

AFRO



BAROMETER

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Demand for Democracy Is Rising in Africa, But Most Political Leaders Fail to Deliver

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Introduction

Africans express growing attachment to democracy according to citizen attitude surveys conducted by the Afrobarometer in 34 countries¹. Seven out of ten Africans prefer democracy to other political regimes, and the proportion of deeply committed democrats (that is, those who also reject authoritarian alternatives) has risen steadily over the past decade.

These insights run counter to an emerging view that the impetus for democratization on the African continent has stalled. Influential analysts have suggested recently that “political reform left Africa ‘too democratic’ given the level of income... [and] that the continent has begun to regress to its expected level... by becoming less democratic.”² Others have pointed to a global trend of “democratic retreat”³ that is driven in Africa by China’s economic expansion and the Western security response to spreading Islamic *jihād*.⁴

Cover Photo Credit: Brittany Danisch, 2011 Liberian elections

¹ The Afrobarometer, a cross-national survey managed by a network of African social scientists, measures public opinion on key political, social and economic issues of the day. In the Round 5 (2011-2013) surveys reported here, data were collected in 51,605 face-to-face interviews across 34 countries: Algeria, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Cote d’Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The Afrobarometer uses nationally representative samples, so the 34-country results presented here represent the views of approximately three-quarters (76%) of the continent’s population. Results for each country are reliable within a margin of sampling error of +/- 3% (or less) at a 95% confidence level.

The average level of wealth in these countries (GNI per capita = \$2033) closely approximates the average wealth level of all African countries (\$2296). In addition, the proportion of “free” – that is, liberal democratic – countries in the Afrobarometer Round 5 (29%) is close to the continental norm (22%). As such, Afrobarometer Round 5 surveys come closer than ever before to accurately representing, not only individual countries, but also the continent as a whole. For further information visit www.afrobarometer.org

² Anke Hoeffler, Robert Bates and Ghada Fayad, “The State of Democracy in Sub-Saharan Africa,” *Research Highlights* (University of Oxford: Centre for the Study of African Economies, 2013).

³ Richard Joseph, “Democracy At Bay: The Arab Spring and Sub-Saharan Africa,” www.africaplus.wordpress.com, September 3, 2013.

⁴ “Democratic Breakthroughs in the Balance” in *Freedom in the World, 2013* (Washington D.C., Freedom House, 2013).

How can these contrasting images of democratization be reconciled? This Afrobarometer policy paper points to the *gap* in many countries between *popular demand for democracy* and the *supply of democracy* actually delivered by ruling elites. While ordinary Africans clamor for high-quality elections and leadership accountability, too many political leaders continue to manipulate the polls, challenge term limits, and even seize power by coup. In the most common pattern across African countries, popular demand for democracy *exceeds* the available supply, producing a *deficit of democracy*.


The mismatch between popular aspirations and elite retrenchment also reveals a diversity of political regimes and political trajectories in Africa. While democratization is driven from below in some countries, it is resisted from above in others. Not surprisingly, the perceived level of democracy is low among citizens in North Africa, where a *surplus of authority* prevails. But in other countries across the sub-Saharan sub-continent – like Ghana in West Africa, Mauritius in East Africa, and Zambia in Southern Africa – an institutionalized form of electoral democracy is gradually taking root.



Counting in Zambia's 2011 elections
Source: Afromusing, Flickr Commons

Key Findings

- A majority of Africans say they want democracy (71%) but, at the same time, only a minority (46%) also rejects all alternative forms of autocratic rule.
- More than half of all survey respondents in 16 African countries now evince a deep commitment to democratic rule: the composite index of *demand for democracy* climbed 15 percentage points, from 36% in 2002 to 51% in 2012.
- But people don't always think they are *getting* democracy. A composite index of *supply of democracy* reveals that fewer than half (43%) consider their country a democracy and, at the same time, say they are satisfied with the way democracy works.
- Rightly or wrongly, people think that the consolidation of democracy, while partial everywhere, is most advanced in East Africa and least advanced in North Africa. Other regions fall in between, with democratic demand being greatest in West Africa. Regimes in this region may be particularly susceptible to mass mobilization from below as citizens exert pressure for more democracy.
- Several African countries – notably Cameroon, Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Uganda and Zimbabwe – continue to experience a *deficit of democracy* in which popular demand for democracy greatly exceeds the amount of democracy that political elites are willing or able to supply.
- People increasingly believe that the quality of elections is the best sign of a democratic regime. Thus, popular attachment to institutions is slowly but surely displacing mass loyalty to dominant personalities.



Demand for Democracy



Do Africans want democracy?


When asked what kind of government they prefer, most Africans (71%) opt for democracy (Figure 1). By contrast, 11% say that sometimes a non-democratic political regime is preferable, and 18% admit they either don't know or don't care. Much depends on the country in question. Fewer than half of all adults prefer democracy in Madagascar (39%) and Swaziland (46%), where open elections have been repeatedly disputed, postponed, or never held at all. By contrast, almost everyone expresses support for democracy in Senegal (88%) and Zambia (90%), where recent elections have led to peaceful turnovers in national leadership.



Voting in Kenya's 2013 elections
Source: Afrobarometer

Figure 1: **Support for democracy**

| 34 countries | 2011-2013



Participants were asked:

"Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion:

Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.


Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have."

(% choosing Statement 1)

Because people can pay easy lip service to democracy, it is also important to check whether they remain attached to various forms of autocratic rule.⁵ For example, do Africans feel nostalgic for the single-party regimes that were so common across the continent in earlier decades? Generally speaking, they do not: more than three-quarters (77%) now reject one-party rule (Figure 2). The citizens of Mauritius, Ghana, Liberia and Zambia display the strongest antipathy to a single-party monopoly (all over 90%), especially compared to the lukewarm denial that prevails in Tunisia (57%) and Mozambique (56%).

Figure 2: Rejection of one-party rule
| Highest and lowest countries | 2011-2013



Participants were asked: "There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?"
(% disapprove / strongly disapprove)


Importantly, Africans also reject other forms of autocracy. On average, 80% shun personal dictatorship⁶, that is, at an even higher level than they rebuff one-party rule. But since fewer than three out of four (73%) spurn military government, there is evidence that this form of rule still exerts a lingering appeal among some citizens (full results by country can be found in the annexes).

⁵ Linz and Stepan argue that democracy can consolidate only when all relevant political actors – mass and elite – come to regard it as "the only game in town." See *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996: p.5). Diamond has noted that this standard can only be met when individuals *both* support democracy *and* reject its alternatives. See *Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999: p.68).

⁶ The question on rejection of personal dictatorship could not be asked in Swaziland so the results on this question capture 33 countries rather than 34.

To test the depth of popular democratic commitments, the Afrobarometer employs an index of **demand for democracy**. An individual is held to demand democracy if he or she *both* expresses support for democracy *and* rejects *all three* autocratic alternatives (Figure 3). We find that almost all Africans (93%) reject at least one form of autocracy (whether one-party, military, or one-man rule). But fewer people reject two forms (81%) and far fewer reject all three forms (58%). Most importantly, less than half of all Africans interviewed (46%) consistently identify democracy as the *only* form of government they would ever wish to have. So far, therefore, a deeply rooted demand for democracy apparently remains a minority public sentiment. Demand is relatively high in Zambia, Mauritius and Ghana, with two-thirds or demonstrating solid commitment to democratic rule, but less than one in five express similar commitments in Egypt (17%), Algeria (18%) and Madagascar (20%) (Figure 4).

Figure 3: **Demand for democracy**
 | Average levels | 34 countries* | circa 2012



*(% rejecting military rule, one-party rule **and** dictatorship)


Note: The question about rejection of personal dictatorship could not be asked in Swaziland so the results for rejecting 3 alternatives capture data from only 33 countries.

**(% rejecting military rule, one-party rule and dictatorship and supporting democracy)

Note: For Swaziland, the figure included in this 34-country average is based on rejection of only two alternative regimes rather than all three. As such, the proportion recorded as demanding democracy in Swaziland (31%) is likely somewhat inflated relative to the levels of demand for democracy reported for other countries.

Figure 4: **Demand for democracy**

| Support democracy + reject authoritarian alternatives |
| Highest and lowest countries | circa 2011-2013



Civil society campaign at the regional level, SADC
Source: Afrobarometer

Supply of Democracy

Do Africans think they are getting democracy?

One practical signal of whether people think they are getting democracy is whether they declare satisfaction with the way democracy actually works. At first glance, Tanzanians are apparently the most satisfied of all Africans (75%), closely followed by Ghanaians (74%) (Figure 5). Since Tanzanians are below average in rejection of one-party rule, however, they may well use a much less exacting democratic standard than Ghanaians. At the other end of the scale, citizens exhibit extremely low levels of satisfaction with democracy in places like Togo (21%), where a family dynasty dominates political life by suppressing opposition protest.




Agang SA Diepsloot election campaign launch, 16 November 2013

Source: Niko Knigge, Flickr Commons

Figure 5: **Satisfaction with democracy**

| 34 countries | 2011-2013




Participants were asked: "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [your country]?"

(% somewhat / very satisfied)

Another approach is to ask Africans to judge the extent of democracy achieved by their own country. Is it a full democracy, one with minor problems, one with major problems, or not a democracy at all? As might be expected, Botswana, Ghana and Mauritius emerge at the top of the list, where more than three out of four citizens regard their country as a full or almost full democracy (Figure 6). By contrast, three North African countries – Sudan, Tunisia and Egypt – anchor the bottom of the scale, with only about one quarter of their citizens perceiving full or almost full democracy. Adding credence to these results, we note that all six of the above countries have relatively well-educated populations that are capable of making sound judgments about actual levels of democratic achievement.

Figure 6: **Perceived extent of democracy**
 | Highest and lowest countries | 2011-2013



Participants were asked: "In your opinion, how much of a democracy is [your country] today?" (% 'a full democracy' or 'a democracy, but with minor problems')


Across Africa, the average level of satisfaction with democracy (49%) reaches a similar level to the perceived extent of democracy (53%). Moreover, the two attitudes are positively correlated; for example, people who are satisfied with democracy also tend to see extensive democracy (Table 1). This conjunction justifies the creation of a second index, which the Afrobarometer calls the **perceived supply of democracy**. It measures whether an individual is *both* satisfied with democracy's performance *and* confident that he or she is living in a democracy. As such, the index provides an estimate of whether ordinary people think that political elites are supplying democratic rule. But it also shows that fewer than half (43%) think this is the case (Figure7).

Table 1: **Satisfaction with democracy compared to extent of democracy**
 | 34 countries | 2011-2013

	Not satisfied with democracy	Satisfied with democracy
Don't see extensive democracy	32%	10%
Perceive extensive democracy	15%	43%

N=51,605 respondents
 Pearsons's $r=.659^{***}$

Figure 7: **Perceived supply of democracy**
 | Satisfied + perceive extensive democracy |
 | Highest and lowest countries | 2011-2013



Participants were asked: "During election campaigns in this country, how much do you personally fear becoming a victim of political intimidation or violence?" (% 'somewhat' or 'a lot')

Trends in Public Attitudes




Growing Demand for Democracy

In the 16 countries Afrobarometer has surveyed regularly since 2002,⁷ popular support for democracy increased by an average of 12 percentage points, from 63% to 75% of the adult population (Figure 8). The popular rejection of one-party rule has risen 10 percentage points (from 67% to 77%); but the rejection of military rule has increased just 2 points (from 77% to 79%).

But for the first time, *more than half* of all survey respondents in 16 African countries now evince a deep commitment to democratic rule: the composite index of demand for democracy thus climbed from 36% in 2002 to 51% in 2012.

Figure 8: **Do Africans want democracy?**
| Average trends | 16 countries | 2002-2012




⁷ Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

This promising result is tempered by the fact that, across all 34 countries surveyed in and around 2012, fewer than half of all citizens expressed unqualified demand for democracy (46%, see Figures 3 and 4). While majorities in several countries increasingly demand democracy, majorities in others are still uncertain of the benefits of democracy, and thus want to keep their options open with regard to a return to some form of strong-arm rule.

Lagging Supply

The supply of democracy has not kept pace with demand. Most notable is the failure of popular satisfaction with democracy to rise over the last decade; across the same 16 countries tracked since 2002, satisfaction registered the same level (53%) in 2012 as in 2002, with a dip in the intervening years (Figure9). By contrast, popular estimates of the extent of democracy rose by 7 percentage points (from 52% to 59%). The divergence between these two indicators can be interpreted as a sign that as people experience democracy in practice, they adjust their expectations downwards. Even as their satisfaction with a regime's performance stagnates, they are now more likely to conclude that they live in a democracy, warts and all.

Figure 9: **Do Africans think they are getting democracy?**
 | Average trends | 16 countries | 2002-2012



Taken together, stagnant satisfaction alongside relatively small increases in the perceived extent of democracy combine to produce only a modest gain in the perceived supply. This composite index rose by 10 percentage points between 2002 and 2012, from 34% to 44%. In this respect, the 16 countries for which the Afrobarometer has trend data closely resemble the rest of Africa; in 2012, popular perceptions of democratic supply settled at 44% among the 16 countries, as compared to 43% in the full sample of 34 countries (Table 1). As such, the citizens of Africa's more open regimes are not necessarily more satisfied than other Africans with the quality of democracy delivered by political elites. Or perhaps they enjoy more opportunities to learn about their regime's shortcomings and to express dissent.

Validating Results

How *reliable* are the Afrobarometer's estimates about democracy?


Observers often note that Africa lacks an institutional tradition of liberal democracy – or even of electoral democracy. Under these circumstances, do ordinary people have enough experience to properly understand democracy, let alone to develop effective demand for this regime or accurate judgments about its supply? The Afrobarometer has always operated on the assumption that, as long as survey questions are posed in plain and concrete form, Africans can express clear preferences about different types of government and offer valid opinions about government performance.

To test this assumption, Afrobarometer indicators can be checked against other data sources. For example, the Afrobarometer's estimates of popular perceptions of the extent of democracy can be compared with Freedom House's expert estimates for political rights and civil liberties. A scatter-plot of these measures reveals a sturdy correlation ($r = .744$) represented by the diagonal regression line (Figure 10).



Campaigning before Kenya's 2013 elections
Source: Afrobarometer


Figure 10: **The Supply of democracy: Popular and expert estimates compared**
 | 34 African countries | 2011-2013



Notes: (1) Freedom House scores represent the combined inverted (2-14) value.
 (2) Extent of Democracy denotes the percentage who believe that the country is 'a full democracy' or 'a democracy, but with minor problems.'

This result strongly suggests that ordinary people and political scientists arrive at similar conclusions about the quality of democracy in various African countries. True, there are a few outliers: people in Sudan, Algeria and Burundi think they have more democracy than the professionals do; and the populations of Tunisia, Lesotho and Cape Verde think they have less. But the main point is that the judgments of citizens and experts broadly validate each other.


Regional Variations



Are there regional patterns of democratization in Africa?

The addition of North African countries to Round 5 of the Afrobarometer allows a systematic answer to this question. From a public opinion perspective, we see four distinct regional patterns (Figure 11).

Figure 11: **Demand for and supply of democracy, by region**
| Average levels | 34 countries | 2011-2013



The patterns are based on the general observation that, where demand and supply are roughly balanced, political regimes will tend to consolidate. A high-level equilibrium connotes a consolidating democracy, especially if this balance is sustained over time. By contrast, a low-level equilibrium is a hallmark of consolidating autocracy. Finally, a gap between demand and supply signals the presence of unstable, hybrid regimes that are subject to constant pressures for change.

- In East Africa, more than half of all adult citizens demand democracy (54%) and a similar proportion also think it is being supplied (52%). A case can be made that, on average, political regimes are relatively more democratic in this region than in other parts of Africa. But the level of democracy is intermediate at best. And because demand and supply are in rough equilibrium there are few pressures for further regime change in either a democratic or autocratic direction.
- In Southern Africa, a similar pattern prevails. Supply (46%) and demand (47%) are in rough equilibrium, but at an even lower level than in East Africa.
- In West Africa, many more people want democracy (51%) than are getting it (42%). Because demand and supply are out of alignment, political regimes in this region tend to be unconsolidated. Regimes may be particularly susceptible to mass mobilization from below since citizens are likely to exert more pressure for democracy than political elites are willing or competent to supply.
- In North Africa, levels of both demand and supply are low, making this region the least democratic in Africa. In early 2013, when the Afrobarometer surveys in North Africa were conducted, demand lagged behind supply, which suggests that much of the popular energy behind the Arab Spring has dissipated. One might therefore expect the reconsolidation of hard democratic regimes in this region.



Campaign Posters for South Africa's 2014 elections
Source: Afrobarometer

Country Comparisons




How do African countries compare in terms of democratic development?

The regional analysis above, while somewhat illuminating, obscures as much as it reveals. Because of the diversity of political regimes in every region of Africa, countries constitute a more appropriate level of analysis. By focusing on countries, we are able to further explore the following questions: Are African regimes consolidating? If so, are they consolidating as democracies or as some other form of regime? If not, how unstable are they likely to be?

The public opinion data on demand for, and supply of, democracy can be used to situate countries in relation to both the type of regime and the degree of regime consolidation. In Figure 12, the regimes defined by democracy are at the top right, those defined by autocracy at the bottom left. The more consolidated the political regime, the closer it is to the diagonal line - which represents the balance between supply and demand.

Figure 12: **African political regimes: Popular demand and perceived supply**
 | 34 African countries | circa 2012



Accordingly, African countries can be sorted into three main categories:

- Countries with a deficit of democracy, where demand for democracy exceeds its supply. Sixteen of 34 countries are in deficit - and appear to the upper left of the equilibrium line in Figure 12.

Based on the attitudes of citizens, countries range from Tunisia at the low end to Mauritius at the high end. Cote d'Ivoire, which has yet to hold national elections in the wake of a civil war, represents the country with the largest gap between supply of democracy (22%) and demand for democracy (64%), a 42 percentage point difference. Other countries with large negative gaps between high demand and low supply include Nigeria (a deficit of 29 points), Zimbabwe (27 points), Togo (23 points), Uganda (21 points) and Cameroon (20 points) (Figure 13). The ruling elites in countries with a democratic deficit can expect to encounter sustained popular pressures for further democratization.

- Countries with a surplus of authority. In these places, mass demands are relatively limited and people say they are satisfied with (whatever elites choose to call) "democracy." The 11 countries in this category fall to the bottom right of the equilibrium line in Figure 12.


Based on the attitudes of their citizens, the range of countries with a surplus of political authority runs from Botswana among proto-democracies to Egypt among autocracies.⁸ Other countries in which low levels of democratic demand are greatly surpassed by an excessive supply of elite control are Algeria (29 points), Niger (28 points), Namibia (17 points) and Tanzania (14 points) (Figure 13). Because elites in these countries enjoy a great deal of room for policy maneuver, any political change is likely to emanate from authorities.

⁸ Note that in Swaziland, where a near-absolute monarch resists democratization, the question about rejection of personal dictatorship could not be asked. As such, the calculation of demand in Swaziland is based on rejection of only two alternatives rather than three as in other countries. The value for demand (31%) is therefore likely to be somewhat inflated relative to other countries, and to the measure of supply. Thus the 4 percentage point gap shown here between supply and demand is likely an underestimate of the gap. See *Swaziland: A Failed Feudal State* (Washington, D.C.: Freedom House, 19 September 2013).

- Countries with consolidated regimes. The final seven countries reside on the equilibrium line where demand exists in balance with supply.

The cases range from Ghana and Senegal – whose regimes are consolidating at relatively high levels of democracy – to Madagascar and Sudan – which are hardening as autocracies. Other hybrid regimes – in countries like Benin – appear to be consolidating at middling levels between democracy and authoritarianism. In the absence of excess pressures from either side, the political development of all these regimes seems destined to settle in its present form.

Figure 13: **Democracy deficit or surplus of authority**



Note: A positive sign indicates that Supply exceeds Demand (Surplus of Authority). A negative sign indicates that Demand exceeds Supply (Deficit of Democracy)

An Electoral Explanation



What explains popular perceptions of the supply of democracy in Africa?

Based on analysis of public attitudes in 34 African countries in 2011-2013, the quality of elections is closely linked to the supply of democracy. If citizens see the last national election as largely free and fair, they are also likely to consider that political elites are supplying democracy. Indeed, fully 89% of those who perceive clean elections also regard their country as an extensive democracy.⁹ In short, ordinary Africans make a direct connection between the quality of elections and the nature of the resultant political regime.

Other factors also matter. In keeping with persistent personal rule in some places, people still also use the job performance of the national president to judge the degree of democracy. If they think the president has done a good job over the previous year, they are likely to give higher democracy ratings. And, given widespread poverty, they also often make reference to their material well-being; if the national economy has performed well, they tend to equate it with the delivery of democracy.

But which of these explanatory factors matters most? When a regression analysis on the supply of democracy was first done for 12 African countries in 2000, the most important factor was the performance of the president. Since that time, however, the situation has changed. Across 34 countries in 2011-2013, the leading explanatory factor is now the quality of elections.¹⁰ In other words, the order of the leading explanatory factors has been reversed.

This result can be read as evidence of gradual political institutionalization. Appraisals of the quality of an institution - elections - now trump the public's assessment of the behavior in office of a "big man" president. Thus, popular attachment to institutions is slowly but surely displacing mass loyalty to dominant personalities. Moreover, the quality of political institutions (in this case, elections) continues to explain more variance in democratic supply than the condition of the national economy. As such, the results of the Afrobarometer's latest survey reconfirm that democracy building depends primarily on the delivery of political goods (like clean elections and good governance) and is less beholden to economic recovery than might conventionally have been thought.

⁹ The statistical correlation between these two factors is a robust .379.

¹⁰ Compare the beta coefficients for free and fair elections (.308) with presidential performance (.263) and the country's present economic condition (.152).

Annexes

Preference for democracy				
Country	It doesn't matter what kind of government we have	Non-democratic governments can be preferable	Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government	Don't Know
Algeria	14%	30%	52%	4%
Benin	15%	9%	76%	0%
Botswana	9%	7%	82%	2%
Burkina Faso	15%	5%	72%	8%
Burundi	23%	3%	74%	1%
Cameroon	16%	14%	64%	6%
Cape Verde	9%	6%	81%	3%
Cote d'Ivoire	8%	5%	83%	4%
Egypt	10%	20%	56%	14%
Ghana	9%	7%	82%	2%
Guinea	10%	10%	77%	3%
Kenya	7%	10%	73%	9%
Lesotho	18%	19%	55%	8%
Liberia	7%	5%	81%	7%
Madagascar	27%	9%	39%	25%
Malawi	8%	14%	76%	3%
Mali	18%	19%	62%	1%
Mauritius	9%	5%	85%	2%
Morocco	14%	10%	63%	14%
Mozambique	12%	11%	63%	14%
Namibia	20%	15%	64%	1%
Niger	23%	8%	66%	3%
Nigeria	11%	19%	69%	1%
Senegal	5%	5%	87%	2%
Sierra Leone	6%	15%	76%	4%
South Africa	11%	15%	72%	3%
Sudan	12%	26%	51%	51%
Swaziland	26%	22%	46%	6%
Tanzania	4%	10%	84%	2%
Togo	13%	5%	77%	5%
Tunisia	12%	11%	71%	6%
Uganda	9%	10%	79%	2%
Zambia	5%	4%	90%	2%
Zimbabwe	12%	8%	79%	1%
Average	13%	11%	71%	5%

Rejection of one-party rule				
Country	Strongly disapprove/ Disapprove	Neither approve nor disapprove	Strongly approve/ Approve	Don't Know
Algeria	71%	9%	9%	10%
Benin	86%	4%	10%	0%
Botswana	80%	1%	19%	1%
Burkina Faso	76%	4%	15%	5%
Burundi	74%	6%	19%	1%
Cameroon	81%	2%	9%	8%
Cape Verde	86%	3%	9%	2%
Cote d'Ivoire	88%	2%	9%	1%
Egypt	79%	5%	6%	9%
Ghana	90%	1%	9%	0%
Guinea	82%	3%	13%	2%
Kenya	69%	4%	23%	3%
Lesotho	63%	1%	33%	3%
Liberia	90%	0%	8%	2%
Madagascar	70%	6%	10%	13%
Malawi	74%	2%	23%	2%
Mali	77%	4%	18%	1%
Mauritius	91%	1%	5%	2%
Morocco	63%	12%	6%	19%
Mozambique	56%	8%	25%	11%
Namibia	76%	2%	20%	1%
Niger	80%	4%	15%	1%
Nigeria	84%	5%	10%	1%
Senegal	88%	2%	9%	1%
Sierra Leone	84%	5%	9%	1%
South Africa	68%	8%	22%	2%
Sudan	70%	6%	16%	8%
Swaziland	70%	5%	20%	5%
Tanzania	76%	1%	22%	1%
Togo	81%	2%	13%	4%
Tunisia	57%	4%	32%	7%
Uganda	82%	2%	15%	1%
Zambia	90%	1%	9%	0%
Zimbabwe	73%	4%	22%	2%
Average	77%	4%	15%	4%

Rejection of military rule				
Country	Strongly disapprove/ Disapprove	Neither approve nor disapprove	Strongly approve/ Approve	Don't Know
Algeria	50%	23%	18%	10%
Benin	81%	8%	11%	0%
Botswana	90%	1%	7%	2%
Burkina Faso	62%	7%	24%	7%
Burundi	82%	4%	11%	2%
Cameroon	74%	4%	14%	8%
Cape Verde	79%	5%	9%	6%
Cote d'Ivoire	85%	3%	12%	1%
Egypt	32%	12%	51%	6%
Ghana	86%	3%	10%	1%
Guinea	70%	6%	22%	2%
Kenya	83%	5%	9%	3%
Lesotho	81%	1%	14%	3%
Liberia	79%	1%	17%	2%
Madagascar	51%	14%	20%	15%
Malawi	86%	2%	10%	2%
Mali	58%	6%	34%	3%
Mauritius	96%	1%	1%	2%
Morocco	62%	11%	6%	21%
Mozambique	59%	9%	17%	15%
Namibia	77%	7%	15%	2%
Niger	58%	10%	30%	2%
Nigeria	77%	8%	14%	1%
Senegal	81%	3%	13%	2%
Sierra Leone	83%	7%	10%	1%
South Africa	69%	13%	16%	2%
Sudan	51%	10%	31%	8%
Swaziland	86%	2%	10%	2%
Tanzania	79%	2%	18%	1%
Togo	62%	5%	28%	6%
Tunisia	56%	6%	33%	6%
Uganda	89%	1%	9%	1%
Zambia	96%	1%	3%	0%
Zimbabwe	79%	5%	14%	2%
Average	73%	6%	17%	4%

Rejection of one man rule				
Country	Strongly disapprove/ Disapprove	Neither approve nor disapprove	Strongly approve/ Approve	Don't Know
Algeria	55%	18%	18%	10%
Benin	85%	10%	4%	1%
Botswana	92%	1%	6%	1%
Burkina Faso	79%	4%	6%	11%
Burundi	82%	5%	11%	2%
Cameroon	83%	2%	5%	10%
Cape Verde	86%	5%	5%	4%
Cote d'Ivoire	92%	1%	4%	3%
Egypt	76%	9%	6%	9%
Ghana	91%	3%	6%	0%
Guinea	71%	4%	20%	5%
Kenya	87%	3%	6%	3%
Lesotho	85%	1%	11%	4%
Liberia	89%	2%	6%	3%
Madagascar	63%	8%	9%	21%
Malawi	87%	1%	11%	1%
Mali	80%	4%	13%	3%
Mauritius	94%	1%	3%	2%
Morocco	65%	10%	6%	19%
Mozambique	57%	11%	13%	19%
Namibia	79%	6%	13%	2%
Niger	68%	5%	18%	8%
Nigeria	83%	9%	7%	1%
Senegal	89%	1%	8%	2%
Sierra Leone	86%	6%	7%	2%
South Africa	70%	12%	15%	4%
Sudan	64%	7%	20%	9%
Tanzania	90%	2%	7%	1%
Togo	75%	4%	10%	11%
Tunisia	78%	4%	11%	7%
Uganda	93%	1%	6%	1%
Zambia	94%	1%	4%	1%
Zimbabwe	85%	3%	9%	2%
Average	91%	3%	6%	0%

Satisfaction with democracy				
Country	Fairly/ Very satisfied with democracy	Not at all/ Not very satisfied with democracy	This country is not a democracy	Don't Know
Algeria	61%	33%	1%	6%
Benin	60%	40%	0%	0%
Botswana	71%	28%	1%	1%
Burkina Faso	50%	42%	1%	8%
Burundi	65%	33%	1%	1%
Cameroon	30%	58%	2%	11%
Cape Verde	45%	50%	1%	4%
Cote d'Ivoire	30%	64%	1%	5%
Egypt	31%	57%	3%	9%
Ghana	74%	25%	0%	1%
Guinea	39%	56%	4%	1%
Kenya	47%	41%	2%	10%
Lesotho	50%	42%	1%	7%
Liberia	59%	38%	1%	3%
Madagascar	13%	47%	4%	36%
Malawi	53%	43%	0%	4%
Mali	31%	67%	1%	1%
Mauritius	72%	26%	0%	2%
Morocco	45%	38%	3%	14%
Mozambique	35%	54%	3%	9%
Namibia	62%	37%	0%	1%
Niger	65%	30%	1%	5%
Nigeria	32%	66%	2%	0%
Senegal	68%	28%	1%	4%
Sierra Leone	61%	36%	1%	3%
South Africa	60%	39%	0%	1%
Sudan	38%	48%	5%	9%
Swaziland	35%	44%	12%	9%
Tanzania	75%	23%	0%	2%
Togo	21%	70%	3%	6%
Tunisia	40%	52%	2%	6%
Uganda	52%	44%	1%	3%
Zambia	68%	30%	0%	1%
Zimbabwe	31%	58%	9%	2%
Average	49%	44%	2%	5%

Extent of democracy				
Country	Full democracy/ Democracy with minor problems	A democracy with major problems	Not a democracy	Don't Know
Algeria	50%	35%	8%	4%
Benin	71%	25%	4%	0%
Botswana	79%	16%	3%	2%
Burkina Faso	55%	25%	8%	8%
Burundi	72%	20%	7%	1%
Cameroon	36%	40%	12%	9%
Cape Verde	63%	31%	2%	4%
Cote d'Ivoire	35%	39%	20%	4%
Egypt	20%	34%	32%	9%
Ghana	78%	19%	1%	2%
Guinea	41%	40%	17%	2%
Kenya	42%	39%	8%	7%
Lesotho	50%	28%	10%	10%
Liberia	70%	21%	3%	4%
Madagascar	30%	20%	12%	24%
Malawi	55%	35%	5%	3%
Mali	36%	48%	12%	2%
Mauritius	76%	19%	2%	3%
Morocco	32%	31%	19%	12%
Mozambique	58%	23%	5%	12%
Namibia	73%	23%	3%	1%
Niger	69%	21%	4%	5%
Nigeria	42%	47%	10%	1%
Senegal	67%	24%	5%	4%
Sierra Leone	71%	18%	7%	3%
South Africa	66%	30%	3%	1%
Sudan	27%	25%	34%	10%
Swaziland	37%	24%	28%	9%
Tanzania	75%	19%	3%	1%
Togo	36%	38%	20%	4%
Tunisia	27%	41%	24%	4%
Uganda	52%	35%	9%	2%
Zambia	76%	20%	2%	1%
Zimbabwe	31%	34%	32%	2%
Average	53%	29%	11%	5%

Preference for democracy over time (% democracy is preferable to any other kind of government)

Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2008	Circa 2012
Botswana	66%	69%	85%	82%
Cape Verde	66%	70%	81%	82%
Ghana	52%	75%	78%	82%
Kenya	80%	75%	78%	73%
Lesotho	50%	50%	46%	55%
Malawi	64%	56%	74%	76%
Mali	71%	68%	72%	62%
Mozambique	54%	56%	59%	63%
Namibia	54%	57%	64%	64%
Nigeria	68%	65%	72%	69%
Senegal	75%	75%	70%	88%
South Africa	57%	65%	67%	72%
Tanzania	64%	38%	71%	84%
Uganda	75%	61%	79%	79%
Zambia	70%	64%	80%	90%
Zimbabwe	47%	66%	68%	79%
Average	63%	63%	71%	75%

Rejection of one-party rule over time (% strongly disapprove/ disapprove one-party rule)

Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2008	Circa 2012
Botswana	68%	26%	80%	80%
Cape Verde	79%	78%	79%	86%
Ghana	79%	82%	81%	90%
Kenya	75%	73%	80%	69%
Lesotho	61%	70%	54%	63%
Malawi	66%	56%	65%	74%
Mali	71%	73%	75%	77%
Mozambique	42%	52%	51%	56%
Namibia	55%	59%	69%	76%
Nigeria	80%	82%	74%	84%
Senegal	76%	76%	90%	88%
South Africa	67%	66%	63%	68%
Tanzania	62%	44%	63%	76%
Uganda	54%	57%	76%	82%
Zambia	72%	86%	79%	90%
Zimbabwe	58%	88%	67%	73%
Average	67%	70%	72%	77%

Rejection of military rule over time (% strongly disapprove/ disapprove military rule)				
Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2008	Circa 2012
Botswana	79%	80%	89%	90%
Cape Verde	75%	71%	79%	79%
Ghana	83%	83%	78%	86%
Kenya	92%	89%	94%	83%
Lesotho	85%	83%	75%	81%
Malawi	84%	51%	84%	86%
Mali	65%	66%	61%	58%
Mozambique	53%	57%	63%	59%
Namibia	51%	40%	67%	77%
Nigeria	69%	72%	74%	77%
Senegal	75%	81%	69%	81%
South Africa	77%	72%	67%	69%
Tanzania	86%	82%	89%	79%
Uganda	85%	76%	78%	89%
Zambia	95%	92%	92%	96%
Zimbabwe	80%	84%	79%	79%
Average	77%	74%	77%	79%

Rejection of one man rule over time (% strongly disapprove/ disapprove one man rule)				
Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2008	Circa 2012
Botswana	85%	89%	92%	92%
Cape Verde	67%	65%	64%	86%
Ghana	82%	85%	84%	91%
Kenya	90%	88%	90%	87%
Lesotho	82%	86%	75%	85%
Malawi	78%	66%	78%	87%
Mali	66%	73%	78%	80%
Mozambique	41%	42%	59%	57%
Namibia	58%	45%	73%	79%
Nigeria	72%	75%	75%	83%
Senegal	77%	86%	87%	89%
South Africa	73%	64%	63%	70%
Tanzania	86%	82%	91%	90%
Uganda	90%	91%	86%	93%
Zambia	90%	89%	90%	94%
Zimbabwe	80%	90%	85%	85%
Average	76%	76%	79%	84%

Satisfaction with democracy over time (% fairly/ very satisfied with democracy)				
Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2008	Circa 2012
Botswana	58%	59%	83%	71%
Cape Verde	33%	46%	46%	45%
Ghana	46%	70%	80%	74%
Kenya	78%	53%	42%	47%
Lesotho	48%	40%	30%	50%
Malawi	47%	26%	57%	53%
Mali	63%	57%	49%	31%
Mozambique	54%	59%	46%	35%
Namibia	69%	69%	67%	62%
Nigeria	35%	26%	32%	32%
Senegal	57%	53%	27%	68%
South Africa	44%	63%	49%	60%
Tanzania	63%	37%	71%	75%
Uganda	59%	51%	47%	52%
Zambia	55%	26%	40%	68%
Zimbabwe	37%	14%	26%	31%
Average	53%	47%	50%	53%

Extent of democracy over time (% full democracy/ democracy with minor problems)				
Country	Circa 2002	Circa 2005	Circa 2008	Circa 2012
Botswana	59%	73%	91%	79%
Cape Verde	41%	55%	70%	63%
Ghana	45%	71%	83%	78%
Kenya	76%	52%	43%	42%
Lesotho	48%	44%	37%	50%
Malawi	38%	28%	56%	55%
Mali	63%	57%	60%	36%
Mozambique	67%	64%	59%	58%
Namibia	60%	73%	73%	73%
Nigeria	32%	28%	41%	42%
Senegal	57%	59%	37%	67%
South Africa	46%	64%	58%	66%
Tanzania	63%	39%	74%	75%
Uganda	54%	48%	54%	52%
Zambia	48%	31%	47%	76%
Zimbabwe	36%	14%	28%	31%
Average	52%	50%	57%	59%

Demand for and supply of democracy and 2012 Freedom House score			
Country	Demand for democracy	Supply of democracy	2012 Freedom House overall score (inverted 2-14)
Algeria	18%	46%	5
Benin	53%	52%	12
Botswana	62%	68%	11
Burkina Faso	39%	46%	8
Burundi	52%	60%	6
Cameroon	45%	26%	4
Cape Verde	59%	41%	14
Cote d'Ivoire	64%	22%	6
Egypt	16%	19%	6
Ghana	67%	67%	13
Guinea	45%	29%	6
Kenya	48%	37%	8
Lesotho	33%	43%	11
Liberia	60%	56%	9
Madagascar	20%	19%	6
Malawi	54%	44%	9
Mali	32%	25%	4
Mauritius	76%	68%	13
Morocco	40%	33%	7
Mozambique	25%	35%	9
Namibia	38%	55%	12
Niger	34%	61%	9
Nigeria	52%	23%	8
Senegal	61%	62%	11
Sierra Leone	59%	57%	11
South Africa	42%	51%	12
Sudan	24%	23%	2
Swaziland	31%	34%	4
Tanzania	54%	68%	10
Togo	42%	19%	7
Tunisia	27%	22%	9
Uganda	63%	42%	7
Zambia	78%	64%	9
Zimbabwe	55%	28%	4

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LET THE PEOPLE HAVE A SAY

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