

Social cohesion: An African collage of imperfect tolerance and cautious trust

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Summary

With more than 1,500 languages and dialects, Africa has experienced social cohesion – and its absence – as a complex interplay of unity and diversity shaped by colonial legacies, ethnic division, and political rhetoric. The Rwandan Genocide of 1994, South African apartheid, the mass expulsion of Nigerians from Ghana in 1969, and the retaliatory "Ghana must go" expulsion in 1983 stand as stark reminders of the devastating consequences of ethnic polarisation and failure to nurture a shared sense of identity and tolerance (Parker & Rathbone, 2007; Lawal, 2019).



Over the past 20 years, the continent has seen some indications of a growing acceptance of diversity. In East Africa, for example, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (2016) cites Kenya's National Cohesion and Integration Commission, Uganda's Vision 2040, and Tanzania's Vision 2025 as examples of efforts to build more inclusive societies. Other authors emphasise the importance of building social

cohesion by reducing social and economic inequality and ensuring that the basic needs of all people are met (Harsch, 2006; Saoudi & Louis-Sarbib, 2023).

Yet parts of the continent still grapple with xenophobic attacks and discrimination, economic disparities, political instability, corruption, the marginalisation of certain groups, and other threats to social cohesion (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, 2016; Masiko-Mpaka, 2023; Mabasa, 2023; Schwikowski, 2023). Ethnic nationalism, religious extremism, and growing scepticism toward public institutions exacerbate social tensions and undermine efforts to foster a sense of belonging and solidarity among diverse communities (Ould Mohamedou, 2016; Bikus, 2022; Wortmann-Kolundžija, 2023). The LGBTQ+ community in Africa faces some of the world's harshest and most discriminatory laws (Ferragamo & Robinson, 2023).

Are African countries doing enough to fight exclusion and marginalisation in a way that creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust and peace, and offers all people a fair opportunity of upward mobility? This paper explores social cohesion across four dimensions – tolerance, trust, discrimination, and identity – using recent Afrobarometer survey data.

Findings from 39 African countries surveyed between late 2021 and mid-2023 show that Africans express fairly high levels of tolerance for differences of ethnicity, religion, nationality, and political affiliation. The same is not true when it comes to sexual differences, although intolerance is not universal across the continent.

Africans are cautiously trusting: While majorities say they trust other groups of people at least "somewhat," only relatives enjoy "a lot" of trust from a majority of respondents, and nearly half of respondents express little or no trust in people from other ethnic and religious backgrounds.

Survey responses also reflect widespread perceptions of unfair treatment by governments, especially on the basis of people's economic status.

Overall, Africans express a strong attachment to their national identities, but a majority consider their ethnic identities at least equally important.

Afrobarometer surveys

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, non-partisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Nine survey rounds in up to 42 countries have been completed since 1999. Round 9 surveys (2021/2023) cover 39 countries. (See Appendix Table A.1 for a list of countries and fieldwork dates.)

Afrobarometer's national partners conduct face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice that yield country-level results with margins of error of +/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

This 39-country analysis is based on 53,444 interviews. The data are weighted to ensure nationally representative samples. When reporting multi-country averages, all countries are weighted equally (rather than in proportion to population size).

Key findings

On tolerance:

- On average across 39 countries, at least eight in 10 Africans express tolerant attitudes toward people of different ethnicities (89%), different religions (85%), different political affiliations (82%), and different nationalities (80%). Only one-fourth (24%) say the same about people in same-sex relationships.
 - Levels of tolerance have remained fairly stable over the past decade.
 - While intolerance for sexual differences reaches 94% in Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Niger, it is not universal across the continent: Fewer than one-third of respondents express intolerant attitudes toward people in same-sex relationships in Cabo Verde (18%), South Africa (23%), and Seychelles (30%).
 - Comparing regions, North Africa consistently ranks at or near the bottom in tolerance toward social differences, while Central and West Africa rank at the top.

On interpersonal trust:

- Relatives are the only people whom a majority (58%) of Africans say they trust "a lot." But majorities say they at least "somewhat" trust neighbours, other citizens, people from different religious or ethnic backgrounds, and "other people you know."
- Interpersonal trust is higher among rural residents, less educated people, Muslims, and West and Central Africans than among their respective counterparts.
- A majority (57%) say they trust their fellow citizens "somewhat" or "a lot," ranging from just 26% in São Tomé and Príncipe to 86% in Mali.

On discrimination:

- Six in 10 Africans (61%) say people are "often" or "always" treated unequally under the law.

- Almost half (47%) say their government “often” or “always” treats people unfairly based on how rich or poor they are – about three times as many as perceive widespread discrimination based on ethnicity (17%).
- Perceptions of frequent government discrimination based on people's economic status are most pervasive in Tunisia (72%), Nigeria (67%), Eswatini (66%), Cabo Verde (66%), and Mali (66%).


On national vs. ethnic identity:

- Only 13% of Africans say they feel more attached to their ethnic identity than to their national identity. The largest share (45%) say they value both identities equally.

Tolerance in Africa

As an element of social cohesion, tolerance helps ensure that perceived group, value, or lifestyle differences do not result in discrimination and violence (Vollhardt, Migacheva, & Tropp, 2009). Across 39 African countries, large majorities say they would “strongly like,” would “somewhat like,” or would not care if they had neighbours of a different ethnicity (89%),¹ different religion (85%), different political affiliation (82%), or different nationality (80%) (Figure 1). But only 24% say the same about homosexuals, while 74% say they would “somewhat” or “strongly” dislike having neighbours with a different sexual orientation.

Figure 1: Social tolerance | 39 countries* | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People of a different religion? People from other ethnic groups? Homosexuals? Immigrants or foreign workers? People who support a different political party?

* The question about different ethnicities was not asked in Tunisia and Seychelles.

¹ Due to rounding, percentages for combined categories reported in the text may differ slightly from the sum of sub-categories shown in figures (e.g. for ethnicity, 55% “would like (somewhat or strongly)” and 35% “would not care” sum to 89%).

Across 30 countries for which we have complete data back to 2014/2015, levels of tolerance have not varied much (Figure 2). Tolerance for homosexuals has increased by 3 points compared to 2016/2018, while levels of tolerance have remained stable when it comes to different ethnicities, religions, and nationalities.

Figure 2: Trends in tolerance | 30 countries* | 2014-2023



Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People of a different religion? People from other ethnic groups? Homosexuals? Immigrants or foreign workers? (% who say they “would not care,” would “somewhat like,” or would “strongly like”)

* The question about different ethnicities was not asked in Tunisia and Seychelles in 2021/2023.


Intolerance for homosexuals climbs to 94% in Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Niger, but it is not universal across the continent (Figure 3). About one-third or fewer of respondents express intolerant attitudes toward people in same-sex relationships in Cabo Verde (18%), Seychelles (30%), and Mauritius (34%), as well as in South Africa (23%), where same-sex marriage has been legal since 2006 (Pew Research Center, 2023).

However, South Africans express the highest level of intolerance toward immigrants and foreign workers (39%), which seems to erupt in the country’s sporadic xenophobic attacks (Masiko-Mpaka, 2023; Mabasa, 2023; Schwikowski, 2023). Other countries recording above-average levels of intolerance toward foreigners include Sudan (35%), Botswana (29%), and Lesotho (28%).

While intolerant attitudes toward homosexual persons have decreased only marginally (by 2 percentage points on average across 32 countries surveyed in both 2014/2015 and 2021/2023), we see significant changes within some countries (Figure 4). Twelve countries show reductions in intolerance of at least 3 percentage points, led by Eswatini (-17 points), Mauritius (-16 points), Lesotho (-13 points), and Zimbabwe (-11 points).


On the other hand, seven countries record increases of at least 3 points in intolerant attitudes, including a double-digit jump in Tanzania (+14 points).

Figure 3: Intolerance for homosexuals and foreigners | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: Homosexuals? Immigrants or foreign workers? (% who say "somewhat dislike" or "strongly dislike")

Figure 4: Changes in intolerance toward homosexuals | 32 countries | 2014-2023




Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: Homosexuals? (The figure shows the difference, in percentage points, between surveys in 2014/2015 and 2021/2023 in the proportion of respondents who say they would “somewhat dislike” or “strongly dislike” having a homosexual person as a neighbour. Negative numbers indicate a decrease in intolerant attitudes.)

Toward different religions, ethnicities, nationalities, and political views, tolerance is consistently fairly high across key demographic characteristics, though we see some differences. With regard to religious tolerance, respondents who identify as Christian (90%) are more likely than Muslims (79%) and others (82%) to welcome or not mind neighbours of a different religion (Figure 5).


On the other hand, respondents who “feel close to” a political party are just as open to neighbours who support different parties as are respondents who don’t identify with any political party (Figure 6).

Figure 5: Religious tolerance | by religious affiliation | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People of a different religion?


Figure 6: Political tolerance | by political affiliation | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People who support a different political party? Do you feel close to any particular political party?

Tolerant views toward immigrants and foreign workers are somewhat more common in cities than in rural areas (83% vs. 78%) and are more widespread in West (87%) and Central (86%) Africa than in East (76%), Southern (74%), and North (73%) Africa (Figure 7).²

Figure 7: Tolerance for immigrants/foreign workers | by demographic group
 | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: Immigrants or foreign workers? (% who say they “would not care,” would “somewhat like,” or would “strongly like”)

Among the continent's regions, North Africa consistently ranks at or near the bottom in tolerance toward social differences (Figure 8). Central Africans rank at the top except with regard to sexual differences, where Southern Africa (36%) leads the way. West Africans match Central Africans when it comes to tolerance for ethnic, national, and political differences.

² Regions: West (Benin, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo), East (Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, Mauritius, Seychelles, Tanzania, Uganda), Southern (Angola, Botswana, Eswatini, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa, Zambia, Zimbabwe), North (Mauritania, Morocco, Sudan, Tunisia), Central (Cameroon, Congo-Brazzaville, Gabon, São Tomé and Príncipe)

Figure 8: Social tolerance | by region | 39 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People of a different religion? People from other ethnic groups? Homosexuals? Immigrants or foreign workers? People who support a different political party? (% who say they “would not care,” would “somewhat like,” or would “strongly like”)


* The question about different ethnicities was not asked in Tunisia and Seychelles.

How much do Africans trust other people?

Like tolerance, interpersonal trust contributes to social cohesion and the effective functioning of a liberal society (Du Toit & Kotzé, 2011; Khaile, Roman, October, van Staden, & Balogun, 2022). On average across 39 countries, relatives are the only people whom a majority (58%) of Africans say they trust “a lot.” For neighbours, “a lot” of trust drops to 31%, while only about one in five respondents express “a lot” of trust in other citizens (23%), people from different ethnic groups (19%) and different religious backgrounds (18%), and “other people you know” (17%) (Figure 9).

But when we combine responses of “trust a lot” with “trust somewhat,” we see majorities expressing trust in all of these groups, ranging from 53% for “other people you know” to 64% for neighbours and 81% for relatives. Even so, close to half of respondents express little or no trust in other citizens (42%), people from other religious (46%) and ethnic (45%) backgrounds, and “other people you know” (47%).


Figure 9: Interpersonal trust | 39 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following types of people?
 * The question about other ethnic groups was not asked in Tunisia and Seychelles.

On average across 31 countries surveyed in both 2011/2013 and 2021/2023, levels of trust in relatives has not changed significantly over the past decade (Figure 10). Trust in neighbours increased by a modest 4 percentage points, while trust in “other people you know” gained 11 points, from 43% to 54%.

Figure 10: Trust in relatives, neighbours, and ‘other people you know’ | 31 countries | 2011-2023



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Your relatives? Your neighbours? Other people you know? (% who say “somewhat” or “a lot”)


Moving beyond familial and personal relationships as well as group membership, generalised trust reflects a bond that people share across society, across economic, ethnic, religious, and racial differences. When asked about their faith in “other citizens,” a majority (57%) of Africans say they trust them “somewhat” or “a lot.”

Africans with no formal education are most likely to express trust in their fellow citizens: Two-thirds (67%) say they trust them “somewhat” or “a lot,” compared to 53%-54% of those with at least secondary education (Figure 11). Trust in other citizens is higher in rural areas than in cities (61% vs. 53%) and among Muslims (63%) compared to other religions (54%), and increases modestly with age, reaching 61% among those over age 55.

Levels of trust in other citizens vary significantly by region: West Africans (66%) and East Africans (63%) are most likely to trust their fellow citizens, while North Africans (43%) are least trusting.


And at the country level, a 61-percentage-point spread separates levels of trust in other citizens in São Tomé and Príncipe (26%) and Mali (87%) (Figure 12). Tanzania (86%), Niger (82%), and Guinea (80%) also record overwhelming majorities who express trust in their fellow citizens, while only 30% of Sudanese say the same.

Figure 11: Trust in other citizens | by demographic group | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other citizens?

Figure 12: Trust in other citizens | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following types of people: Other citizens? (% who say "somewhat" or "a lot")

Perceptions of discrimination

Perceptions of unfair treatment increase discord, promote marginalisation, and threaten social cohesion in the long run (Langer, Stewart, Smedts, & Demarest, 2017). Across the continent, survey findings indicate widespread perceptions of unfairness.

Most African countries have constitutions that provide that all persons are equal before the law. But on average across 39 countries, six in 10 citizens (61%) say people are “often” or “always” treated unequally under the law (Figure 13). Only 14% say this “never” happens.


Figure 13: Unequal treatment under the law | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often, in this country, are people treated unequally under the law?

In 31 out of 39 countries, at least half of all adults say that unequal treatment under the law happens “often” or “always” (Figure 14). That includes more than three-fourths of Nigerians (83%), Gabonese (80%), Senegalese (79%), and Tunisians (79%). Tanzania (28%) and Ethiopia (33%) lead the few countries where unequal treatment under the law is not widely perceived as the norm.


Figure 14: Unequal treatment under the law | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often, in this country, are people treated unequally under the law? (% who say “often” or “always”)

Perceptions of widespread unequal treatment under the law increase with respondents' experience of poverty, ranging from 53% among well-off citizens to 65% among those with high lived poverty³ (Figure 15). They are also particularly common among respondents with post-secondary education (65%) and urban residents (64%, vs. 58% of rural residents).

Figure 15: Unequal treatment under the law | by demographic group | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, how often, in this country, are people treated unequally under the law? (% who say "often" or "always")*

Afrobarometer also asked citizens about discrimination on the basis of people's ethnic identity and economic status. On average, Africans are almost three times as likely to report economic discrimination as they are ethnic discrimination (Figure 16). Almost half (47%) say their government "often" or "always" treats people unfairly based on how rich or poor they are, in addition to 34% who say it "sometimes" does so.

In contrast, only 17% say that unfair treatment by the government based on people's ethnicity is a frequent problem, while 24% see it as an occasional occurrence. A majority (56%) say ethnic discrimination by the government "never" happens.

³ Afrobarometer's Lived Poverty Index (LPI) measures respondents' levels of material deprivation by asking how often they or their families went without basic necessities (enough food, enough water, medical care, enough cooking fuel, and a cash income) during the preceding year. For more on lived poverty, see Mattes and Patel (2022).

Figure 16: Discrimination based on economic status and ethnicity | 39 countries*
| 2021/2023



Respondents were asked:


How often, if ever, are [members of the respondent's ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?

How often, if ever, are people treated unfairly by the government based on their economic status, that is, how rich or poor they are?

* The question about unfair treatment based on ethnic identity was not asked in Seychelles, Sudan, and Tanzania. In other countries, respondents who identified only with their national identity and not an ethnic group (5% of all respondents) were not asked this question.

Perceptions of frequent government discrimination based on people's economic status are remarkably consistent across key demographic characteristics except for economic status: The poorest citizens are far more likely to say that the government treats people unfairly based on their economic status than the best-off respondents (53% vs. 37%) (Figure 17).


Figure 17: Government often/always treats people unfairly based on their economic status | by demographic group | 39 countries | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked:
How often, if ever, are people treated unfairly by the government based on their economic status, that is, how rich or poor they are? (% who say "often" or "always")

The sense that poor people are often the victims of government discrimination is most pervasive in Tunisia (72%), Nigeria (67%), Eswatini (66%), Cabo Verde (66%), and Mali (66%) (Figure 18). It is far less common in Madagascar (19%), Botswana (25%), and Tanzania (27%).

Figure 18: Government often/always treats people unfairly based on their economic status | 39 countries | 2021/2023




Respondents were asked: How often, if ever, are people treated unfairly by the government based on their economic status, that is, how rich or poor they are? (% who say "often" or "always")

Identity in Africa

As an aspect of social cohesion, social identities that are inclusive – i.e. that allow different identities to coexist – can encourage healthy, cooperative, and peaceful social relations (Leininger et al., 2021).

In Africa, both national and ethnic identities are salient. When citizens are asked whether they feel more attached to their national or their ethnic identity, the largest share (45%) say they value the two equally. Another 41% place greater emphasis on their national than their ethnic identity. Only 13% feel more attached to their ethnic than national identity (Figure 19).

Figure 19: National vs. ethnic identity | 36 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [national identity] and being a [member of your ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?


* The question was not asked in Seychelles, Sudan, and Tanzania. In other countries, respondents who identified only with their national identity and not an ethnic group (5% of all respondents) were not asked this question.

Countries vary significantly in how their citizens value their identities (Figure 20). For example, overwhelming majorities feel more attached to their national than their ethnic identity in Mauritania (84%) and Guinea (78%),⁴ while the same is true of fewer than one in five citizens in Nigeria (16%), Uganda (17%), Botswana (18%), and South Africa (19%). In 11 countries, majorities say they value both identities equally, led by Liberia (71%) and Ghana (67%).

A preference for ethnic over national identity is strongest in Nigeria (27%) and South Africa (26%).

⁴ In Eswatini, 99% of respondents self-identified only as “Emaswati” rather than as part of a particular ethnic or cultural group, and were therefore not asked about national vs. ethnic identity.

Figure 20: National vs. ethnic identity | 35 countries* | 2021/2023




Respondents who identified with a particular ethnic group were asked: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [national identity] and being a [member of respondent's ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?

* The question was not asked in Seychelles, Sudan, and Tunisia. In other countries, respondents who identified only with their national identity and not an ethnic group (5% of all respondents) were not asked this question. Results for Eswatini, where 99% did not identify with a particular ethnic or cultural group, are excluded.)

Across 27 countries for which we have relevant data from both 2011/2013 and 2021/2023, we see a marginal decrease (-3 percentage points) in the proportion of respondents who value their national identity at least as much as their ethnic identity (i.e. who say they value the two equally, value their national identity more, or value only their national identity) (Figure 21).

Cabo Verde recorded an increase of 15 percentage points on this indicator, followed by Burkina Faso (+6 points). But 15 countries show declines of at least 3 points, including double-digit drops in South Africa (-12 points), Namibia (-11 points), and Lesotho (-10 points).

Figure 21: Change in proportion who value national identity at least as highly as ethnic identity | 27 countries | 2011-2023




Respondents were asked: Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [national identity] and being a [member of respondent's ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?

(The figure shows the change, in percentage points, between surveys in 2011/2013 and 2021/2023 in the percentage of respondents who say they feel "only [national identity]," "more [national identity] than [ethnic group]," or "equally [national identity] and [ethnic group]"

Survey findings suggest a possible association between people's feelings about their own identity and their feelings about people from other ethnic backgrounds. Respondents who feel more attached to their ethnic group than to their national identity are more likely to express intolerance toward people from different ethnic groups (14%-20%) than those for whom their national identity is at least as important as their ethnic identity (8%-11%) (Figure 22).

Figure 22: Identity and tolerance for different ethnicity | 36 countries* | 2021/2023



Respondents were asked:

Let us suppose that you had to choose between being a [national identity] and being a [member of respondent's ethnic group]. Which of the following statements best expresses your feelings?
 * The question about national vs. ethnic identity was not asked in Seychelles, Sudan, and Tunisia. In other countries, respondents who identified only with their national identity and not an ethnic group (5% of all respondents) were not asked this question.
 For each of the following types of people, please tell me whether you would like having people from this group as neighbours, dislike it, or not care: People from other ethnic groups?

Conclusion

Findings from Afrobarometer surveys suggest some of the complexities of understanding – and potentially strengthening – social cohesion in African societies.

Large majorities voice tolerant attitudes toward differences of ethnicity, religion, political affiliation, and nationality. At the same time, almost half of respondents express little or no trust in people from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, or even in their fellow citizens.

Intolerance for differences in sexual orientation remains extremely high, though it is not universal across the continent.

Perceptions of unfair treatment by the justice system and the government are also widespread, more often seen as based on people's economic status than on their ethnic background.

Given that these perceptions vary by country and demographic group, they suggest a need for tailored analysis and intervention to fight discrimination, exclusion, and marginalisation in a way that creates a sense of belonging, promotes trust, and offers opportunities for upward mobility.

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Appendix

Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 9 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds

Country	Round 9 fieldwork	Previous survey rounds
Angola	Feb.-March 2022	2019
Benin	Jan. 2022	2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2020
Botswana	June-July 2022	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Burkina Faso	Sept.-Oct. 2022	2008, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019
Cabo Verde	July-Aug. 2022	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2017, 2019
Cameroon	March 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Congo-Brazzaville	June-July 2023	NA
Côte d'Ivoire	Nov.-Dec. 2021	2013, 2014, 2017, 2019
Eswatini	Oct.-Nov. 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Ethiopia	May-June 2023	2013, 2020
Gabon	Nov.-Dec. 2021	2015, 2017, 2020
Gambia	Aug.-Sept. 2022	2018, 2021
Ghana	April 2022	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Guinea	Aug. 2022	2013, 2015, 2017, 2019
Kenya	Nov.-Dec. 2021	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014, 2016, 2019
Lesotho	Feb.-March 2022	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2020
Liberia	Aug.-Sept. 2022	2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2020
Madagascar	April-May 2022	2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2018
Malawi	Feb. 2022	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Mali	July 2022	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020
Mauritania	Nov. 2022	NA
Mauritius	March 2022	2012, 2014, 2017, 2020
Morocco	Aug.-Sept. 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Mozambique	Oct.-Nov. 2022	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2018, 2021
Namibia	Oct.-Nov. 2021	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2019
Niger	June 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2020
Nigeria	March 2022	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015, 2017, 2020
São Tomé and Príncipe	Dec. 2022	2015, 2018
Senegal	May-June 2022	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2021
Seychelles	Dec. 2022	NA
Sierra Leone	June-July 2022	2012, 2015, 2018, 2020
South Africa	Nov.-Dec. 2022	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015, 2018, 2021
Sudan	Nov.-Dec. 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2021
Tanzania	Sept.-Oct. 2022	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2021
Togo	March 2022	2012, 2014, 2017, 2021
Tunisia	Feb.-March 2022	2013, 2015, 2018, 2020
Uganda	Jan. 2022	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015, 2017, 2019
Zambia	Aug.-Sept. 2022	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014, 2017, 2020
Zimbabwe	March-April 2022	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014, 2017, 2021

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