values and aspirations.

Citizen's perceptions of the level of corruption among top political actors are probably the most serious rule-of-law problem. Capeverdeans see judges, magistrates, teachers, and school administrators as exempt from the temptations of corruption. However, the main approach taken by citizens in evaluating corruption is avoid judging political actors: most people say they "don't know" or "haven't heard enough about it" to make a judgment.

### ***Attitudes Toward the Economy***

Capeverdeans are ambivalent about the type of economic system they prefer. There is no consensus that a market economy is better than a state-run planned economy. Views about government intervention are contradictory. Capeverdeans think government should manage the production and distribution of goods, but they also think that individuals should decide what to produce, buy and sell. This contradiction is exacerbated by majority support for the idea that people are responsible for their own well being, but also for the idea that the government is like a parent that should take care of its children.

Assessments of where the government should intervene in the economy show that Capeverdeans do not want the government to shy away from intervening in everyday problems such as unemployment. Respondents are also against measures that would increase unemployment, including opening the domestic market to foreign products or firing public servants.

Capeverdeans are willing to sacrifice in order to improve their living standards in the future. They do not want to abort economic reform. They praise the current regime for improving living standards and making more goods available, but they believe that job opportunities and the gap between rich and poor have deteriorated under the current system.

Respondents feel that the overall economy is in worse shape than their own pocketbooks, but there is no general perception that the country is faring poorly on economic terms. Moderate levels of satisfaction with the reduced role of the government in the economy were the dominant view.

Overall, attitudes toward the market economy and economic reform are more skeptical than views about democracy and liberalization of the political system. Capeverdeans are unsure whether that current economic reform has helped them in their daily lives, and they have mixed feelings towards neo-liberal reforms.

### ***Sources of Conflict Inside Cape Verde***

Conflicts occur mostly inside communities and between neighbors. Political issues are the most common cause for conflicts, but very few people can identify the motives for conflicts. Ethnic, racial, and religious disputes seem to be absent. Asked to self-identify with a sub-national group, nearly a majority could not; i.e., they refuse to identify themselves as anything other than Capeverdean.

A majority of the population rejects violence, although almost one-third would be willing to use violence for a just cause. Most respondents see the rivalry between inhabitants of different islands as

modest, but almost one-half thinks that there is an unfair distribution of resources between islands. Residents of Santo Antão and Fogo are more critical of the government's resource allocation criteria. In addition, views about the rivalry between residents of Santiago and other islands are stronger in São Vicente and Santiago. Finally, although most Capeverdeans think of themselves as Africans, a substantial portion of the population believes that African immigrants bring the country more problems than contributions to the country's development.

### ***Relation Between Attitudes Toward Democracy and Market Economy***

In this section we applied a multivariate statistical model to analyze the correlates of support for democracy and for a market economy. The model shows that support for democracy and for a market economy are strongly correlated in Cape Verde. Those who positively evaluate the government, who favor political and economic reforms and who have higher educational levels also are more prone to favor democracy. Surprisingly, however, positive retrospective and prospective evaluations of personal economic conditions negatively impact support for democracy. Those who are more satisfied with their personal economic condition are less likely to support democracy. The model also shows that favorable evaluations of political reform and contact with emigrants have positive effects. Positive evaluations of the current national economy have an unexpectedly negative impact on support for market reform.

### ***Cape Verde in the African Context***

This section compares Cape Verde with twelve African democracies previously analyzed in Round 1 of the Afrobarometer. Cape Verde does not differ from other African countries regarding support for democracy, but it does differ regarding satisfaction with democracy. Capeverdeans appear to be more critical of their regime than other Africans. In addition, Capeverdeans are above the African mean in thinking that their country is a democracy with major or minor problems. But when comparing the relation between support for democracy and rejection of authoritarianism, Capeverdeans do not deviate from the African average. As elsewhere in Africa, only about half of all Capeverdeans are deeply committed democrats.

## INTRODUCTION

### **From a Negotiated Transition to Mass Support for Democracy**

Among both scholars and visitors, Cape Verde is typically labeled an African exception. In its history the country has faced no wars, and it has relatively low levels of corruption and urban violence. Power has alternated between the two most important parties with no rupture of the institutional order. This combination of political stability and social peace certainly differentiates Cape Verde's history from that of most other African countries.

Cape Verde achieved its independence from Portugal in combination with Guinea-Bissau. The armed struggle against Portugal, which plagued all of Portugal's continental colonies – i.e. Moçambique, Angola, and Guinea-Bissau – never reached Cape Verde. This does not mean that Capeverdeans did not participate in the war effort; indeed they did, but military actions were always in Guinea-Bissau. War was never fought in Capeverdean territory.

The liberation struggle was coordinated by the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which held the reins of government in both countries in the first years of independence. A 1980 military coup in Guinea-Bissau put an end to dreams of unification, at least from the perspective of Cape Verde.

According to Meyns (2002), PAIGC (later PAICV, African Party for the Independence of Cape Verde), maintained quite pragmatic relations with the world powers during the Cold War. Cape Verde took advantage of its strategic location in the Atlantic Ocean and made the Sal Airport a viable stopping point for aircraft crossing the Atlantic. Another source of income for the country was the flow of remittances from Capeverdeans living abroad. Finally, donations from other countries, first China and the Soviet Union and then Western countries, helped force PAICV into a more practical, less aligned posture in the years of the Cold War.

The opening of the country to the international community, according to Meyns, has been one of the reasons for the gradual transformation of the political system in a democratic direction. Though one-party rule was sustained until the late 1980s, PAICV leaders realized that maintaining the growing assistance of western countries required an expansion of democratic competition. In September of 1990, the country's constitution was changed to allow for multiparty competition and the introduction of a semipresidential regime. The president, who would serve as head of state, would be chosen in direct elections, and a prime minister (as head of government) would come from the majority party in the National Assembly.

Despite the short period of time between the inauguration of the new constitution, which allowed for the existence of opposition parties, and the first elections, in January of 1991, a dissident group from PAICV formed the Movement for Democracy (MPD). The new party was not in any way prohibited or coerced by the PAICV. Rather, continuous dialogue was maintained between the two groups, leading scholars to argue that the transition from one-party rule to multiparty competition in Cape Verde was a negotiated one (Évora 2001, Meyns 2002).

Nonetheless, as Évora makes clear, this negotiated character did not negate conflict and disputes between opposing political forces. The opposition did influence governmental decisions that led to the opening of the regime, but in Cape Verde conflicts did not lead to institutional breakdown. Another aspect of the Cape Verdean transition that re-inforces its negotiated nature is the absence of popular participation and mobilization. The transition was accomplished from the top down in the sense that it was mainly a consequence of elite negotiation and decision, with little or no popular participation.

To the surprise and dismay of PAICV, the MPD won the elections of 1991, becoming the majority party in parliament and electing the president. Évora claims that the brevity of the period between the change in party rules (which allowed a multiparty system) and the actual election is the essence of understanding MPD's victory (2001). The short time span did not allow for the formation of various independent political parties. Thus PAICV stood for the system of one-party rule and was blamed for all the problems the population then faced, and MPD represented change and openness. The two parties became polarized, and this polarization ultimately harmed the PAICV.

With the victory of the MPD came drastic changes in the economy. The new government's basic goal was the reduction of government intervention in the economy, expansion of privatization, and further opening of the country to the international economy. In 1995, the MPD's governing strategy was rewarded with victory in both the National Assembly and the presidency.

A widening process of privatization and a strengthening of ties between Cape Verde and Portugal marked the second term of the MPD (Meyns 2002). In fact, Portuguese companies bought most of the public firms sold under the MPD government. A collateral effect of market reform was an increase in inequality between the urban rich, who benefited from the privatization process, and the inhabitants of rural, poorer areas, still excluded from the benefits of the market economy.

In the 2001 elections, the collateral effects of economic reforms took their toll. During the campaign the MPD faced fierce criticism from a better structured, more unified, and more experienced PAICV, now under the control of the post-independence generation of the party. PAICV keenly criticized what it considered an indiscriminate urge to sell national firms to foreign owners.

The MPD, in addition to facing a more skilled adversary than in the two previous elections, was driven by internal disputes. These disputes arose mostly during its second term in office because the party appeared unconcerned about the social consequences of economic reform. Disputes about the party's candidate for president also caused divisions inside the party. The disagreements about this question were so insurmountable that they led to the creation of altogether new political party, Partido Renovador Democrático (PRD), which further increased the electoral vulnerability of the MPD.

The result was the victory of the PAICV in both parliamentary and presidential elections. The presidential elections were especially competitive, requiring two rounds and a face-off between Pedro Pires from the PAICV and Carlos Veiga from the MPD. Pires won by 12 votes (Meyns 2002). Initially, the results were contested in court. But, after a Supreme Court ruling that favored the PAICV, the MPD accepted its defeat, thus signifying the maturation of political parties in Cape Verde and showing that the social consequences of political reform did affect voters' choices. Pedro Pires and the current PAICV Prime Minister, José Maria Neves, have headed the government since that election.

The negotiated nature of Cape Verde's transition to democracy, with peaceful alternation in power between the two most important parties and the absence of internal violence and external wars, is a distinct trait of Capeverdean politics. Another distinct trait is the existence of political parties based not on tribal or ethnic rivalries but, especially in their early days, on altogether different views about how the economy should be handled and how social problems should be attacked. Even though ideological differences have blurred considerably, especially since PAICV's new government, no religious or ethnic cleavages lie behind political parties in Cape Verde. The nation has an ethnically, religiously, and racially homogenous population, formed mostly by miscegenation between Portuguese and Africans. There are no significant religious divides and no traditional cults, such as those seen in continental African countries. Thus, disagreements about pragmatic political issues dominate the political agenda of Cape Verde.

Given this distinctive historical background (compared not just to other African countries but also to newly democratized nations around the globe), what is the shape of citizens' attitudes towards democracy and markets in Cape Verde? Did its unusual history lead to the formation of values and beliefs that also differentiate Capeverdeans from citizens in other recently democratized countries? Did the years of negotiated, elite-based transition affect the mass public's views about the political and economic systems? Or is there a disjunction between elites and masses in Cape Verde, with the latter still not fully incorporating democratic and market-oriented values?

### **The 2002 Survey**

The Afrobarometer survey was conducted by AfroSondagem (an independent polling firm based in the city of Praia) in conjunction with the international Afrobarometer research network in June of 2002. The survey provides some initial evidence regarding Capeverdean views about democracy and the market economy, helping to answer the questions above. The survey was implemented using a stratified national probability sample, proportional to population size, of the adult population of Cape Verde. In all, 1289 individuals were interviewed between June 3 and June 14 of 2002. Of this total, 52 percent live in urban primary sampling units and 48 percent in rural ones. The sample is evenly divided between men and women.

The sample was designed so that representative samples could also be obtained on key islands. We included the four most populated islands, comprising over 90 percent of the country's population including 256 interviews in Santo Antão, 258 in Fogo, 258 in São Vicente, and 496 in Santiago. Thus the survey design allows for the analysis of public opinion both at the national and the regional/island level.

Interviews lasted from 25 minutes to 3 hours and 38 minutes, with an average length of 58 minutes. Seventy percent of the interviews took between 40 minutes and 70 minutes. The language used for 99 percent of the interviews was Creole.<sup>1</sup>

### **Attitudes Toward Democracy**

How can we categorize attitudes towards political systems? Suppose we distinguish two types of attitudes: those regarding the legitimacy of the regime and those regarding the efficiency of its institutions. The first type relates to abstract, unconditional support of the existing institutional framework. Such support is independent of the outputs offered by the political system. Caldeira and Knight refer to such defenses of the regime as "diffuse support" and as a "reservoir of favorable attitudes and good will" towards political institutions (1992, 637). The second type of attitude toward the political system is customarily known as specific support. In this case what matters is the effectiveness of institutions. What is under consideration is not the system itself, whether it is a desirable regime or not, but whether the institutions of this regime deliver what is expected in terms of producing outcomes satisfying the requests and needs of the general public. Caldeira and Knight define specific support as "a set of attitudes toward an institution based upon the fulfillment of demands for particular policies" (1992, 637).

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<sup>1</sup> According to interviewers, 95 percent of the respondents did not check their answers with other family members, and in 93 percent of the interviews third parties did not influence respondents. However, interviewers also thought that only 20 percent of the interviewed population had no difficulty understanding the questions and that 42 percent had minor difficulties, with the remaining 38 percent having some or many difficulties. Despite difficulties in comprehension, interviewers thought respondents were "friendly" 93 percent of the time, interested in the interview 81 percent of the time, collaborative in 85 percent of the cases, and honest in 79 percent of the interviews. Over 96 percent of the interviews were done on the first attempt. Household substitution did not severely affect the survey collection process: only 9 percent of the initially sampled population refused to be interviewed, and only 3 percent could not be found in their houses (or the houses were simply empty).

The analysis that follows applies this distinction to Cape Verde. We can then compare postures directly confronting the existing democratic order with those more concerned with the functioning of institutions. The former attitude is more threatening to the continuation of democracy in Cape Verde *in the short term* than the latter. If citizens do not like democracy and do not desire it for its intrinsic value, then the prospects for the consolidation of the regime are very bleak. However, if Capeverdeans do support democracy diffusely but criticize the functioning of some of its institutions, then the regime is more likely to be threatened in the long haul if changes in existing institutions are not made. Immediate threats of institutional rupture are less tangible when there is diffuse support for the system, regardless of the existence of specific support.

In addition, two other aspects of democratic regimes are not encompassed by the distinction between diffuse and specific support but cannot be ignored when analyzing prospects of regime strengthening. A third section of this report will focus on the role of citizens and organized civil society in Cape Verde. Scholars have regarded independent collective action in civil society as a central component of democratic governance, a means of ensuring that demands are made visible to the government and of guaranteeing the accountability of elected representatives.

Finally, a fourth section focuses on citizens' views regarding the rule of law. How satisfied are citizens with the functioning of law-imposing institutions and how do they evaluate law-abiding behavior? The literature on democratic consolidation, especially in Latin America (O'Donnell 1997, 2001; Boeninger 1997; Linz and Stepan 1997), has suggested that political institutions, i.e., electoral and political party systems, tend to function adequately in newly democratized countries, but that the heritage of authoritarianism is more visible when it comes to the functioning of law-imposing institutions. Aspects of democratic regimes related to law and order tend to change more slowly, from an arbitrary, unequal system to one of universal rights typical of democracies. Obviously this has been a problem in poor African countries, where the judiciary and police system are poorly equipped and trained, and where independence or civil wars have recently occurred. By differentiating these aspects of political systems, we will be able to analyze Capeverdean views and to speculate about the consequences of current attitudes for the future of democracy in Cape Verde.

***Diffuse Support***

When considering a regime's diffuse support, it is first necessary to measure the population's perceptions of the regime. Capeverdean citizens do think their country is a democracy. Only 6 percent believe otherwise. They are, however, very critical of their regime. Forty-one percent respond that the country is a democracy with major problems. Combined with those seeing Cape Verde as a democracy with minor problems, the total figure is 77 percent of the population. Given this predominance of critical views about the democratic regime in Cape Verde, are its citizens willing to change their political regime?

***Table 1. Extent of Cape Verde's Democracy***

	% of respondents
It is not a Democracy	6
It's a Democracy with Major Problems	41
It's a Democracy with Minor Problems	36
It's a Full Democracy	7

It is clear that the great majority of the Capeverdean population prefers democracy to any other type of regime (Table 2). Given Cape Verde's history of democratic governance and alternation in power between the two main parties, this comes as no surprise. Citizens are critical of their regime, but they embrace democracy as the best form of government. For most people, democracy is the "only game in town," in Linz and Stepan's (1997) words.

**Table 2. Support for Democracy**

	% of respondents
Type of Government doesn't matter	12
Under some circumstances, a non-democratic government is preferable	8
Democracy is always preferable to any other type of government	66

To confirm that democracy is in fact often seen as “the only game in town,” we asked if Capeverdeans think other forms of governing are better. When given several alternatives, most Capeverdeans reject authoritarian options such as one-party, military, and one-man rule (Table 3).

However, at the same time few citizens are willing to give the current political system of elected government more time to solve problems. There is certainly a sense of urgency or impatience. This is a clear sign that it is necessary to solve immediate problems, that is, to deal with issues of specific support for the regime, to guarantee the strengthening of democracy in the country. In other words, even though Capeverdeans prefer democracy over other regime alternatives, a good portion of the country is unwilling to live under democracy if problems are not resolved. This presents clear difficulties for the long-run stability of democracy and suggests that diffuse support of the system is in danger unless specific issues are resolved by elected governments. Still, for those who defend democracy in Cape Verde it is reassuring that although the current democratic regime faces problems, there is no second-best option.

**Table 3. Forms of Governing**

	Agree %
One-Man Rule	14
One-Party Rule	12
Military Rule	13
Current Political System with Elected Governments should be given more time	39

In addition, most Capeverdeans seem to support institutions typical of democratic regimes. As can be seen in Table 4, the majority of the population agrees that leaders should be chosen through elections, that more political parties are better than fewer, and that presidents should have limited terms. These aspects of democratic regimes all ensure voters' ability to make their elected representatives accountable. In addition, a near-majority thinks that the National Assembly should make the laws, three times more than those who think the president should make them. In Cape Verde, citizens feel it is necessary to have institutions that place checks on their representatives and that allow voters to have a true set of distinct electoral alternatives to choose from.

**Table 4. Democratic Practices**

	Agree %
Choose Leaders through Elections	73
Many Political Parties Needed	62
No More than Two Terms for President	75
National Assembly Makes the Law	49 (15% think president should make law)

Other indicators of diffuse support for the current regime, with its multiparty competition, are comparisons to the previous one-party regime. Are civil and political rights better defended under the current order? In the political realm, the answer is yes (Table 5). Citizens feel that their freedoms of speech, choice, and association were enhanced by the post-1991 regime. But when it comes to the functioning of other aspects of the current regime, such as law enforcement (fear of unjust arrest, equal treatment by the government, safety from crime) as well as citizens' ability to influence government decisions, improvements have been less obvious. Hence, some of the lack of support for the current system that we saw above might be due to the state's lack of ability to assure these civil rights.

**Table 5. Comparison Between Previous and Current Regimes**

	Better %
Freedom of Speech	80
Freedom of Association	79
Freedom of Electoral Choice	81
Freedom from Fear of Unjust Arrest	64
Ability to Influence Government	55
Equal treatment for all	36
Safety from Crime/Violence	35

A final aspect of diffuse support relates to trust in institutions (Table 6). Overall, levels of trust in institutions tend to be low in Cape Verde, and levels of mistrust are very similar toward all institutions. Very small percentages of the population trust each institution “a lot”; most tend to trust “a little.” There is somewhat more variation in the percentage who have no trust at all in a given institution. The ruling party and the president (both recently elected from PAICV), as well as the opposition party (MPD), are among the institutions attracting lowest levels of trust.

More citizens trust broadcasting institutions and newspapers. There are no big differences in trust between government-owned and independent media. It is also worthwhile highlighting the considerable difference between trust in big private corporations and big public corporations. More people tend to trust the latter “a lot,” and fewer do not trust them at all. Hence, the population does seem to appreciate public services in Cape Verde more than, or at least as much as, services offered by private firms.

**Table 6. Trust in Political Institutions**

	No Trust at all	Trust a Little	Trust a lot
Army	23	34	17
Government Broadcasting Service	15	40	17
Independent Broadcasting Services	14	41	16
Trust Public Corporations	18	39	15
Government Newspapers	17	38	12
President of the Republic	31	38	11
Government	29	41	11
National Assembly	26	39	11
Opposition Party	31	36	11
Independent Newspapers	19	38	11
Ruling Party	33	38	10
Local Authority Council	26	40	9
Independent National Electoral Commission	31	37	8
Trust Private Corporations	28	41	7

### ***Specific Support***

The discussion above pointed to the overall impatience of Capeverdeans with their multiparty regime regarding its ability to solve daily problems, but it also revealed a general preference for democracy. In this section we turn exclusively to aspects of specific support for democracy in Cape Verde. First, how satisfied is the population with democracy? Most Capeverdeans tend to be dissatisfied with the democratic regime. 16 percent declare they are not satisfied at all. And 44 percent are “not very satisfied.” Only one third is fairly satisfied or very satisfied. Thus, if we combine the first three categories, then two thirds of the population is not satisfied with how democracy works in Cape Verde. This is predictable, given that about two-thirds of the population thinks that Cape Verde is a democracy with problems. Again, critical points of view about regime performance prevail.

**Table 7. Satisfaction with Democracy**

	%
Cape Verde is not a Democracy	1
Not at all satisfied	16
Not very satisfied	44
Fairly satisfied	22
Very satisfied	11

Dissatisfaction with the regime is probably born of the government's performance (Table 8). Again, only one-third of the population reports being pleased with the government's performance regarding economic issues (managing the economy, creating jobs, keeping prices stable, narrowing gaps between rich and poor, ensuring everyone has enough to eat). The situation is equally bad when it comes to the government's ability to force the law. Only about one-third of the population positively evaluates the government's ability to reduce crime, to fight corruption, and to solve conflicts between communities. Government evaluations only improve when it comes to issues of health, education, and housing: around 50 percent of the population positively evaluates the government's capacity to offer these basic services. Hence, the root of the government's poor evaluation is its inability to deal with economic and public security issues.

**Table 8. Evaluation of Government Performance**

	Well (Well and Very Well)%
Combating HIV/AIDS	56
Addressing Educational Needs	54
Improving Basic Health Services	50
Delivering Household Water	45
Ensuring Everyone has enough to eat	34
Managing the Economy	33
Resolving Conflicts between Communities	33
Keeping Prices Stable	29
Reducing Crime	29
Fighting Corruption in Government	24
Creating Jobs	23
Narrowing Gaps between Rich and Poor	23

Though the government is seen as performing its job poorly in some areas, a majority of citizens still believes that the government can solve most of the country's problems (Table 9). Only one-third of the population thinks the government cannot find a solution to any problem or to only a few of them.

Thus, the Capeverdean population is divided: two-thirds support democracy both specifically and broadly; one-third has consistently been extremely critical of the government and open to changes in the political regime.

**Table 9. Proportion of Country's Problems Government Can Solve**

	%
None	7
Few	25
Some	46
Almost All	12
All	5

Does approval of the government vary for assessments of local and national political actors and across branches of government? The political actors most poorly evaluated are the president, followed by mayors, National Assembly Representatives and Local Government Councilors (Table 10). However, differences are small between these distinct representatives. One-third or more of the population is critical of all political actors.

**Table 10. Performance of Political Actors**

	Disapprove % (includes disapproves strongly)
President	41
National Assembly Representative	34
Mayor	35
Local Government Councilor	31

Finally, how does the current regime compare to the previous one? Since the change in regime was accompanied by a change in the party in control of the government, it is difficult to disentangle which political phenomenon the population is evaluating; i.e., whether differences in regime performance or differences between the parties' governments. This question therefore has implications for issues of specific support of the current regime.

In general, about half of the population positively evaluates the new regime's capacity to enforce the law and deliver services (Table 11). Only one-fourth of the population thinks the current regime is more corrupt than the previous one, while one-third believe it is more trustworthy. These results are contradictory, because one would expect a regime predominantly seen as less corrupt to be viewed as more trustworthy. However, this contradiction disappears when we compare positive evaluations (more favorable to the new regime) with negative evaluations (less favorable to the new regime) within these categories. Positive evaluations prevail in both cases: a plurality think the new regime is less corrupt and that it is more trustworthy. This suggests that even though the population is critical about the current regime's performance, they still prefer it to the previous one.

**Table 11. Effectiveness of Current Political Regime compared to Previous One**

	More and Much More %
New Regime More Capable of Enforcing the Law	50
New Regime More Effective in Services Delivery	47
New Regime More Trustworthy	36 (less or much less 30)
New Regime More Corrupt	25 (less or much less 30)

### **Civil Society Activism**

Another aspect of democratic regimes, not necessarily related to diffuse or specific support, concerns citizens' roles in the political system. This includes citizens' overall interest in public affairs, attention to political news, participation in politics and organized civil society, and feelings of political effectiveness. A central part of a democratic system is a vibrant civil society, one capable of affecting the decisions governments make, and one permeated by independent and empowered social groups (Putnam 1993). Basically, the essence of this aspect of democratic governance is the relation between state and society. Is society capable of organizing itself independently from the state?

A first requirement for an active civil society is a citizenry interested in public affairs and in participating politically. The table below indicates that the overwhelming majority of citizens in Cape Verde are interested in politics; fully 49 percent are very interested. Such interest is confirmed by the frequency with which Capeverdeans watch media news. The great majority either listens to news on the radio or watches it on the TV quite frequently (daily or weekly). So political and public information is

quite visible for citizens on a regular basis. As in other countries where educational levels are low, newspaper reading is less common.

**Table 12. Interest in Public Affairs**

	Yes %
Interested in Public Affairs	78 (49% very interested)

**Table 13. Attention to Media News**

	Every Week %	Every day %
News from the Radio	35	46
News from the Television	24	45
News from Newspapers	17	5

However, one must also ask if declared interest materializes into actual participation. Do citizens really get involved in collective action to make demands or influence government decisions? The table below shows the extent of citizen participation in informal, temporary types of collective action. All the forms of participation in Table 14 share a lack of stability and continuity in their patterns of mobilization. They occur without any necessary long-lasting commitment to a group or organization.

Levels of engagement in such types of political activities are at medium levels. About half of all Capeverdeans discuss politics with friends and get together to raise public issues. Fewer people participate in a more organized form of political participation, attending community meetings. Finally, even fewer have ever joined a political march or protest. This is not surprising given the country's history of negotiated transitions with very limited popular participation and low levels of political violence (Meysns 2002). Citizens, as in other moments of Capeverdean history, do not appear to participate in activities that demonstrate their declared interest in public issues.

**Table 14. Political Participation**

Discussed Politics with Friends or Neighbors	51
Get together with others to Raise an Issue	49
Attended a Community Meeting	38
Attended a Demonstration or Protest March	13
Used Force or Violence for a Political Cause	3

The lack of participation in more stable social organizations that require a longer commitment and investment is evident when analyzing participation in traditional forms of civil society organizations. Very few Capeverdeans are members, active or inactive, of trade unions, professional associations, or community development associations. Citizens do not tend to get involved in longer lasting and more organized collectivities. The exception to this trend, as elsewhere in newly democratized countries (Renno 2001), is participation in religious groups.

**Table 15. Association Membership**

	Member % (active and inactive)
Religious Group	47
Development Association	16
Trade Union/Farmers Association	14
Professional/Business Association	10

Such low levels of involvement with collective action and engagement with community issues can be explained by citizens' feelings of political efficacy and their propensity to contact influential

political actors. Most citizens think politics and government are too complicated, and only a scant majority agrees that they can make elected representatives listen to their demands. Finally, only a third of the population is confident that friends and neighbors listen to them on political issues. Overall, citizens feel quite incapable of influencing the functioning of the political system.

**Table 16. Political Efficacy**

	Agree %
Politics and Government too Complicated	63
Can make elected Representatives listen	56
People listen to me on politics	34

It is not surprising, then, that citizens rarely contact their elected representatives. The vast majority of the population has never contacted any person related to the political system. Voters appear to play their role during elections and then hide from politics in their everyday lives. The most frequent contacts – with religious leaders and other influential persons – are with persons who are not necessarily linked to the formal political arena. As in the case of participation in associations of the organized civil society, religious ties seems to be the main channel of collective participation and voicing of demands in Cape Verde.

**Table 17. Contact with Leaders**

	Never %
Contacted National Assembly Representative	91
Contacted An Official Government Ministry	89
Contacted Local Government Councilor	87
Contacted Political Party Official	85
Contacted a Religious Leader	76
Contacted Other Influential Person	76

### **Rule of Law**

O'Donnell has called attention to regimes in which democratic political institutions, such as periodic competitive elections, freedom of speech, association and choice all exist but in which the rule of law is not fully functional (2001). Countries in Africa and Latin America are usually seen as prototypical in terms of disrespect for the rule of law. Hence it is fundamental to evaluate this aspect of the functioning of democracy in Cape Verde.

A first element related to the rule of law is corruption. Conventional wisdom points to widespread levels of corruption in African countries. Cape Verde, however, is usually seen as an exception (Meyns 2002). Yet our findings indicate significant levels of perceived corruption in Cape Verde. A plurality of the population believes that at least some members of the government organizations listed below – especially the police – are involved with corruption. The exceptions are judges, magistrates, teachers, and school administrators. However, most of the population avoids making a judgment about corruption and say they “don’t know” or “haven’t heard enough about it.” Citizens overwhelmingly avoid judging political actors’ propensity to corruption, as if the subject were taboo. Perhaps citizens really don’t know what political actors do. Some factors analyzed above, such as the rareness of contact with politicians and feelings of political inefficacy, indicate that citizens’ daily life is very distant from that of political actors. Thus citizens might actually not feel confident enough to judge the actions of public figures.

**Table 18. Involvement with Corruption**

	Some	None %
Police Officers	28	18 (Don't know 46%)
Government Officials	27	16 (Don't know 51%)
Elected Leaders	24	14 (Don't know 54%)
Border Officials	24	14 (Don't know 51%)
Officials in the Presidency	20	17 (Don't know 57%)
Teachers and School Administrators	20	27 (Don't know 48%)
Judges and Magistrates	19	21 (Don't know 55%)

Other forms of criminal activities are more common in every day life than corruption. Such perceptions as feeling safe at home and feeling immune to physical attack are more concrete measures of respect of the law. In Cape Verde, levels of violence are very low. An astounding 92 percent of the population has never been physically attacked. This certainly differentiates Cape Verde from most other newly democratized countries in Africa and South America. It also confirms Meyns (2002) description of Cape Verde being intrinsically peaceful. Even though people might not trust law-imposing institutions, as discussed below, crime rates are not a concern for most Capeverdeans.

**Table 19. Victimization**

	Never %
Frequency Been Physically Attacked	92
Frequency Home Broken into and Something Stolen	78
Frequency felt Unsafe at home	74

The functioning of the rule of law is also related to trust in institutions that administer and implement the law. Most of the population tends to trust the police and law courts even though they regard some of the officials of these institutions as corrupt. This is a sign that the population respects these institutions, though not overwhelmingly.

**Table 20. Trust in Law Enforcement Institutions**

	No Trust at all	Trust a Little	Trust A Lot
Police	21	38	17
Law Courts	18	31	23

Finally, an indicator of the state of the rule of law in Cape Verde regards citizens' support of basic aspects of a legal system: 51 percent of the population believes that the current constitution of the country expresses the dominant values and aspirations of Capeverdeans; 82 percent of the population believe courts have the right to make binding decisions; 81 percent that the police has the right to make people obey the law; 71 percent believe that the tax department has the right to make people pay taxes. Hence, most of the population does believe that the institutions of the legal system do have the right to carry out their duties.

**Table 21. Support for the Rule of Law**

	Agree %
Constitution Expresses Capeverdean values and aspirations	51
Courts have the Right to make binding decisions	82
Police have Right to make people obey the law	81
Tax department has the Right to make people pay taxes	71

To summarize this section, we find that the population of Cape Verde generally favors the democratic regime and supports democratic institutions. Nonetheless, the population is critical of the

functioning of political institutions and seems to feel that changes are necessary. It appears that at least a third of the population is not satisfied with the way democracy works. Responding to their demands might be a central factor in guaranteeing that the democratic regime survives in the long run.

In addition, a great deficiency of the current political situation in Cape Verde is the weak participation of the population in civil society's collective movements and a generalized feeling of political inefficacy. Citizens rarely get engaged in collaborative enterprises with their fellow citizens or contact their representatives. They also do not feel their voices can be heard. These are central aspects of a democratic regime, because they relate to citizens' ability to make their representatives accountable. In Cape Verde, politics seem to be very distant from everyday life, and politicians appear to be insulated from popular control.

On the other hand, when it comes to law-abiding behavior and the rule of law, the country, in its population's view, does not seem overwhelmed by corruption or crime. There is a feeling that improvements are needed in law enforcement institutions, as in most other institutions of the country, but Capeverdeans do agree that law is in general respected and that they are free from violence. This certainly differentiates Cape Verde from other African countries.

### **Attitudes Toward the Economy**

In this section we analyze three interrelated aspects of attitudes toward the economy. First, we discuss views about the type of management of the economy preferred by citizens from Cape Verde. This includes not just declared preference for a centrally planned or a market economy, but also the role of government intervention in the economy and views about areas in which the government should intervene. A second step is to evaluate citizen views about recent reforms in the direction of opening the economy. Given that the party that carried out such reforms was ousted from government in the previous election, our analysis will shed light on citizens' evaluations of the shift of directions carried out since 1991. Finally, we end by providing evidence of citizens' evaluations of the current economic situation and of their personal lives.

#### ***Planned or Market Economy?***

As in other African countries (Lewis, Alemika and Bratton, 2002), Capeverdeans are also ambivalent about the type of economic system they prefer. There is no consensus that a market economy is better than a planned regime. In fact, a quarter of the population does prefer a centralized administration of the national economy to an open market economy. Combined with those who do not care (14 percent) and those who do not know (19 percent), this adds up to almost a half of the population.

***Table 22. Preference for Market Economy***

	Agree %
Prefer Market Economy	43
Prefer Centralized Economy	24
Economic System does not matter	14

However, declared preference for a market economy is a crude measure of citizen views about government intervention. In Table 23, we see that the dilemma the population faces is much more complex. Citizens hold paradoxical attitudes about the role of the government. Capeverdeans think the government should manage the production and distribution of goods, but they also think that individuals should decide what to produce, buy and sell. These two statements are contradictory, suggesting that

Capeverdeans have mixed feelings about state intervention.<sup>2</sup> The question, then, is to what extent do Capeverdeans want state intervention?

The fact that 40 percent of the population thinks the government is responsible for the well being of the population is telling. Although a majority of Capeverdeans agree that individuals are responsible for their own well-being, there still is a substantial portion of the population expecting incisive governmental intervention in improving standards of living. In addition, the government is overwhelmingly associated with the image of a parent responsible for the care of its children (the population). This indicates that Capeverdeans believe they have very little control over the actions of governments and that they delegate responsibility to an autonomous government.

However, governmental responsibility is counterbalanced by a view that citizens should also be able to decide what to buy and sell and that people are also responsible for looking out for themselves. Views about government intervention indicate that Capeverdeans prefer a mix of both things. Government as well as citizens should be made responsible for the well being of the population.

**Table 23. Views of Government Intervention in the Economy**

	Agree %
Govt. Manages Production and Distribution of Goods	51 (24% disagree)
Individuals Decide what to Produce, Buy, and Sell	68 (16% disagree)
People should look after themselves	55
Govt. Responsible for the Well-being of population	40
Govt. is like a parent, should take care of people	69 (33% agree strongly)
Govt. is like an employee; people control the government	23

The ambivalence towards a market economy is even more evident in assessments of where government should intervene. It also points to areas of the economy where the population feels the government should take a more active role. The population of Cape Verde favors the payment of school fees (69 percent) but not of privatization of agricultural marketing (34 percent). They have no doubt that government must respect property rights, but they are also against opening the economy to imports (62 percent believe local producers should be protected). In addition, 94 percent agree that jobs should be available for all, even if wages are low, and that civil servants should keep their jobs (73 percent). Hence, equality of access to jobs, of which protecting local business is a central part, is definitely a strong message.

It is clear that, when it comes to the creation of jobs and to fostering national production, the government should not shy from intervening in the economy. The government should also protect its population from the private manipulation of agricultural goods, which is related to the accessibility of food. On the other hand, all of this must be achieved respecting property rights and improving educational levels, even if this requires the end of free (no tuition) schools.

Above all, Capeverdeans praise highly the availability of jobs and protection of local producers. The fact that 55 percent of the population mentions unemployment as the most important problem of the country (and 10 percent mention poverty/destitution) certainly explains why Capeverdeans are so strongly against government measures that reduce the availability of jobs. It is understandable that Capeverdeans will not support market values that increase the difficulties of their daily lives. In other words, citizens

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<sup>2</sup> Some of this contradiction is certainly due to questionnaire design. Despite the fact that these two questions are basically two opposite sides of a same issue, these items were not asked as a forced-choice, balanced question. The way the item was designed certainly affects the results.

from Cape Verde favor measures that will solve their most immediate problems. In order to achieve such ends, active government intervention is not just desirable, but needed.

**Table 24. Market Values**

	Agree %
Better to have free schools, even if quality of education is low	28
Better to raise the quality of education, even if fees need to be paid.	69
Privatized Agricultural Marketing	34
Government Controlled Marketing	47
Better to have low wages so that all have jobs	94 (64% agree strongly)
Better to have higher wages, even if some go without a job	5
Government respect property rights	92 (50% agree strongly)
Government has right to seize property	4
All Civil Servants keep Jobs	73
Lay Offs to Reduce Costs	16
Allow Imports	26
Protect Local Producers	62

**Evaluation of Economic Reform**

Citizens’ desires to improve the quality of their lives is evident by the majoritarian support for the assertion that current hardships are required for the economy to improve. Capeverdeans do not want to abort economic reform, despite that fact that 68 percent agree that reform policies hurt most of the population.

**Table 25. Views on Reform**

	Agree %
Costs of Economic Reform are too high; government should abandon it	25
For the Economy to Improve, must accept hardships now	53
Government’s Economic policies helped most people	27
Government’s Economic policies hurt most people	68

In Table 26, it becomes clear that Capeverdean complaints about reform are basically oriented to job opportunities and inequality between rich and poor. Very few believe that the current economic system has provided more jobs and narrowed income gaps. Centralized economies are usually seen – and its advocates are sure to vocalize such claims – as being more oriented towards fomenting equality between citizens. Hence, changes toward a system based more strongly on competition and less state intervention may bring with them some externalities, including inequality, in the short run.

Nonetheless, the current system is seen as more effective in improving the availability of goods by 67 percent of the population and as improving living standards and guaranteeing security from property seizure by the government by about 45 percent of the population. Economic reform has clearly improved some aspects of the system and dampened others.

**Table 26. Comparison between Present and Past Economic Systems**

	Better % (“better and much better”)
Availability of Goods	67
Security of Property from Seizure	45
People’s Living Standard	44
Job Opportunities	27
Gap Between Rich and Poor	18

The results of reforms are also reflected in citizen evaluations of the country's and their personal economic situation. There is some difference between evaluations of personal and country conditions. Citizens are more critical of the country's situation than their own personal condition. For a near majority, the country is in bad shape. However, the predominant evaluation for both cases is that the present economic situation is not good or bad. Overall, then, citizens do not seem to be overly critical of either.

**Table 27. Evaluation of Countries and Personal Present Economic Condition**

	Bad % (includes bad and very bad)
Countries Economic Condition	40 (10% good and very good; 45% neither)
Personal Economic Condition	29 (15% good and very good; 56% neither)

Moderate satisfaction with the government's reduced role in the economy confirms the above result. Around 60 percent allege they are satisfied, but 40 percent are only satisfied 'a little.' Those who are not satisfied at all add up to 28 percent. This confirms our findings that Capeverdeans are satisfied with some but not all aspects of the reform. Nonetheless, there seems to be a reservoir of good faith towards improving the economy.

**Table 28. Satisfaction with Government's Reduced Role in Economy**

	%
Not Satisfied at all	28
"A little" Satisfied	40
Satisfied	14
Very Satisfied	5

Overall, then, feelings toward the market economy and economic reform are less straightforward than attitudes toward democracy. Capeverdeans are not sure that current economic reforms have helped their daily lives. Their feelings towards opening the economy are ambivalent. On the one hand, some measures have reduced the availability of jobs and weakened local production. On the other, more goods are now available in the market and people's living conditions have improved.

Nonetheless, Capeverdeans hold some values compatible with market economies. For example, private property is highly valued, and individual initiative is also praised. But the strongest message sent by Capeverdeans is that the government should not shy from taking an active role in economic and social issues when such intervention is needed. Currently, jobs are the central area for intervention.

### **Sources of Conflict in Cape Verde**

A key difference between Cape Verde and other African countries is the absence of internal war. Wars of independence did not reach this archipelago in the Atlantic. Cape Verde was not devastated, for example, by the long civil wars that succeeded the independence struggles in Mozambique and Angola. Nor did it replicate the postcolonial conflicts in neighboring Liberia, Guinea and Guinea-Bissau and currently even Ivory Coast and Senegal. Negotiation and elite agreement have been the essence of political conflict resolution in Cape Verde.

Internal rivalries between ethnic groups are also missing. Tribal disputes or open conflicts based on race or ethnicity are nonexistent. No political party, for example, defends the specific interest of a race or religion. Political conflict is carried out over issue-specific disputes and class cleavages more than any other source of cleavage.

Is Cape Verde immune from social conflict and violence? Though conflicts do not stem from religion or race, are there other motives for discrimination and segregation peculiar to Cape Verde? This chapter seeks to answer these questions. We will analyze the most common sources of conflict inside the

country, discussing the rivalries between the different islands and the problem of discrimination against continental Africans.

Conflicts in Cape Verde, more often than not, occur inside individual communities. Disputes between neighbors, mainly over local or personal issues, are the predominant form of violent conflicts. The perception of disputes amongst different groups in the country as the primary loci of conflicts is also widespread. Domestic conflicts appear to be more rare, and the least common location for the initiation of conflicts is inside families.

**Table 29. Locations where Conflicts Begin**

	Never %
Inside own Family	78
Between different groups in the Country	55
Inside own Community	36

Almost half (46 percent) of Capeverdeans mentioned at least one source of conflict. We then asked this subsample to name the motives for the conflict.<sup>3</sup> Table 30 contains views about the distinct reasons for the existence of conflicts. The most common conflicts are based on political issues, followed by drug-related violence and discrimination. Thus political divides are much more important than ethnic or religious ones. Still, the problem of discrimination cannot be ignored and will be discussed in more detail below.

**Table 30. Main causes of conflicts in Cape Verde**

	%
Political Issues (partisan disputes included)	10
Drugs/Alcohol	7
Discrimination	7
Economic Problems	4
Religion	1

Such results can be better understood by two very important factors that describe Cape Verde quite well. When asked to self-identify in terms of a specific social group, in a question with an open-ended response, a near majority (43 percent) of Capeverdeans refuse to identify themselves other than being from Cape Verde. The most important cleavage in Cape Verde is based on placement in the economic structure of the country. Roughly 14 percent of Capeverdeans self-identify based on occupation, and 11 percent self-identify based on economic class. If combined, 25 percent of Capeverdeans position themselves on an economic basis. Religion is only the fourth motive for differentiation inside the country, with 7 percent identifying themselves through religion.

The fact that Capeverdeans do not tend to identify themselves except as citizens of Cape Verde certainly explains why they are unable to point to locations where conflict begins and or to describe its motives. It also provides further evidence of the lack of religious, ethnic and racial cleavages in this very homogeneous population. In fact, the cleavages that exist are basically guided by economic and class-related issues. In addition, violence, crime and public security are only seen as problems needing immediate government attention for 2 percent of the population. Problems of violence are definitely not on the agenda of Capeverdeans.

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<sup>3</sup> Those who said there were no conflicts were filtered out.

**Table 31. Identity, In addition to being a Capeverdean**

	%
Refuses to identify as anything other than Capeverdean	43
Occupation	14
Class	10
Religion	7
African	5
Gender	3
Island	3
Race	1

Though politics is the main source of conflict in Cape Verde, the majority of the population agrees that the use of violence is never justifiable in Capeverdean politics. In fact, 23 percent reject violence “very strongly.” However, 31 percent would be willing to use violence for a just cause. This number is quite high and surprising, given Cape Verde’s history, where political violence is almost completely nonexistent. We did not expect that a third of the population would affirm that violence could be justified.

Capeverdeans nevertheless resist conflicts that could lead to national disintegration. The strong identification with Cape Verde is confirmed by the fact that 89 percent of the population agrees that the country should remain united, despite conflicts; 51 percent agree very strongly with that response. So although political violence may find some space in the Capeverdean polity, such conflict is unlikely to lead to the country’s dissolution.

**Table 32. Views about Political Violence and Country Unity**

	Agree % (includes agrees strongly)
The Use of Violence is Never Justifiable in Cape Verde’s Politics	53 (23% strongly agree)
Sometimes, the Use of Violence in the Name of a Fair Cause is Justifiable	31 (7% strongly agree)
Country Should Remain United, Even if there are Conflicts amongst Groups	89 (51% strongly agree)
Difference Between Capeverdeans are so Big, Country Should be Divided	6

### ***Badius and Sampadjudos***

An apparent source of conflict inside Cape Verde, less visible in the political sphere but playing a role in social life, is the rivalry between the inhabitants of different islands. Inhabitants of Santiago Island, where the national capital Praia is located, are called Badius. Inhabitants of all other islands are called Sampadjudos by inhabitants of Santiago. Both of these are derogatory terms, and though they do not necessarily lead to violence and conflicts, they do express a clear-cut source of division inside the country. Are these inter-island rivalries really strong? Is the allocation of national resources affected by such rivalry? In other words, does this social divide affect political disputes, and do the differences between islands extend to opinions about markets, democracy, and government effectiveness?

Table 33 shows the widespread feeling that some islands are favored to the detriment of others. However, the consensus on this favoritism is not overwhelming: 35 percent of the population states that there is no discrimination in the distribution of resources, another 20 percent don’t know or have no opinion. Hence, a majority of the population cannot affirm with certainty that some islands are favored.

**Table 33. Fair distribution of Resources**

	Agree % (includes agrees strongly)
The Government makes a fair distribution of resources between islands	35
The Government favors some islands	46

Confirming the general feeling that there is no intense rivalry between islands, most of the population believes that there is no rivalry between badius and sampadjudos. Those who think a rivalry exists believe it is weak or moderate. Only 20 percent believe that there is a strong or very strong rivalry. This indicates that the distinction in appellation of these two groups is probably a social phenomenon with limited repercussions in more serious political disputes.

**Table 34. Rivalry Between Badius and Sampadjudos**

	%
There is no Rivalry	37
There is a Weak Rivalry	18
The Rivalry is not Weak nor Strong	13
There is a Strong Rivalry	13
There is a Very Strong Rivalry	7

#### ***Ideological Differences between Islands***

Another factor potentially masking inter-island conflict is the fact that inhabitants of each island could hold conflicting opinions about key issues in Capeverdean politics. That would indicate that island cleavages underlie the ideological cleavages that seem to orient political conflict.

We calculated our national sample so that representative island subsamples could be analyzed separately.<sup>4</sup> Table 35 offers a cross tabulation between island of dwelling and opinions toward democracy. The distribution of opinions is quite similar in all the islands, in that democracy is the preferred option for two thirds of the population in all islands. The distribution of opinions among islands is identical to that of the entire nation. Hence we can discard this aspect of diffuse support of the political system as a source of political conflict between islands.

**Table 35. Support for Democracy by Island**

	Indifferent %	Non-Democratic Government %	Democracy %
Santo Antão	15	14	66
São Vicente	17	10	66
Santiago	9	6	66
Fogo	19	6	64

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<sup>4</sup> Sample sizes for each island are small, hence the margin of error of the statistics offered is larger than when using the entire national sample.

When it comes to preferences about management of the national economy, there are clearer divisions between islands. In this case, support for the market economy is very high in Santo Antão and Santiago. Support for a planned economy is much higher in São Vicente and Fogo. In fact, in these two islands, the populations are equally distributed between those supporting a centralized economy and those favoring a market economy. In these last two islands, there seems to be much more opposition to the economic reforms that took place since 1991. However, variation in opinion about the market economy is not conditioned by living in each island. The ideological stances between an open market economy and a planned one crosscut regional differences. If island of dwelling determined ideological preference, then we would not see inner-island divisions. But that is exactly what we find. In fact, in some islands, diverging opinions about the market economy and centralized economy are more evident.

**Table 36. Support for Market Economy by Island**

	Indifferent %	Centralized Economy %	Market Economy %
Santo Antão	22	25	46
São Vicente	22	35	35
Santiago	8	20	47
Fogo	25	31	31

There are, nonetheless, some differences between islands in terms of comparisons between the economic system now in place and that existing before 1991. Citizens of Santo Antão appear here as the most critical regarding the availability of goods, living standards, and job opportunities. The fact that the island is predominantly rural and that has been less affected by the changes taking place after 1991 explains the more critical points of view. Santo Antão has very small urban areas. Its mostly rural dwellers did not benefit at all from the opening of the economy after 1991.

The proximity of Santo Antão and São Vicente, where Mindelo, the second most populated city in the country and an important tourist center, is located, also contributes to the more critical stances of Santo Antão inhabitants. Changes have been very visible in Mindelo since 1991. Since there is plenty of commercial exchange between Mindelo and Santo Antão, Santo Antão inhabitants currently see such changes when in Mindelo. The fact that the same changes are not present in Santo Antão may also foster more criticism.

**Table 37. Comparison between Economic System before and after 1991 by Island**

	Santo Antão - Worst %	São Vicente - Worst %	Santiago - Worst %	Fogo - Worst %
Availability of Goods	47	19	17	13
Living Standard	63	23	29	19
Job Opportunities	75	44	50	50

A final point that needs to be addressed about inter-island rivalry has to do with evaluations of resource distribution. Table 38 provides interesting evidence that views about fairness of resource allocation by the central government does vary strongly by island. Residents of Santo Antão and Fogo are more critical of the government's resource allocation. These are the two most rural islands in our sample, and apparently they feel discriminated against by the central government. In Santiago, where the central government administration is located, the view predominates that the government is fair and that there is no discrimination between islands. This indicates that views about access to resources are very different depending where one lives.

**Table 38. Views about Distribution of Resources between islands by Island**

	Fair Distribution of Resources %	Govt. Favors some islands %
Santo Antão	17	72
São Vicente	28	55
Santiago	43	33
Fogo	19	67

Still, such differences can be related to an urban/rural divide as well. Fogo and Santo Antão are predominantly rural, while São Vicente is predominantly urban. Santiago, however, in addition to having the capital city of Praia, also has a substantial rural area. In order to rule out the possibility that the difference in views about resource distribution is due to a urban/rural divide, we cross tabulated urban/rural locality and opinion about the distribution of resources. Results presented in Table 39 indicate that there is no difference between those who live in urban and rural areas about resource distribution. We thus conclude that there is, in fact, an island component in the controversy about resource distribution. Residents of islands that feel they are underprivileged by the central administration are more vocal about their criticism.

**Table 39. Views about Distribution of Resources between islands by Urban/rural location**

	Fair Distribution of Resources %	Government Favors some islands %
Urban localities	29	52
Rural localities	30	53

A final aspect of inter-island disputes is the debate about the rivalry between badius and sampadjudos. Our data indicate that the rivalry between badius and sampadjudos is mostly between São Vicente and Santiago, and is not relevant in other islands. In these locations are the two most important cities, Mindelo and Praia, and there have always been controversies between them. Mindelo is considered, mostly by its own citizens, to be the most culturally advanced, Europeanized city in the country, whereas Praia is seen as more rural and backward. These stereotypes are also matters of dispute, but they do reflect some of the differences and rivalries between both cities. Hence, disputes between badius and sampadjudos are mainly a consequence of the Praia-Mindelo controversy.

**Table 40. Views about Rivalry between Badius and Sampadjudos by Island**

	No Rivalry %	Weak and Moderate Rivalry %	Strong Rivalry %
Santo Antão	54	20	10
São Vicente	33	32	29
Santiago	35	35	19
Fogo	41	27	21

### ***Forms of Discrimination in Cape Verde***

A final potential source of conflict inside Cape Verde refers to the relation between native Capeverdeans and immigrants from neighboring countries of continental Africa. Given Cape Verde's peaceful tradition, a substantial number of citizens from Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, and the Gambia have moved to Cape Verde to seek a better life and to flee political persecution and urban violence. Is discrimination against African immigrants a problem in Capeverdean society? Furthermore, what are the predominant forms of discrimination in the country?

Initially, the data reveal a surprise: 81 percent of the population in the entire country identifies as African. Only 4 percent of Capeverdeans see themselves as European. Hence, it is mere myth that Capeverdeans feel more like Europeans and that they would tend to look down upon Africans. Another myth is that inhabitants of São Vicente feel more like Europeans than Africans, whereas in the rest of the country citizens would identify more with Africa. People from São Vicente identify as strongly with

Africa as do those from other islands. These results provide a first sign that the potential for discrimination of African immigrants in Cape Verde is very small.

**Table 41. Views of African Identity; National view and by Island**

	African %	European %
Entire Country	81	4
Santo Antão	78	8
São Vicente	84	4
Santiago	81	4
Fogo	86	4

Further evidence is offered by the fact that only 1 percent of the population believes that there is discrimination against foreigners in the country. The most prominent source of discrimination in Cape Verde is against poor people, followed by discrimination based on political views.

**Table 42. Forms of Discrimination in Cape Verde**

	%
Against Poor People	37
There is no discrimination	20
Due to Political reasons	17
Against Women	5
For Racial Reasons (color of the skin)	5
Against Foreigners	1

However, discrimination against foreigners is not necessarily related to discrimination against African immigrants. A better measure of such prejudice is offered by responses to a question in which respondents are asked to choose between the following options: “People from African countries that come to live and work in Cape Verde bring more problems than improvements to the country” or “people from African countries who come to live and work in Cape Verde contribute to the development of the country.” As we see below, 48 percent agree with the former and 32 percent with the latter. Hence, the view that African immigrants create trouble is supported by almost half of Cape Verde’s population. Even though Capeverdeans see themselves as African and argue that there is no discrimination against foreigners, there is an almost majoritarian consensus that African immigration is not helping the country in any way. This obviously is an implicit statement that there is prejudice against African immigrants and that there is a potential for discrimination against them.

**Table 43. Views about African Immigrants in Cape Verde**

	Agree %
Africans Bring Problems	48
Africans Contribute to Development	32

### **Relation Between Attitudes Toward Democracy and Market Economy**

The debate about the connections between democracy and market economy is a long lasting controversy. As far back as Schumpeter (1950), scholars have been seeking to illuminate the links between the existence of a democratic political regime and a market economy. Such inquiries became even more prominent during the recent wave of democratization incorporating most of Africa, Eastern Europe and Latin America into the group of democratic countries. Most of the newly democratized countries were also facing intense processes of economic reform, more often than not in the direction of opening national economies to foreign products and investments, privatizing state firms, and reducing government intervention. In other words, these countries faced a dual transition towards both political democracy and market economy.

If that were not sufficient, this dual process of transition was occurring in countries devastated by economic crisis, which combined recession with inflation, and by serious social problems, including urban violence, civil wars, inequality, and so forth. Hence, the obstacles for the creation and strengthening of democracy and of a market economy were far from negligible.

Observers of the relation between market-oriented reforms and transitions towards democracy seem to be reaching a consensus that these two factors, even though intertwined, are independent. Dahl has pointed out, on a theoretical level, that democracy and market economy actually have distinct genealogies and that their coexistence on a worldwide basis is a very recent phenomenon (1997). Neither is a sufficient condition for the success of the other. Relying on survey data from Eastern Europe, Gibson has found evidence at the individual level that support for a market economy is not the driving force behind support for democracy in that region of the world (1996). Democratic practices are cherished for their intrinsic value and coexist with preferences for planned economies.

In Nigeria, Lewis, Alemika and Bratton (2002) have found evidence that supports Gibson's claims. Although most people supporting market economies also support democracy, the opposite is not true. That is, citizens who support democracy also support planned economies. Attachment to democratic values is more widespread than closeness to market values.

In this section we address some of these issues in Cape Verde. We identify the factors correlated with support for democracy and the market economy. In the next section, we describe the model used to assess support for both democracy and markets. In the subsequent section we present results.

### ***The Model***

Support for democracy was coded as '1' if the respondent said he/she prefers democracy to all other forms of government. All other response options (indifference, support for non-democratic options, and "don't know") were coded as 0. The same procedure was followed to measure support for a market economy. Because we coded both as dichotomous variables, multivariate logistic regression was used to assess their correlates. The advantage of a multivariate analysis is that several distinct explanatory factors can be controlled at once, diminishing the chance of spurious relations and, hence, increasing the robustness and reliability of the findings.

Our models of support for democracy and support for a market economy include the same variables. This probably oversimplifies support for democracy and the market economy, but it allows comparisons between variables in both equations. Since the models are identical, and since the dependent variables are also coded identically, we can compare the influences of the same factors towards democracy and markets.

Is support for democracy affected by support for a market economy and vice-versa? In this way, we test the hypothesis that these two types of attitudes are correlated and that the presence of one increases the chances that the other will also exist. We expect, as in Nigeria, a positive relation between these two attitudes. Since both processes occurred simultaneously in Cape Verde, it is difficult to determine if one precedes the other. In addition, the absence of longitudinal data in Cape Verde prohibits any inference about temporal antecedence. Therefore, we say only that these two attitudes go together in citizens' minds.

Another factor that should influence support for democracy as well as support for a market economy is a positive evaluation of the reform processes that have been occurring in the political and

economic spheres.<sup>5</sup> On the one hand, we expect that sympathetic evaluations of the economic system should positively affect support for a market economy. We also predict that favorable evaluations of the political system should increase support for democracy. On the other hand, the relation between positive evaluations of economic reform in support for democracy and positive evaluations of political reform in support for a market economy is more complex. The most straightforward hypothesis is that positive evaluations of either reform will positively impact both support for democracy and markets.

Evaluations of the current government also constitute a factor that cannot be ignored. Such evaluations differ from measures based on comparisons between Cape Verde's past and present economic and political systems. Whereas the two items above focus on comparisons between regime types, this one is limited to an evaluation of the current PAICV government.<sup>6</sup> It is a quintessential measure of specific support of the regime. The obvious hypothesis is that those who are happier with the functioning of the government will also be more supportive of democracy. However, it might be that both factors are independent of each other. In fact, democracies are more consolidated when support for the regime is no longer affected by evaluations of the current government.

More abstract positions about the role of the government might also influence citizen views about democracy and markets. We include two items that measure citizen views about the role of the government. The first asks if citizens think government is more like a parent to the population or if it is more like an employee. A more paternalistic view of the government, one believing that the government is like a parent and the population is like children, is detrimental to both supportive views of the market and of democracy. If the government is not seen as an employee, issues of accountability are at stake.

Another way to evaluate how views about the government affects support for democracy and a market economy is based on citizens' beliefs that government is responsible for the well-being of the population or if individuals are responsible for their own well-being. This item is more clearly related to economic issues than political ones, so it should have a more noticeable effect in support of a market economy than support for democracy. Citizens believing that government is responsible for the well-being of the population should be less inclined to support a market economy.

Another, altogether distinct, factor related to democratic consolidation and a free economy is the existence of a vibrant civil society, one permeated by independent collective action. Following social capital theory, we argue that participation in civil society organizations should increase support for

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<sup>5</sup> Evaluation of political reform is measured as an additive index composed of citizens' comparison between the current and previous (pre-1991) political regimes in relation to freedom of speech, association, opinion, and civil liberties. Evaluations of economic reform is an additive index of citizens' comparison between the current period and that before 1991 regarding availability of goods, living standards, job opportunities, inequality and protection of private property. Each of the composing items in each index was first coded as a dichotomous variable distinguishing between citizens who approved of changes (thought the systems were better or much better now) and all other options (the two systems are identical, disapproved of changes and those who don't know). These items were then added. Cronbach's Alpha, which measures the reliability of scale for support of the current economic system, was .77 and for support of current political system was .78.

<sup>6</sup> This variable was measured by citizens' evaluations of the performance of the current government regarding the administration of the economy, creation of jobs, price stability, shortening the gap between rich and poor, reducing crime, improving health and educational services, providing food and housing, combating corruption and solving conflicts. The components of this index were coded 1 if the respondent thought the government was doing a good job and 0 otherwise. The index is composed by 12 items and has a Cronbach Alpha of .86.

democracy.<sup>7</sup> The same theory is less direct about the relation between social capital and market economy. However, since an independent civil society is a cornerstone of a market economy, freedom of association should also positively affect support for a market economy.

Two factors peculiar to Cape Verde were also included in the analysis. The first involves contact with Capeverdean emigrants who live or once lived outside the country. Cape Verde is also unique among African countries because there are more Capeverdeans living outside of country than inside. A substantial share of the country's gross national product comes from "remessas" sent by Capeverdeans living outside the country. Though migration to Russia was quite extensive in the late 1970's and early 1980's, it is not comparable to the current migration to the United States and Portugal. The largest current Capeverdean communities in foreign countries are in Portugal and the United States. Given that both countries are market democracies, and given that contact with emigrants is a form of value diffusion, contact with emigrants helps assess the ways in which the diffusion of democratic and market values influence Capeverdeans' support for democracy and market economy. We expect that contact with emigrants increases the likelihood of supporting democracy and markets.

A second factor peculiar to Cape Verde are disputes between islands. Citizens who believe the central government privileges some islands in detriment of others when it comes to resource allocation should be more critical of the functioning of the current political and economic system in Cape Verde. Therefore, more critical views about inter-island inequality should be negatively correlated to support of democracy and the market economy.

A final factor affecting support for democracy and markets is related to both egocentric and sociotropic assessments of the economy and of prospective and retrospective evaluations of the economy. Egocentric evaluations are based on the current personal economic situation of the respondent. Sociotropic evaluations refer to assessments of the state of the national economy. Prospective evaluations regard assessments of the future state of both personal and national economic conditions; retrospective evaluations refer to assessments of the improvement of personal and national economic conditions over the past. In general, positive evaluations of all of the above should positively affect support for democracy and of the market economy. Gibson (1996) and other authors (Lewis-Beck 1990; McKuen, Ericson and Stimson, 1991; Kinder & Kiewit, 1981) argue that prospective evaluations of the national economy have the stronger impact in political and economic attitudes.

Finally, we control for demographic and political factors influencing support for democracy and a market economy. Since political and social reform have taken place after 1991, younger generations that have lived longer portions of their lives in democratic regimes with open market economies should be more supportive of democracy (Gibson 1996). Hence, age should have a negative impact in support for democracy and market economies. The literature about democratic values has also pointed out the decisive impact of educational level (Lipset 1959). We also control for urban/rural location and party preference. Populations from rural areas may have less access to the benefits of democracy and the market economy as well as less information about such things and may, therefore, be more resistant to them. Support for the MPD, the party that advanced economic reforms, might also have a positive impact in supporting market economy. We do not expect, however, that partisanship should have any impact in support for democracy, since both parties appear devoted to democratic principles.

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<sup>7</sup> We included in our model an additive index of participation in four distinct types of associations: religious groups, labor unions, professional associations, and community development groups. The index counts the number of civil society associations in which the respondent is involved; scores range from 0 to 4.

### *Analysis*

Table 44 shows that the variables having statistically significant effects on support for democracy include support for market economy, positive evaluations of political and economic reform as well as of the current government, retrospective and prospective personal economic conditions, and educational level. Citizens who favor market economies, like the reforms that occurred after 1991, positively evaluate the current government and have higher educational levels are more prone to supporting democracy. All these relations were expected.

However, the impact of retrospective and prospective personal economic conditions is totally opposite to the original hypotheses. First, sociotropic evaluations, i.e. evaluations of the national economy, have no effect on support for democracy. Second, and most importantly, positive retrospective and prospective evaluations of personal economic conditions negatively impact support for democracy. That is, those who more positively evaluate their personal conditions in comparison to a year ago (retrospective evaluation) and who have more positive expectations for the year to come (prospective evaluation) are *less* likely to support democracy. This is totally contrary to theoretical expectations, and we have no explanation for this finding.<sup>8</sup> Further investigation of this specific relation is unquestionably necessary.

Those who think the government is like a parent also tend to be more supportive of democracy. Though this relationship is weak, statistically significant at only the .10 level, it stands in sharp opposition to our theoretical expectations. Perhaps those who support democracy in Cape Verde do not really understand what democracy means. Or perhaps democracy is still so young in Cape Verde that it has been unable to disentangle itself from traditional views about the functioning of the political system.

Another result that can only be generalized with caution regards the role of contact with emigrants. As hypothesized, emigrants do appear to serve as mechanisms for the diffusion of democratic values.

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<sup>8</sup> Given our surprise with this finding, we considered that it could have been caused by problems of multicollinearity. In fact, all of these forms of evaluation of the economy are correlated. Hence, we decided to run equations with the entire model, but with each of these variables entered separately. Even when entered separately, the results above are maintained, so they must be due to some other factors.

**Table 44. Correlates of Support for Democracy**

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp (B)
<i>Support for Market Economy</i>	.595	.151	.000	1.813
<i>Positive Evaluation of Political Reform</i>	.185	.039	.000	1.203
<i>Positive Evaluation of Economic Reform</i>	.183	0.053	.001	1.200
<i>Positive Evaluation of Current Government</i>	.054	.026	.038	1.056
Government is like a Parent	.266	.163	.103	1.305
Government is Responsible for Well Being of Population	.021	.148	.886	1.021
Social Capital	-.037	.079	.640	.964
Contact with Emigrants	.390	.238	.101	1.477
Inter Island Conflict	.214	.166	.198	1.239
Current National Condition	-.107	.101	.286	.898
Current Personal Condition	.080	.113	.479	1.083
Retrospective National Condition	.111	.093	.231	1.117
<i>Retrospective Personal Condition</i>	-.206	.103	.045	.814
Prospective National Condition	.091	.131	.484	1.096
<i>Prospective Personal Condition</i>	-.293	.142	.039	.746
Age	.004	.005	.482	1.004
<i>Education</i>	.219	.058	.000	1.245
Rural	-.055	.155	.723	.947
PAICV	.178	.184	.334	1.195
MPD	.309	.186	.098	1.361
Constant	-1.000	.724	.167	0.368

N = 1058, Nagelkerke  $R^2 = 20\%$ , significant at .001

In relation to support for a market economy, we find that support for democracy, positive comparisons between current and past political systems, and contact with emigrants all have positive effects. Unexpectedly, once again, positive evaluations of the current national economy negatively affect support for a market economy. In other words, those who more positively evaluate the current economy are less likely to support a market economy. But the most unexpected finding in this model is the negative, statistically significant impact of positive evaluations of economic reform in support for market economies. We predicted that those who were happier with the changes in the economic system after 1991 would also be more supportive of a market economy, but we find just the opposite. Instead, positive evaluations of the reforms *decrease* the likelihood of supporting a market economy! Perhaps the reforms being carried out are not seen as oriented towards a market economy. Citizens simply may not know enough about market economies to identify the changes occurring in the country.

Note that contact with emigrants is fundamental to support for a market economy, whereas it was not related to support for democracy. Hence the diffusion of market values seems to be more effective than the diffusion of democratic values. The fact that a greater portion of the population supports democracy indicates that there is less leeway for diffusion. Since support for the market is not as widespread, diffusion of market values still plays an important role.

It is also important to highlight how support for democracy and support for market economies are strongly correlated and how the relation seems to be reciprocal. That is, both types of support are positively correlated, but the causal vectors seem to go both ways. Given the concomitant occurrence of both in Cape Verde, support for these forms of administering the political and economic systems are intertwined. At the individual level, support for democracy and support for a market economy are strongly related to each other in Cape Verde.

**Table 45. Correlates of Support for Market Economy**

	B	S.E.	Sig.	Exp(B)
<i>Support of Democracy</i>	.605	.150	.000	1.832
<i>Comparison Between Current and Past Political System</i>	.129	.037	.001	1.138
<i>Comparison Between Current and Past Economic System</i>	-.144	.047	.002	.866
Government Evaluation	-.015	.023	.516	.985
Social Capital	-.028	.073	.703	.973
Government is like a parent	.041	.146	.780	1.042
Government is Responsible for Well being of Population	-.006	.134	.963	.994
<i>Contact with Emigrants</i>	.620	.246	.012	1.860
Inter Island Conflict	.060	.146	.683	1.062
<i>Current National Condition</i>	-.206	.093	.026	.814
Current Personal Condition	.079	.103	.442	1.082
Retrospective National Condition	.103	.084	.218	1.109
Retrospective Personal Condition	.153	.093	.100	1.165
Prospective National Condition	.050	.119	.675	1.051
Prospective Personal Condition	.114	.128	.374	1.120
Age	.002	.005	.732	1.002
Education	.059	.049	.233	1.060
PAICV	-.242	.166	.145	.785
MPD	-.116	.166	.485	.891
Rural	-.050	.140	.719	.951
Constant	-2.744	.677	.000	.064

N = 1051, Nagelkerke R<sup>2</sup> = 9%, significant at .001

### **Cape Verde in the African Context**

This section compares Cape Verde's position with the data reported for 12 African democracies in Round 1 of the Afrobarometer. The discussion offers some very preliminary explanations of the differences between Cape Verde's results and those from the other nations.

#### ***Support for Democracy***

The Afrobarometer used a standard wording in its question regarding support for democracy: "Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion? A. Democracy is preferable to any other form of government. B. In certain situations, a non-democratic government can be preferable. C. To people like me, it doesn't matter what form of government we have."

In Table 46 we see that the mean of the surveyed citizens in the twelve African nations giving response A, that democracy is preferable to any other form of government, was 69 percent.<sup>9</sup> Capeverdeans were similar, at 66 percent. Twelve percent of Africans said that a non-democratic government might be preferable; only 8 percent of Capeverdeans (surpassing only Botswana's 7 percent), offered that response.

<sup>9</sup> Note that in these tables the Afromean does not include Cape Verde.

**Table 46. Popular Attitudes to Democracy**

	Botswana	Ghana	Lesotho	Malawi	Mali	Namibia	Nigeria	South Africa	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Cape Verde	AfroMean
<b>1. Support for Democracy (a)</b>														
Democracy is preferable to any other form of govt	85	77	40	65	60	58	81	60	84	80	75	71	<b>66</b>	69
In certain situations a non-democratic govt can be preferable	7	9	11	22	16	12	9	13	12	8	9	11	<b>8</b>	12
To people like me it doesn't matter what form of govt we have	6	15	24	11	24	12	10	21	5	8	12	13	<b>12</b>	13
Don't know	3	-	25	2	-	19	<1	6	-	4	4	5	<b>15</b>	6
<b>2. Satisfaction with Democracy</b>														
Not a Democracy	1	-	4	2	0	1	-	1	2	3	1	17	<b>1</b>	3
Very Dissatisfied	7	16	22	20	17	6	3	16	6	6	12	37	<b>16</b>	14
Somewhat Dissatisfied	14	16	9	19	17	20	11	27	13	9	24	21	<b>44</b>	17
Neutral	-	14	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Somewhat Satisfied	43	37	14	31	41	36	58	36	49	37	43	13	<b>22</b>	37
Very Satisfied	32	17	24	26	19	28	26	16	14	25	16	5	<b>11</b>	21
Don't Know, etc. (b)	3	-	27	2	6	10	2	4	16	21	4	7	<b>7</b>	8
<b>3. Rejection of Authoritarian Rule</b>														
<b>a. A strong leader who could decide everything (c)</b>														
Disagree/Strongly disagree	88	86	69	87	73	57	83	67	92	84	91	78	<b>67</b>	80
Neither Agree nor Disagree	3		4	3	-	11	-	15	-	-	2	6	<b>7</b>	4
Agree/Strongly Agree	7	12	19	9	23	24	15	15	7	13	5	11	<b>14</b>	13
Don't know	2	2	8	1	4	7	2	3	1	3	3	5	<b>12</b>	3
<b>b. Only one political party</b>														
Disagree/Strongly disagree	78	78	51	76	73	63	88	56	61	53	80	74	<b>79</b>	69
Neither Agree nor Disagree	2	-	5	3	-	6	-	17	-	-	3	5	<b>3</b>	3
Agree/Strongly Agree	17	19	33	19	21	24	9	23	39	41	15	14	<b>12</b>	23
Don't know	2	2	12	1	5	8	2	4	1	6	2	6	<b>6</b>	4
<b>c. The Army</b>														
Disagree/Strongly disagree	85	88	70	83	70	59	90	75	96	89	95	80	<b>75</b>	82
Neither Agree nor Disagree	1	-	5	3	-	11	-	12	-	-	1	6	<b>5</b>	3
Agree/Strongly Agree	9	10	18	13	24	24	8	9	4	9	3	10	<b>13</b>	12
Don't know	4	2	7	2	6	6	2	3	<1	2	2	5	<b>7</b>	3
<b>4. No. Forms of authoritarian rule rejected (d)</b>														
Rejects none	6	3	14	3	10	19	2	9	<1	3	3	9	<b>7</b>	7
Rejects one	5	5	10	5	11	15	5	13	2	5	3	7	<b>16</b>	7
Rejects two	9	11	21	13	17	15	7	20	10	16	9	13	<b>28</b>	13
Rejects three	21	29	24	28	32	19	28	21	35	39	18	24	<b>50</b>	27

<b>5. Extent of Democracy</b>														
Not a democracy	5	12	17	12	6	3	1	8	7	5	7	38	<b>6</b>	10
Democracy w/major problems	8	-	13	23	37	15	46	24	26	27	20	17	<b>40</b>	21
Democracy w/minor problems	36	-	13	28	21	41	33	34	33	27	38	18	<b>33</b>	27
Full Democracy	46	-	24	34	24	30	17	26	17	21	25	9	<b>7</b>	23
Yes, it is a democracy (e)	-	69	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6
Don't know, etc. (f)	5	18	33	3	11	11	3	8	17	20	9	17	<b>12</b>	13

- (a) Relatively high proportions of missing data were recorded in Botswana (2.8 percent) and Lesotho (3.7 percent). In addition, 15.4 percent were recorded as “not applicable” in Uganda because respondents had been unable to supply a meaning for democracy. These cases are excluded from the calculations.
- (b) Percentages of all responses (i.e., up to three per respondent) that were both valid (i.e., missing data was excluded) and provided a meaning (i.e., those whose response was “don’t know” or “never heard of democracy” are excluded).
- (c) In Western and Eastern Africa, respondents were asked what they thought of the idea of “getting rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything.” In Southern African countries, respondents were asked whether they would approve “if parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the president could decide everything.”
- (d) This reports the proportion of individual respondents who reject from none to all four of the authoritarian alternatives: a strongman leader, a one-party state, military rule, and rule by traditional leaders (i.e., rule by technocratic experts is not included in this calculation, as it is not necessarily authoritarian).
- (e) In Ghana respondents were only offered the choices of “yes, it is a democracy” or “no, it is not a democracy.”
- (f) “Don’t know, etc.” includes both “don’t know” responses, as well as responses recorded as “not applicable.” Interviewers in Uganda and Ghana were instructed to select “not applicable” and skip the question if the respondent had not previously been able to provide a meaning for the term democracy (see Table 1-1), although the number of “not applicable” responses actually recorded is considerably lower than the proportion of respondents who met this criteria. It thus appears that “not applicable” may have been used inconsistently by interviewers. All “not applicable” responses are thus treated as “don’t know.”

**Satisfaction with Democracy**

Cape Verde deviates from the twelve-nation mean in terms of satisfaction with democracy. As Table 46 (section 2) shows, the percentage of supporters satisfied with democracy is clearly below the African average (33 vs. 58 percent). Thus Capeverdeans are as supportive of democracy as the average of other African countries, but they are clearly less satisfied with their democracy. Only Zimbabwe (18 percent) scores below Cape Verde on this item, while Lesotho (38 percent) is in the same range. The other African countries in the twelve-nation study are at least 20 points above Cape Verde, and the explanation given for Zimbabwe’s low score, political and economic crisis, does not fit the case of Cape Verde.

**The Interaction of Support and Satisfaction**

What happens when we link support and satisfaction? Table 47a presents results for the 12-nation study, while Table 47b offers parallel data for Cape Verde. As this table shows, 31 percent of Capeverdeans are "satisfied democrats" (versus 57 percent in the 12-nation average); 47 percent are "dissatisfied democrats" (vs. 18 percent in the 12-nation average); 5 percent are "satisfied non-democrats" (vs. 12 percent); and 17 percent are "dissatisfied non-democrats" (vs. 12 percent).

**Table 47a. Cross-Tabulation of Support for, and Satisfaction with Democracy**

(Percentage of respondents in 12 African countries, n=18,526, excluding “Don’t knows”)

	Satisfied with Democracy	
	Yes	No
Support Democracy		
Yes	57% Satisfied Democrats	19% Dissatisfied Democrats
No	12% Satisfied Non-Democrats	12% Dissatisfied Non-Democrats

**Table 47b. Cross-Tabulation of Support for, and Satisfaction with Democracy**

(Percentage of respondents in Cape Verde, n=939, excluding “Don’t knows”)

	Satisfied with Democracy	
	Yes	No
Support Democracy		
Yes	31% Satisfied Democrats	47% Dissatisfied Democrats
No	5 % Satisfied Non-Democrats	17% Dissatisfied Non-Democrats

**Rejection of Authoritarian Rule**

In Table 46, section 4, we examine the percentages respondents in the 12-nation study who reject authoritarian rule. Using this table, we can divide African countries into three groups. In Zambia, Botswana, and Nigeria, more than 60 percent of the citizens completely reject all authoritarian alternatives. In the second group (Ghana, Malawi, Tanzania, and Zimbabwe, slim majorities reject all authoritarian alternatives. And in the third group (Uganda, South Africa, Namibia, Lesotho and Mali), there are no majorities of “convinced anti-authoritarians.” Cape Verde, as we can see, falls in the intermediate group. As Table 46 shows, 50 percent of Capeverdeans reject all three alternatives to democracy.

**Table 48a. Cross-Tabulation of Support for Democracy and Rejection of Authoritarianism**  
(Percentage of respondents in 12 African countries, n=18,554, excluding “Don’t knows”)

	Reject Authoritarianism	
	Yes	No
Support Democracy		
Yes	43% Committed Democrats	32% Proto-Democrats
No	9% Proto- Non-Democrats	15% Committed Non-Democrats

**Table 48b. Cross-Tabulation of Support for Democracy and Rejection of Authoritarianism**  
(Percentage of respondents in Cape Verde, n=849, excluding “Don’t knows”)

	Reject Authoritarianism	
	Yes	No
Support Democracy		
Yes	51% Committed Democrats	29% Proto-Democrats
No	11% Proto- Non-Democrats	10% Committed Non-Democrats

### ***Support for Democracy and Rejection of Authoritarianism***

The authors of the 12-nation study point out that if rejection of authoritarian rule were evolving into (positive) support for democracy, these popular sentiments should be strongly correlated. In fact, the correlations, though statistically significant, are not particularly strong. Hence, in the words of the 12-nation report, “African opposition to dictatorship has yet to fully deepen into an unshakeable commitment to democracy.” Indeed, only a minority of the people we interviewed (43 percent) can be described as “committed democrats” (see Table 48a) in that they consistently say that they both support democracy and reject all four authoritarian alternatives. Others express discordant views, simultaneously saying that they support democracy while harboring nostalgic feelings for more forceful forms of rule. This group, comprised of those who at best are “proto-democrats,” constitutes almost one-third (32 percent) of all survey respondents. Table 48b shows these categories in the case of Cape Verde. No major deviations from the African average seem to emerge: 51 percent of Capeverdeans are “committed democrats” (supporting democracy and rejecting all authoritarian alternatives.), versus 43 percent in the 12-nation study. “Proto-democrats” (supporting democracy while harboring nostalgia for authoritarian forms of rule) in Cape Verde are 29 percent of respondents, vs. 32 percent in the 12-nation study. “Proto-non-democrats” (rejecting authoritarianism but failing to support democracy) number 11 percent in Cape Verde versus 9 percent in the 12-nation study. Finally, “committed non-democrats” (rejecting both authoritarianism and democracy) are 10 percent in Cape Verde versus 15 percent in the 12-nation study.

### ***How Complete is Democracy?***

The surveys have asked whether each respondents’ country is “a full democracy,” “a democracy, but with minor problems,” “a democracy, but with major problems,” or “not a democracy” at all. The distribution of responses by country is shown in Table 46 (Section 5). Capeverdeans, it turns out, are the

least *extreme* of any country in these studies. Fewer Capeverdeans (7 percent) believe their country is a “full democracy” than any of the countries in the 12-nation study, but only 6 percent (versus the 12-nation average of 10 percent) believe the country is not a democracy. To put this another way, 73 percent of Capeverdeans classify their country as a democracy with major or minor problems. The 12-nation average for the sum of these two categories is 48 percent; Cape Verde is, surpassed only by Nigeria.

### ***Explaining Support for Democracy***

What kinds of people support democracy? In the 12-nation study, multivariate regression results suggest that popular attitudes toward democracy (including support for democracy, rejection of authoritarianism, perception of the extent of democracy, and satisfaction with democracy) are poorly explained by demographic factors like gender, age, education, or residential location. Rather, Africans are pragmatic, supporting democracy and rejecting authoritarianism when they favorably evaluate overall governmental performance. Democrats are also more likely to be interested in politics, feel efficacious politically, and backers of recent electoral victors.

To undertake a similar analysis using Capeverdean data is not an automatic process, because some of the independent variables had to be measured in a slightly different manner.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> [1] The index measuring rejection of authoritarian rule uses just three items (one-party, military, and one-man rule), since no question on traditional leaders was asked.

[2] In the case of satisfaction with democracy, Cape Verde’s item, like East and West Africa but unlike South Africa, used no middle category; i.e., 0 = “not a democracy”; 1 = “very dissatisfied”; 2 = “somewhat dissatisfied”; 4 = “somewhat satisfied”; 5 = “very satisfied.” Skipping from “2” to “4” makes the arbitrary assumption that the distance between the two “somewhat” responses is double the distance between any other pair of responses. If we recode so that all distances are equal, significance levels drop a bit, but the coefficients are generally the same.

[3] In the 12-nation study satisfaction with the national economy was measured with the following question: “How satisfied are you with the condition of (your country’s) economy today?” Responses were coded as follows: 1 = “not at all satisfied”; 2 = “not very satisfied”; 3 = “somewhat satisfied”; and 4 = “very satisfied.” Cape Verde’s question was “In general, how would you describe the present economic condition of this country?” The response categories were 1 = “very bad”; 2 = “bad”; 3 = “neither bad nor good”; 4 = “good”; 5 = “very good.” Needless to say, then, the 12-nation version and the Capeverdean version are not the same.

[4] Support for structural adjustment in the 12-nation study was measured with an index representing the number of adjustment policies supported by respondents. Four such policies were considered: market pricing of consumer goods, user fees for health or educational services, job reductions in the civil service, and privatization of public corporations. Support meant respondents “strongly” or “somewhat strongly” agreed with a pro-reform position. Support for an adjustment policy was scored as a 1 and opposition as a 0. Over the four policies the index was additive, ranging from 0 to 4. In Cape Verde, the questions used related to: school fees, civil servant layoffs, more jobs with lower wages, and allowing imports. Responses indifferent between the two options were coded .5.

[5] Political efficacy in the 12-nation study was measured by a single item that asked respondents to choose between two statements: A) “No matter how you vote, it won’t make things better in the future”; or B) “The way you vote could make things better in the future.” Once strength of opinion was factored in, the item was scored on a standard 5-point response scale. For Cape Verde there is no strictly equivalent question, so we utilized an index built by answers to questions on the respondent’s level of agreement with two items: “can make elected representatives listen,” and “present vs. past: ability to influence government.” Both questions scale from 1 to 5. They were summed and divided by two.

[6] “Delivery of political goods” was measured, both in the 12-nation study and in Cape Verde, by the following question: “We are going to compare the present system of government with the former system of rule. Please tell me if the following things are better or worse now than they used to be: a) people are free to say what they think; b) people can join any organization they want, and c) each person can freely choose who to vote for without feeling pressured.” Responses were scored on a standard 5-point scale from 1 = “much worse” to 5 = “much better,” then combined into an index in which all sub-items were added then divided by three.

Let us now turn to the Capeverdean results. A multivariate regression predicting Capeverdeans' popular attitudes toward democracy revealed a more variegated pattern of results than we found in the 12-nation study. In terms of support for democracy, the analysis found that neither socioeconomic, demographic, sociotropic, or political variables had significant coefficients.

A similar regression, explaining rejection of authoritarian rule, yielded more interesting results. Authoritarian rule was more likely to be rejected by Capeverdeans who were more educated, lived in urban areas, supported structural adjustment, had an interest in public affairs, and approved the present government's "delivery of political goods."

The "extent of democracy" indicator in Cape Verde also yielded significant results. Respondents who more favorably assessed the country's present economic situation (or more favorably compared present to past living standards), or who trusted government institutions more, tended to evaluate more favorably the extent of Cape Verde democracy.

Finally, satisfaction with democracy in Cape Verde is related to age (older people are more satisfied), favorable assessment of overall government performance, favorable assessment of current vs. past living standards, favorable assessment of present versus past in the equal treatment of everyone by the government, and trust in government institutions.

## CONCLUSION

Given Cape Verde's distinctiveness in enjoying a history free from military conflict, relatively low levels of corruption and urban violence, and political parties that have peacefully alternated in power, how do Capeverdeans see democracy and economic reform?

### *Attitudes toward Democracy*

Capeverdeans are democrats, though they see their country as a democracy with problems. They prefer democracy to authoritarianism, and they support specific democratic practices. At the same time, Capeverdeans are skeptics: one-third of our respondents does not trust the nation's democratic institutions, and another third trusts them only "a little." A third of the population seems pleased with the government's performance regarding economic issues and its ability to enforce the law, and a somewhat greater number positively evaluates government when it comes to the administration of health, education, and housing.

Interest in public affairs is high, and Capeverdeans do pay close attention to media news. But they rarely discuss politics with each other or meet to raise issues, and they seldom attend community meetings. Participation in organized associations is even more rare. Low levels of civic engagement are understandable in the light of the low political efficacy reported by our respondents.

In Cape Verde, the law appears to be respected in everyday life, and institutions enforcing the law, i.e., police and courts, are trusted, even if corrupt. Levels of violence are low, and most of the population has not been victimized by crimes. There is little sense that top political actors are corrupt; indeed, Capeverdeans see judges, magistrates, teachers, and school administrators as exempt from the temptations of corruption.

### *Attitudes toward the Economy*

Capeverdeans' views about government intervention are contradictory. They think government should manage the production and distribution of goods, but they also think that individuals should decide what to produce, buy and sell. A majority supports the idea that people are responsible for their own well being, but a majority also believes that the government is like a parent that should take care of its children. Given these contradictory economic attitudes, it is no surprise that Capeverdeans are ambivalent about the type of economic system they prefer. There is no consensus that a market economy is better than a planned regime. Our respondents do not want the government to shy away from intervening in everyday problems such as unemployment. They are also against measures that would increase unemployment, including opening the domestic market to foreign products or firing public servants. At the same time, Capeverdeans are willing to sacrifice in order to improve their living standards in the future. They do not want to abort economic reform. They praise the current regime for improving living standards and making more goods available, but they believe that job opportunities and the gap between rich and poor have deteriorated under the current system. Respondents felt that the overall economy is in worse shape than their own livelihoods, but there is no general perception that the country is faring poorly in economic issues. Moderate levels of satisfaction with the reduced role of the government in the economy were the dominant view.

### *Sources of Conflict Inside Cape Verde*

We have argued that ethnic, racial, and religious disputes are largely absent in Cape Verde. Asked to self-identify as other than Capeverdean, a near majority could not; i.e., they refuse to identify as anything except as Capeverdean. There is some evidence of rivalry between the major islands of the nation, but the rivalry is relatively mild. Note, however, a possible harbinger of future conflict: a substantial portion of the population believes that African immigrants brings the country more problems than contributions to the country's development.

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