

Working Paper No. 191

Only game in town?

Inequality and demand for democracy in Africa – a micro perspective

by Thomas Isbell | August 2022

Only game in town? Inequality and demand for democracy in Africa – a micro perspective

by Thomas Isbell | August 2022

Thomas Isbell is a post-doctoral research fellow at the Institute for Democracy, Citizenship and Public Policy in Africa (University of Cape Town) as well as a research assistant at Afrobarometer. Email: tisbell@afrobarometer.org

Abstract

In this paper, I explore whether perceived inequality is associated with demand for democracy among Africans. Past research has diverged on whether macro-level inequality should increase or decrease support for democracy, with some arguing that people might see democracy as a solution to inequality, and others that people might see it as a cause. I advance this literature by using a perceptual measure of inequality from Afrobarometer: how people feel their living situation compares to others' in their country. I find that perceived equality is significantly associated with greater demand for democracy, while perceptions of relative deprivation and relative advantage are both associated with lower democratic demand. These effects are largely significant above and beyond the effect of absolute poverty and known predictors of support for democracy, such as free and fair elections and level of education.



1. Introduction

Although inequality “is devilishly complicated to analyze” (Pinker, 2018: 98), it has become something of a conventional wisdom that increases in it are threatening democracy. For example, in a speech in Greece in 2016, then-U.S. President Barack Obama noted that growing inequality created a sense among ordinary people that the “global elites and corporations” live by different rules, which “feeds a profound sense of injustice and a feeling that our economies are increasingly unfair” (Deutsche Welle, 2016). This sense of injustice may generate “rising ‘tribalism’ and ‘nationalism’ that breeds suspicion of democratic institutions and government” (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Similarly, U.S. economist Joseph Stiglitz (2015: 379) notes that:

Growing inequality within most countries around the world is one of the critical issues facing the world today. People everywhere sense that it is morally wrong. We sense that it cannot be justified. We sense that it is dividing our societies and undermining our democracies. And we are right in sensing this harm.

Indeed, economic inequality within countries has risen in many of the world's most advanced democracies and economies over the past four decades (Alderson, Beckfield, & Nielsen, 2005; Atkinson & Piketty, 2007; Solt, 2008; Milanovic, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2013; Piketty & Saez, 2014; Piketty, 2015). Research suggests multiple direct and indirect paths by which high levels of economic inequality may affect democracy in the short and long run (Karl, 2000; Houle, 2009; Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Solt, 2012)).

However, the literature on the linkages between economic inequality and democracy has to date focused primarily on developed countries of the global North, or newly democratising countries in Central and Eastern Europe (see, for example, Loveless, 2013). Far less evidence is available in this regard for cases in the global South, including Africa.

This is a serious gap in the literature, as Africa forms a critical set of cases for understanding the linkage between economic inequality and democracy. As a region, Africa is marked by the highest rates of inequality globally (Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalén, & Gaddis, 2016), and the salience of inequality is recognised in the public and political discourse in Africa (Mkandawire, 2014). Indeed, as South African economist Murray Leibbrandt (2021) points out, “inequality remains the developmental challenge of our time.”

At the same time, many African regimes are characterised by both democratic and non-democratic elements. Thirty years after the continent's “democratic dawn” in the early 1990s, Africa's democracies are characterised by variance and differentiation rather than a common, “continental trajectory” (Bratton & Mattes, 2009; Mattes & Bratton, 2016). According to the World Governance Indicators (data from 2018), political regimes in sub-Saharan Africa score lower on average on voice and accountability, political stability, and state quality than all other world regions except for the Middle East and North Africa. To many observers, the past decade has even been marked by a backsliding of democracy in many African countries, although this trend is not unique to Africa (Hellmeier et al., 2021).


The question therefore emerges to what extent inequality in Africa is associated with democratic governance. Previous research focusing on attitudes at the macro level has mixed lessons for Africa. In a study from 2014, Krieckhaus, Son, Bellinger, and Wells use World Values Survey data and the Gini coefficient to test the relationship between inequality and support for democracy. They find a significant negative correlation, showing that people, on average, report less support for democracy in more unequal countries (N=57, R-square= 0.2319, $p < 0.001$). Using a similar approach with Afrobarometer Round 7 data from 33 countries, I find no correlation between national inequality (Gini ($r(32) = -0.125$, $p > 0.05$; and

Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) ($r(30) = -0.176, p > 0.05$) and mean support for democracy per country (Figure 1).

This lack of correlation might suggest that, unlike in other regions of the world, attitudes toward democracy are not tied to levels of inequality in Africa. However, previous rounds of Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents what the most essential characteristic of a democracy was to them. The results clearly showed that notions of equality and egalitarianism were connected to the term democracy in the minds of ordinary Africans.¹

A further explanation for this lack of association could be that country-level scores on inequality often do not correlate strongly with how ordinary people see levels of inequality. Previous research has shown that ordinary people are often unaware of the level of inequality in their country or misjudge how they personally fit within national income or wealth distributions (Kuhn, 2011, 2019; Norton & Ariely, 2011; Tverdova, 2012; Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 2014; Niehues, 2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018); this might mean that measures like Gini coefficients are divorced from individuals' assessments. As such, there may not be a significant correlation because subjectively perceived inequality is different from objectively measured inequality. In fact, a large psychological literature exists on the consequences of perceptions of relative deprivation for social and political behaviour, especially among and between groups.²

Figure 1: Correlation between economic inequality and country mean of support for democracy in 32 countries³



¹ See Appendix 1.

² See Gurr (1970); Tajfel (1974, 1979, 1982); Crosby (1976); Tajfel, Turner, Austin, & Worchel (1979); Walker & Pettigrew (1984); Brewer & Kramer (1985); and Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell (1987). For select studies in Africa, see Duckitt & Mphuthing (1998); Harris (2002); and Duckitt, Callaghan, & Wagner (2005). Most widely, relative deprivation has been applied to Africa in the context of conflict studies: Barrows (1976); Østby (2008); Østby, Nordås, & Rød (2009); Cederman, Weidmann, & Gleditsch (2011); and Cederman, Gleditsch, & Buhaug (2013).

³ I use the Afrobarometer Round 7 data here, collected in 2016-2018. I then use the Gini coefficient and SWIID Gini coefficient closest to the date of the Afrobarometer fieldwork in each country. I was not able to obtain SWIID data for Gabon and the Gambia. Both countries have been excluded from Figure 1.

The relative-deprivation argument essentially proposes that it is not the absolute situation or conditions of groups that especially drive behaviour and attitudes, but rather individuals' perceptions of those conditions. As such, I take a bottom-up perspective by focusing on attitudes toward democracy voiced by ordinary people. My research question is therefore whether people's perception of lived inequality is correlated with their demand for democracy.

Structure

This paper progresses as follows. In the next section, I present and discuss the existing literature regarding the effects of economic inequality on politics. Drawing from the literature, I derive divergent hypotheses that I will test in the latter half of this paper. After introducing my dependent variables and predictor variables, I present descriptive statistics for both. In Section 4, I test the explanatory model. I first test a number of basic models focused on testing the main predictor. I find a significant positive relationship between perceived lived equality and demand for democracy: Feeling equal to others increases demand for democracy, while feeling either better off or worse off reduces demand for democracy.

I then turn to testing the main predictors in the context of known predictors of demand for democracy to assess whether the main predictor variables are useful to consider above and beyond the current explanatory model in the literature on demand for democracy. These models suggest that the positive relationship between perceived lived equality and demand for democracy is significant above and beyond the effect of trust in rulers, perceptions of government economic performance, political freedoms, and socio-demographic traits. I find no significant effect of national inequality measured per Gini coefficient.

2. Literature review

Until fairly recently, researchers have commonly measured economic inequality using objective, country-level measures such as the Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio. In the past decade, however, a number of studies have found that objective scores of economic inequality are weakly understood by ordinary people. This research suggests that objective and subjective levels of inequality are only loosely associated, if that (Loveless & Whitefield, 2011; Loveless, 2013; Binelli & Loveless, 2016). For example, research suggests that U.S. citizens underestimate wealth inequality (Norton & Ariely, 2011) but have overestimated the increase in income inequality since 1960 (Chambers et al., 2014; Bartels, 2016). Individuals also appear to be unclear regarding their own position within the national income distribution. In a survey experiment in Argentina, perceived placement within the national income distribution was correlated with respondents' position in the local income distribution, but not the national one (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, & Tetaz, 2013).

This lack of association raises questions as to how exactly inequality shapes people's attitudes and behaviours. As Gimpelson and Treisman (2018:30), note:

Theories [...] assume key actors accurately perceive the degree of income inequality. Yet, given how hard it is to estimate distributions of income and property – for skilled professionals, let alone statistically unsophisticated citizens – this assumption is implausible. People may not respond to inequality as posited because, quite simply, they do not know its level.

Rather, I employ a subjective measure of individual equality and inequality using representative survey data. Drawing from the existing literature, which relies primarily on measures of objective inequality, there is little to go by as to what effect one might expect perceptions of individual inequality to have on demand for democracy in Africa. Broadly, two schools of thought exist on the linkage between objective levels of inequality and



democratic support: political-economy approaches on the one hand and survey literature and area studies on the other.

Political economists argue that higher inequality should increase support for democracy, as the masses see democracy as a means of redistribution between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This is because, by definition, rising inequality should leave more people with less of the overall distribution and (assuming self-interest) more supportive of redistributive measures that, given equal votes and interest representation, they could demand in a democratic regime. This approach is prospective, in that citizens want (more) democracy as a means to redistribute and transfer wealth and income, which they, as the majority, would be able to achieve under democratic rule.⁴ The political-economy literature would thus expect that:

H1: *Feelings of relative deprivation increase demand for democracy.*

Conversely, the survey and area studies literatures assume people are retrospective in their assessment of regimes (Krieckhaus et al., 2014). As such, high levels of inequality will reduce regime support as people become disillusioned with the system. In systems with democratic institutions, the retrospective perspective predicts that citizens will support democracy less when faced with high inequality, as the negative outcome (inequality) is attributed to democracy or democracy is perceived to be unable to solve this problem.

However, research has argued that there may be an effect of inequality on popular support for authoritarianism. As will be discussed in the following section, the dependent variable in this paper – demand for democracy – comprises both variables measuring support for democracy and support for non-democratic alternatives. As such, the literature on support for authoritarianism is fitting to consider here. For example, Solt (2012) finds that high levels of economic inequality produce support for authoritarianism because the experience of hierarchical relations in highly unequal societies leads to greater respect for authority. Solt derives this argument from relative-power theory, which states that inequality of economic resources leads to inequality of power (Solt, 2008). As Solt (2012) notes:

Experiences with authority in the economic sphere should be expected to affect people's attitudes toward authority more generally. As economic inequality increases, people are more and more trained by the market to expect command and obedience, and these lessons are then applied in other settings as well.

Given these possibilities, we might formulate an opposite expectation to Hypothesis 1:

H2: *Feelings of relative deprivation reduce demand for democracy.*

In this section, I have briefly overviewed two literatures regarding how economic inequality relates to political-regime preferences. The first – political economy – approach posits that inequality should increase support for democracy, as people see democracy as a vehicle for redistribution. At the individual level, I thus posited that people who feel relatively deprived should want more democracy. Conversely, retrospective approaches and relative-power theory both argue that high inequality could increase support for authoritarianism. Both

⁴ The political-economy approaches are largely grounded in democratic-transition research. Based on the seminal Meltzer-Richard (1981) model, distributive-conflict models presume that the poor will see potential gains from redistribution of wealth from the rich and thus favour democracy, since it empowers them. Conversely, the rich should oppose it, since they would bear the costs from these popular demands (Boix, 2003; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). Other scholars argue that these sentiments in favour of or against democracy depend not just on absolute wealth, but also on the level of inequality. In particular, when inequality is high, the poor will be strongly in favour of democracy, because of its redistributive potential, while the rich will be even more strongly opposed (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Krieckhaus et al., 2014).

hypotheses will be tested using representative survey data, which I introduce in the next section.

3. Data, methodology, and variables

I use Afrobarometer Round 7 survey data to test whether perceptions of individual equality and inequality are correlated with demand for democracy.⁵ These data were collected between September 2016 and September 2018 in 33 African countries (N= 44,329).⁶ The survey was conducted face to face in the respondent's choice of language, with nationally representative samples. Country samples range from 1,193 (Guinea) to 2,400 (Tanzania, Ghana).

Dependent variable: Demand for democracy

Simply asking people whether they support democracy may not be conclusive. Democracy may mean different things to different people, and thus voicing support for “democracy” may actually mean support for different things. Critics have argued that the commonly used measures of “support for democracy” often lack references to concrete attributes of democracy. Such “vacuous conceptions of democracy” (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007: 639) are problematic, as it is unclear what, if anything, “democracy” means to the respondents, and whether such understandings are consistent across different groups and contexts (Muller & Jukam, 1977; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002).⁷ In addition, it is unclear from measuring only “support

⁵ To access data used in this paper, see Afrobarometer (2019). For the survey codebook, see Afrobarometer (2020a). For information on the sampling methodology, see Afrobarometer (2020b).

⁶ My data set includes 34 countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Eswatini, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. However, I could not include Eswatini in my analysis of demand for democracy because one element of the index, the question of whether the respondent approves or disapproves of one-man rule, was not asked in Eswatini. The sample used to predict demand for democracy therefore comprises 33 countries (N=44,329).

⁷ In earlier survey rounds, Afrobarometer asked respondents what they considered the most essential characteristic of democracy. The surveys included four consecutive questions asking respondents to identify what they considered the most essential characteristic of democracy out of four characteristics that were read out to them each time. Two of the four questions included responses about equality. In response to the first of these questions, 25% of respondents said “government narrowing the gap between rich and poor.” This was the second-most-frequent response after “people choose government leaders in free and fair elections” (33%). The other two response options pertaining to freedom of expression (22%) and government not wasting tax money (14%) were reported less frequently. In response to the second question, respondents most commonly said “government ensuring job opportunities for all” (36%), followed by “government ensuring law and order” (24%). Multiparty competition and media freedom were mentioned by 18% and 17%, respectively. Importantly, the percentages cannot be compared across questions. Also, it must be considered that respondents were presented a closed-question format, making it impossible to ascertain what they would have said without the offered response categories.

Another weakness of the Afrobarometer data is that the term “democracy” is read out in English, French, or Portuguese and is only translated into a local language if the respondent does not understand the original term. Unfortunately, no data are recorded on how often the interviewer is required to translate the term and whether the interviewer is able to use a single local-language term or has to describe democracy to the respondent. However, the Afrobarometer survey does allow interviewers to record questions that they feel the respondents “had problems answering” (Q109 in Round 7). Fifty-nine interviewers noted that respondents had issues regarding “questions about democracy,” without making references to specific questions, while 167 specifically cited Question 28 (support for democracy). Moreover, 99 respondents refused to answer the

for democracy" whether respondents may support democracy but also hold "conflicting values" (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007: 639). Instead, as Bratton and Mattes (2001: 457) argue, support for democracy is best queried in "concrete terms and in the form of comparisons with plausible alternatives."⁸

In survey studies, including "plausible alternatives" is referred to as measuring "authentic democratic support."⁹ The premise of this measure is that democratic and non-democratic norms and ideals are inherently incompatible. Thus, someone who prefers democracy but can still accept or see merit in non-democratic forms of governance may display normative and practical support for democracy, but not authentic support. Only supporting democracy practically and rejecting non-democratic alternatives registers as authentic support.¹⁰

Afrobarometer uses a constructed index called "demand for democracy" to tap authentic support for democracy. Demand for democracy captures whether someone voices support for democracy as a regime type *and* rejects non-democratic alternatives (one-man, military, and one-party rule).

To measure support for democracy, respondents were asked:

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

Seven in 10 respondents (69%) across the sample of 33 countries said that democracy was preferable to any other regime type, while 12% felt that "sometimes" a non-democratic regime was preferable, and a similar number (14%) said that it "doesn't matter." However, these numbers hide significant variation between countries (see Appendix 5). While more than eight in 10 respondents in Sierra Leone (84%), Senegal (82%), Zambia (81%), Ghana (81%), and Uganda (81%) support democracy in this way, fewer than half do so in Madagascar (47%) and Tunisia (46%). Grouped by region, support for democracy was highest in East Africa (75%) and West Africa (74%) and lowest in North Africa (59%) (see Appendix 6). The attitude that the regime doesn't matter was most common in North Africa (20%).

To measure rejection of non-democratic alternatives, respondents were asked:

There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?

Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?

The army comes in to govern the country?

question. Slightly more than 4% of the sample said they "don't know" (n=970), although no further details are available as to what exactly respondents may be referring to or whether the question was not understood. Respondents without any formal education (7%) or with primary schooling only (6%) were considerably more likely to say they "don't know" than those with secondary (2%) or post-secondary (1%) education. This may suggest that those lacking education may not understand the question or the subject.

⁸ See also Norris (1999) and Dalton (2004).

⁹ Testing whether respondents prefer democracy as a regime type over other regime forms is typically referred to as the Churchill hypothesis in survey research (Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998).


¹⁰ See also Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah (2005) and Sin & Wells (2005).

Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything?

Respondents are then categorised by whether they “disapproved” or “strongly disapprove” of these alternatives on the one hand, or “approve,” “strongly approve,” or “neither approve nor disapprove” of alternatives on the other hand. The former category is assigned a score of 1, while the latter is assigned a score of 0. Likewise, respondents who said that democracy as a regime type is preferable are scored as 1, while those who said that alternatives may be preferable or the regime type doesn’t matter are scored as 0. Combining the two recoded variables produces a scale running from 0 to 4. Someone who is indifferent to or supportive of non-democratic alternatives would score low on this scale, while someone who supports a democratic regime and rejects other alternatives would score high. Accordingly, 0 is coded as “no demand for democracy,” while 4 is coded as “full demand.”

Across the sample of 33 countries, 42% of respondent scored as full demand for democracy, while 28% scored three out of four components (see Figure 2 below). National mean demand for democracy varied significantly (see Appendix 7), ranging from 67% among Mauritians and Zambians to only 17% among Tunisians and 19% among Basotho. On average, Africans were most rejecting of one-man rule (80%), followed by military rule (74%) and one-party rule (72%). But these numbers also hide large variation between countries. For example, only 39% of Liberians rejected military rule, and only 41% of Mozambicans rejected one-man rule. These diverse results emphasise the need to acknowledge clustering by country.

Figure 2: Demand for democracy | 33 countries | 2016/2018



Examined by geographical region, full demand for democracy was highest in East Africa (54%) and lowest in North Africa (28%) (see Appendix 8). Comparing rejection of non-democratic alternatives within each region, West Africans most widely rejected one-man rule (84%) and least opposed military rule (69%), while East Africans found one-man rule most objectionable (90%) and one-party rule least objectionable (72%) among the three alternatives. Southern Africans were least opposed to military rule (67%) and most opposed to one-man rule (74%), while North Africans were least opposed to one-party rule (58%) and equally opposed to military (63%) and one-man rule (64%). In the Central region, respondents least frequently opposed one-party rule (71%) and most strongly rejected one-man rule (83%).


Predictor variables: Perceptions of individual inequality

I compute the predictor variables (perceptions of individual inequality) using an Afrobarometer survey question that asks how respondents think their living conditions compare to others' in their country. I refer to this question as a measure of individuals' subjective relative living situation or perceived relative living situation throughout this paper. Substantive responses include "much worse" (1), "worse" (2), "same" (3), "better" (4), and "much better" (5) (see Figure 3). Responses were read out to respondents, but the questionnaire provides no references as to who "others" are or what exactly "living conditions" entail.¹¹

To test the effect of subjective relative living situation, I compute four dummy variables by coding the variable described above into four dichotomous variables. For these four variables, I code "much better," "better," "worse," and "much worse" as 1, and all other categories as 0. I do not include a dummy for the "equal" category, making it a reference category. I do this (rather than including the variable as a continuous or categorical single variable) as it is not clear whether the relation between the predictor variable and the dependent variable is linear. Using a series of dummy variables allows each category on the independent variable to be entered separately.

Across the sample of 33 countries, about one in three respondents (34%) felt their living situation was equal to others'. Two-thirds (65%) said their living situation was different (better or worse), including 11% who felt "very" unequal to others. However, large country differences underlie these numbers (see Appendix 3). While 59% of Mauritians and 57% of Malagasy felt "the same," only 13% of Malawians and 16% of Ugandans did. At the regional level, North Africans (50%) were most likely to feel equal, followed by Central Africans (39%). Conversely, East Africans were on average least likely to say they felt "the same" (27%) (see Appendix 4).

Figure 3: Perceived lived equality | 33 countries | 2016/2018¹²



¹¹ This variable has been used in the past to measure perceived equality, as by Langer, Stewart, Smedts, & Demarest (2015), who used it in constructing a social cohesion index. Afrobarometer Round 3 asked respondents to assess the economic situation of their ethnic group compared to that of other ethnic groups. Langer & Mikami (2013) used that question in a study exploring why perceived economic group differences differed from objective group differences.

¹² N=44,611. Only valid responses are displayed here, but the percentages include 61 people who refused to answer the question and 1,439 who said they "don't know."

4. Analysis: Understanding economic determinants of demand for democracy

To test whether perceived lived equality is associated with demand for democracy, I proceed in two steps.¹³ First, I run a series of models focused on untangling the main predictors (perceived relative living situation) from related phenomena such as subjective absolute poverty, objective absolute poverty, and country-level income inequality and development.¹⁴ If people who feel relatively deprived have less demand for democracy, it is important to establish whether this correlation is independent of or works in conjuncture with how poor people feel they are or how poor they actually are, for example.

Second, I run a series of models that test whether perceived individual inequality is associated with demand for democracy even when we include known explanations of demand for democracy. From the models run in Step 1, it is unclear whether perceptions of individual inequality add something to our understanding of demand for democracy that is unaccounted for by current explanations found in the literature. Here I focus on three groups of explanations — intrinsic, instrumental, and partisan — of why people support democracy as a regime type.

Because of the clustering of the data (significant clustering confirmed by testing the interclass correlation coefficient), all tests are multilevel models (MLMs) using country as the Level 2 unit and individual as the Level 1 unit. Due to the structure of the data at both levels (large N at Level 1 and small N at Level 2),¹⁵ I use restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation, which is advised when the case number at Level 2 is small. For both dependent variables, the estimates of covariance parameters were significant at the 1% level.¹⁶

Results

The analysis shows that how people perceive their relative situation compared to others' is significantly associated with how much or little demand for democracy they have (Model 1a displayed in Table 1, below). The results indicate that perceptions of strong relative deprivation and strong relative advantage are significantly associated with demand for democracy. In both cases, the effect is significant and negative. This means that respondents who feel relatively much worse off or much better off have significantly less demand for democracy than those who feel less unequal, and vice versa. In addition, Model 1a shows that those who feel moderately worse off than others also have significantly less demand for democracy than those who feel equal.

What the results also show is that feeling equal to others is not simply the opposite of feeling unequal. The results indicate that the effect of feeling relatively deprived on demand for

¹³ For space reasons, the tables in this section do not include the null model, which is used to calculate the explained variance for each model.

¹⁴ In line with most survey-based empirical research, I also control for important socio-demographic characteristics — age, gender, location (urban/rural), and level of education. For example, in a study of 20 African countries, Mattes (2016) finds strong predictive power for level of education (albeit a negative relationship) on demand for democracy and satisfaction with democracy.

¹⁵ In my data, the N at Level 2 (country) is small (33) compared to the N (>44,000) at Level 1 (individual). Ideally, data used in an MLM analysis is structured with a large N at Level 2 and a small N at Level 1. A possible problem arising from my data could be an underestimation of effect size due to the limited case number at Level 2. Data with low case numbers at Level 2 tend to yield overly small effect sizes when the random slope model is used. As such, I test only random intercept models.

¹⁶ To further confirm the necessity of an MLM approach, I calculated the interclass correlation coefficient for each dependent variable. For both dependent variables (and for both estimation methods), the interclass correlation coefficient met the minimum threshold of 0.05. Support for democracy met the threshold (0.053), and demand for democracy met the threshold comfortably (0.105).



democracy is considerably weaker than the effect of feeling relatively advantaged, especially feeling strongly advantaged. What is more, in many cases feeling moderately deprived compared to others was not significantly associated with demand for democracy. This suggests that people who feel only moderately worse off than others have no more or less demand for democracy than people who feel equal. In most cases, it is only people who feel much worse off (strong relative deprivation) who have significantly less demand for democracy than those who feel equal.

People may want democracy more or less, not because they subjectively *think* they are worse off than others, but because they objectively *are* worse off than others. I therefore control for absolute poverty with two measures: the Lived Poverty Index and an Asset Index. The Lived Poverty Index is an additive index of five variables that measure how often a respondent or anyone in their family went with basic commodities – enough food, enough water for home use, medical services, enough cooking fuel, and a cash income – in the past year.¹⁷ The index is computed by averaging a respondent's five responses (never, just once or twice, several times, many times, always). The index is recoded, and categories are created running from “no lived poverty” (coded 0) to “high lived poverty” (coded 3).¹⁸

The Asset Index reflects how many non-essential goods a respondent has access to or owns personally, including a radio, television, mobile phone, computer, motor vehicle, and bank account.¹⁹ Each variable is coded 0 (no ownership or access), 1 (access but no ownership), or 2 (personal ownership). The scores for the six items were added without any weighting, and the resulting scale was not recoded. The scale runs from 0 (no access or personal ownership to any item) to 12 (personal ownership of all six items).²⁰ I also control for the respondent's objective relative situation.²¹ At the country level, I control for both income inequality and country-level development. To control for country-level income inequality, I use the Gini coefficient, which is arguably the most widely known and commonly used measure of inequality. To control for country-level development, I use the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a multi-item index comprising scores from dimension indices for life expectancy, education, and per capita gross national income.

¹⁷ The questions ask: *Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough food to eat? Gone without enough clean water for home use? Gone without medicines or medical treatment? Gone without enough fuel to cook your food? Gone without a cash income?* See Mattes (2008) for a discussion of the Lived Poverty Index.

¹⁸ I performed a confirmatory factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) and extracted a single factor (direct oblimin rotation). A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha. The Afrobarometer data are collected based on a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample design, and sampling is probability proportionate to population size at each stage (Afrobarometer, 2020). This means that the sample is designed to ensure that each (adult) citizen has the same chance of being selected within a given area. The survey is not designed to sample according to income or wealth distribution. By definition, a random selection proportionate to population size sampling design will under-sample those at the top of income or wealth distributions in more unequal countries or areas, as there are simply far fewer of them.

¹⁹ A confirmatory factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) was performed, and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha.

²⁰ This index has been used in the past by Langer & Mikami (2013). In a study of perceived horizontal inequalities in Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria, and Kenya, the authors use the same set of variables and a similar approach to recoding and call the variable an Asset Index. Langer & Mikami dichotomise the six items and compute an Asset Index ranging from 0 to 6.

²¹ Arguably, people's reported absolute poverty level may also be drawn from comparative judgements by respondents. As such, people may be reporting how often they went without a cash income (for example) based on their perception of how often a salient reference group or person went without income. I therefore calculate a score of objective relative poverty by computing the respondent's relative distance to the national LPI and Asset Index mean score (using the indices described above).

Table 1: Economic determinants of demand for democracy | 33 countries | Afrobarometer Round 7 data (2016/2018)

	M1a: Relative living situation	M1b: Controls	M1c: Objective relative poverty (LPI)	M1c: Objective relative poverty (Assets)	M1d: Country inequality	M2a: Poverty	M2b: Country poverty	M3a: Full economic model 1	M3b: Full economic model 2
Intercept	3 (0.065)	2.821*** (0.076)	2.814 (0.075)	2.809 (0.074)	2.778 (0.364)	2.657 (0.079)	3.106 (0.368)	3.009 (0.473)	2.87 (0.479)
Much worse= 1	-0.143*** (0.021)	-0.064*** (0.021)	-0.041* (0.021)	-0.037 (0.021)	-0.064** (0.021)	-0.02 (0.021)	-0.064** (0.021)	-0.02 (0.021)	-0.02 (0.021)
Worse= 1	-0.049*** (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	0.019 (0.014)	0.02 (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	0.031* (0.014)	0.004 (0.014)	0.031* (0.014)	0.031* (0.014)
Better= 1	-0.007 (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.04** (0.013)	-0.047*** (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.053*** (0.013)	-0.031* (0.013)	-0.053*** (0.013)	-0.053*** (0.013)
Much better= 1	-0.174*** (0.032)	-0.214*** (0.031)	-0.223*** (0.031)	-0.244*** (0.031)	-0.214*** (0.031)	-0.25*** (0.031)	-0.214*** (0.031)	-0.25*** (0.031)	-0.25*** (0.031)
Relative to national LPI mean			-0.054*** (0.006)						-0.042*** (0.007)
Relative to national Asset Index mean				0.038*** (0.002)				0.036*** (0.002)	
Lived Poverty Index						-0.041*** (0.007)		-0.041*** (0.007)	
Asset Index						0.036*** (0.002)			0.036*** (0.002)
Age		0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.002*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)
Female= 1		-0.178*** (0.01)	-0.177*** (0.01)	-0.152*** (0.01)	-0.178*** (0.01)	-0.152*** (0.011)	-0.178*** (0.01)	-0.152 (0.011)	-0.152*** (0.011)
Rural= 1		-0.029** (0.011)	-0.02 (0.011)	0.019 (0.012)	-0.029** (0.011)	0.024*** (0.012)	-0.029** (0.011)	0.024* (0.012)	0.024* (0.012)
Level of education		0.109*** (0.003)	0.105*** (0.003)	0.086*** (0.003)	0.109*** (0.003)	0.084*** (0.003)	0.109*** (0.003)	0.084*** (0.003)	0.085*** (0.003)
Income inequality (Gini)					0.001 (0.008)			0.002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.009)
Human Development Index							-0.52 (0.657)	-0.439 (0.671)	-0.741 (0.679)
Within-country R ²	0.008	0.060	0.064	0.074	0.060	0.076	0.060	0.076	0.076
Between-country R ²	0.006	-0.078	-0.073	-0.038	-0.113	-0.117	-0.091	-0.100	-0.128

Cell entries are linear mixed model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Some effect sizes have been rounded to 0. *p<=0.05, **p<=0.01, ***p<=0.001



Interestingly, when socio-demographic and economic control variables are introduced in the models, the effect of feelings of relative advantage on demand for democracy remains significant and even increases in magnitude, while the effect for feelings of relative deprivation (both strong and moderate) turns non-significant or decreases in magnitude. For example, the significant, negative association of feeling much better off and demand for democracy increases if one considers a person's objective relative material well-being (see Model 1c), while it is reduced in magnitude or becomes non-significant for feelings of relative deprivation. Elsewhere (see Model 2a), the association between feeling relatively deprived and demand for democracy switches from negative to positive for feelings of moderate deprivation while the effect of perceived strong relative deprivation is non-significant.

What does this mean? The results tell us that people who feel relatively advantaged, in particular people who feel strongly advantaged, have less demand for democracy than people who feel equal to others. Comparing the effect size to the results obtained for support for democracy, this suggests that those who feel relatively (much) better off than others not only have less support for democracy but are also open to non-democratic regime forms. Conversely, people who feel relatively deprived also have less demand for democracy than people who feel equal to others, but the linkage is far weaker and likely explained in part or in total by how much poverty someone has experienced both subjectively and objectively. Compared to support for democracy, demand for democracy also appears more strongly associated with socio-demographic traits. Here, men and less educated respondents are significantly more supportive of non-democratic regime forms than women and those with higher levels of education.

I find no significant country-level effects. This suggests that people in countries that are more unequal (as per Gini coefficient of income inequality) or less developed (as per HDI) have no more or less demand for democracy than people in more equal or more developed countries.

5. Understanding perceived relative deprivation and advantage in context

But do these explanations give us a better understanding of demand for democracy than current explanations of demand for democracy found in the literature? In this paper, I focus on three alternative explanations of demand democracy: because of what democracy is (intrinsic motivations), because of what democracy does (instrumental motivations), and because democracy allows a person to “win” (partisan motivations).


In the following section I briefly review the operationalisation of each alternative explanation before analysing the perceived individual inequality variables in the context of these alternative explanations (see Table 2 below).

Democracy for 'what it is': Intrinsic explanations

Attitudes toward democracy may be tied to intrinsic characteristics of democracy, such as perceptions of civil freedoms and rights as well as free and fair elections.²² To account for such an effect, I include an index comprising variables that measure respondents' evaluations of how often people in their country have to be careful about what they say about politics, which political organisations they join, and how they vote.²³

²² See Easton (1975), Evans & Whitefield (1995), Diamond (1999), Klingemann (1999), Norris (1999), Waldron-Moore (1999), Mattes (2016). For African cases, Mattes (2016) provides the most recent and comprehensive analysis of predictors of support for and satisfaction with democracy.

²³ Respondents were asked: *In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics? Do people have to be careful about what political organisations they join? Do people have to be careful about how they vote in an election?* I conducted both factor analysis and reliability analysis



Moreover, I include a variable that measures how free and fair respondents believed the most recent national election was²⁴ and whether they feel (and if so, how often) the government discriminates against their ethnic group.²⁵ Political and personal freedoms are always to a large extent grounded in the laws of the country. At the country level, I therefore include a control variable – the rule of law index – from the Varieties of Democracy Project, which captures to what extent “laws [are] transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent ... the actions of government officials comply with the law” (Coppedge et al., 2019: 266).²⁶

Democracy for ‘what it does’: Instrumental explanations

A different literature argues that support for democracy is mainly instrumental, and support is awarded by individuals for producing positive outputs, i.e. for “what democracy does.”

In the African context, high levels of inequality were often inherited from times of colonial rule, when economic, administrative, and societal systems were introduced and upheld to explicitly enrich a minority, both domestically with the colonised state and in the colonial metropolis, while having no concern for the economic conditions of the overwhelming majority (Nafziger & Nafziger, 1988; van de Walle, 2009; Mkandawire, 2010; Heldring & Robinson, 2012; Atkinson, 2014; Alvaredo, Bergeron, & Cassan, 2017). In many cases, the post-colonial legal and administrative systems adopted by the newly independent states mimicked the former colonial power and thereby exacerbated the continuation of high inequality between the political and administrative elites and the wider population (Nafziger & Nafziger, 1988; Burton & Jennings, 2007; Lentz, 2015). It is therefore possible that rather than perceptions of inequality itself (which might be seen as a relic of colonial rule), it is the way in which the government is perceived to be handling the issue that shapes support for democracy among ordinary Africans. To control for this, I use a question asking respondents to evaluate how well the government is handling narrowing gaps between “rich” and “poor.”²⁷

I also include two indices that correspond to respondents’ evaluation of how the government is doing in terms of economic performance and service delivery. The economic management index consists of questions regarding managing the economy, improving the living standards of the poor, creating jobs, and keeping prices stable.²⁸ The service delivery

before computing an additive factor variable (“freedoms factor”). A factor analysis (extraction method: principal axis factoring) was performed and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). The items were found to be suitable for index construction: A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.

²⁴ Respondents were asked: *On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]?*

²⁵ Respondents were asked: *How often, if ever, are _____s [respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government?* Responses are: *never* (coded as 0), *sometimes* (1), *often* (2), *always* (3). Respondents who refused to answer or said they *didn’t know* were coded as missing and excluded from the analysis.

²⁶ For details on aggregation method and a list of variables used, see Coppedge et al., 2019: 269.

²⁷ This is the only Afrobarometer question (in Round 6 and Round 7) that explicitly touches on inequality. Respondents were asked: *How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?* I treat this variable as quasi-metric, and the four-point response scale runs from “very badly” (coded as 1) to “very well” (coded as 4). I do not recode this variable. This variable speaks to a broad sense of inequality but does not allow any further reasoning as to what form of inequality (wealth, income, assets) the respondent may be referring to, whom the respondent may consider “rich” and “poor,” whether the respondent considers him- or herself to belong to either group, or, more broadly, how much inequality a respondent perceives to exist or how much inequality a respondent deems acceptable or desirable.

²⁸ See Appendix 2 for a full description of questions. A factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) was performed, and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.



index reflects how well the government is perceived to be reducing crime, improving basic health services, addressing educational needs, providing water and sanitation, and maintaining roads and bridges.²⁹ Both indices are based on evaluations of the past 12 months. To account for longer-term evaluations, I also include a variable that reflects whether people feel the country is generally going in the right or wrong direction.³⁰

Further, I control for the perceived performance of the president or chief executive. Past research has pointed to the importance of the chief executive in systems of political economy of African states.³¹ At the country level, I also control for economic development using the mean score of GDP (per capita) growth in the economy between 2011 and 2017.

Partisanship

It is likely that people's evaluations of "what democracy is" and "what democracy does" is not independent of whether they support the ruling party. Following Bratton and Mattes (2001), I control for whether respondents said they "feel close to" a ruling party (coded 2), a different party (1), or no party (0).³² The dependent variable – demand for democracy – includes reference categories from which democratic support is distinguished: one-man rule, one-party rule, and military rule. High levels of trust in the president, military, or ruling party may thus motivate people to support non-democratic alternatives that would allow such individuals or organizations to hold more or total power in a non-democratic regime.³³ To control for the role of trust, I include three variables that capture how much people trust the president, the ruling party, and the military.³⁴

Results

Table 2 below displays the results of three models in which I test whether perceptions of relative situation are significantly associated with demand for democracy above and beyond known covariates of demand for democracy (models 4-6). I then include all covariates in a full model (Model 7).

The results suggest that people who feel better off than others have less demand for democracy than people who feel equally well off. These effects are significant above and beyond the effect of intrinsic, instrumental, and partisan explanations (see models 4- 7). The effect is stronger for those who feel much better off ($\beta = -0.25^{***}$, Model 7) than for people

²⁹ See Appendix 2 for a full description of questions. A factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) was performed, and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). The items were found to be suitable for index construction: A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach's alpha.

³⁰ Respondents were asked: *Let's start with your general view about the current direction of our country. Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is going in the right direction. So let me ask you about the overall direction of the country: Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction?* Response options are: "going in the wrong direction" (coded as 1) and "going in the right direction" (coded as 2). Respondents who refused to answer the question or who said they "don't know" were excluded from the analyses.

³¹ These systems – termed "neopatrimonialism" (see e.g. Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Hyden, 2012; Mkandawire, 2015) – place strong emphasis on the reciprocal connection between patrons in the state (with a "big man" at the top of the network) and clientelist networks attached to these patrons as a means of distributing state resources on the one hand and winning (particularised) public support on the other hand (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Erdman & Engel, 2006). As such, the role of the executive, embodied in the president or prime minister, may shape people's attitudes toward democracy.

³² Respondents were asked: *Do you feel close to any particular political party? [If "yes":] Which party is that?*

³³ See for example Schäfer (2013).

³⁴ Respondents were asked: *How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The president? The ruling party? The military?* (See Appendix 2 for a full description.) The assumption here is that the president is most likely to lead a "one-man rule."



who feel only moderately better off ($\beta = -0.072^{***}$, Model 7), but both are consistently significant across all models.

In models 4, 5, and 7, feeling much worse off is also significantly and negatively associated with demand for democracy, although the effect is weaker than the effect for feeling much better off. This suggests that regardless of how people evaluate democracy based on intrinsic or instrumental explanations, feeling much worse off than others reduces how much demand for democracy people have. Only when the partisan orientations of the respondent are considered (in Model 6) are feelings of strong relative deprivation not significantly associated with demand for democracy. In all models, feeling only moderately deprived (“worse off”) is not significantly associated with demand for democracy.

Looking at the full model, people who feel strong and moderate relative advantage, feel strong relative deprivation, have greater lived poverty experiences, or perceive more frequent government discrimination against their ethnic group have less demand for democracy. Moreover, people have less demand for democracy the more they trust the ruling party and the military. This is likely because those who have more trust in the ruling party and military are more supportive of one-party and military rule (which form part of the demand for democracy index). Likewise, people who feel close to the ruling party have more demand for democracy. Overall, the models appear of good fit in explaining both between-country and within-country variance.³⁵

Of course, the data suggest that people with more extreme assessments of their relative living situation form only a small minority (3% of respondents said they felt “much better off” than others and 8% said they felt “much worse off”). Moreover – despite the significant results – the models suggest that feelings of relative deprivation and advantage alone (even strong feelings) account for only a limited share of the variance in support and demand for democracy both within and between countries. The results show that despite significant correlations, feeling relatively deprived or advantaged alone is likely not going to turn people off democracy as a regime form. Of course, it is possible (and warrants over-time analysis in the future) that sustained, generational experiences or perceptions of relative deprivation might be linked more strongly to diminishing support for democracy as a regime type.

The results also suggest that how people perceive the current government to be handling income gaps is significantly correlated with demand for democracy. Here I find that people who have more positive assessments of their government in this regard have less demand for democracy as a regime form, while those who assess their government poorly in reducing income gaps have more demand for democracy. The same result is found for more positive evaluations of the government in other economic matters. This may suggest that people see democracy as a vehicle to improve redistribution, but when the government is doing well in the eyes of the people, non-democratic alternatives (possibly the status quo in some of the countries sampled) are supported.

³⁵ The models for demand for democracy account for more variance in the dependent variable between countries than within countries. Overall, Model 7 accounts for 17.6% of variance in demand for democracy within countries and 27.8% between countries. Among Level 2 variables, only recent economic growth was significantly correlated with demand for democracy ($\beta = 0.132^*$, Model 5).

Table 2: Modelling demand for democracy | 33 countries | Afrobarometer
Round 7 data (2016/2018)

	M3: Democracy for what it is	M4: Democracy for what it does	M5: Partisanship performance	Full model
<i>Intercept</i>	3.097 (0.4)	2.096 (0.613)	3.074 (0.464)	2.38 (0.58)
Much worse= 1	-0.059* (0.023)	-0.054* (0.023)	-0.028 (0.022)	-0.079** (0.026)
Worse= 1	0.009 (0.015)	0.006 (0.015)	0.022 (0.014)	0.002 (0.017)
Better= 1	-0.068*** (0.014)	-0.052*** (0.015)	-0.055*** (0.014)	-0.072*** (0.016)
Much better= 1	-0.26*** (0.034)	-0.231*** (0.036)	-0.238*** (0.032)	-0.25*** (0.039)
Relative to national asset mean	0.031*** (0.002)	0.031*** (0.002)	0.032*** (0.002)	0.028*** (0.003)
Lived Poverty Index	-0.04*** (0.007)	-0.049*** (0.007)	-0.052*** (0.007)	-0.051*** (0.008)
Freedoms index	0 (0.002)			0.001 (0.002)
Free elections	-0.023*** (0.006)			0.001 (0.007)
Ethnic group treated fairly	-0.028*** (0.007)			-0.027*** (0.008)
Government handling income gaps		-0.036*** (0.009)		-0.034** (0.01)
Economic performance index		-0.018*** (0.003)		-0.016*** (0.003)
Service delivery index		0 (0.002)		0.003 (0.002)
Overall direction of the country		-0.015* (0.007)		0.003 (0.008)
Performance of the president		-0.001 (0.013)		0.022 (0.015)
Incumbent partisan			0.035*** (0.007)	0.034*** (0.008)
Trust president			0.001 (0.007)	0.003 (0.008)
Trust ruling party			-0.052*** (0.007)	-0.038*** (0.008)
Trust military			-0.02** (0.006)	-0.015* (0.007)
Age	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)	0.003*** (0)
Female= 1	-0.115*** (0.011)	-0.123*** (0.012)	-0.13*** (0.011)	-0.097*** (0.013)
Rural= 1	0.021 (0.013)	0.03* (0.013)	0.028* (0.012)	0.032* (0.015)
Level of education	0.072*** (0.003)	0.071*** (0.003)	0.076*** (0.003)	0.065*** (0.004)
Rule of law index	0.429 (0.286)			0.425 (0.29)
Economic growth (mean: 2011-2017)		0.132* (0.05)		0.09 (0.047)
Income inequality (Gini)	-0.01 (0.008)	0.003 (0.008)	0.002 (0.008)	-0.008 (0.008)
Human Development Index	0.21 (0.603)	0.619 (0.716)	-0.375 (0.658)	0.804 (0.664)
<i>Within-country R²</i>	0.151	0.127	0.113	0.176
<i>Between-country R²</i>	0.247	0.059	-0.057	0.278

Note: Cell entries are linear mixed model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Some effect sizes have been rounded to 0. *p<=0.05, **p<=0.01, ***p<=0.001.



6. Conclusion

Are people who feel left out or left behind disillusioned with democracy, or do they want democracy more as it gives them a possible vehicle for redistribution? Do the self-perceived have-nots lose faith in democracy and turn to alternatives? Much has been said about the growing threat to democracy by those who feel the system is not working for them and about the risk of a growing number of have-nots losing faith in democracy. However, little research in this regard has been done for cases in Africa.

In this paper, I explored whether perceptions of relative living situation are significantly linked to how much people demand democracy. Accounting for country-level clustering of the data, I find that people who feel equal to others have more demand for democracy than people who do not feel equal to others. Conversely, feeling both strongly relatively deprived and strongly relatively advantaged tend to be associated with less demand for democracy. These patterns remain significant even when controlling for other explanations for demand for democracy that have been used in the literature, such as absolute poverty, quality of elections and civil freedoms, and personal traits (education and age). Unlike Solt (2008), who argues that inequality may foster support for non-democratic regime forms, I find no significant relation between *country-level* income inequality and less demand for democracy. However, at the individual level, I find that people who feel relatively deprived do in fact show less demand for democracy.

Previous research has relied on using objective measures of inequality, usually at the group or country level. I included arguably the most widely used measure of national inequality – the Gini coefficient for income inequality. However, I find no significant effect of the Gini coefficient. The results underline that perceived relative living situation is an important explanation of regime support in Africa, and one that should be included in predictive models in the future.

My findings present an extension of how economic inequality and its effects can be measured, as well as of the study of economic inequality as a determinant of political-regime support. In both regards, Africa has received little prior attention, and this study provides a promising starting point for future research. Given the high levels of inequality in many African countries and the limited success of democratic consolidation in the past decade or two (Lindberg, 2001; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Beresford, Berry, & Mann, 2018; Cheeseman, 2018), this research represents an important addition to the literature and may provide valuable insights for academics and policymakers alike.



References

- Acemoglu, D., & Robinson, J. A. (2006). Economic backwardness in political perspective. *American Political Science Review*, 100(1), 115-131.
- Afrobarometer. (2019). Merged round 7 data (34 countries).
- Afrobarometer. (2020a). Round 7 codebook.
- Afrobarometer. (2020b). Sampling principles and weighting.
- Alderson, A. S., Beckfield, J., & Nielsen, F. (2005). Exactly how has income inequality changed? Patterns of distributional change in core societies. *International Journal of Comparative Sociology*, 46(5-6), 405-423.
- Alvaredo, F., Atkinson, A. B., Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2013). The top 1 percent in international and historical perspective. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 27(3), 3-20.
- Alvaredo, F., Bergeron, A., & Cassan, G. (2017). Income concentration in British India, 1885-1946. *Journal of Development Economics*, 127, 459-469.
- Atkinson, A. B. (2014). The colonial legacy: Income inequality in former British African colonies. *WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2014-045*. World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
- Atkinson, A.B., & Piketty, T. (2007). *Top incomes over the twentieth century: A contrast between European and English-speaking countries*. Oxford University Press.
- Barrows, W. L. (1976). Ethnic diversity and political instability in black Africa. *Comparative Political Studies*, 9(2), 139-170.
- Bartels, L. M. (2016). *Unequal democracy*. Princeton University Press.
- Beegle, K., Christiaensen, L., Dabalén, A., & Gaddis, I. (2016). *Poverty in a rising Africa*. World Bank Publications.
- Beresford, A., Berry, M. E., & Mann, L. (2018). Liberation movements and stalled democratic transitions: Reproducing power in Rwanda and South Africa through productive liminality. *Democratization*, 25(7), 1231-1250.
- Binelli, C., & Loveless, M. (2016). The urban-rural divide: Perceptions of income and social inequality in Central and Eastern Europe. *Economics of Transition*, 24(2), 211-231.
- Boix, C. (2003). *Democracy and redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. (2001). Support for democracy in Africa: Intrinsic or instrumental? *British Journal of Political Science*, 31(3), 447-474.
- Bratton, M., & Mattes, R. (2009). *Neither consolidating nor fully democratic: The evolution of African political regimes, 1999-2008*. Institute for Democracy in South Africa.
- Bratton, M., Mattes, R., & Gyimah-Boadi, E. (2005). *Public opinion, democracy, and market reform in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Bratton, M., & van de Walle, N. (1997). *Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Brewer, M. B., & Kramer, R. M. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes and behavior. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 36(1), 219-243.
- Burton, A., & Jennings, M. (2007). Introduction: The emperor's new clothes? Continuities in governance in late colonial and early postcolonial East Africa. *International Journal of African Historical Studies*, 40(1), 1-25.
- Cederman, L., Gleditsch, K. S., & Buhaug, H. (2013). *Inequality, grievances, and civil war*. Cambridge University Press.




- Cederman, L., Weidmann, N. B., & Gleditsch, K. S. (2011). Horizontal inequalities and ethnonationalist civil war: A global comparison. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3), 478-495.
- Chabal, P., & Daloz, J.-P. (1999). *Africa works: Disorder as political instrument*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press.
- Chambers, J. R., Swan, L. K., & Heesacker, M. (2014). Better off than we know: Distorted perceptions of incomes and income inequality in America. *Psychological Science*, 25(2), 613-618.
- Cheeseman, N. (2018). *Institutions and democracy in Africa*. Cambridge University Press.
- Coppedge, M., Gerring, J., Knutsen, C. H., Lindberg, S. I., Teorell, J., Altman, D., Bernhard, M., Fish, M. S., Glynn, A., Hicken, A., Lührmann, A., Marquardt, K. L., McMann, K. M., Paxton, P., Pemstein, D., Seim, B., Sigman, R., Skaaning, S., Staton, J. K., Cornell, A., Gastaldi, L., Gjerløw, H., Mechkova, V., von Römer, J., Sundström, A., Tzelgov, E., Uberti, L. J., Wang, Y., Wig, T., & Ziblatt, D. (2019). *V-Dem codebook v9*. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.
- Crosby, F. (1976). A model of egoistical relative deprivation. *Psychological Review*, 83(2), 85.
- Cruces, G., Perez-Truglia, R., & Tetaz, M. (2013). Biased perceptions of income distribution and preferences for redistribution: Evidence from a survey experiment. *Journal of Public Economics*, C(98), 100-112.
- Dalton, R. J. (2004). *Democratic challenges, democratic choices*. Oxford University Press.
- Deutsche Welle. (2016). Obama: 'Inequality the greatest threat to democracy.' 16 November.
- Diamond, L. (1999). *Developing democracy: Toward consolidation*. JHU Press.
- Duckitt, J., Callaghan, J., & Wagner, C. (2005). Group identification and outgroup attitudes in four South African ethnic groups: A multidimensional approach. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, 31(5), 633-646.
- Duckitt, J., & Mphuthing, T. (1998). Group identification and intergroup attitudes: A longitudinal analysis in South Africa. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 74(1), 80-85.
- Easton, D. (1975). A re-assessment of the concept of political support. *British Journal of Political Science*, 5(4), 435-457.
- Erdmann, G., & Engel, U. (2006). Neopatrimonialism revisited: Beyond a catch-all concept. GIGA Working Paper No. 16.
- Evans, G., & Whitefield, S. (1995). The politics and economics of democratic commitment: Support for democracy in transition societies. *British Journal of Political Science*, 25(4), 485-514.
- Gimpelson, V., & Treisman, D. (2018). Misperceiving inequality. *Economics & Politics*, 30(1), 27-54.
- Gurr, T. (1970). *Why men rebel*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Gyimah-Boadi, E. (Ed.) (2004). *Democratic reform in Africa: The quality of progress*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (2012). Inequality and regime change: Democratic transitions and the stability of democratic rule. *American Political Science Review*, 106(3), 495-516.
- Harris, B. (2002). Xenophobia: A new pathology for a new South Africa. In Hook, D., & G. Eagle (Eds.), *Psychopathology and Social Prejudice*, pp. 169-184. Cape Town: University of Cape Town Press.
- Heldring, L., & Robinson, J. A. (2012). Colonialism and economic development in Africa. *NBER Working Paper No. w18566*. National Bureau of Economic Research.
- Hellmeier, S., Cole, R., Grahn, S., Kolvani, P., Lachapelle, J., Lührmann, A., Maerz, S. F., Pillai, S., & S. Lindberg. (2021). State of the world 2020: Autocratization turns viral. *Democratization*, 6(28), 1053-1074.
- Houle, C. (2009). Inequality and democracy: Why inequality harms consolidation but does not affect democratization. *World Politics*, 61(4), 589-622.



- Hyden, G. (2012). *African politics in comparative perspective*. Cambridge University Press.
- Karl, T. L. (2000). Economic inequality and democratic instability. *Journal of Democracy*, 11(1), 149-156.
- Klingemann, H. D. (1999). Mapping political support in the 1990s: A global analysis. In Norris, P. (Ed.), *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, pp. 31-56. Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Kriekhaus, J., Son, B., Bellinger, N. M. & Wells, J. M. (2014). Economic inequality and democratic support. *Journal of Politics*, 76(1), 139-151.
- Kuhn, A. (2011). In the eye of the beholder: Subjective inequality measures and individuals' assessment of market justice. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 27(4), 625-641.
- Kuhn, A. (2019). The subversive nature of inequality: Subjective inequality perceptions and attitudes to social inequality. *European Journal of Political Economy*, 59, 331-344.
- Langer, A., & Mikami, S. (2013). The relationship between objective and subjective horizontal inequalities: Evidence from five African countries. In Mine, Y., F. Stewart, S. Fukuda-Parr, & T. Mkandawire (Eds.), *Preventing Violent Conflict in Africa*, pp. 208-251 London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Langer, A., & Smedts, K. (2013). Seeing is not believing: Perceptions of horizontal inequalities in Africa. Centre for Research on Peace and Development (CRPD) Working Paper 16.
- Langer, A., Stewart, F., Smedts, K., & Demarest, L. (2015). Conceptualising and measuring social cohesion in Africa: Towards a perceptions-based index. *Social Indicators Research*, 131(1), 321-343.
- Leibbrandt, M. (2021). The human tragedy of South Africa's inequality. New Frame. 17 May.
- Lentz, C. (2015). Elites or middle classes? Lessons from transnational research for the study of social stratification in Africa. Working Paper 161 of the Department of Anthropology and African Studies of the Johannes Gutenberg University.
- Lindberg, S. I. (2001). Forms of states, governance, and regimes: Reconceptualizing the prospects for democratic consolidation in Africa. *International Political Science Review*, 22(2), 173-199.
- Loveless, M. (2013). The deterioration of democratic political culture: Consequences of the perception of inequality. *Social Justice Research*, 26(4), 471-491.
- Loveless, M. (2016). Inequality and support for political engagement in new democracies. *Europe-Asia Studies*, 68(6), 1003-1019.
- Loveless, M., & Whitefield, S. (2011). Being unequal and seeing inequality: Explaining the political significance of social inequality in new market democracies. *European Journal of Political Research*, 50(2), 239-266.
- Mattes, R. (2008). The material and political bases of lived poverty in Africa: Insights from the Afrobarometer. In Møller, V., D. Huschka, & A. C. Michalos (Eds.), *Barometers of Quality of Life Around the Globe*, pp. 161-185 Social Indicators Research Series (Vol. 33). Dordrecht: Springer.
- Mattes, R. (2016). Sub-Saharan Africa: The positive impact of effective democracy. In Denmark, D., R. Mattes, & R. G. Niemi (Eds.), *Growing Up Democratic: Does It Make a Difference?*, pp. 151-180. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
- Mattes, R., & Bratton, M. (2016). Do Africans still want democracy? Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 36.
- Meltzer, A. H., & Richard, S. F. (1981). A rational theory of the size of government. *Journal of Political Economy*, 89(5), 914-927.
- Milanovic, B. (2012). Global income inequality by the numbers: In history and now. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 6259.



- Mkandawire, T. (2010). On tax efforts and colonial heritage in Africa. *Journal of Development Studies*, 46(10), 1647-1669.
- Mkandawire, T. (2014). Can Africa turn from recovery to development? *Current History*, 113(763), 171-177.
- Mkandawire, T. (2015). Neopatrimonialism and the political economy of economic performance in Africa: Critical reflections. *World Politics*, 67(3), 563-612.
- Muller, E. N., & Jukam, T. O. (1977). On the meaning of political support. *American Political Science Review*, 71(4), 1561-1595.
- Munck, G. L., & Verkuilen, J. (2002). Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(1), 5-34.
- Nafziger, E. W., & Nafziger, W. (1988). *Inequality in Africa: Political elites, proletariat, peasants and the poor*. Cambridge: CUP Archive.
- Niehues, J. (2014). Subjective perceptions of inequality and redistributive preferences: An international comparison. Cologne Institute for Economic Research. IW-TRENDS Discussion Paper 2, 1-23.
- Norris, P. (1999). Institutional explanations for political support. In Norris, P. (Ed.) *Critical Citizens: Global Support for Democratic Government*, pp. 217-235 Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Norton, M. I., & Ariely, D. (2011). Building a better America — one wealth quintile at a time. *Perspectives on Psychological Science*, 6(1), 9-12.
- Østby, G. (2008). Polarization, horizontal inequalities and violent civil conflict. *Journal of Peace Research*, 45(2), 143-162.
- Østby, G., Nordås, R., & Rød, J. K. (2009). Regional inequalities and civil conflict in sub-Saharan Africa. *International Studies Quarterly*, 53(2), 301-324.
- Piketty, T. (2015). *The economics of inequality*. Harvard University Press.
- Piketty, T., & Saez, E. (2014). Inequality in the long run. *Science*, 344(6186), 838-843.
- Pinker, S. (2018). *Enlightenment now: The case for reason, science, humanism, and progress*. Penguin.
- Rose, R., Mishler, W., & Haerpfer, C. (1998). *Democracy and its alternatives: Understanding post-communist societies*. Baltimore, MD: JHU Press.
- Rueschemeyer, D., Stephens, E. H., & Stephens, J. D. (1992). *Capitalist development and democracy (Vol. 22)*. Cambridge: Polity.
- Schäfer, A. (2013). Affluence, inequality and satisfaction with democracy. *Society and Democracy in Europe*, 89, 139.
- Schedler, A., & Sarsfield, R. (2007). Democrats with adjectives: Linking direct and indirect measures of democratic support. *European Journal of Political Research*, 46(5), 637-659.
- Sin, T. C., & Wells, J. (2005). Is democracy the only game in town? *Journal of Democracy*, 16(2), 88-101.
- Solt, F. (2008). Economic inequality and democratic political engagement. *American Journal of Political Science*, 52(1), 48-60.
- Solt, F. (2012). The social origins of authoritarianism. *Political Research Quarterly*, 65(4), 703-713.
- Stiglitz, J. E. (2012). *The price of inequality: How today's divided society endangers our future*. W.W. Norton & Co.
- Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Information (International Social Science Council)*, 13(2), 65-93.



- Tajfel, H. (1979). Individuals and groups in social psychology. *British Journal of social and clinical psychology*, 18(2), 183-190.
- Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33(1), 1-39.
- Tajfel, H., Turner, J. C., Austin, W. G., & Worchel, S. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In Hatch, M., & M. Schultz (Eds.), *Organizational Identity: A Reader*, pp. 56-65. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: A self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
- Tverdova, Y. V. (2012). The formation of economic perceptions in post-communist countries of east central Europe. *Political Behavior*, 34, 137-158.
- Van de Walle, N. (2009). The institutional origins of inequality in sub-Saharan Africa. *Annual Review of Political Science*, 12, 307-327.
- Waldron-Moore, P. (1999). Eastern Europe at the crossroads of democratic transition: Evaluating support for democratic institutions, satisfaction with democratic government, and consolidation of democratic regimes. *Comparative Political Studies*, 32(1), 32-62.
- Walker, I., & Pettigrew, T. F. (1984). Relative deprivation theory: An overview and conceptual critique. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 23(4), 301-310.



Appendices


Appendix 1: Most essential characteristic of democracy (Afrobarometer Round 5)

In Round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked:

Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. If you have to choose only one of the things that I am going to read, which one would you choose as the most essential characteristic of democracy?

Respondents were asked the same question twice, and each time given four answer options, as well as the possibility to say “none of these” or “don’t know.” The descriptive results of the answers given to both questions are displayed in Figure A.1 below. Percentages can only be compared to other frequencies within the same question, not across the two questions.

Figure A.1: The most essential characteristic of democracy | 35 countries
| 2011/2013





Appendix 2: Variables used in the analyses (Source: Afrobarometer Round 7)

2.1 Independent variable: Perceived relative living situation

Question Number: Q5

Question: In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [ENTER NATIONALITY]?

Variable Label: Q5. Your living conditions vs. others

Values: 1-5, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don't know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

2.2 Dependent variables

a. Support for Democracy

Question Number: Q30

Question: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.

Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have.

Variable Label: Q30. Support for democracy

Values: 1-3, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Statement 3: Doesn't matter, 2=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 3=Statement 1: Democracy preferable, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Note: Interviewer was instructed to "read the question in the language of the interview, but always read 'democracy' in English. Translate 'democracy' into local language only if respondent does not understand English term."

b. Demand for democracy

Question Number: Q28A

Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?

Variable Label: Q28a. Reject one-party rule

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q28B

Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: The army comes in to govern the country?

Variable Label: Q28b. Reject military rule

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q28C

Question: There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the President can decide everything?

Variable Label: Q28c. Reject one-man rule

Values: 1-5, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.



2.3 Competing explanations

a. Lived Poverty Index

Question Number: Q8A

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough food to eat?

Variable Label: Q8a. How often gone without food

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Question Number: Q8B

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough clean water for home use?

Variable Label: Q8b. How often gone without water

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Question Number: Q8C

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without medicines or medical treatment?

Variable Label: Q8c. How often gone without medical care

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Question Number: Q8D

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?

Variable Label: Q8d. How often gone without cooking fuel

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Question Number: Q8E

Question: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without a cash income?

Variable Label: Q8e. How often gone without cash income

Values: 0-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB


b. Asset Index

Question Number: Q89A

Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Radio?

Variable Label: Q89a. Own radio

Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1



Value Labels: 0=No one in household owns, 1=Yes, someone else in household owns, 2=Yes, personally owns, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q89B

Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Television?

Variable Label: Q89b. Own television

Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=No one in household owns, 1=Yes, someone else in household owns, 2=Yes, personally owns, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q89C

Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Motor vehicle or motorcycle?

Variable Label: Q89c. Own motor vehicle, car, or motorcycle

Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=No one in household owns, 1=Yes, someone else in household owns, 2=Yes, personally owns, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q89D

Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Computer?

Variable Label: Q89d. Own computer

Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=No one in household owns, 1=Yes, someone else in household owns, 2=Yes, personally owns, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 7

Question Number: Q89E

Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Bank account?

Variable Label: Q89e. Own bank account

Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=No one in household owns, 1=Yes, someone else in household owns, 2=Yes, personally owns, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 7

Question Number: Q89F

Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Mobile phone?

Variable Label: Q89f. Own mobile phone

Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1

Value Labels: 0=No one in household owns, 1=Yes, someone else in household owns, 2=Yes, personally owns, 8=Refused, 9=Don't know, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

c. Freedoms Index

Question Number: Q42A

Question: In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?


Variable Label: Q42a. How often careful what you say

Values: 0-3, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don't know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Question Number: Q42B



Question: In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful about what political organizations they join?

Variable Label: Q42b. How often careful which organizations joined

Values: 0-3, 9, 8, 99, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don't know, 8=Refused to answer, 99=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 7

Question Number: Q42C

Question: In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful about how they vote in an election?

Variable Label: Q42c. How often careful how vote

Values: 0-3, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don't know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 7

d. Free elections

Question Number: Q23

Question: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]. Was it:

Variable Label: Q23. Freeness and fairness of the last national election

Values: 1-4, 8, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Not free and fair, 2=Free and fair, with major problems, 3=Free and fair, but with minor problems, 4=Completely free and fair, 8=Do not understand the question, 9=Don't know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Notes: Year of last national election was inserted in each country. See country questionnaires for details.

e. Economic performance index

Question Number: Q56A

Question: Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Managing the economy?

Variable Label: Q56a. Handling managing the economy

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56B

Question: Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving the living standards of the poor.

Variable Label: Q56b. Handling improving living standards of the poor

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 4


Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56C

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Creating jobs?

Variable Label: Q56c. Handling creating jobs

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1



Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56D

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Keeping prices down?

Variable Label: Q56d. Handling keeping prices down

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

f. Service delivery index

Question Number: Q56F

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Reducing crime?

Variable Label: Q56f. Handling reducing crime

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very Badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56G

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Improving basic health services?

Variable Label: Q56g. Handling improving basic health services

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56H

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Addressing educational needs?

Variable Label: Q56h. Handling addressing educational needs

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56I

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Providing water and sanitation services?

Variable Label: Q56i. Handling providing water and sanitation services

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

Question Number: Q56J

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat?



Variable Label: Q56j. Handling ensuring enough to eat

Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

g. Government handling inequality

Question Number: Q56E

Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?

Variable Label: Q56e. Handling narrowing income gaps

Values: 1-4, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

h. Performance of the president

Question Number: Q58A

Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven't you heard enough to say? [NAME OF PRESIDENT]

Variable Label: Q58a. Performance: President

Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 8, 99, -1

Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly approve, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, 99=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

* The question asked about the most powerful executive role in the country, whether the President or the Prime Minister. If there was a secondary leader, those are included in country-specific questions. Refer to country data sets.

* The following countries asked about their President: BEN, BFO, BOT, CAM, CDI, CVE, GAB, GAM, GHA, GUI, KEN, LIB, MAD, MLI, MLW, MOZ, NAM, NGR, NIG, SAF, SEN, STP, SRL, SUD, TAN, TOG, UGA, ZAM, ZIM

* The following countries asked about their Prime Minister: LES, MAU, MRC, TUN

* Not asked in Swaziland/eSwatini.

i. Direction of country

Question Number: Q3

Question: Let's start with your general view about the current direction of our country. Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is going in the right direction. So let me ask YOU about the overall direction of the country: Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction?

Variable Label: Q3. Overall direction of the country

Values: 1, 2, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 1=Going in the wrong direction, 2=Going in the right direction 9=Don't know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: NDB, Zambia96

j. Ruling-party supporter

Question Number: Q88A

Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party?



Variable Label: Q88a. Close to political party

Values: 0-1, 8, 9, 99, -1

Value Labels: 0=No, not close to any party, 1=Yes, feels close to a party, 8=Refused to answer, 9=Don't know, 99=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing

Source: Zambia 96

Question Number: Q88B

Question: Which party is that?

Variable Label: Q88b. Which party

Values: 100-106, 140-144, 146, 180-182, 184-185, 187-193, 220-221, 226-227, 261-265, 267, 300-309, 340-349, 352-354, 380-410, 422, 424-425, 428-429, 432-435, 437-438, 440-441, 443, 461-464, 467, 471, 474, 500-503, 505-517, 540-544, 580, 582-585, 587-594, 620-626, 631, 634, 638-640, 642-643, 660-665, 669, 671- 672, 674, 677-679, 684-686, 700, 702, 704-705, 708, 711-712, 716, 726, 740-742, 744, 476, 758, 780-782, 784, 788, 790-791, 821, 823, 825-828, 860-864, 866-867, 900-904, 906, 908-909, 930-943, 1100-1111, 1140-1145, 1148-1151, 1220-1224, 1260-1263, 1265-1266, 1268-1269, 1300-1308, 1500-1508, 1540-1546, 1580-1589, 1660-1664, 1700-1704, 1740-1748, 9995, 9997-9999, 9996, -1

Value Labels: 100=Nouveau Départ, 101=Union fait la Nation (UN), 102=Renaissance du Bénin (RB), 103=Parti du Renouveau Démocratique (PRD), 104=Force Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE), 105=Alliance ABT, 106=PIK-Nouvelle conscience, 140=Botswana Congress Party (BCP), 141=Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), 142=Botswana Movement For Democracy (BMD), 143=Botswana National Front (BNF), 144=Botswana People's Party (BPP), 146=Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC+), 180=ADF/RDA (Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération/Rassem, 181=CDP (Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès) de Achille TA, 182=Le Faso Autrement de Ablassé OUEDRAOGO, 184=MPP (Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès) de Roch Marc Chris, 185=NAFA (Nouvelle Alliance du Faso) de Rasmané OUEDRAOGO, 187=ODT (Organisation pour la Démocratie et le Travail) de Maham, 188=PAREN (Parti de la Renaissance Nationale) de Laurent BADO, 189=PDS/Metba (Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme) de Phi, 190=RDS (Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme) de O, 191=UBN (Union pour un Burkina Nouveau) de Djemdjoada Amadou DIC, 192=UNIR/PS (Union pour la renaissance/Parti sankariste) de Me B, 193=UPC (Union pour le Progrès et le Changement) de Zéphirin DIA, 220=Movement for Democracy (MPD), 221=African Party for Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV), 226=Cape Verdean Union Independent and Democratic (UCID), 227=Popular Party (PP), 260=Convention People's Party (CPP), 261=National Democratic Congress (NDC), 262=New Patriotic Party (NPP), 263=People's National Convention (PNC), 264=Progressive People's Party (PPP), 265=Democratic People's Party (DPP), 267=National Democratic Party (NDP), 300=Kenya Social Congress (KSC), 301=NARC Kenya, 302=Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), 303=Restore and Build Kenya (RBK), 304=SAFINA party, 305=The National Alliance (TNA), 306=United Democratic Front (UDF), 307=United Republican Party (URP), 308=Wiper Democratic Movement (WDM-K), 309=Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP)/Jubilee Party, 340=Democratic Congress (DC), 341=All Basotho Convention (ABC), 342=Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD), 343=Basotho National Party (BNP), 344=Popular Front for Democracy (PFD), 345=National Independent Party (NIP), 346=Lesotho People's Congress (LPC), 348=Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP), 349=Basotho Congress Party (BCP), 352=Alliance of Democrats (AD), 353=Movement for Economic Change (MEC), 354=Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL), 382=Alliance of Peace and Democracy (APD) – UPP & LPP, 383=National Democratic Coalition (NDC), 384=Liberty Party (LP), 386=Unity Party (UP), 387=National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL), 389=Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC), 393=All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP), 394=Liberia Reconstruction Party (LRP), 395=National Union for Democratic Progress (NUDP), 400=Victory for Change (VCP), 408=All Liberian Party (ALP), 409=People Unification Party (PUP), 410=Alternative National Congress (ANC), 422=AME (Antoko Miombon'Ezaka), 424=AREMA (Antokin'ny REVolisiona Malagasy), 425=AVI (Asa Vita no Ifampitsarana), 428=LEADER FANILO (Libéralisme Economique et Action DEMocratique pour la Réconciliation), 429=Mahaleo tena, 432=MDM (Miara Mientana ho an'ny Demokrasia), 433=MONIMA (MOuvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar), 434=MTS (Malagasy Tonga Saina), 435=RPSD-Vaovao (Rassemblement pour la Social Démocratie), 437=TGV (Tanora malaGasy Vonona), 438=TIM (Tiako i Madagasikara), 440=MAPAR (Miaraka Amin'ny Prezida Andry Rajoelina), 441=HVM (Hery Vaovao ho an'i Madagasikara), 443=MMM (Malagasy Miara-Miainga), 461=Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), 462=Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNDE), 463=Malawi Congress Party (MCP), 464=National Salvation Front (NSF), 467=People's Party (PP), 471=United Democratic Front (UDF), 474=United Independent Party (UIP), 500=ADEMA – PASJ / Dionkounda Traoré / Tiémoko Sangaré, 501=ADP – Mailba / Boubacar Diallo, 502=ASMA – CFP / Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga, 503=CDS – Mogo Tigiya / Mamadou Blaise Sangaré, 505=CNID – Faso Yiriwa Ton / Mountaga Tall, 506=CODEM / Ousséni Amion Guindo ou Poulô, 507=FARE – An Ka Wuli / Modibo Sidibé, 508=MIRIA / mamdou Kassa Traoré, 509=MPR / Choguel Kokala Maïga, 510=PARENA / Tiébilé Dramé, 511=PDES / ATT, 512=RPM / Ibrahim Boubacar Kéïta ou IBK, 513=SADI / Oumar Mariko /



Cheick Oumar Sissoko, 514=UDD / Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly, 515=UM-RDA / Badara Aliou Macalou, 516=URD / Soumaïla Cissé, 517=YELEMA / Moussa Mara, 540=Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), 541=Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), 542=MDM (Movimento Democrático Moçambicano), 543=PDD (Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento), 580=APP (All People's Party), 582=COD (Congress of Democrats), 583=DPN (Democratic Party of Namibia), 584=DTA (DTA of Namibia), 585=MAG (Monitor Action Group), 587=NEFF (Namibia Economic Freedom Fighters), 588=NUDO (National Unity Democratic Organisation of Namibia), 589=RDP (Rally for Democracy and Progress), 590=RP (Republican Party of Namibia, 591=SWANU (Swanu of Namibia), 592=SWAPO (SWAPO Party of Namibia), 593=UDF (United Democratic Front of Namibia), 594=UPM (United People's Movement), 620=Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD), 621=All Progressive Congress (APC), 622=Alliance for Democracy (AD), 623=African Democratic Congress (ADC), 624=All Nigeria People's Party (ANPP), 625=All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), 626=All People's Party (APP), 628=Conscience People's Congress (CPC), 631=Democratic People's Party (DPP), 634=Labour Party (LP), 638=People's Democratic Party (PDP), 639=Progressive People's Alliance (PPA), 640=Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), 642=People's Salvation Party (PSP), 643=Social Democratic Mega Party, 660=Abdoulaye WADE (Parti Démocratique Sénégalais), 661=Ousmane Tanor DIENG (Parti Socialiste), 662=Moustapha NIASSE (Alliance des Forces du Progrès), 663=Macky SALL (Alliance Pour la République), 664=Idrissa SECK (REWMI), 665=Diégane SENE (Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique), 669=JEF JEL, 671=Abdoulaye BALDE (UCS), 672=Malick GAKOU (Grand Parti), 674=Serigne Mansour SY DJAMIL (Beuss du Niak), 677=Abdoul MBAYE (ACT), 678=Ousmane SONKO (Pastef), 679=Macky SALL (Benno Book Yakaar, 684=Serigne Modou KARA MBACKE (Parti de la vérité pour le dévelo, 685=El Hadji Issa SALL (PUR), 686=Khalifa SALL (Manko Taxawou Sénégal), 700=African Christian Democratic Party (ACDP), 702=African National Congress (ANC), 704=Congress of the People (COPE), 705=Democratic Alliance (DA), 708=Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), 711=New National Party / Nuwe Nasionale Party (NNP), 712=Pan Africanist Congress (PAC), 716=Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), 726=National Freedom Party (NFP), 740=Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM), 741=The Civic United Front (CUF), 742=Chama cha Demokrasia na Maendeleo (CHADEMA), 744=National Convention for Construction and Reform (NCCR – MAGEUZI), 746=United People's Democratic Party (UPDP), 758=Alliance for Change and Transparency (ACT-Wazalendo), 780=National Resistance Movement [NRM], 781=Forum for Democratic Change [FDC], 782=Democratic Party [DP], 784=Uganda Peoples Congress [UPC], 788=The Justice Forum (JEEMA), 790=Go Foward, 791=Uganda Farmers Party, 821=Forum for Democracy & Development (FDD), 823=Movement for Multiparty Democracy (MMD), 825=National Restoration Party (NAREP), 826=Patriotic Front (PF), 827=United National Independence Party (UNIP), 828=United Party for National Development (UPND), 860=Movement for Democratic Change- Tsvangirai [MDC-T], 861=Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF], 862=Movement for Democratic Change –Mutambara [MDC-M], 863=Mavambu. Kusile. Dawn [MKD] – Simba Makoni, 864=Zimbabwe African People's Union-Dabengwa [ZAPU-Dabengwa], 866=MDC People's Democratic Party [Tendai Biti], 867=Zimbabwe People First [ZIMPF] – Joice Mujuru, 900=Mouvement Socialiste Mauricien, 901=Mouvement Libérateur (ML), 902=Parti Mauricien Social Démocrate, 903=Parti Travailleiste, 904=Mouvement Militant Mauricien, 906=Front Solidarité Mauricien (FSM), 908=Organisation du Peuple Rodriguais (OPR), 909=Mouvement Rodriguais (MR), 930=Sierra Leone People's Party (SLPP), 931=All People's Congress (APC), 932=People's Movement for Democratic Change (PMDC), 933=National Democratic Alliance (NDA), 936=Coalition for Change Party (C4C), 937=National Grand Coalition (NGC), 1100=Alliance Nigérienne pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (ANDP Zaman Lahiya), 1101=Convention Démocratique et Sociale (CDS Rahama), 1102=Mouvement National pour la Société de Développement (MNSD Nassara), 1103=Mouvement Démocratique Nigérien pour une Fédération Africaine (MODEN FA Lumana), 1104=Parti Nigérien pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme (PNDS Tarayya), 1105=Parti Nigérien pour l'Auto gestion (PNA Al'Oumat, 1106=Rassemblement pour la Démocratie et le Progrès (RDP Jama'a), 1107=Rassemblement Social Démocrate (RSD Gaskia), 1108=Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social (UDPS Amana), 1109=Mouvement Patriotique Nigérien (MPN-Kishin Kassa), 1110=MPR Jamhuriya, 1111=Ingantchi, 1140=UNIR (Union pour la République) de Faure Essozimna Gnassingb, 1141=UFC (Union des Forces de Changement) de Gilchrist Olympio, 1142=ANC (Alliance Nationale pour le Changement) de Jean-Pierre F, 1143=CAR (Comité d'Action pour le Renouveau) de Me Yaovi Agboyibo, 1144=CDPA (Convention Démocratique des Peuples Africains) du Prof, 1145=PRR (Parti du Renouveau et de la Rédemption) de Nicolas Laws, 1148=ADDI (Alliance des Démocrates pour le Développement Intégral, 1149=CST (Collectif « Sauvons le Togo »), 1150=Arc-en-Ciel, 1151=PNP (Parti National Panafricain de Tikpi Atchadam), 1220=Cameroon People's Democratic Movement (CPDM), 1221=Social Democratic Front (SDF), 1222=National Union For Democracy and Progress (UNDP), 1223=Union Démocratique du Cameroun (UDC), 1224=Mouvement for Progressiste (MP), 1260=Rassemblement des Républicains (RDR, 1261=Parti Démocratique de Cote d'Ivoire (PDCI), 1262=Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI), 1263=Union pour la Démocratie et pour la Paix en Cote d'Ivoire (U, 1265=Mouvement des Forces d'Avenir (MFA), 1266=Parti Ivoirien des Travailleurs (PIT), 1268=Union Pour

la Cote d'Ivoire (UPCI), 1269=RHDP, 1300=Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée (RPG), 1301=Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG), 1302=Union des Forces Républicaines (UFR), 1303=Parti de l'Espoir pour le Développement National (PEDN), 1304=Union pour le Progrès de la Guinée (UPG), 1305=Rassemblement pour le Développement Intégré de la Guinée (RDIG), 1306=Bloc Libéral (BL), 1307=Union Démocratique de Guinée (UDG), 1308=Dadis, 1500=The Justice and Development Party (PJD), 1501=The Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), 1502=Istiqlal Party (PI), 1503=The National Rally of Independents (RNI), 1504=The Popular Movement (MP), 1505=Socialist Union of Popular Forces (USSP), 1506=The Constitutional Union (UC), 1507=Party of Progress and Socialism (PPS), 1508=Social and Democratic Movement (MDS), 1540=National Congress Party, 1541=Umma party, 1542=Democratic Unionist Party, 1543=Popular Congress Party, 1544=Communist Party, 1545=Sudanese congress Party, 1546=National Movement for Reform and Development, 1580=Nidaa Tounes, 1581=Ennahdha, 1582=The Free Patriotic Union, 1583=The Popular Front, 1584=Afek tounes, 1585=Tunisia Al Irada Movement (Hirak), 1586=The initiative, 1587=The people's Movement, 1588=The democratic current, 1589=Machrou3=Tounes, 1660=Acção Democrática e Independente (ADI), 1661=Movimento para a Libertação de S. Tomé e Príncipe (MLSTP/PSD), 1662=Partido da Convergência Democrática (PCD), 1663=Movimento para a Mudança e Progresso do Príncipe, 1664=União Democrática dos Cidadãos para a Mudança e Desenvolvimento (UDD), 1700=PDG (Parti Démocratique Gabonais), 1701=UN (Union Nationale), 1702=UPG (Union du Peuple Gabonais), 1703=CLR (Centre des Libéraux Réformateurs), 1704=DN (Démocratie Nouvelle), 1740=Alliance for Patriotic Reorientation and Construction (APRC), 1741=Gambia Democratic Congress (GDC), 1742=National Reconciliation Party (NRP), 1743=People's Democratic Organisation for Independence and Socialism (PDOIS), 1744=People's Progressive Party (PPP), 1745=Gambia Party for Democracy and Progress (GPDP), 1746=National Convention Party (NCP), 1747=Gambia Moral Congress (GMC), 1748=United Democratic Party (UDP), 9995=Other, 9997=Not applicable, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don't know, 9996=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing

Source: Zambia 96

k. Trust

Question Number: Q43A

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The President?

Variable Label: Q43a. Trust president

Values: 0-3, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: Zambia96

* The question asked about the most powerful executive role in the country, whether the President or the Prime Minister. If there was a secondary leader, those are included in country-specific data sets.

* The following countries asked about their President: BEN, BFO, BOT, CAM, CDI, CVE, GAB, GAM, GHA, GUI, KEN, LIB, MAD, MLI, MLW, MOZ, NAM, NGR, NIG, SAF, SEN, STP, SRL, SUD, TAN, TOG, UGA, ZAM, ZIM

* The following countries asked about their Prime Minister: LES, MAU, MRC, TUN

* Not asked in SWZ

Question Number: Q43E

Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?

Variable Label: Q43e. Trust the ruling party

Values: 0-3, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, 99=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing

Source: Adapted from Zambia96

Question Number: Q43H


Question: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The national military?

Variable Label: Q43h. Trust army

Values: 0-3, 9, 8, -1

Value Labels: 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don't know/Haven't heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: Afrobarometer Round 5



2.4 Control variables

a. Location

Question Number: URBRUR

Question: PSU/EA

Variable Label: Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit

Values: 1-3, 460

Value Labels: 1=Urban, 2=Rural, 3=Semi-Urban, 460=Peri-Urban

Note: Answered by interviewer

b. Education

Question Number: Q97

Question: What is your highest level of education?

Variable Label: Q97. Education of respondent

Values: 0-9, 99,98, -1

Value Labels: 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Intermediate school or Some secondary school / high school, 5=Secondary school / high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don't know [Do not read], 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

c. Age

Question Number: Q1

Question: How old are you?

Variable Label: Q1. Age

Values: 18- 99, 103, 106, 998, 999, -1

Value Labels: 998=Refused, 999=Don't Know, -1=Missing

d. Gender

Question Number: Q101

Question: Respondent's gender

Variable Label: Q101. Gender of respondent


Values: 1, 2, -1

Value Labels: 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing

Source: SAB

Note: Answered by interviewer

Appendix 3: Share of respondents per country who say their living conditions are “the same” as others’ and mean perceived lived equality score (Afrobarometer Round 7)




	Same	Perceived equality (mean)
Mauritius	60%	2.6
Madagascar	57%	2.5
Morocco	56%	2.5
Tunisia	54%	2.4
Cabo Verde	51%	2.5
São Tomé and Príncipe	51%	2.5
Gabon	47%	2.4
Côte d'Ivoire	46%	2.4
Gambia	44%	2.4
Sudan	43%	2.3
Senegal	42%	2.3
Mozambique	37%	2.3
Guinea	37%	2.3
Kenya	36%	2.3
Burkina Faso	34%	2.3
Eswatini	34%	2.2
Togo	33%	2.2
Zimbabwe	33%	2.2
Cameroon	33%	2.2
Mali	32%	2.2
Lesotho	32%	2.1
Niger	30%	2.2
Benin	30%	2.2
Nigeria	30%	2.2
Tanzania	28%	2.2
South Africa	27%	2.1
Namibia	26%	2.1
Ghana	26%	2.2
Botswana	25%	2.1
Liberia	25%	2.1
Zambia	22%	2.1
Sierra Leone	19%	2.1
Uganda	17%	2.1
Malawi	14%	1.9

Appendix 4: Share of respondents per region who say their living conditions are “the same” as others’ (Afrobarometer Round 7)




	Same
West Africa	33%
East Africa	27%
Southern Africa	32%
North Africa	50%
Central Africa	39%

Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics of support for democracy by country
(Afrobarometer Round 7)




	Statement 1: Democracy preferable	Statement 2: Sometimes non- democratic preferable	Statement 3: Doesn't matter
Sierra Leone	84%	6%	7%
Senegal	82%	6%	9%
Zambia	81%	9%	6%
Ghana	81%	12%	5%
Uganda	81%	5%	8%
Botswana	80%	10%	8%
Tanzania	78%	8%	8%
Mauritius	77%	6%	9%
Côte d'Ivoire	77%	5%	11%
Guinea	76%	11%	12%
Zimbabwe	75%	5%	13%
Togo	75%	8%	14%
Benin	73%	13%	13%
Gabon	72%	11%	16%
Cabo Verde	70%	10%	15%
Liberia	70%	13%	16%
Niger	69%	12%	16%
Morocco	69%	7%	15%
Nigeria	69%	15%	15%
Gambia	68%	20%	11%
Mali	67%	19%	13%
Kenya	67%	12%	10%
Namibia	65%	13%	20%
Burkina Faso	63%	17%	18%
Cameroon	62%	15%	15%
Sudan	62%	17%	17%
Malawi	62%	24%	11%
São Tomé and Príncipe	61%	11%	24%
Mozambique	57%	17%	16%
South Africa	54%	18%	25%
Lesotho	52%	18%	24%
Madagascar	47%	14%	28%
Tunisia	46%	20%	29%
33-country sample	69%	12%	14%

Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics of support for democracy by region
(Afrobarometer Round 7)



	Statement 1: Democracy preferable	Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable	Statement 3: Doesn't matter
West Africa	74%	12%	12%
East Africa	75%	8%	9%
Southern Africa	64%	14%	16%
North Africa	59%	15%	20%
Central Africa	65%	12%	19%


Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics of demand for democracy by country
(Afrobarometer Round 7)



	% who report full demand for democracy	Mean demand for democracy score	Reject military rule*	Reject one-party rule*	Reject one-man rule*
Mauritius	67%	3.47	76%	64%	89%
Zambia	67%	3.48	81%	86%	92%
Botswana	62%	3.44	81%	91%	92%
Uganda	60%	3.39	51%	47%	92%
Senegal	58%	3.36	74%	83%	84%
Côte d'Ivoire	55%	3.24	83%	77%	84%
Tanzania	55%	3.26	72%	50%	92%
Sierra Leone	54%	3.26	89%	81%	86%
Ghana	52%	3.22	86%	78%	88%
Gambia	52%	3.23	87%	71%	91%
Gabon	51%	3.21	64%	81%	90%
Kenya	46%	3.05	78%	72%	85%
Togo	46%	3.07	69%	87%	85%
Benin	46%	3.16	80%	71%	92%
Zimbabwe	44%	2.90	82%	92%	78%
Guinea	44%	3.06	80%	72%	81%
Nigeria	43%	2.98	79%	61%	75%
Liberia	42%	3.08	39%	77%	88%
Cabo Verde	42%	3.03	81%	69%	83%
São Tomé and Príncipe	41%	3.05	82%	72%	86%
Mali	40%	2.96	67%	87%	87%
Malawi	40%	3.04	76%	60%	88%
Namibia	39%	2.93	52%	53%	77%
Morocco	38%	2.73	88%	90%	60%
Niger	34%	2.88	80%	71%	79%
Cameroon	31%	2.71	72%	60%	75%
Sudan	28%	2.56	62%	57%	72%
South Africa	23%	2.44	85%	71%	69%
Burkina Faso	23%	2.57	74%	43%	77%
Mozambique	22%	2.06	67%	76%	41%
Madagascar	22%	2.53	77%	73%	69%
Lesotho	19%	2.44	71%	82%	76%
Tunisia	17%	2.06	81%	65%	61%
33-country sample	42%	2.95	74%	72%	80%


* % of respondents in each country who said they either "strongly disapprove" or "disapprove"

Appendix 8: Descriptive statistics of demand for democracy by region
(Afrobarometer Round 7)



	% who report full demand for democracy	Mean demand for democracy score	Reject military rule*	Reject one-party rule*	Reject one-man rule*
West Africa	46%	3.1	81%	69%	84%
East Africa	54%	3.2	72%	85%	90%
Southern Africa	38%	2.8	67%	73%	74%
North Africa	28%	2.5	63%	58%	64%
Central Africa	41%	3.0	78%	71%	83%

* % of respondents in each country who said they either “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove”



Recent Afrobarometer working papers

- No. 190 Krönke, Matthias, Robert Mattes, and Vinothan Naidoo Mapping state capacity in Africa: Professionalism and reach. 2022
- No. 189 Lewis, Jacob S., & Sedef A. Topal. How does exposure to conflict events shape social trust? A spatiotemporal approach. 2021
- No. 188 Stoecker, Alexander. Partisanship in a young democracy: Evidence from Ghana. 2021
- No. 187 Marfouk, Loubna, Martin Sarvaš, Jack Wippell, & Jintao Zhu. Does sensitivity bias lead respondents to misreport their level of trust in political parties? An investigation into Afrobarometer's survey results and methodology. 2021
- No. 186 Krönke, Matthias, Sarah J. Lockwood, & Robert Mattes. Party footprints in Africa: Measuring local party presence across the continent. 2020
- No. 185 Erlich, Aron & Andrew McCormack. Age-group differences in social and political interactions in Africa. 2020
- No. 184 Armah-Attoh, Daniel. Curbing intolerance of persons in same-sex relationships in Ghana: The important role of education. 2020
- No. 183 Chlouba, Vladimir. Traditional authority and state legitimacy: Evidence from Namibia. 2019
- No. 182 Brass, Jennifer N., Kirk Harris, & Lauren M. MacLean. Is there an anti-politics of electricity? Access to the grid and reduced political participation in Africa? 2019
- No. 181 Lockwood, Sarah J. & Matthias Krönke. Do electoral systems affect how citizens hold their government accountable? Evidence from Africa. 2018
- No. 180 O'Regan, Davin. Police-citizen interaction in Africa: An exploration of factors that influence victims' reporting of crimes. 2018
- No. 179 Blimpo, M., Justice Tei Mensah, K. Ochieng' Opalo, & Ruifan Shi. Electricity provision and tax mobilization in Africa. 2018
- No. 178 Irvine, John M., Richard J. Wood, & Payden McBee Viewing society from space: Image-based sociocultural prediction models. 2017
- No. 177 Depetris-Chauvin, Emilio & Ruben Durante. One team, one nation: Football, ethnic identity, and conflict in Africa. 2017.
- No. 176 Tannenberg, Marcus. The autocratic trust bias: Politically sensitive survey items and self-censorship. 2017.
- No. 175 Liu, Shelley. Wartime educational loss and attitudes toward democratic institutions. 2017.
- No. 174 Crisman, Benjamin. Disease, disaster, and disengagement: Ebola and political participation in Sierra Leone. 2017.
- No. 173 Claassen, Christopher. Explaining South African xenophobia. 2017.
- No. 172 Logan, Carolyn. 800 languages and counting: Lessons from survey research across a linguistically diverse continent. 2017.
- No. 171 Guardado, Jenny & Leonard Wantchekon. Do electoral handouts affect voting behavior? 2017.
- No. 170 Kerr, Nicholas & Anna Lührmann. Public trust in elections: The role of media freedom and election management autonomy. 2017.
- No. 169 McNamee, Lachlan. Indirect colonial rule and the political salience of ethnicity. 2016.

Afrobarometer Working Papers Series

Editor: Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz, jconroy@afrobarometer.org

Editorial Board: E. Gyimah-Boadi, Michael Bratton, Carolyn Logan, Robert Mattes

Afrobarometer publications report results of national sample surveys on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, markets, civil society, and other aspects of development. Afrobarometer publications are simultaneously co-published by the five Afrobarometer core partner and support unit institutions. All Afrobarometer publications can be searched and downloaded from www.afrobarometer.org.

Financial support for Afrobarometer Round 8 has been provided by Sweden via the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation, the Open Society Foundations, the William and Flora Hewlett Foundation, the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) via the U.S. Institute of Peace, the European Union, the National Endowment for Democracy, Freedom House, the Embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in Uganda, GIZ, and Humanity United.



#95 Nortei Ababio Loop,
North Airport Residential Area
Legon-Accra, Ghana
+233 (0) 302 776142/784293
www.afrobarometer.org

Core partners:



**Center for Democratic
Development
(CDD-Ghana)**
Accra, Ghana
www.cddghana.org



**Institute for Development Studies (IDS),
University of Nairobi**
Nairobi, Kenya
www.ids.uonbi.ac.ke



Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR)
Cape Town, South Africa
www.ijr.org.za

Support units:

**MICHIGAN STATE
UNIVERSITY**

Michigan State University (MSU)
Department of Political Science
East Lansing, Michigan, U.S.A.
www.polisci.msu.edu



University of Cape Town (UCT)
Institute for Democracy, Citizenship
and Public Policy in Africa
Cape Town, South Africa
www.idcpa.uct.ac.za/