

Working Paper No. 212

# **Demanding more: Does education increase public backing for good governance in Africa?**

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## Abstract

This paper investigates how education shapes public attitudes toward transparent and accountable governance in Africa. Much of the research on governance and education has focused on Western contexts, leaving the African perspective underexplored. Afrobarometer surveys show that many Africans consistently support transparent and accountable governance, with growing education and awareness of anti-corruption efforts across the continent. Yet little is known about how education influences support for good governance. We investigate this using data from Afrobarometer Round 9 surveys conducted in 39 African countries between late 2021 and mid-2023. Our results show the significant role of education in shaping attitudes: Both greater access to education and country-level measures of higher educational attainment are associated with increased support for good governance. Finally, we highlight the opportunities that arise from this relationship.

**Keywords:** education; transparency; accountability; corruption; governance; democracy; public attitudes; Africa; Afrobarometer

## Introduction

Accountability and transparency are key elements of good governance and are essential for sustainable development and democratic stability in Africa. While these two principles work hand in hand, public support for them varies considerably across African countries (Ohamadike & Orakwe, 2024). As Hood (2010) describes, they function as “matching parts” of governance. Transparency provides citizens with access to government information, equipping them to hold officials accountable (Ohamadike & Orakwe, 2024), while accountability demands that public officials explain and justify their actions and decisions, often by responding to citizens’ expectations and demands (Armah-Attah, Ampratwum, & Paller, 2014).

While scholars have long linked transparency and accountability to effective governance, citizens differ in the extent to which they value or support these principles (Ohamadike & Orakwe, 2024). Education may play a key role in shaping these attitudes, a topic that has been studied in Western contexts but remains underexplored in the Global South, particularly in Africa.

We hypothesise that higher levels of education are associated with greater citizen support for transparent and accountable governance. Education enhances cognitive skills, critical thinking, and civic awareness, and this can empower individuals to demand better governance and engage more actively in the political process (Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007; Apergis, 2018). More educated citizens are likely to be more informed about the importance of good governance in fostering development. They may also be more aware of government corruption and inadequacies in government responsiveness to citizen needs – issues that are prevalent in many African countries.

The emphasis on political education in many African educational institutions may also enhance awareness. For example, Stellenbosch University in South Africa signed a memorandum of understanding last year with South Africa’s Special Investigations Unit to expand public awareness and intensify education about anti-corruption practices (Sunday, 2024). This heightened awareness could create a stronger demand for good governance. Furthermore, education may enhance internal political efficacy. Better-educated individuals may feel more capable of understanding and influencing political processes, which can strengthen their belief that they deserve a say in how they are governed (Lipset, 1959; Kamens, 1988; Harber & Oryema, 2014).

Conversely, lower levels of education may result in citizens having a weaker grasp of their country’s political climate and the benefits of transparency and accountability of public officials. Consequently, less-educated citizens may be less inclined to demand good governance.

To test this hypothesis, we conducted a multilevel logistic regression analysis using data from the Afrobarometer Round 9 survey. Our findings indicate a significant association between education and attitudes at both an individual and a country level. Being more educated is correlated with increased support for transparent and accountable governance, as is citizenship in a country with greater educational access and attainment. Conversely, lower levels of education are associated with less support for these principles.

This paper is structured as follows. First, we review the literature on the role of education in demanding good governance. Next, we discuss the research methodology, including the data, data sources, and analytical techniques. In the results section, findings from a sample of 54,436 Africans are presented. Concluding discussions follow at the end.

## Education and democratic governance

Formal education has been closely associated with democratic governance since the 19th century (Mattes & Mughogho, 2009). From development theories to socialisation and political awareness theories, education is widely considered to be a key element of the democratic process (Lipset, 1959; Glaeser, Ponzetto, & Shleifer, 2007). However, while the body of

literature is extensive, education's role in democracy in non-Western countries remains underexplored. Further, much of the literature has looked at the role of education more broadly without testing some of the core theories regarding education and democratic governance, such as how it shapes perceptions of accountability and transparency.

The conceptual underpinnings of education and democracy first emerged with the development of modernisation theory. Within this theory, education is seen as vital for the democratic development of states. Proponents of modernisation theory posit that education is not only vital for economic growth, through the promotion of human capital formation, but is also important for the consolidation and preservation of democracy (Diamond, 1999; Lipset, 1959; Mattes & Mughogho, 2009). The underlying logic is that education can help inform and promote political consciousness among people, allowing them to be more active within the political system. This, in turn, increases citizens' desire to protect and support more accountable and transparent governance, which ultimately plays a role in consolidating democracy.

Furthermore, modernisation theorists argue that people with greater levels of education feel more confident and capable of making decisions (Harber & Oryema, 2014). This means that people will be more vocal in how they want to be governed because they feel their opinions regarding political choices merit greater attention. However, due to the Western-centric focus of modernisation theory, much of the empirical research has hitherto been conducted in the West (Evans & Rose, 2007; Demarest & Kuppens, 2025). This led to the Global South, particularly the African continent, being overlooked in empirical studies and policies being built from research done in a different context.

Additionally, most studies focusing on education tend to explore the broad concept of democracy or perceptions of democracy. For example, Geoffrey Evans and Pauline Rose (2007) explore how education levels affect perceptions of democracy. However, despite transparency and accountability being key components of good governance, they are often overlooked.

This paper seeks to address these gaps by leveraging Afrobarometer's survey data to better understand how education shapes support for transparency and accountability in Africa. In doing so, the paper aims to provide insights into the complexities of African democracies and better understand how education can, if at all, promote good governance.


## **Data and methodology**

### *Data*

The data used in this study were obtained from various sources, including the Afrobarometer Round 9 survey covering 39 African countries. The survey aimed to create a representative cross-section of adult citizens in each country by employing a national probability sample of 1,200 to 2,400 respondents. This produces country-level results with margins of sampling error of between +/-3 and +/-2 percentage points at a 95% confidence level (Afrobarometer, 2022a). To ensure accuracy, random selection methods were utilised at every stage of sampling, providing every adult citizen with an equal chance of being selected for an interview (Afrobarometer, 2022a). Moreover, a probability proportionate to the population size was used whenever possible, ensuring that more populous geographic units had a proportionally higher likelihood of being included in the sample (Afrobarometer, n.d.).

### *Dependent variables*

Afrobarometer surveys contain questions that explore respondents' attitudes toward various sociopolitical and economic issues in Africa, with two specific questions of interest for this study. The first focuses on political accountability, while the second measures support for transparency in government.



### Survey question relating to political accountability

Question 18: *Which of the following statements is closest to your view?*

Statement 1: *It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.*

Statement 2: *It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.*

Respondents had the following options: "Strongly agree with Statement 1," "Agree with Statement 1," "Agree with Statement 2," "Strongly agree with Statement 2," "Agree with neither," and "Don't know."

### Survey question relating to government transparency

Question 75: *For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: Information held by public authorities is only for use by government officials; it should not have to be shared with the public.*

The response options for this question were: "Strongly disagree," "Disagree," "Neither agree nor disagree," "Agree," "Strongly agree," and "Don't know."

We create a dichotomous dummy variable from the responses to each of the two questions. Ohamadike and Orakwe (2024) note that this approach simplifies interpretation by reducing responses to a clear "agree" vs. "disagree" comparison, which works well given the consistency in each group. It also allows for assessing how specific responses influence the dependent variables. For example, categorising location as "rural" (1) vs. "urban/semi-urban" (0) provides a clear distinction between groups and helps to show how they perceive transparent and accountable governance and the factors shaping their views.


For the question on political accountability, we code "Strongly agree" and "Agree" responses to Statement 2 as 1, while all other responses are coded as 0 to indicate lower support for political accountability. For the question on transparency, we code all "Strongly disagree" and "Disagree" responses as 1 to indicate higher support for transparency of information held by public authorities, while the rest are coded as 0 to indicate lower levels of such support. Respondents who answered "Don't know" or refused to answer were included in the data in this part and coded as 0. However, we conducted a separate analysis excluding these responses from the relevant variables, and the main findings remained consistent (see Table A.1 and Table A.2 in the Appendix).

In principle, supporting the transparency of public authorities complements holding officials accountable by providing citizens with the information needed to oversee and assess their actions (Androniceanu, 2021; Ohamadike & Orakwe, 2024). In our data set, a 0.07 correlation ( $p < 0.001$ ) exists between the two dependent variables, a relatively low correlation coefficient, indicating that these are distinct concepts in respondents' eyes, yet they are related at a statistically significant level.

Figures 1 and 2 show average perceptions related to accountability and transparency from the Round 9 Afrobarometer survey in 39 African countries. Figure 1 shows that, on average, 60% of respondents support government-to-citizen accountability. Ghana, Botswana, Kenya, and Zambia record the greatest support for political accountability, while Sudan, Niger, and Angola display the lowest levels of support for political accountability.

Similarly, Figure 2 depicts support for the transparency of information held by public authorities. Across 39 countries, 55% of African citizens support the disclosure of public-sector information. Botswana and Madagascar show the highest levels of support, while Mauritania and Sudan exhibit the lowest.

**Figure 1: Support for government-to-citizen accountability** | 39 African countries  
| Afrobarometer | 2021/2023




**Respondents were asked:** Which of the following statements is closest to your view?

Statement 1: It is more important to have a government that can get things done, even if we have no influence over what it does.

Statement 2: It is more important for citizens to be able to hold government accountable, even if that means it makes decisions more slowly.

(% who "agree" or "strongly agree" with Statement 2)

**Figure 2: Support for the transparency of information held by public authorities**  
 | 39 African countries | Afrobarometer | 2021/2023



**Respondents were asked:** For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you disagree or agree: Information held by public authorities is only for use by government officials; it should not have to be shared with the public. (% who “disagree” or “strongly disagree”)

The results indicate that majorities of Africans support government accountability (60%) and transparency (55%), although there is significant variation across countries. Greater support in countries such as Kenya and Botswana suggests stronger democratic norms, whereas less support in Sudan, Niger, and Mauritania may reflect weaker democratic institutions or limited civic empowerment.

### *Independent variables*

The main independent variables, focused on self-reported and country-level measures of educational attainment, are sourced from Afrobarometer's Round 9 survey (individuals' self-reported level of education) and the United Nations Development Programme's education index scores for the surveyed countries in 2022 (UNDP, 2024). These two variables provide a comprehensive way of examining how education shapes public backing for good governance. The education index provides country-level data that complements the self-reported measure, allowing for cross-validation of findings and testing the robustness of the self-reported educational levels (Ohamadike & Orakwe, 2024).

We use the country-level measure to examine whether the overall educational level in a country impacts citizens' perceptions of governance. As societies become better educated, norms may emerge that emphasise citizens' right to participate in governance. Such norms may affect everyone, regardless of their level of education.

#### **Self-reported measure of educational attainment**

Afrobarometer's Round 9 survey asked respondents:

Question 94: *What is your highest level of education?*


The response options were: "No formal schooling," "Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling)," "Some primary schooling," "Primary school completed," "Intermediate school or some secondary school/high school," "Secondary school/high school completed," "Post-secondary qualifications, other than university, e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college," "Some university," "University completed," "Postgraduate," and "Refused."

For this question, we code responses from 0 to 9 in the above order and exclude "Missing," "Refused," and "Don't know" responses. We do not dichotomise this variable since it is difficult to establish clear thresholds for dichotomising low and high educational levels.

#### **Country-level measure of educational attainment**

The country-level education index was constructed using UNDP data for mean years of schooling and expected years of schooling indicators. The mean years of schooling of a country's population indicate the average number of years spent in school for those aged 25 years and above (Smits & Permanyer, 2019; Ohamadike, 2023). The aspirational target for this indicator for the year 2025 is 15 years; thus, the indicator is measured on a scale of 0 to 15 (Smits & Permanyer, 2019; UNDP, 2022).

The expected years of schooling, on the other hand, "is the number of years a child of school-entrance age (ages 5-24) is expected to spend in school, or university, including years spent on repetition," should enrolment rates remain the same for the duration of the child's life (UNDP, 2022; World Bank, n.d.). The aspirational aim for this indicator is 18 years. On both measures, the higher the value, the better a country performs on educational access and attainment. To calculate the education index, we obtained the simple average of the two indicators expressed as an index by scaling with the corresponding maxima.



### Individual-level control variables

The individual-level control variables are sourced from Afrobarometer's Round 9 survey. People's experiences of poverty likely shape their support for good governance. To capture this, we use Afrobarometer's Lived Poverty Index (LPI) (Mattes, 2020), which is based on five Afrobarometer Round 9 questions:

Questions 6a-e: *Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: Enough food to eat? Enough clean water for home use? Medicines or medical treatment? Enough fuel to cook your food? A cash income?*

A range of response options was offered: "Never," "Just once or twice," "Several times," "Many times," "Always," and "Don't know." We exclude "Refused" and "Don't know" responses from the LPI calculation.

We control for demographic variables (age, gender, and urban/rural location) since these are standard in the literature (Ohamadike & Orakwe, 2024; Isbell, 2023). Moreover, we control for citizens' trust in the ruling party, as those who trust the party may be more inclined to perceive it as transparent and accountable, consistent with the principal-agent framework (Mabillard & Pasquier, 2015).

The individual-level control variables (except lived poverty) are represented as dummy variables (0, 1) derived from various survey questions (Table 1).

**Table 1: Coding scheme for individual-level control variables**

Variable name	Coding categories
Age	Youth (aged 35 years and below) = 1
	Non-youth (aged 36 years and above) = 0
Gender	Female = 1
	Male = 0
Location	Rural = 1
	Urban/Semi-urban = 0
Trust the ruling party	Distrust the ruling party = 1
	Trust the ruling party = 0

### Country-level control variables

We use the same country-level control variables as a similar study by Ohamadike and Orakwe (2024) to account for contextual factors that might influence the relationship between education and public attitudes toward good governance (Table 2). These variables were drawn from 2022 data across multiple databases. Population growth is measured using the population data from the World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2023a). We included this as rapid population growth can strain the delivery of socioeconomic and political goods when resources are limited (Simmons, 1977; Gallup, Sachs, & Mellinger, 1998; Ezeh, Bongaarts, & Mberu, 2012).

To capture democratic governance, we use the liberal democracy index from Varieties of Democracy (2024). We include this given evidence that democracies in Africa tend to outperform autocracies on governance and socioeconomic outcomes, and citizens in more democratic contexts may engage more critically with politics (Alence, 2023). We also control for political stability using the World Bank's (2023b) "political stability and absence of violence/terrorism" indicator, which captures how differing levels of stability may shape support for good governance.

Finally, we conduct a correlation analysis to check for multicollinearity among predictors, with results presented in the Appendix.

**Table 2: Summary statistics for each variable (N=54,436) | 39 African countries<sup>1</sup>**

Statistic	Mean	St. dev.	Min.	Pctl. (25)	Median	Pctl. (75)	Max.
Support for political accountability	0.6	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Support for transparency of information	0.6	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Rural	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Lived Poverty Index	1.4	0.9	0.0	0.6	1.4	2.0	4.0
Youth	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Distrust ruling party	0.3	0.5	0	0	0	1	1
Female	0.5	0.5	0	0	1	1	1
Educational attainment (Afrobarometer)	3.6	2.3	0	2	4	5	9
Education index (UNDP)	0.5	0.1	0.2 (Niger)	0.4	0.5	0.6	0.8 (South Africa)
GDP per capita (constant 2015 US\$)	2,398.6	2,706.0	453.9 (Madagascar)	888.2	1,395.2	2,449.6	14,461.5 (Seychelles)
Political stability	-0.5	0.8	-2.5 (Mali)	-0.9	-0.5	-0.1	1.1 (Botswana)
Liberal democracy	0.3	0.2	0.1 (Sudan)	0.2	0.3	0.5	0.7 (Seychelles)
Population	33,653,860	42,680,636	119,878 (Seychelles)	5,302,681	22,593,590	47,249,585	218,541,212 (Nigeria)

### Method of data analysis

We conducted the analyses for this study using Version 4.2.1 of the R statistical software. Given the hierarchical structure of the data and the binary nature of the outcome variables, we employed multilevel logistic regression to estimate the impact of both individual-level and country-level predictors on measures of good governance. Multilevel models, also known as hierarchical or mixed-effects models, are often used in regression analysis for nested or clustered data, where cases within the same group are expected to exhibit similarities but remain independent from cases in other groups (Nganje, 2022). In this study, the observations are clustered by the countries included in the survey, accounting for country-specific factors that might influence the results.

Employing multilevel or mixed models means we can examine the relationship between predictor and outcome variables both within and between groups (Fox & Weisberg, 2019). These models include both fixed and random effects: Fixed effects assume that the relationship between outcome variables and predictors is consistent for all observations, while random effects capture variation in the predictors' effects between groups. Statistical significance in this study was determined at the 95% ( $p < 0.05$ ) confidence level.

<sup>1</sup> The re-coded versions of the individual-level variables are presented here. This excludes "Don't know," "Refused," and "Missing" values.

## Results

### Support for political accountability

The regression results (Table 3) suggest that education is vital in shaping citizens' support for political accountability. In both models, the Afrobarometer (self-reported) measure of educational attainment is positively and significantly associated with support for political accountability. Although weak, the coefficients in both Model 1 (0.025) and Model 2 (0.032) are statistically significant at the  $p < 0.01$  level, suggesting that individuals with higher levels of education are more likely to endorse political accountability. This indicates that education may foster a greater awareness of governance issues and strengthen citizens' demand for political accountability in Africa.

**Table 3: Support for accountability (logit, mixed effects)**

Dependent variable: Support for political accountability		
	Binary logit (M1)	Mixed effects (M2)
Educational attainment (Afrobarometer)	0.025*** (0.005)	0.032*** (0.005)
Education index (UNDP)	1.024*** (0.116)	0.739 (0.747)
Female	-0.069*** (0.018)	-0.074*** (0.018)
Youth	-0.051*** (0.018)	-0.046** (0.019)
Rural	0.008 (0.019)	-0.039* (0.020)
Distrust ruling party	0.171*** (0.020)	0.179*** (0.021)
Lived Poverty Index	-0.054*** (0.010)	0.017 (0.011)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.121*** (0.018)	-0.074 (0.113)
Political stability	0.205*** (0.020)	0.233* (0.133)
Liberal democracy	0.479*** (0.069)	0.574 (0.452)
Population (log)	0.103*** (0.008)	0.100* (0.054)
Constant	-0.922*** (0.180)	-1.210 (1.146)
Observations	54,290	54,290
Log likelihood	-35,825.640	-35,019.060
Akaike inf. crit.	71,675.290	70,064.120
Bayesian inf. crit.		70,179.850

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

The second education variable, the UNDP's education index, also shows a strong positive and significant relationship with support for accountability in Model 1. However, in Model 2 (the mixed-effects model), the relationship weakens and becomes statistically insignificant.

This contrast between the models may indicate that while self-reported educational measures correlate with political accountability, country-level ones might be more variable in their relationship with political accountability when country-specific characteristics/differences are controlled. Overall, both of our measures of educational attainment demonstrate that education is associated with greater public demand for accountability in Africa.

Other control variables, including gender and age, also show statistically significant effects: Women and young people are less likely than men and older generations to support political accountability. Meanwhile, distrust in the ruling party is positively associated with support for accountability, while lived poverty and GDP per capita (both measures of economic prosperity) are negatively associated with demand for accountability in Model 1. By contrast, liberal democracy and political accountability are strongly associated with demand for accountability in Model 1, though the relationship weakens in the mixed-effects model.

### *Support for transparency of information*

Table 4 further highlights the important role of education in public demand for good governance in Africa. In both models, the self-reported Afrobarometer measure of educational attainment is positively associated with support for transparency of information held by public authorities, with statistically significant ( $p < 0.01$ ) coefficients of 0.055 in Model 1 and 0.063 in Model 2, although the coefficients are also weak. This suggests that as education levels increase, so too does public demand for transparency in government-held information. The UNDP's education index shows a strong, significant positive effect in Model 1 (binary logit), though again this effect weakens when we introduce country-level mixed effects in Model 2.

Beyond education, distrust in the ruling party remains a robust predictor of support for transparency, while (contrary to results in Table 3) lived poverty shows a significant positive association with transparency demand, particularly in the mixed-effects model. GDP per capita is negatively associated with support for transparency in both models, though the relationship is not statistically significant in Model 2. Political stability and liberal democracy also show positive relationships with transparency in Model 1.

Taken together, the findings from both regression results show a positive association between education and public demand for good governance in Africa in the form of increased support for political accountability and transparency of information. This suggests that individuals with higher educational attainment are more likely than less-educated citizens to prioritise and advocate for greater transparency and accountability from their governments.

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**Table 4: Support for transparency of information held by public authorities (logit, mixed effects)**

Dependent variable: Support for transparency		
	Binary logit (M1)	Mixed effects (M2)
Educational attainment (Afrobarometer)	0.055*** (0.005)	0.063*** (0.005)
Education index (UNDP)	1.395*** (0.114)	1.068 (0.695)
Female	-0.059*** (0.018)	-0.061*** (0.018)
Youth	0.012 (0.018)	0.022 (0.019)
Rural	-0.021 (0.019)	-0.037* (0.020)
Distrust ruling party	0.261*** (0.019)	0.228*** (0.021)
Lived Poverty Index	0.023** (0.010)	0.043*** (0.011)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.196*** (0.017)	-0.153 (0.105)
Political stability	0.069*** (0.019)	0.131 (0.126)
Liberal democracy	0.442*** (0.068)	0.627 (0.428)
Population (log)	0.094*** (0.008)	0.104** (0.051)
Constant	-0.934*** (0.177)	-1.332 (1.067)
Observations	54,290	54,290
Log likelihood	-36,660.780	-35,882.670
Akaike inf. crit.	73,345.570	71,791.340
Bayesian inf. crit.		71,907.070

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

## Conclusion

This study investigates the role of education in public attitudes toward transparent and accountable governance in Africa. While much of the research on governance and education has focused on Western contexts, education and awareness of anti-corruption efforts have been growing across Africa, with many Africans voicing support for transparency and accountability of governance in several Afrobarometer survey rounds (Sunday, 2024; Afrobarometer, 2022b; Afrobarometer, 2023). In this study, we examined the relationship between education and this support in Africa. We hypothesised that higher levels of education increase citizen support for transparent and accountable governance by enhancing cognitive skills, internal political efficacy, critical thinking, civic awareness, and political participation.

We sourced data primarily from Afrobarometer's Round 9 survey. Supplementary data were obtained from the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), World Development

Indicators, Worldwide Governance Indicators, and Varieties of Democracy databases. To analyse the data, we employed mixed-effects binary logistic regression.


The regression results show that both self-reported and country-level measures of educational attainment are related to public attitudes toward transparent and accountable governance in Africa. The self-reported measure gauges people's actual levels of education in the countries, while we use the country-level measure to examine whether the overall educational level in a country impacts citizens' perceptions of governance. The findings reveal a consistent, positive association between higher educational attainment and stronger support for both political accountability and transparency in government-held information. The results also reveal that sociopolitical factors included as control variables, such as GDP per capita, gender, scepticism toward ruling parties, country-level political stability, and liberal democracy, are correlated with support for good governance as well.

Overall, the findings demonstrate the importance of investing in education as a means of strengthening governance across the continent. As citizens achieve higher levels of education, their civic awareness, cognitive abilities, internal efficacy, and critical thinking skills may improve, leading them to demand greater accountability and transparency and to challenge corruption. This highlights the potential of education to drive improvements in governance and foster stronger, more accountable political institutions in Africa.



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
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## Appendix

Figure A.1 shows the correlation of all variables included in our analysis. The results indicate that there is no multicollinearity among the predictors included in our models.

**Figure A.1: Correlation of all variables used in the analysis**



Tables A.1 and A.2 below show our regression results with "Don't know," "Refused," and "Missing" responses excluded. The results are very similar to our main results. They show a positive association between education and public demand for good governance in Africa in the form of increased support for political accountability and transparency of information.

**Table A.1: Support for accountability (logit, mixed effects) with "Don't know," "Refused," and "Missing" responses excluded**

Dependent variable: Support for political accountability		
	Binary logit	Mixed effects
	(M1)	(M2)
Educational attainment (Afrobarometer)	0.019***	0.026***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education index (UNDP)	1.150***	0.836
	(0.118)	(0.728)
Female	-0.057***	-0.059***
	(0.018)	(0.019)
Youth	-0.048**	-0.045**
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Rural	-0.001	-0.043**
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Distrust ruling party	0.160***	0.174***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Lived Poverty Index	-0.052***	0.021*
	(0.010)	(0.011)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.115***	-0.054
	(0.018)	(0.108)
Political stability	0.193***	0.214
	(0.020)	(0.132)
Liberal democracy	0.494***	0.620
	(0.071)	(0.446)
Population (log)	0.093***	0.085
	(0.008)	(0.051)
Constant	-0.823***	-1.137
	(0.185)	(1.061)
Observations	52,558	52,558
Log likelihood	-34,482.740	-33,730.420
Akaike inf. crit.	68,989.480	67,486.840
Bayesian inf. crit.		67,602.140


Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

**Table A.2: Support for transparency of information held by public authorities (logit, mixed effects) with "Don't know," "Refused," and "Missing" responses excluded**

Dependent variable: Support for transparency		
	Binary logit	Mixed effects
	(M1)	(M2)
Educational attainment (Afrobarometer)	0.047***	0.054***
	(0.005)	(0.005)
Education index (UNDP)	1.570***	1.279*
	(0.117)	(0.705)
Female	-0.035*	-0.035*
	(0.018)	(0.018)
Youth	0.007	0.018
	(0.019)	(0.019)
Rural	-0.023	-0.042**
	(0.019)	(0.020)
Distrust ruling party	0.249***	0.224***
	(0.020)	(0.021)
Lived Poverty Index	0.028***	0.053***
	(0.010)	(0.011)
GDP per capita (log)	-0.196***	-0.147
	(0.018)	(0.108)
Political stability	0.077***	0.131
	(0.020)	(0.128)
Liberal democracy	0.461***	0.661
	(0.070)	(0.438)
Population (log)	0.096***	0.101*
	(0.008)	(0.052)
Constant	-0.982***	-1.379
	(0.183)	(1.124)
Observations	52,077	52,077
Log likelihood	-34,968.210	-34,221.170
Akaike inf. crit.	69,960.420	68,468.330
Bayesian inf. crit.		68,583.520

Note: \* $p < 0.1$ ; \*\* $p < 0.05$ ; \*\*\* $p < 0.01$

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