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Adapting to a changing climate

The importance of climate-change literacy

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Summary

Scientists continue to issue urgent warnings about accelerating climate change, with each year bringing new evidence of its devastating impacts globally (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2023a; NASA, 2024). Recent years have witnessed unprecedented extreme weather events across the African continent that underscore the immediacy of the climate crisis, from tropical cyclone Freddy and severe drought in Southern Africa to record-breaking heatwaves and catastrophic floods in the Sahel (Barnes et al., 2024; Pinto et al., 2024).

Yet the global political landscape for climate action has become more challenging. Major greenhouse-gas emitters, including the United States, have retreated from climate commitments, threatening to undermine international climate agreements and domestic climate policies (Dolphin, 2025). At the same time, African leaders demand additional financial support to finance green-energy projects but are divided over how quickly their countries should transition to green energies (Chime, 2025; FSD Africa 2025). On one hand, Ethiopia, Kenya, Egypt, and South Africa have made meaningful progress toward adopting renewable energy sources. On the other hand, countries with large oil and natural-gas reserves (e.g. Nigeria and Senegal) are more reluctant to commit to the green-energy transition and the reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions (Kimeu, 2023; Climate Investment Funds, 2025).

This evolving context makes understanding public opinion about climate change more critical than ever. As international cooperation remains challenging, building domestic support for climate action increasingly depends on understanding what citizens know, what they are experiencing, how they adapt to climate change, and what policies they support. This is particularly urgent for African nations, which face disproportionate climate impacts despite minimal contributions to global emissions (Notre Dame Global Adaptation Initiative, 2023).

While climate-change *mitigation* is essential globally, *adaptation* is the more immediate challenge in Africa. Take the continent's agricultural sector: About 80% of farmers in sub-Saharan Africa are engaged in smallholder agriculture, cultivating low-yield staple food crops on small plots with minimal use of inputs and technology (Oyewole, 2022). On a per-capita basis, these farms contribute relatively little to CO_2 emissions. But they are highly dependent on rainwater and the vagaries of the weather; less predictable rainfall severely affects the yields, and thus the livelihoods, of these farmers (Oyewole, 2022; Lemarpe et al., 2022).

Moreover, rapid urbanisation on the continent leads to growing informal settlements in floodplains and on steep unstable hillsides, placing those residents in the direct path of floods, storm surges, and landslides. Similarly, urban areas that lack green spaces make cities significantly hotter than surrounding rural areas, intensifying the risk of heatwaves and heat-related illnesses.

Adaptation to the negative impacts of climate change requires both government action and citizen support. Gauging public climate-change literacy, lived experience of climate change, and policy preferences can help governments, civil society organisations, and climate advocates to design effective interventions, target communication strategies, and build the political will necessary for ambitious climate policies across the continent. Understanding where citizens stand on these issues is essential for translating climate-change literacy into meaningful and transformative action – particularly on climate adaptation.

Findings from Afrobarometer's latest round of public-opinion surveys in 38 African countries show that rates of climate-change awareness and climate-change literacy vary considerably, with island nations showing the highest levels of understanding. Crucially, climate-change literacy has increased in many countries since 2016/2018, particularly in West Africa. These rates tend to be higher among men, urban residents, and citizens with greater wealth, education, and access to news.

We also find that the impacts of climate change are widely felt across the continent, with drought and crop failure representing the most commonly reported effects. Most climate-change-literate citizens say climate change is making life in their countries worse. In response, substantial portions of the population have adapted by changing water sources or reducing water use, reducing or adjusting outdoor work hours, and/or altering agricultural and food-consumption practices, with rural, poorer, and agricultural communities particularly likely to engage in adaptation strategies.

Importantly, Africans demonstrate strong support for climate action. While climate-change-literate citizens overwhelmingly believe that rich, developed countries should take immediate action and should assist poorer nations, they also want their own governments to take proactive measures – such as investing in infrastructure and adopting mitigation policies – despite their potential costs. Primary responsibility for climate action is most widely assigned to national governments, though there has been a notable shift in recent years toward holding wealthy nations accountable.

Afrobarometer survey

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Ten survey rounds in up to 45 countries have been completed since 1999. Round 10 surveys (2024/2025) cover 38 countries. (See Appendix Table A.1 for a list of countries and fieldwork dates.)

Afrobarometer's national partners conduct face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice that yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

This 38-country analysis is based on 50,961 interviews. The data are weighted to ensure nationally representative samples. When reporting multi-country averages, all countries are weighted equally (rather than in proportion to population size).

Key findings

Awareness and understanding of climate change:

- On average across 38 countries, more than half (56%) of citizens say they have heard of climate change. Awareness levels range from 27% in Nigeria to 91% in Seychelles.
- More than four in 10 Africans (43%) are "climate-change literate," meaning they have both heard of climate change and recognise it as being at least partly caused by human activity.
- Climate-change literacy increased marginally between 2016/2018 and 2024/2025. It is higher among men and urban residents and increases with wealth, education, and news consumption.

Experiencing climate change:

- Drought and crop failure are the most widely experienced climate threat, with half of respondents reporting that these events have become "somewhat more" or "much more" severe in their local area over the past decade. Reported increases in flooding severity are lower, at 35%.
- Eight in 10 climate-change-literate respondents (80%) say that climate change is making life "somewhat" or "much" worse in their country.

Adapting to climate changes:

- About three in 10 respondents report that in response to changing weather patterns, they or their family had to alter their water consumption (34%), outdoor work patterns (31%), and/or crop planting or food consumption (28%). Two in 10 had to make changes in their livestock rearing (20%) and/or relocate (19%).
- Overall, 60% of respondents say they made at least one of these five adaptations, including 38% who report two or more.
- Rural, poorer, and less educated respondents are more likely to engage in at least one of the five types of climate-change adaptation, as are people working in agricultural occupations.

Support for climate mitigation and action:

- Climate-change-literate Africans assign primary responsibility for addressing climate change to their own governments (37%), wealthy or developed nations (26%), ordinary citizens (20%), and business/industry (11%). The belief that developed nations should lead climate action appears to be on the rise.
- Among climate-change-literate respondents, there is overwhelming demand for developed countries to take immediate action on climate change (83%) and to assist poorer nations (85%), alongside strong backing for their own governments to take proactive measures (73%).
- Africans strongly support government climate action through infrastructure investment (81%) and pressure on wealthy nations for climate aid (78%), with moderate support for banning tree cutting for fuel (51%) and mandating the use of cleaner cookstoves (47%).

Awareness of climate change

Understanding public awareness and perceived causes of climate change is essential for effective policy development. Measuring basic familiarity with the term "climate change" shows how widely climate discourse and education have reached across the continent while revealing the contexts or groups where targeted efforts may be required to achieve foundational awareness.

On average across 38 countries, more than half (56%) of citizens say they have heard of climate change (Figure 1). Awareness levels are highest in the Seychelles (91%), followed by Mauritius (83%), Gabon (79%), Malawi (77%), and Cabo Verde (76%). However, fewer than one-third of citizens in Mauritania (31%) and Nigeria (27%) have heard of it.

Afrobarometer has measured awareness of climate change in Africa since 2016/2018. On average across the 29 countries surveyed in all rounds over this period, awareness of climate change has remained relatively stable, hovering around 57% except for a dip to 50% in 2021/2023 (Figure 2).

Figure 1: Awareness of climate change (%) | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *Have you heard about climate change, or haven't you had the chance to hear about this yet? (% yes)*

Figure 2: Awareness of climate change | 29 countries | 2016-2025



Respondents were asked: *Have you heard about climate change, or haven't you had the chance to hear about this yet?*

Toward climate-change literacy

While measuring public awareness of climate change provides important baseline information, awareness alone does not capture the depth of public understanding necessary to drive climate action. Past Afrobarometer research on African publics has established a crucial distinction: People who are climate-change *aware* are not necessarily climate-change *literate* (Selormey, Dome, Osse, & Logan, 2019).

This distinction is important because respondents may be aware of climate change without understanding that it is driven by human activity. Without this understanding, shifts in

awareness levels may reflect recent experiences with extreme weather rather than changes in knowledge enabling individuals to make informed decisions and take actions that can reduce the risks of climate change to themselves, their families, communities, and businesses (Simpson, 2024; Torsu & Krönke, 2023).

Increasing climate-change literacy among African publics will likely be key in shaping their views on climate interventions such as emission reductions or costly mitigation policies and in motivating both citizen engagement and government action in response to this growing threat (Simpson et al., 2021).

To measure basic levels of climate-change literacy, Afrobarometer asked respondents who have heard of climate change what they believe is its main cause, with options distinguishing between human activities and natural processes.

On average, among those who are climate-change aware, not quite two-thirds (64%) cite "human activity" (cutting down forests, burning fuel, and other activities that pollute the atmosphere), while 21% attribute climate change to "natural weather patterns or natural processes." About one in eight (12%) blame both human activity and natural processes (Figure 3). (For country breakdown, see Appendix Figure A.1.)

Figure 3: Main cause of climate change | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are aware of climate change were asked: *People have different ideas about what causes climate change. What about you? Which of the following do you think is the main cause of climate change, or haven't you heard enough to say: Human activity, like cutting down forests, or burning fuel and other activities that pollute the atmosphere? Natural weather patterns or natural processes?*

Based on the two survey questions above, we construct the more restrictive measure of climate-change literacy. Respondents are categorised as "climate-change literate" if they are both aware of climate change and say that climate change is caused by "human activity" or by "both human activity and natural processes".[1] All other respondents are categorised as not climate-change literate. Moving from climate-change awareness to climate-change literacy reveals the scale of education and engagement efforts still needed. On average, 43% of all respondents across the 38 countries surveyed in 2024/2025 are

[1] Our definition differs from Selormey et al. (2019), who also required that respondents say that climate change means "negative changes in weather patterns." This reflects changes in survey design (the question was not asked in Round 10) and recognition of the possibility that its effects are not always perceived as negative, even among experts (Javeline et al., 2023).

climate-change literate (Figure 4).[2] These levels vary considerably by country, ranging from 19% of respondents in Nigeria to around three-quarters (73%) in Seychelles – one of four island nations in the top six.

Figure 4: Climate-change literacy | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure shows % of all respondents in each country who are "climate-change literate," meaning they not only have heard of climate change but also know that human activity plays a part in causing it.

As can be seen in Figure 5, climate-change literacy improved substantially in many countries between Afrobarometer's Round 7 (2016/2018) – the only previous time both questions were asked in a survey round – and Round 10 (2024/2025). (For country breakdowns of climate-change literacy and its components, see Appendix Table A.2).

Across the 30 countries with data from both rounds, literacy increased by an average of 3 percentage points. Liberia experienced the most dramatic improvement: The proportion of climate-change literate respondents jumped from 30% to 53%. Madagascar (+18 percentage points), the Gambia (+15 points), and South Africa (+15 points) also saw significant increases. These substantial gains likely reflect both genuine improvements in climate literacy and a "catch-up" effect, as countries starting from lower baseline levels (e.g. Liberia and South Africa) had more room for growth.

The decrease in climate-change literacy is more puzzling. While a drop of up to 6 percentage points could at least partially be attributed to the survey margin of error of +/-3 percentage points for each national survey, the steeper decrease in literacy in Uganda (-7), São Tomé and Príncipe (-10), Benin (-11), and Nigeria (-11) requires additional analysis that is beyond the scope of this work.

[2] These percentages refer to the share of climate-change-literate respondents among all citizens who were surveyed in a country, not just those who are climate-change aware.

Figure 5: Climate-change literacy | 30 countries* | 2016-2025



*Figure shows % of all respondents who were "climate-change literate" in 2016/2018 (orange dots) and 2024/2025 (green triangles). Labels report percentage-point change between the two survey rounds. * Of 31 countries surveyed in both Round 7 and Round 10, the question on the main cause of climate change was not asked in one (Zimbabwe) in Round 7.*

Beyond country-level differences, understanding which groups have higher levels of climate-change literacy can help identify where to target education and communication efforts.

Similar to previous studies, we find that climate-change literacy is higher among men and urban residents than among women and rural residents, and that it increases with wealth[3] (Figure 6). In contrast, we do not find any differences by age group despite the fact that climate change is often framed as an intergenerational issue. Together, these findings suggest that exposure to information and opportunities to develop climate knowledge are more strongly shaped by socioeconomic and structural factors than by generational divides.

Importantly, climate-change literacy is also lower among those employed in the agriculture sector, including fishing and forestry, compared to their peers working in other jobs (38% vs. 44%). This is particularly concerning for the four in 10 respondents who work in this sector in rural areas. Not being climate-change literate makes it more difficult to take the transformative actions that will reduce their vulnerability to extreme weather events and other consequences of climate change. This indicates a need for greater public awareness programming in agrarian communities.

Again similar to previous research, education seems to have the strongest association with climate-change literacy among demographic variables (Simpson et al., 2021). Almost two-

[3] Afrobarometer's Lived Poverty Index (LPI) measures respondents' levels of material deprivation by asking how often they or their families went without basic necessities (enough food, enough water, medical care, enough cooking fuel, and a cash income) during the preceding year. For more on lived poverty, see Mattes and Lekalake (2025).

thirds (63%) of respondents with post-secondary education can be considered climate-change literate, compared to only 26% of those with no formal education. The substantial gap by educational attainment suggests that information about climate change may not be reaching less educated populations through alternative channels, despite the fact that these communities often face the most immediate impacts of climate change.

Figure 6: Climate-change literacy | by demographic group | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure shows % of all respondents in each demographic group who are "climate-change literate," meaning they not only have heard of climate change but also know that human activity plays a part in causing it.

This raises the question of whether exposure to various media sources can help bridge this literacy gap.

We find that daily news consumption is strongly associated with climate-change literacy across all media platforms (Figure 7). Respondents who access news daily are substantially more likely to be literate in this domain than those who "never" consume news from the radio (48% vs. 35%), television (52% vs. 33%), newspaper (52% vs. 39%), social media (55% vs. 32%), and other Internet sources (57% vs. 34%).

While education and media consumption are likely to be closely linked, examining these patterns provides important insights into potential channels for climate communication on the continent.

Figure 7: Climate-change literacy | by news consumption | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure shows % of all respondents who are "climate-change literate" by their reported news consumption.

Experiencing climate change: Severity and effects

Beyond awareness and understanding, lived experience with the impacts of climate change shapes how communities perceive and respond to the crisis. Africa is already experiencing significant climate-related disruptions, from intensifying droughts to unpredictable rainfall patterns that threaten agricultural livelihoods (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2023b). To capture these experiences, Afrobarometer asked respondents about the severity of extreme weather events in their communities over the past decade, as well as whether they believe climate change is making life in their country better or worse.

On average across 38 countries, about half of respondents report that droughts (51%) and crop failure (51%) are "somewhat more severe" or "much more severe" than 10 years ago (Figure 8). In contrast, only 35% report increased flooding severity, while 39% say floods have become "somewhat less" or "much less" severe in their area.

Figure 8: Severity of droughts, crop failure, and flooding | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *In your experience, over the past 10 years, has there been any change in the severity of the following events in the area where you live? Have they become more severe, less severe, or stayed about the same?*

Country-level analysis shows the complexity of climate-change experiences across Africa, with individual countries facing distinct combinations of drought, flood, and crop-failure challenges that reflect their unique geographic and agricultural contexts (Figure 9; see Table A.3 for results).

Southern African countries are particularly likely to report increases in the severity of droughts over the past decade, including Zimbabwe (94%), Lesotho (91%), Zambia (82%), and Madagascar (80%). This likely reflects the region's recent severe drought cycles. Large majorities of citizens in Morocco (86%), Tunisia (77%), and Cabo Verde (71%) also report increases in the severity of droughts. In contrast, East African countries such as Tanzania (18%) and coastal nations such as Seychelles (24%) report lower rates of increased drought severity.

Reported increases in the severity of crop failure are most common in Zimbabwe (95%), Lesotho (87%), Malawi (86%), and Zambia (85%), while Mauritania (17%) and Seychelles (19%) report much lower rates.

We also find significant variation on flooding: Majorities in Mauritius (90%), Gabon (53%), Chad (52%), and Congo-Brazzaville report increased flooding, while Botswana (7%) Tunisia (10%), and Morocco (11%) record very low levels. This suggests more localised flood experiences compared to the continent-wide drought concern.

Figure 9: Increased severity of droughts, crop failure, and flooding | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *In your experience, over the past 10 years, has there been any change in the severity of the following events in the area where you live: Drought? Flooding? Crop failure? Have they become more severe, less severe, or stayed about the same?*
(% who say "somewhat more" or "much more" severe)

In a subset of countries, we also asked about two other climate impacts: mudslides or landslides (22 countries) and land or soil erosion (26 countries). Although these items were asked only in countries where these events are known to be a common problem, we still find substantial cross-country variation in reports of increased severity, ranging up to 47% in Malawi for landslides and up to 69% in Lesotho for erosion (Figure 10).

Figure 10: Severity of landslides and erosion (%) | up to 26 countries* | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *In your experience, over the past 10 years, has there been any change in the severity of the following events in the area where you live: Mudslides or landslides? Land or soil erosion? Have they become more severe, less severe, or stayed about the same?*
(% who say "somewhat more" or "much more" severe)
** Question about mudslides/landslides asked in 22 countries; question about land/soil erosion asked in 26 countries.*

While they are important, these five weather events do not fully capture the wide variation in climate impacts across a continent with such diverse climatic conditions – from forests to deserts and from coastal or island areas to landlocked countries. We therefore also asked respondents to assess its overall impact on life in their country.

On average across 38 surveyed countries, a large majority (80%) of climate-change-literate respondents – that is, those who are both aware of climate change and attribute it to

human causes – say that climate change is making life "somewhat worse" (33%) or "much worse" (47%) (Figure 11). Only 13% think climate change is making their lives better.

Figure 11: Perceived impact of climate change | climate-change-literate respondents | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are climate-change literate were asked: *Do you think climate change is making life in [your country] better or worse, or haven't you heard enough to say? (Respondents who are not climate-change literate are excluded).*

Large majorities in all surveyed countries agree that climate change is harming their quality of life, though as Figure 12 shows, this perception is considerably more widespread in Mauritius (95%), Lesotho (94%), Zimbabwe (93%), and Zambia (93%) than in Comoros (62%), São Tomé and Príncipe (67%), and the Gambia (69%).

Figure 12: Climate change is making life worse | climate-change-literate respondents | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Map shows % of climate-change-literate respondents in each country who say climate change is making life "somewhat worse" or "much worse." Darker red indicates higher proportions reporting negative effects, while lighter red indicates lower proportions.

Climate-change adaptation

Severe droughts and floods as well as other intensifying climatic events threaten to reverse critical development gains. For example, in 2024, heatwaves negatively affected agriculture and labour productivity in many parts of the continent (World Meteorological Organization, 2025). Malawi, Zambia, and Zimbabwe suffered their worst drought in at least two decades, resulting in decreased cereal yields. Moreover, "low water levels and low hydropower output from Lake Kariba, Africa's largest man-made reservoir, caused prolonged power outages and economic disruption" (World Meteorological Organization, 2025).

Given these multiple and often simultaneous challenges, it is important to understand how people adapt in order to secure their livelihoods and protect their resources. Afrobarometer asked all respondents, regardless of whether they were aware of the concept of climate change, whether they or their family had to take any of several adaptive measures during the preceding five years in response to changing weather patterns.

One-third (34%) report having to change the source or reduce the amount of water they use (Figure 13). About three in 10 respondents say they reduced or changed the times they work outdoors (31%) and changed the types of crops they plant or the types of food they eat (28%). One in five (20%) report that they changed grazing patterns or reduced the number and type of livestock they keep, and about the same proportion (19%) say they had to move to a different place.

Figure 13: Adaptation to changes in weather patterns | 38 countries* | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *Here are a range of actions that some people have had to take because of climate changes or changing weather patterns. Please tell me whether you or your family have had to do any of the following in the past five years:*

Change the source or reduce the amount of water that you use?
Reduce the amount of work you do outdoors or work outdoors at different times?
Change the types of crops you plant or the types of food you eat?
Change grazing patterns or reduce the number and type of livestock you keep?
Move to another place?

** The question on changes in livestock rearing was posed to all survey respondents, with those indicating that they do not have livestock or grazing land coded as "Not applicable" in the figure. This question was excluded from the Mauritius survey.*

Comparing the results for each of the five questions at the country level reveals important variations in adaptation measures. For example, at least half of all citizens say they or their family changed their water consumption in Tunisia (55%), Guinea (51%), and Guinea-Bissau

(50%) (Figure 14). In contrast, fewer than half as many report doing the same in Tanzania (22%), Benin (21%), Togo (21%), Ghana (21%), Mauritius (18%), and Nigeria (18%).

In most countries, changes in water consumption and changes in outdoor work were about equally common. But there are exceptions: In Tunisia, changes in water consumption were almost twice as common as changes in outdoor work (55% vs. 30%). In Morocco, that gap is 14 percentage points. Lesotho and Malawi are the only countries where substantially more citizens made changes to their outdoor work patterns than to their water consumption.

Figure 14: Climate-induced changes in water consumption and outdoor work (%) | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *Here are a range of actions that some people have had to take because of climate changes or changing weather patterns. Please tell me whether you or your family have had to do any of the following in the past five years:*

Change the source or reduce the amount of water that you use?
Reduce the amount of work you do outdoors or work outdoors at different times?

Country-level comparisons for the four most commonly reported adaptation measures (Figure 14 and Figure 15) suggest the diversity of climate experiences across the continent. The spread between the most and the least affected countries differs by measure, ranging from 38 percentage points for changed outdoor work patterns to 47 percentage points for changes in crops and food. And countries rank differently across these measures, suggesting that they face distinct (often, multiple) adaptation challenges that require context-specific policy strategies.

Figure 15: Climate-induced changes in crops/food and livestock rearing
| 38 countries* | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *Here are a range of actions that some people have had to take because of climate changes or changing weather patterns. Please tell me whether you or your family have had to do any of the following in the past five years:*

Change the types of crops you plant or the types of food you eat?

Change grazing patterns or reduce the number and type of livestock you keep?

** The question on livestock rearing was not asked in Mauritius.*

Focusing on what is probably the costliest of the five adaptation measures, Figure 16 shows how many citizens moved to another place in response to changes in weather patterns. The numbers are staggering. In Liberia (39%), Guinea-Bissau (35%), and Angola (35%), more than one in three respondents say they or their family had to move during the past five years. At the other end of the spectrum, about one in 20 report having moved in Mauritius (6%), Lesotho (6%), and Seychelles (4%).

These rates are higher than one might expect and may reflect differing understandings of "mov[ing] to another place." For instance, a respondent might have moved from a drought-affected rural area into a more food-secure urban area. Or a respondent or family member might have moved a much shorter distance – such as from an informal settlement vulnerable to sea-level rise to an unaffected part of town. Given the broad question framing, the responses may also capture a temporary, rather than permanent, move after an extreme weather event.

Figure 16: Moved because of changes in weather patterns | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *Here are a range of actions that some people have had to take because of climate changes or changing weather patterns. Please tell me whether you or your family have had to do any of the following in the past five years: Move to another place?*

One way to capture how disruptive climate change is in Africa is by measuring how many of these five adaptation measures individual respondents and their families have had to take over the past five years. We created a composite adaptation index that ranges from 0 to 5. A score of 0 indicates that none of these adaptations was made, while a score of 5 means an individual engaged in all five adaptation strategies measured in the survey. Higher scores thus reflect greater climate-related disruption, as individuals and families have had to make more numerous adjustments to their daily lives and livelihoods in response to climate change.

As Figure 17 shows, 40% of respondents say they did not take any of the five adaptive measures they were asked about, 22% report taking one of the five steps, and an astonishing 38% say that they or their family took two or more adaptive actions.

Figure 17: Climate adaptation | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure shows % of respondents reporting climate-related adaptive actions in the past five years. Results are based on an additive index ranging from 0 (no adaptation) to 5 (all five adaptions: changed water sources/usage, adjusted outdoor work patterns, modified livestock practices, altered crop types or food consumption, relocated residence).

To better understand who is most likely to adapt to climate changes or changing weather patterns, we combined all those who report adapting in at least one of the five ways and looked at the variation across key demographic variables. As can be seen in Figure 18, there are no substantial differences across gender and age. However, compared to their peers, rural (66%), poorer (high lived poverty: 66%), and less educated (no formal education: 63%) respondents are all more likely to engage in at least one of the five types of climate adaptation. In addition, those working in the agricultural sector (67%) are more likely to take adaptive measures than those working in other sectors (58%).

Figure 18: Climate adaptation | by demographic group | 38 countries | 2024/2025



(% of those with at least one adaptation)

Determinants of climate-related adaptation

To examine which factors influence whether people take steps to adapt to climate changes or changing weather patterns, we conducted statistical analyses using a method called probit regression. This approach is suitable for examining yes-or-no outcomes – in this case, whether a family engaged in a particular adaptation strategy (coded as 1) or did not (coded as 0). We ran five separate statistical models, one for each of the five adaptation strategies in the survey, to identify which characteristics – such as age, education, income level, or location – are associated with engaging in each type of climate adaptation (for full results, see Table A.4 in the Appendix).

Change in water consumption and outdoor work

Figure 19 shows how two factors influence the likelihood of two types of climate adaptation: changes to water consumption (shown as blue triangles) and adjusted outdoor work patterns (shown as red dots). The results display "marginal effects," which indicate how much more or less likely someone is to engage in each adaptation strategy based on his or her demographic characteristics, exposure to news media, and level of climate-change literacy.

Figure 19: Factors associated with changes to water consumption and outdoor work in response to changing weather patterns | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure displays marginal effects from probit regression models. Blue triangles indicate the likelihood of changing water consumption, while red circles show the likelihood of changing outdoor work patterns. Points to the right of zero indicate increased likelihood of adaptation, while points to the left indicate decreased likelihood. Horizontal lines represent confidence intervals. Reference categories are: women, no formal education, aged 18-35, urban residents, no news exposure, not climate literate, non-agricultural workers, and no lived poverty.

The results show that news exposure[4] and climate-change literacy increase the likelihood of adapting water consumption in response to changes in weather patterns. Poor and rural residents are more likely to change their water sources or reduce usage – perhaps because they more often rely on vulnerable water sources such as rivers and unprotected wells – while agricultural workers are *less* likely to do so.

For outdoor work adaptations, men, rural residents, poorer individuals, and the climate-change literate are more likely to reduce or modify their outdoor activities in response to climatic changes, with the likelihood increasing as poverty levels rise. Conversely, those with higher education and older adults are less likely to change their outdoor work patterns.

Relocating residence

Similarly, Figure 20 shows the marginal effects of the same set of variables on the likelihood of moving in response to changing weather patterns. (For marginal effects on change in crops/food and livestock rearing, see Appendix Figure A.2.) We find that men, those exposed to news, climate-change-literate individuals, and people living in poverty are more likely to say that they or someone in their family moved in the preceding five years in response to climate changes. Conversely, relocation is less likely among those with higher education, older adults, and rural residents – suggesting that even though rural areas often face greater climate impacts, rural populations may have fewer resources or opportunities to relocate.

Figure 20: Factors associated with residential moves in response to changing weather patterns | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure displays marginal effects from probit regression models. Points to the right of zero indicate increased likelihood of moving, while points to the left indicate decreased likelihood. Horizontal lines represent confidence intervals. Reference categories are: women, no formal education, aged 18-35, urban residents, no news exposure, not climate-change literate, non-agricultural workers, and no lived poverty.

[4] This is a binary variable capturing how often a person obtains news through radio, television, newspapers, social media, and other Internet sources. Individuals who access any of these news sources at least a few times a month are classified as "exposed to news" (assigned a value of 1); otherwise, they are coded as 0.

Composite climate adaptation index

Figure 21 shows factors associated with the total number of adaptation strategies individuals have employed in response to climate changes. As many of our respondents (40%) did not engage in any adaptations – resulting in a large number of zeroes in our data – we used a specialised statistical model called zero-inflated Poisson regression, which is designed for this type of count data. (See Appendix Table A.5 for detailed results.)

The analysis reveals that rural residents, agricultural workers, and men tend to engage in a greater variety of climate adaptations than urban residents, non-agricultural workers, and women, respectively. Moreover, news exposure, climate-change literacy, and poverty are also associated with undertaking more types of adaptations. This suggests that both awareness and economic vulnerability drive more extensive behavioural changes in response to climate impacts.

Conversely, individuals with higher education and older adults are likely to engage in fewer adaptation strategies, indicating they may be less affected by climate changes or may have different means of coping that were not captured in this survey.

Figure 21: Factors associated with the number of climate adaptations undertaken | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Figure displays marginal effects from a zero-inflated Poisson regression model. Points indicate the expected change in the number of adaptation strategies (ranging from 0 to 5) associated with each factor. Points to the right of zero indicate an increased number of adaptations, while points to the left indicate fewer adaptations. Horizontal lines represent confidence intervals. Reference categories are: women, no formal education, aged 18-35, urban residents, no news exposure, not climate-change literate, non-agricultural workers, and no lived poverty.

Support for climate action

Climate action, which includes both efforts to mitigate climate change (by reducing greenhouse-gas emissions) and measures to adapt to current and future climate impacts, requires the involvement of a range of stakeholders, including ordinary citizens, governments, and local and international organisations.

As emphasised by the United Nations' (2015) Sustainable Development Goal No. 13, climate action requires these stakeholders to improve education, raise awareness, and enhance human and institutional capacities to combat climate change and its effects, as well as to strengthen resilience and adaptive capacities against climate-related hazards and natural disasters.

Responsibility for climate change

A major challenge in climate-change mitigation is the absence of a clearly defined sense of responsibility – both for causing the problem and for taking action to address it (Ntodwa, 2025). It is therefore critical to understand who citizens believe should be held accountable and who should take the lead on climate action.

When asked who is most responsible for causing climate change, climate-change-literate citizens attribute responsibility equally to domestic and international actors (Figure 22). Almost half (48%) of respondents believe that individuals, businesses, and governments in other countries are mainly to blame, while 47% think the people, businesses, and government of their own country are mainly responsible.

Figure 22: Who is most responsible for causing climate change? | climate-change-literate respondents | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are climate-change literate were asked: *Who do you think is most responsible for causing climate change? (Respondents who are not climate-change literate are excluded.)*

As for who bears the primary responsibility for limiting climate change and reducing its impacts, the largest share (37%) of climate-change-literate citizens believe that is their government (Figure 23). About a quarter (26%) assign this responsibility to wealthy or developed nations, while 20% believe it falls on ordinary citizens and 11% on businesses and industry.

Figure 23: Who should have primary responsibility for limiting climate change? | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are climate-change literate were asked: *Who do you think should have primary responsibility for trying to limit climate change and reduce its impact? (Respondents who are not climate-change literate are excluded.)*

A cross-country comparison reveals that the belief in government responsibility for limiting climate change is strongest among climate-change-literate respondents in Nigeria (64%) Guinea (60%), Chad (57%), Benin (54%), Guinea-Bissau (54%), Liberia (52%), and Mali (51%) (Figure 24). In contrast, few Tunisians (11%), Seychellois (13%), and Moroccans (17%) share this view; in their eyes (64% each), developed countries bear primary responsibility.

In three countries, respondents are most likely to say that ordinary citizens are most responsible for climate action: Uganda (48%), Zambia (44%), and Togo (40%).

Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question, for any country and survey round. It's easy and free at www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis.

Figure 24: Who should have primary responsibility for limiting climate change? | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are climate-change literate were asked: *Who do you think should have primary responsibility for trying to limit climate change and reduce its impact? (Respondents who are not climate-change literate are excluded.)*

For a subset of 35 African countries, we can also track whether climate-change-*aware* citizens – not climate-change-*literate* citizens[5] – have changed whom they hold primarily responsible for climate action. Among these respondents, the belief that rich or developed nations bear the main responsibility for limiting climate change rose by an average of 14 percentage points between 2021/2023 and 2024/2025 (Figure 25). Notably, this perspective has surged in Morocco (+42 percentage points), Eswatini (+33 points), Seychelles (+32 points), Lesotho (+32 points) and Mauritania (+32 points).

Over the same period, the belief that African governments should take responsibility for limiting climate change decreased by 7 percentage points (see Appendix Figure A.3). Huge declines were registered in Zimbabwe (-28 percentage points), Morocco (-27 points), Liberia (-27 points), and Mauritania (-23 points).

Figure 25: Rich/developed countries have primary responsibility | respondents who are aware of climate change | 35 countries | 2021-2025



Respondents who are aware of climate change were asked: *Who do you think should have primary responsibility for trying to limit climate change and reduce its impact? (% who say "rich or developed countries") (Respondents who are not aware of climate change are excluded.)*

While it remains essential that African governments engage in climate action, at least partially reapportioning citizen expectations of responsibility onto historical greenhouse-gas emitters with more resources is important as it increases the chances of implementing scalable climate responses. Relatedly, a previous analysis of Round 9 Afrobarometer data has shown that among climate-change-aware citizens, those who are more educated, experience less poverty, and have more access to news media sources are more likely to assign responsibility for climate action to historical emitters (Andrews et al., 2025).

Support for climate action

Figure 26 turns toward African citizens' attitudes toward climate action, focusing on three key dimensions: support for domestic government action despite potential economic costs, expectations for developed countries to lead mitigation efforts, and beliefs about developed nations' obligation to provide climate finance for adaptation in Africa. Including potential economic consequences – such as job losses or financial costs – is crucial for measuring genuine policy support.

[5] Because the question about the main cause of climate change was not asked in Round 9, we cannot identify climate-change-literate respondents.

Among climate-change-literate respondents, 85% believe that developed countries have a duty to assist poorer nations in adapting to and responding to the adverse effects of climate change. A similarly overwhelming majority (83%) say it is important for wealthy, developed countries, which have contributed most to climate change, to take immediate action to limit its future impact, even if this incurs significant costs. And about three-fourths (73%) believe it is vital for their own government to take proactive measures now to limit climate change in the future, even if such actions may be expensive or result in job losses or other economic costs.

Figure 26: Support for climate action | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are climate-change literate were asked: *For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree:*

It is important for our government to take steps now to limit climate change in the future, even if it is expensive or causes some job losses or other harm to our economy.

It is important for rich or developed countries that have done the most to cause climate change to take steps now to limit climate change in the future, even if it is costly for those countries.

Rich or developed countries that have done the most to cause climate change have an obligation to help [this country] cover the costs of adapting and responding to the negative impacts of climate change.

(Respondents who are not climate-change literate are excluded.)

Table 1 offers an illustration of country-level citizen demand for climate action and aid by developed countries as well as their own government, with dark-green fields indicating the strongest support (90% or above) and pale-yellow the weakest (below 70%).

A quick look tells us that demand registers at 70% or above for all three forms of climate action in most countries. No country drops below 50% on any indicator; Mauritius is the only country where support for climate action garners less than a clear majority (50% for government action).

Interestingly, in all countries except Malawi and Uganda, the demand for climate mitigation and aid by developed countries is even stronger than the call for action by respondents' own government.

We see particularly high demand for action in Lesotho, Madagascar, and Eswatini, with more than nine out of 10 citizens calling for climate-change mitigation and aid by developed countries and more than eight in 10 looking for climate action by their government.

Gabon and Morocco express similarly high demand for action and aid by developed countries but drop to lower levels in their support for measures by their own government.

Overall, Namibians express the weakest demand, with only 62%-67% favouring action on all three indicators.

Table 1: Support for climate action | climate-change-literate respondents | 38 countries | 2024/2025

	Rich countries should contribute to climate-action costs	Rich countries must act now to limit climate change	Government must act now to limit climate change
Lesotho	**95%**	**92%**	82%
Madagascar	**94%**	**94%**	88%
Tunisia	**94%**	**92%**	78%
Gabon	**92%**	88%	63%
Morocco	**92%**	**90%**	69%
Sierra Leone	**92%**	88%	74%
Chad	**91%**	87%	76%
Eswatini	**91%**	**92%**	81%
Senegal	**90%**	86%	74%
Tanzania	**90%**	89%	85%
Congo-Brazzaville	88%	83%	60%
Guinea	88%	87%	84%
Seychelles	88%	87%	69%
Comoros	87%	87%	77%
Liberia	87%	85%	84%
Togo	86%	81%	69%
Cabo Verde	85%	**90%**	77%
Côte d'Ivoire	85%	86%	75%
Mauritius	85%	68%	50%
Nigeria	85%	79%	72%
38-country average	**85%**	**83%**	**73%**
Guinea-Bissau	83%	87%	79%
Kenya	83%	83%	74%
Benin	82%	83%	76%
Gambia, The	82%	82%	76%
Mauritania	82%	76%	54%
Malawi	81%	81%	84%
Mali	81%	85%	80%
South Africa	81%	72%	60%
Uganda	81%	81%	84%
Botswana	80%	85%	67%
São Tomé and Príncipe	80%	79%	73%
Ghana	79%	81%	78%
Zimbabwe	79%	77%	60%
Cameroon	77%	79%	70%
Zambia	77%	78%	74%
Mozambique	75%	75%	71%
Angola	74%	74%	67%
Namibia	67%	65%	62%
Key: 50%-69%	70%-79%	80%-89%	**90%-100**

(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" with each statement)

These results demonstrate strong public backing for climate action across Africa, with support exceeding 70% for all three measures in most countries. Critically, a higher proportion of climate-change-literate citizens in most countries demand action by developed countries than by their own governments, which may reflect their awareness of Africa's minimal contribution to historical emissions and recognition of its disproportionate vulnerability to climate impacts.

Africans' mixed support for climate-change mitigation policies

Although historically Africa has contributed much less to climate change than other parts of the world, countries such as South Africa and Equatorial Guinea now emit levels of CO_2 per capita that are similar to those emitted by Austria, the Netherlands, and Portugal (Our World in Data, 2025). We therefore asked respondents for their views on a range of climate-change mitigation policy options that could help to reduce or remove greenhouse-gas emissions and thus slow the warming of the planet.

Fully four out of five Africans (81%) believe their government should invest in improving infrastructure to help their countries withstand extreme climate events such as droughts and floods (Figure 27). Almost as many (78%) want their government to pressure wealthy or developed countries to provide climate-change aid.

About half (51%) support a government ban on tree cutting for firewood or charcoal, even if alternative energy sources are more expensive. But 43% would oppose such a policy.

And fewer than half (47%) of Africans favour a policy requiring everyone to switch to cookstoves that use cleaner fuels, such as electricity, gas, or propane, if doing so might make cooking more expensive.

Figure 27: Support for climate-change mitigation policies | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *There are many policies that our government could adopt in order to respond to changing weather patterns and environmental degradation. Please tell me whether you disagree or agree with each of the following options:*

Make it illegal for people to cut down trees for firewood or charcoal, even if it means we have to pay more for other sources of energy.
Require everyone to switch to cookstoves that use cleaner fuels like electricity, gas, or propane, even if it means we have to pay more to cook our food.
Invest in improving infrastructure so our country can withstand more extreme floods and droughts.
Put more pressure on rich and developed countries to provide resources to help [citizens of the country] who are affected by climate change or changes in weather conditions.

Another policy that claims broad public support is investment in wind and solar technologies for electricity generation. On average across a subset of 33 countries where the question was asked, more than two-thirds (69%) of respondents endorse the idea, even if it leads to higher electricity prices (Figure 28). Support is particularly strong in Mali (where 85% "agree" or "strongly agree"), Chad (84%), Liberia (80%), and Comoros (80%). Even in the countries registering the weakest support, half or more of citizens are in favour: Angola (50%), Mauritius (51%), and Mozambique (53%).

Figure 28: Support for investing in wind and solar technologies to generate electricity | 33 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *There are many policies that our government could adopt in order to respond to changing weather patterns and environmental degradation. Please tell me whether you disagree or agree with each of the following options: Invest in wind and solar technologies to generate electricity, even if it increases the price.*

Another option to reduce CO_2 emissions is to electrify public transport. However, in the 22 countries in which this question was asked, fewer than half (46%) of citizens want their government to promote the use of electric taxis or buses if it might mean higher fares (Figure 29). Comoros (66%), Senegal (58%), and Nigeria (53%) express relatively strong support for these cleaner transport options, but only about one in three Batswana (31%) and Kenyans (35%) agree.

Figure 29: Support for promoting electric taxis and buses (%) | 22 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents were asked: *There are many policies that our government could adopt in order to respond to changing weather patterns and environmental degradation. Please tell me whether you disagree or agree with each of the following options: Promote the use of taxis and buses that run on electricity, even if that means we have to pay higher fares.*

These findings demonstrate strong public support for certain climate actions while revealing cost sensitivity around others. Respondents overwhelmingly endorse infrastructure investment to withstand extreme weather events and government pressure on wealthy nations for climate aid, reflecting both pragmatic concerns about resilience and expectations of international support – even among those who are not climate-change literate. However, public backing weakens considerably for policies that would directly increase household expenses, particularly those affecting daily necessities like cooking fuel and transportation.

Conclusion

Findings from Afrobarometer's Round 10 surveys across 38 African countries signal the scope and scale with which climate change is impacting ordinary citizens and challenging their governments.

Six in 10 Africans report that they or their family have had to make significant life adjustments to adapt to changing weather patterns, affecting a wide range of activities from where they get water to what they plant and eat to where they live.

Still, only about four in 10 Africans are climate-change literate, meaning they are both aware of climate change and understand that it is driven by human activity. This understanding has been shown to help move people beyond short-term coping adaptations to support for transformative responses to climate change (Agrawal & Perrin 2009).

Indeed, among climate-change-literate Africans, the call to action is loud and clear. Most want their government to take urgent climate action, including investing in infrastructure and alternative energies. But even stronger majorities demand action by rich, developed countries, including in the form of climate aid to poorer nations. While Africans most commonly assign primary responsibility for climate action to their national government, there has been a notable shift in recent years toward holding wealthy nations accountable for their contributions to the climate crisis.

Mixed results on support for climate-change mitigation policies suggests that successful strategies in Africa will need to balance environmental goals with affordability concerns, ensuring that the transition to cleaner technologies does not place undue financial burdens on populations already facing economic challenges. This is particularly important from an equity perspective, as Africans are being asked to bear costs for a crisis they did little to create.

These insights may help policy makers and activists working to design targeted interventions that build the necessary political will for equitable climate action. Ultimately, they point to a need for continuous efforts to improve climate-change literacy, empower communities to adapt, and advocate for international collaboration to secure a resilient and sustainable future for the continent and the world.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 10 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds

Country	Round 10 fieldwork	Previous survey rounds
Angola	March-April 2024	2019, 2022
Benin	Jan.-Feb. 2024	2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2022
Botswana	July 2024	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022
Burkina Faso	N/A	2008, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2022
Cabo Verde	Aug.-Sept. 2024	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022
Cameroon	Feb.-March 2024	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2022
Chad	Feb.-April 2025	N/A
Comoros	May-June 2025	N/A
Congo-Brazzaville	Sept.-Oct. 2024	2023
Côte d'Ivoire	Jan. 2024	2013, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021
Eswatini	April-May 2025	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2022
Ethiopia	N/A	2013, 2020, 2023
Gabon	April-May 2024	2015, 2017, 2020, 2021
Gambia, The	April-May 2024	2018, 2021, 2022
Ghana	Aug. 2024	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022
Guinea	May-June 2024	2013, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2022
Guinea-Bissau	July-Sept. 2025	N/A
Kenya	April-May 2024	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2019, 2021
Lesotho	March 2024	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2022
Liberia	July-Aug. 2024	2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2020, 2022
Madagascar	Oct.-Nov. 2024	2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2018, 2022
Malawi	Aug. 2024	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2022
Mali	Oct.-Nov. 2024	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2022
Mauritania	Dec. 2024-Jan. 2025	2022
Mauritius	April-May 2024	2012, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2022
Morocco	Feb.-March 2024	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2022
Mozambique	July-Sept. 2025	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2022
Namibia	March 2024	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019, 2021
Niger	N/A	2013, 2015, 2018, 2020, 2021
Nigeria	June-July 2024	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2020, 2022
São Tomé and Príncipe	Sept.-Nov. 2024	2015, 2018, 2022
Senegal	Feb.-March 2025	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2021, 2022
Seychelles	Aug. 2024	2022
Sierra Leone	March-April 2025	2012, 2015, 2018, 2020, 2022
South Africa	June-Aug. 2025	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2022
Sudan	N/A	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021, 2022
Tanzania	June-July 2024	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2021, 2022
Togo	July 2024	2012, 2014, 2017, 2021, 2022
Tunisia	Feb.-March 2024	2013, 2015, 2018, 2020, 2022
Uganda	Jan.-Feb. 2024	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019, 2022
Zambia	July 2024	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020, 2022
Zimbabwe	June 2024	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2021, 2022

Table A.2: Climate-change awareness, cause, and literacy | 29 countries | 2016-2025

Country	Awareness		Caused by human activity		Climate-change literacy	
	2016/2018	2024/2025	2016/2018	2024/2025	2016/2018	2024/2025
Benin	61%	46%	74%	75%	45%	34%
Botswana	51%	42%	67%	65%	33%	27%
Cabo Verde	71%	76%	63%	77%	45%	58%
Cameroon	72%	56%	69%	78%	50%	44%
Côte d'Ivoire	54%	57%	71%	81%	38%	47%
Gabon	55%	47%	85%	77%	39%	34%
Gambia, The	72%	79%	65%	79%	61%	61%
Ghana	60%	68%	69%	76%	39%	54%
Guinea	52%	46%	83%	86%	35%	35%
Kenya	59%	64%	73%	82%	49%	55%
Lesotho	65%	61%	67%	61%	46%	50%
Liberia	44%	54%	56%	78%	29%	33%
Madagascar	54%	68%	83%	88%	30%	53%
Malawi	78%	77%	75%	83%	45%	63%
Mali	64%	63%	56%	69%	59%	64%
Mauritius	83%	83%	81%	79%	36%	44%
Morocco	54%	67%	80%	81%	67%	66%
Mozambique	52%	47%	47%	65%	43%	54%
Namibia	52%	47%	54%	64%	24%	30%
Nigeria	50%	27%	61%	72%	28%	30%
São Tomé & Príncipe	56%	53%	72%	78%	31%	19%
Senegal	41%	36%	57%	76%	48%	39%
Sierra Leone	41%	61%	72%	88%	32%	40%
South Africa	31%	38%	67%	69%	29%	32%
Tanzania	55%	49%	89%	81%	28%	42%
Togo	33%	37%	79%	78%	28%	30%
Tunisia	78%	66%	70%	67%	44%	38%
Uganda	54%	59%	79%	83%	23%	25%
Zambia	73%	56%	68%	74%	62%	55%
29-country average	57%	56%	70%	77%	40%	43%

Table A.3: Climate-change impacts | 38 countries | 2024/2025

	Increased severity of			Climate change making life somewhat/ much worse
	Droughts	Crop failure	Floods	
Angola	49%	45%	50%	70%
Benin	56%	67%	45%	84%
Botswana	70%	79%	7%	89%
Cabo Verde	71%	64%	32%	87%
Cameroon	59%	57%	39%	78%
Chad	48%	50%	52%	87%
Comoros	48%	48%	39%	62%
Congo-Brazzaville	32%	39%	51%	80%
Côte d'Ivoire	47%	56%	28%	80%
Eswatini	48%	59%	33%	90%
Gabon	41%	39%	53%	90%
Gambia, The	32%	36%	49%	69%
Ghana	30%	32%	22%	73%
Guinea	71%	53%	42%	89%
Guinea-Bissau	35%	39%	41%	48%
Kenya	42%	48%	39%	71%
Lesotho	91%	87%	50%	94%
Liberia	38%	31%	38%	73%
Madagascar	80%	77%	46%	89%
Malawi	77%	86%	44%	87%
Mali	47%	39%	48%	81%
Mauritania	33%	17%	18%	70%
Mauritius	46%	68%	90%	95%
Morocco	86%	65%	11%	78%
Mozambique	51%	51%	38%	70%
Namibia	66%	58%	20%	71%
Nigeria	28%	30%	32%	78%
São Tomé and Príncipe	38%	28%	29%	67%
Senegal	33%	46%	39%	71%
Seychelles	24%	19%	21%	79%
Sierra Leone	32%	28%	20%	76%
South Africa	21%	25%	34%	79%
Tanzania	18%	30%	28%	82%
Togo	49%	45%	38%	87%
Tunisia	77%	54%	10%	80%
Uganda	53%	70%	32%	77%
Zambia	82%	85%	20%	93%
Zimbabwe	94%	95%	12%	93%
38-country average	**51%**	**51%**	**35%**	**80%**

Table A.4: Marginal effects from probit model estimation

	Change water consumption	Change outdoor work	Move to another place	Change crops	Change livestock rearing
Men	0.00680	0.0178***	0.0171***	0.0155***	0.0350***
Primary education	-0.00260	-0.00672	-0.0209***	0.0357***	-0.0160***
Secondary	-0.00914	-0.0246***	-0.0290***	0.0143**	-0.0414***
Post-secondary	-0.0139*	-0.0280***	-0.0359***	0.00827	-0.0454***
36-45 years	-0.00784	-0.0141***	-0.0337***	-0.0160***	-0.0166***
46-55 years	-0.00543	-0.0195***	-0.0536***	-0.00823	-0.0181***
56 years and over	0.00285	-0.0174***	-0.0869***	-0.0191***	-0.0239***
Rural	0.0330***	0.0420***	-0.0179***	0.117***	0.114***
News exposure	0.0714***	0.0669***	0.0158***	0.0436***	0.0590***
Climate-change literacy	0.0506***	0.0594***	0.0151***	0.0732***	0.0517***
Agricultural workers	-0.0162***	-0.00119	-0.00456	0.0620***	0.0282***
Low lived poverty	0.0607***	0.0664***	0.0527***	0.0744***	0.0602***
Moderate lived poverty	0.1000***	0.105***	0.0954***	0.121***	0.0891***
High lived poverty	0.163***	0.151***	0.132***	0.146***	0.117***
N	50,139	50,139	50,139	50,139	50,139

** p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01*

Table A.5: Marginal effects on climate-change adaptation

	Zero-inflated Poisson regression model	
Men	0.0865***	(0.01)
Primary education	-0.00440	(0.02)
Secondary	-0.0828***	(0.02)
Post-secondary	-0.105***	(0.02)
36-45 years	-0.0790***	(0.01)
46-55 years	-0.0945***	(0.02)
56 years and over	-0.142***	(0.02)
Rural	0.287***	(0.01)
News exposure	0.262***	(0.02)
Climate-change literacy	0.249***	(0.01)
Agricultural workers	0.0767***	(0.02)
Low lived poverty	0.307***	(0.02)
Moderate lived poverty	0.503***	(0.02)
High lived poverty	0.703***	(0.02)
N	50,139	

*Standard errors in parentheses; * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01*

Figure A.1: Climate change caused by human activity | 38 countries | 2024/2025



Respondents who are aware of climate change were asked: *People have different ideas about what causes climate change. What about you? Which of the following do you think is the main cause of climate change, or haven't you heard enough to say: Human activity, like cutting down forests, or burning fuel and other activities that pollute the atmosphere? Natural weather patterns or natural processes?*

Figure A.2: Marginal effects on change in crops or food and livestock rearing



Figure A.3: Government of the country has primary responsibility for limiting climate change | respondents who are aware of climate change | 35 countries | 2021-2025



Respondents who are aware of climate change were asked: *Who do you think should have primary responsibility for trying to limit climate change and reduce its impact? (% who say "The government of the country") (Respondents who are not aware of climate change are excluded.)*

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Afrobarometer, a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in Ghana, is a pan-African, non-partisan research network. Regional coordination of national partners in about 35 countries is provided by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Michigan State University and the University of Malawi provide technical support to the network.

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