

Working Paper No. 202

# Willingness of Zambians to sacrifice democratic principles during a pandemic: The case of COVID-19

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## Abstract

What is the impact of a pandemic on citizens' willingness to sacrifice democratic principles? Using the novel COVID-19 pandemic as a case, I assess how the effects of COVID-19 influence Zambians' willingness to sacrifice democratic principles through censorship of the media, postponement of elections, and the use of security forces to enforce public health mandates. I analyse data from the Round 8 Afrobarometer survey in Zambia (collected in 2020 from 1,200 adults), which included questions on COVID-19. Results of a multiple linear regression and a logistic regression suggest that Zambians' experiences during the COVID-19 pandemic have an influence on their willingness to sacrifice democratic principles. Those who lost a job due to the pandemic are less willing to accept a sacrifice of democratic principles, while positive assessments of the government's management of the pandemic and perceptions of the pandemic as serious increase people's willingness to suspend democratic principles. The findings also suggest that Zambians' trust in the president and their perceptions of the government as legitimate make them more willing to agree to forfeit a democratic principle, at least when the country is faced with a pandemic.

## Acknowledgements

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## Introduction

The COVID-19 pandemic unleashed scathing effects on social, economic, political, and health dimensions of development. While countries are working to reverse economic losses caused by the pandemic, its shock to democratic principles continues to challenge democracies worldwide in ways that are unprecedented. This paper seeks to understand factors that influence citizens' decision to accept restrictions on certain democratic principles. Using the COVID-19 pandemic in Zambia as a case, it assesses how the effects of a pandemic can influence citizens' willingness to give up democratic principles, at least temporarily.

In an effort to contain the effects of the virus, governments around the world enacted a variety of measures, including lockdowns, social distancing, bans on travel, and the use of the police to enforce public health mandates. Some of these measures required the suspension of certain democratic principles, most obviously freedom of movement.

Another democratic principle that suffered under the pandemic is freedom of the media. Public health crises require the media to provide essential information to the public, who need reporting they can trust. With the important role that free media plays in providing fair and balanced news coverage, reduced media freedom can have a significant negative impact on the quality and reliability of information provided to citizens (Bentzen & Smith, 2020). However, some governments used the pandemic as a pretext to introduce restrictions on press freedom. The 2020 World Press Freedom Index underlines that the pandemic exacerbated existing media freedom threats (Reporters Without Borders, 2020). Of particular interest is the motivation of some citizens to support their governments in the suspension or restriction of media freedom.

In some countries, the pandemic also threatened the democratic principle of regular free and fair elections. In most democracies, elections are organised at regular intervals to allow citizens to choose their representatives. Elections involve the physical mobility of citizens for campaigns and the casting of votes. At the height of the COVID-19 pandemic, movement and physical contact were restricted to contain the spread of the virus. This placed elections at risk of being postponed, and in some cases opened the door to restrictions on campaigning that may have benefited the incumbent (Voice of America, 2020). Palguta, Levinsky, and Skoda (2021) show that after the Czech Republic's 2020 elections, new COVID-19 infections grew significantly faster in voting constituencies than in non-voting constituencies. This raises valid concerns about whether countries should postpone elections during a pandemic.

Beyond such pandemic-related restrictions themselves, which may often be temporary, critics see a tendency to use the restrictions to advance "executive takeovers" framed as legitimate measures to address an urgent public matter (Levitsky & Ziblatt, 2018). The risk is that emergency measures enacted during a pandemic will be used inappropriately to dismantle checks on the executive (Lührmann, Edgell, & Maerz, 2020). Not only can these emergency measures lead to a hyper-powered executive, but they can also create public resentment, which can derail democratic progress.

Zambia recorded its first case of COVID-19 on 18 March 2020, and the government moved quickly to implement measures to reduce the spread of the virus. It closed schools, restaurants, and nightclubs and banned international flights, among other moves. The Oxford Stringency Index (Our World in Data, 2020), a composite of nine COVID-19 response metrics, rated Zambia's response as moderate, with a score of 38.91 on a scale of 0-100.

Still, some of its measures involved compromises on certain democratic principles. Statutory Instrument 22, empowering public officials to fight COVID-19, included restrictions on trading and selling food in locations considered unsanitary (Government of the Republic of Zambia, 2020). The government also instituted controls on the media and free expression with the justification of preventing the spread of misinformation or disinformation about the virus. New

laws and policies gave government officials the authority to prohibit the spread of virus-related information they deem to be false or harmful. For instance, in 2020 the Zambia Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) revoked the license of Prime TV in Lusaka and forced it to cease broadcasting for a year, justifying its decision as serving “public safety, security, peace, welfare or good order” (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020).

In the run-up to elections in Zambia in August 2021, the government, under the guise of COVID-19 restrictions, limited the opposition's ability to campaign (Nkomesha, 2020). There was also increasing concern about oppressive tactics by the police, who repeatedly used excessive force to disperse opposition gatherings. Two people were killed in Lusaka when police opened fire on a crowd of opposition supporters (Mitimangi & Hill, 2020). Political tensions were rising amid broader attempts to alter the basic structure of the Constitution. In 2019, prior to the COVID-19 pandemic, the ruling party had initiated a process to implement major amendments to the 2016 Constitution. Critics argued that the Constitution Amendment Bill No. 10 of 2019 was designed to install a constitutional dictatorship by removing parliamentary oversight over the presidency and to manipulate the electoral system to ensure that the ruling party remains in power in perpetuity (Ndulo, 2020). Following stiff opposition from stakeholders such as the Law Association of Zambia, the bill failed to garner the required two-thirds majority of members of Parliament (Lusaka Times, 2020).

One possibility, of course, is that public disapproval of these moves contributed to the ruling party's loss in the 2021 general elections, which might be seen as a potential bright spot on the democratic front.

Democracy in Zambia had been eroding significantly (V-Dem, 2020), and the advent of the COVID-19 pandemic seemed to worsen the situation. A pandemic offers an ideal excuse for implementing lopsided responses that are anti-democratic in nature. Indeed, Lührmann and Rooney (2020, p. 3) find that “democracies are 75 percent more likely to erode under a state of emergency than without.”

The question is to what extent Zambians would be willing to sacrifice certain democratic rights and principles in the name of public health and safety. A key issue is whether citizens view restrictions on these rights as ploys by the government to stay in power or as legitimate measures to fight the pandemic. COVID-19 caused the loss of lives and jobs and led to different perceptions of the government's handling of the pandemic. Do these effects of COVID-19 have any influence on people's willingness to sacrifice their democratic rights when the need arises? That is to say, do pandemics induce certain effects that make citizens more willing to accept a curtailment of their democratic rights and principles?

In a less-than-stable democracy like Zambia's, can the effects of a pandemic be a tipping point? It is important, then, to study the factors that impact the willingness of Zambians to sacrifice democratic principles. The Afrobarometer Round 8 survey included a module on COVID-19, which can help provide insights into these issues. The results of our analysis suggest that Zambians' trust in the president, perceptions of the government's legitimacy, and positive perceptions of government management of the pandemic make Zambians more willing to sacrifice democratic principles. On the other hand, persons affected by the loss of a job during the COVID-19 pandemic are less likely to accept the suspension of democratic principles. Findings from the study may guide policy makers in the introduction of pandemic-related measures and may forestall public backlash to suspension of democratic rights.

The rest of the paper is organised as follows. First, it provides a brief review of democracy in Zambia before COVID-19. Second, it discusses how COVID-19 has shaped Zambians' perceptions of certain democratic rights. After an explanation of the conceptual framework within which the analysis is situated, it discusses the data and methodology for the study. The penultimate section presents and discusses the results of the study, followed by a conclusion.

## Democracy in Zambia, pre-COVID-19


Zambia gained renown for its peaceful transition from one-party to multiparty democracy in 1991 when it replaced a sitting president through peaceful elections (Chipenzi et al., 2011). However, the country's path to consolidating its democracy since that milestone has been fraught with a number of contentious issues. Key among these were the constitutional amendments of 1996, one of which required presidential candidates and both of their parents to be Zambian citizens by birth or descent. This requirement appeared to be tailored to disqualify specific opposition leaders from running for president, including former President Kenneth Kaunda, and appeared to violate the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Zambia is a party. Another amendment barred chiefs from participating in active politics, including contesting for political office. These amendments resulted in confrontations between opposition parties and civil society organisations, on the one hand, and the government on the other hand.

Support for democracy has remained solid in Zambia. As shown in Figure 1, Afrobarometer surveys conducted between 2005 and 2020 consistently show large majorities who prefer democracy over any other kind of government, rising from 64% in 2005 to 84% in 2020. Such overwhelming support for democracy is important to keep governments with authoritarian tendencies on their toes.

In contrast to their strong support for democracy, Zambians are not content with the way their preferred form of governance is working. As shown in Figure 2, the share of Zambians who are “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” with the country's democracy doubled between 2013 and 2020, from 30% to 60%. Over the same period, the proportion expressing satisfaction with their democracy dropped from 68% to 37%.

This pattern – preference for democratic governance but dissatisfaction with the way it works – has been documented across many African countries. Mattes (2019) finds that 68% of Africans say that democracy is the best form of government, but only 43% are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. Declining satisfaction raises the question of whether Zambia, like other African countries, is backsliding on its democratic journey.

**Figure 1: Support for democracy | Zambia | 2005-2020**




**Respondents were asked:** Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

**Figure 2: Satisfaction with democracy | Zambia | 2005-2020**



**Respondents were asked:** Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Zambia?

### How did the pandemic affect views on democratic principles?

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a shock and a stress test for many democracies. Core principles of democracy such as media freedom, regular elections, and freedom of movement have been tested, with use of security forces extending beyond what citizens were used to.

The beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic stoked concerns about misinformation and disinformation in the media. Some politicians used this as a justification to launch legal and extra-legal attacks on the media. Freedom of expression and press freedom were limited through laws proposed to counter “fake news” (UNESCO, 2020). As shown in Figure 3, a slim majority (53%) of Zambians said the government should have the right to censor media reporting during a health emergency like the pandemic. Such public support may also mean that an incumbent government can have increased media presence, as it can censor media houses that do not preach its message.

With regard to elections, crises and natural disasters can often lead to severely compromised opportunities for deliberation, contestation, participation, and high-quality election management (James & Alihodzic, 2020). Worldwide, at least 80 countries and territories postponed national or subnational elections or referendums because of COVID-19 between February 2020 and February 2022, while at least 160 countries and territories went ahead with elections as planned (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2023). In Africa, 16 countries postponed elections or referendums of some kind during that period,<sup>1</sup> while 35 countries conducted them (including some that had earlier postponed them). As shown in Figure 3, three-fourths (75%) of Zambians reject the idea of postponing elections because of a public health crisis, and indeed the country went ahead with presidential elections in August 2021.


The pandemic also heightened the profile of the police in Zambia, as they were called upon to enforce public health mandates. Zambia’s police has frequently been accused of brutality in its treatment of protesters as well as criminal suspects. The Human Rights Commission of Zambia expressed concerns about police brutality, over-detention, and extra-judicial killings (Muchinsi, 2022). The police have also used force and live ammunition to

<sup>1</sup> Postponed elections or referendums: Botswana, Chad, Ethiopia, Gabon, the Gambia, Kenya, Liberia, Libya, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia, South Africa, Tunisia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe (Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2023).

disperse rallies and demonstrations by opposition supporters during election periods (Al Jazeera, 2015). During the pandemic, a COVID-19 Task Force established in the capital city, Lusaka, was accused of harassing and beating people found violating COVID-19 restrictions. In fact, the provincial minister was quoted as saying that people flouting the rules would "feel his weight" (XinhuaNet, 2021).

Although Zambians have witnessed heavy-handedness from their police forces, more than two-thirds (69%) support the right of the government to deploy police and other security forces to enforce COVID-19 protocols, perhaps reflecting public concern about the spread of the virus if pandemic-related restrictions are disregarded.

**Figure 3: COVID-19 and democratic principles | Zambia | 2020**



**Respondents were asked:** When the country is facing a public health emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic, do you agree or disagree that it is justified for the government to temporarily limit democracy or democratic freedoms by taking the following measures:

*Censoring media reporting?*

*Postponing elections or limiting political campaigning?*

*Using the police and security forces to enforce public health mandates like lockdown orders, mask requirements, or restrictions on public gatherings?*

### Conceptual framework and research hypothesis

COVID-19 brought many effects upon the health, social, and economic dimensions of Zambians' lives. Some people got sick or had family members who contracted the virus. Others lost their means of livelihood, while lives lost to the pandemic shattered people's social relationships. This paper examines the impact of such COVID-19 effects on citizens' willingness to sacrifice democratic principles in exchange for protection against the pandemic. My hypothesis is that people who were more severely affected by the pandemic would be more likely to support limits on democratic rights in response.

Further, I postulate that certain factors may affect individuals' support for what might seem like anti-democratic moves under certain circumstances. The study controls for several of these factors: people's trust in the leader of the country, the perceived legitimacy of the government, people's level of satisfaction with the country's democracy, and their perceptions of the government's management of the economy.

## Data and methodology

As reported in Figure 3 above, the Afrobarometer Round 8 survey provides data on people's willingness to accept media censorship, the use of security forces to enforce public health mandates, and postponement of elections during a public health emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic. Using the responses to these questions, I computed an index for willingness to sacrifice democratic principles as my dependent variable.

A factor analysis shows that the three questions are closely linked, collectively forming a coherent whole when used together (Bartlett's test of sphericity  $p < 0.01$  and Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin of 0.606).

I selected four independent variables related to COVID-19: whether the respondent or a household member became ill with COVID-19, whether the respondent or a household member lost a primary source of income because of COVID-19, the respondent's evaluation of the government's management of the pandemic response, and the respondent's expectation regarding the seriousness of COVID-19 over the next six months. The variables regarding COVID-19 illness and loss of income source were coded into dummy variables (1=Yes, 0=No). Demographic variables of respondents' age, gender, and location (urban or rural) were controlled for in the analysis. Tables A.1 and A.2 in the Appendix provide details on the dependent and independent variables used in the study.

I used a multiple linear regression to test for factors that influence willingness to sacrifice democratic principles. A base model uses only the controls (i.e. variables not related to COVID-19) and demographic variables. Then a COVID-19 model adds COVID-19 variables to the base model to test how these variables behave in the presence of COVID-19 and how the COVID-19 variables themselves influence people's willingness to accept restrictions on their democratic rights.

## Results: Willingness to sacrifice democratic principles

Results in Table 1 show that in the base model, without any of the variables directly related to COVID-19, trust in the president, the perceived legitimacy of the government, and satisfaction with democracy all have positive, statistically significant relationships with willingness to sacrifice democratic principles. The more people trust their president and believe in the legitimacy of their government, the more willing they are to give up certain democratic principles during a public health emergency.

In the COVID-19 model, loss of a primary source of income during the pandemic has a negative and statistically significant relationship with willingness to sacrifice democratic principles. Greater unwillingness to give up democratic rights among people who have lost a main source of income could be the result of a loss of confidence in the government, perhaps along with the hope that maintaining democratic rights such as voting in elections will present them with the opportunity to elect new leaders who can change their economic situation. Evaluations of the government's management of COVID-19 are positively and statistically significantly related to the dependent variable.

Again, trust in the president and the perceived legitimacy of the government are positively and significantly related to willingness to sacrifice democratic principles during a pandemic. This suggests that people's attitudes on these topics are critical to their willingness to sacrifice democratic principles. Also, these results suggest that if people are going to agree to the suspension of certain democratic rights, they must be convinced that the president can be trusted not to use the pandemic as a decoy to entrench his/her stay in power. It could also be argued that, when people trust their president, they become less concerned about potentially anti-democratic moves simply because they would not be worried if he or she were to stay in office longer.

People who perceive the government or party in power to have been legitimately elected are also more likely to support limits to democratic rights during a pandemic. Where the



people view declared election results as legitimate, they tend to view the government as their own and are willing to support it, even if that means dismantling, even if temporarily, some democratic rules.

**Table 1: Determinants of willingness to sacrifice democratic principles (linear regression) | Zambia | 2020**

	Base model		COVID-19 model	
Dependent variable:	<i>Willingness to sacrifice democratic principles (index)</i>			
	$\beta$	$\rho$	$\beta$	$\rho$
Trust in president	.135	.000**	.116	.002**
Legitimacy of government	.142	.000**	.132	.000**
Satisfaction with democracy	.0691	.046*	.021	.567
Assessment of government economic management	.038	.278	.060	.092
Age of respondent	-0.019	0.55	-0.052	0.114
Gender (Male)	-0.033	0.30	-0.029	0.369
Location (Urban)	-0.009	0.771	0.049	0.146
Became ill with COVID-19			.008	.801
Lost source of income because of COVID-19			-.119	.000**
Approves government management of COVID-19			.163	.000**
Seriousness of COVID-19 over next 6 months			-.006	.861

### What differentiates Zambians who are willing to sacrifice democratic principles from those who are not?

With the preliminary evidence from Figure 3, the paper next examines what differentiates Zambians who would agree and those who would disagree with the suspension of each of the three democratic principles used in the study, that is, media censorship, postponement of elections or limitation of electoral campaigns, and use of the police/security forces to enforce COVID-19 protocols. For each of these outcomes, responses were dichotomised, with possible responses of "Agree/Strongly agree" and "Disagree/Strongly disagree." Given the binary nature of the outcome variables, logistic regression was used. The results were interpreted using the odds ratio. When odds ratios are greater than 1, higher values of the independent variable are associated with greater likelihood of agreeing; when they are less than 1, this indicates higher values are associated with decreased likelihood of agreeing.

Results in Table 2 show that trust in the president is positively related to agreeing with the postponement of elections and the use of police enforcement during a pandemic. Those

who trust the president are 1.195 times more likely than those who do not to accept postponement of elections and 1.194 times more likely to support use of police enforcement. However, trust in the president is not significantly associated with acceptance of media censorship.

The perceived legitimacy of the government has a positive and statistically significant relationship with willingness to accept media censorship. In a pandemic, those who see their most recent election as legitimate are 1.223 times more likely than those who do not to accept censorship of the media. However, perceived legitimacy is not significantly associated with the other limits on democratic rights examined.

People who see the economy as well-managed are 1.298 times more likely than those who do not to accept a postponement of elections. Assessments of economic management are not significantly associated with other limits on rights.

**Table 2: Willingness to sacrifice democratic principles during COVID-19 pandemic (logistic regression) | Zambia | 2020**

	Censor media	Postpone elections/Limit campaigning	Use police enforcement
	Odds ratio	Odds ratio	Odds ratio
Trust in president	1.102	1.195*	1.194*
Legitimacy of government	1.223*	1.183	1.157
Satisfaction with democracy	.941	1.094	1.017
Assessment of government economic management	1.02	1.298**	1.066
Age of respondent	0.938	0.985	0.922
Gender (Male)	0.769	1.027	0.965
Location (Urban)	0.906	1.279	1.064
Became ill with COVID-19	0.849	2.144	0.487
Lost source of income because of COVID-19	0.74*	0.484**	0.927
Assessment of government management of COVID-19	1.286**	1.190	1.422**
Seriousness of COVID-19 over next 6 months	.905	0.992	1.207*

\*\*Significant at 0.01 level; \*Significant at 0.05 level  
Reference category: Disagree

With regard to the effects of the pandemic, the results show that Zambians who lost a primary source of income due to COVID-19 are about 70% and 50% as likely to accept censorship of the media and a postponement of elections, respectively, as those who did not. This could be a reflection of people who have lost incomes desiring to have information from the media to make personal judgments about the economy or to be informed about the pervasiveness of job losses during the pandemic. Also, those who have lost jobs may

have less confidence in the ruling government and hope that an election will present them with the opportunity to elect new leaders who can change their economic situation. However, we note that loss of income is not significantly associated with attitudes about police enforcement, and actual reported experience with COVID-19 is not associated with any of the democratic limits studied.

Zambians who positively assess the government's management of the COVID-19 pandemic are 1.3 times more likely than those who do not to support media censorship and 1.4 times more likely to support use of the police. They are not significantly more or less likely to support election postponement. When citizens perceive their government to be doing well in managing the pandemic, they tend to support potential anti-democratic moves from that government, which could enhance their protection from the pandemic.

Finally, the study finds that Zambians' perception of the seriousness of COVID-19 over the next six months is significantly associated with their willingness to accept the use of police to enforce pandemic mandates. However, this variable is not significantly associated with support for postponement of elections or media censorship.

## Conclusion

This paper finds that the effects of a pandemic are associated with attitudes about democratic principles. In particular, one of the key economic effects of COVID-19, the loss of a job, is significantly associated with citizens' being less willing to accept a suspension of their democratic rights. Interestingly, actual experience with becoming ill with COVID-19 is not associated with attitudes about democratic limits.

Aside from the effects of COVID-19, the paper finds that Zambians' trust in their president and their perceptions of the government as legitimate are associated with greater willingness to sacrifice their democratic rights during a public health emergency.

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## Appendix

### Variables used in regression analysis



**Table A.1: Dependent variables**

Variable	Question wording in the survey	Description	Reference category
	When the country is facing a public health emergency like the COVID-19 pandemic, do you agree or disagree that it is justified for the government to temporarily limit democracy or democratic freedoms by taking the following measures?		
<b>Postpone elections/Limit political campaigning</b>	Postponing elections or limiting political campaigning	Continuous variable: 1= Strongly disagree 2=Disagree 3=Neither agree nor disagree 4= Agree 5= Strongly agree	Disagree/Strongly disagree  (After coded into a binary variable for the logistic regression)
<b>Censor media</b>	Censoring media reporting	Continuous variable: 1= Strongly disagree 2=Disagree 3=Neither agree nor disagree 4= Agree 5= Strongly agree	Disagree/Strongly disagree  (After coded into a binary variable for the logistic regression)
<b>Use police enforcement</b>	Using the police and security forces to enforce public health mandates like lockdown orders, mask requirements, or restrictions on public gatherings	Continuous variable: 1= Strongly disagree 2=Disagree 3=Neither agree nor disagree 4= Agree 5= Strongly agree	Disagree/Strongly disagree  (After coded into a binary variable for the logistic regression)

Table A.2: Independent variables

Non-COVID-19 variables	Question wording in the survey	Description	COVID-19 variables	Question wording in the survey	Description
<b>Trust in president</b>	How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The president?	Continuous variable 0=Not at all 1=Just a little 2=Somewhat 3=A lot	<b>Became ill with COVID-19</b>	Please tell me if you personally or any other member of your household have been affected in any of the following ways by the COVID-19 pandemic: Became ill with COVID-19?	Dummy variable 1=Yes 0=No  Reference=No
<b>Legitimacy of government</b>	With regard to the last general election, in 2016, to what extent do you think the results announced by the Electoral Commission of Zambia accurately reflected the actual results as counted?	Continuous variable: 1=Completely accurate 2=Not very accurate, with major discrepancies 3=Mostly accurate, but with some minor discrepancies 4=Completely accurate	<b>Lost source of income because of COVID-19</b>	Please tell me if you personally or any other member of your household have been affected in any of the following ways by the COVID-19 pandemic: Temporarily or permanently lost a job, business, or primary source of income?	Dummy variable 1=Yes 0=No  Reference=No
<b>Satisfaction with democracy</b>	Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Zambia?	Continuous variable: 1=Not at all satisfied 2=Not very satisfied 3=Fairly satisfied 4=Very satisfied	<b>Government management of COVID-19</b>	How well or badly would you say the current government has handled the following matters since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the response to the COVID-19 Pandemic?	Continuous variable: 1=Very badly 2=Fairly badly 3=Fairly well 4=Very well
<b>Government management of the economy</b>	How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Management of the economy?	Continuous variable: 1=Very badly 2=Fairly badly 3=Fairly well 4=Very well	<b>Seriousness of COVID-19 over the next six months</b>	Looking ahead, how serious of a problem do you think the COVID-19 pandemic will be for Zambia over the next six months?	Continuous variable: 1=Not at all serious 2= Not very serious 3=Somewhat serious 4=Very serious

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