Only game in town?
Inequality and demand for democracy in Africa – a micro perspective

by Thomas Isbell | August 2022
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Abstract

In this paper, I explore whether perceived inequality is associated with demand for democracy among Africans. Past research has diverged on whether macro-level inequality should increase or decrease support for democracy, with some arguing that people might see democracy as a solution to inequality, and others that people might see it as a cause. I advance this literature by using a perceptual measure of inequality from Afrobarometer: how people feel their living situation compares to others’ in their country. I find that perceived equality is significantly associated with greater demand for democracy, while perceptions of relative deprivation and relative advantage are both associated with lower democratic demand. These effects are largely significant above and beyond the effect of absolute poverty and known predictors of support for democracy, such as free and fair elections and level of education.
1. Introduction

Although inequality “is devilishly complicated to analyze” (Pinker, 2018: 98), it has become something of a conventional wisdom that increases in it are threatening democracy. For example, in a speech in Greece in 2016, then-U.S. President Barack Obama noted that growing inequality created a sense among ordinary people that the “global elites and corporations” live by different rules, which “feeds a profound sense of injustice and a feeling that our economies are increasingly unfair” (Deutsche Welle, 2016). This sense of injustice may generate “rising ‘tribalism’ and ‘nationalism’ that breeds suspicion of democratic institutions and government” (Deutsche Welle, 2016). Similarly, U.S. economist Joseph Stiglitz (2015: 379) notes that:

Growing inequality within most countries around the world is one of the critical issues facing the world today. People everywhere sense that it is morally wrong. We sense that it cannot be justified. We sense that it is dividing our societies and undermining our democracies. And we are right in sensing this harm.

Indeed, economic inequality within countries has risen in many of the world’s most advanced democracies and economies over the past four decades (Alderson, Beckfield, & Nielsen, 2005; Atkinson & Piketty, 2007; Solt, 2008; Milanovic, 2012; Stiglitz, 2012; Alvaredo, Atkinson, Piketty, & Saez, 2013; Piketty & Saez, 2014; Piketty, 2015). Research suggests multiple direct and indirect paths by which high levels of economic inequality may affect democracy in the short and long run (Karl, 2000; Houle, 2009; Haggard & Kaufman, 2012; Solt, 2012).

However, the literature on the linkages between economic inequality and democracy has to date focused primarily on developed countries of the global North, or newly democratising countries in Central and Eastern Europe (see, for example, Loveless, 2013). Far less evidence is available in this regard for cases in the global South, including Africa.

This is a serious gap in the literature, as Africa forms a critical set of cases for understanding the linkage between economic inequality and democracy. As a region, Africa is marked by the highest rates of inequality globally (Beegle, Christiaensen, Dabalen, & Gaddis, 2016), and the salience of inequality is recognised in the public and political discourse in Africa (Mkandawire, 2014). Indeed, as South African economist Murray Leibbrandt (2021) points out, “inequality remains the developmental challenge of our time.”

At the same time, many African regimes are characterised by both democratic and non-democratic elements. Thirty years after the continent’s “democratic dawn” in the early 1990s, Africa’s democracies are characterised by variance and differentiation rather than a common, “continental trajectory” (Bratton & Mattes, 2009; Mattes & Bratton, 2016). According to the World Governance Indicators (data from 2018), political regimes in sub-Saharan Africa score lower on average on voice and accountability, political stability, and state quality than all other world regions except for the Middle East and North Africa. To many observers, the past decade has even been marked by a backsliding of democracy in many African countries, although this trend is not unique to Africa (Hellmeier et al., 2021).

The question therefore emerges to what extent inequality in Africa is associated with democratic governance. Previous research focusing on attitudes at the macro level has mixed lessons for Africa. In a study from 2014, Krieckhaus, Son, Bellinger, and Wells use World Values Survey data and the Gini coefficient to test the relationship between inequality and support for democracy. They find a significant negative correlation, showing that people, on average, report less support for democracy in more unequal countries (N=57, R-square= 0.2319, p<0.001). Using a similar approach with Afrobarometer Round 7 data from 33 countries, I find no correlation between national inequality (Gini (r(32))= 0.125, p >0.05; and
Standardized World Income Inequality Database (SWIID) ($r(30)=-0.176, p>0.05$) and mean support for democracy per country (Figure 1).

This lack of correlation might suggest that, unlike in other regions of the world, attitudes toward democracy are not tied to levels of inequality in Africa. However, previous rounds of Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents what the most essential characteristic of a democracy was to them. The results clearly showed that notions of equality and egality were connected to the term democracy in the minds of ordinary Africans.¹

A further explanation for this lack of association could be that country-level scores on inequality often do not correlate strongly with how ordinary people see levels of inequality. Previous research has shown that ordinary people are often unaware of the level of inequality in their country or misjudge how they personally fit within national income or wealth distributions (Kuhn, 2011, 2019; Norton & Ariely, 2011; Tverdova, 2012; Chambers, Swan, & Heesacker, 2014; Niehues, 2014; Gimpelson & Treisman, 2018); this might mean that measures like Gini coefficients are divorced from individuals’ assessments. As such, there may not be a significant correlation because subjectively perceived inequality is different from objectively measured inequality. In fact, a large psychological literature exists on the consequences of perceptions of relative deprivation for social and political behaviour, especially among and between groups.²

Figure 1: Correlation between economic inequality and country mean of support for democracy in 32 countries³

¹ See Appendix 1.
³ I use the Afrobarometer Round 7 data here, collected in 2016-2018. I then use the Gini coefficient and SWIID Gini coefficient closest to the date of the Afrobarometer fieldwork in each country. I was not able to obtain SWIID data for Gabon and the Gambia. Both countries have been excluded from Figure 1.
The relative-deprivation argument essentially proposes that it is not the absolute situation or conditions of groups that especially drive behaviour and attitudes, but rather individuals’ perceptions of those conditions. As such, I take a bottom-up perspective by focusing on attitudes toward democracy voiced by ordinary people. My research question is therefore whether people’s perception of lived inequality is correlated with their demand for democracy.

**Structure**

This paper progresses as follows. In the next section, I present and discuss the existing literature regarding the effects of economic inequality on politics. Drawing from the literature, I derive divergent hypotheses that I will test in the latter half of this paper. After introducing my dependent variables and predictor variables, I present descriptive statistics for both. In Section 4, I test the explanatory model. I first test a number of basic models focused on testing the main predictor. I find a significant positive relationship between perceived lived equality and demand for democracy: Feeling equal to others increases demand for democracy, while feeling either better off or worse off reduces demand for democracy.

I then turn to testing the main predictors in the context of known predictors of demand for democracy to assess whether the main predictor variables are useful to consider above and beyond the current explanatory model in the literature on demand for democracy. These models suggest that the positive relationship between perceived lived equality and demand for democracy is significant above and beyond the effect of trust in rulers, perceptions of government economic performance, political freedoms, and socio-demographic traits. I find no significant effect of national inequality measured per Gini coefficient.

### 2. Literature review

Until fairly recently, researchers have commonly measured economic inequality using objective, country-level measures such as the Gini coefficient and the Palma ratio. In the past decade, however, a number of studies have found that objective scores of economic inequality are weakly understood by ordinary people. This research suggests that objective and subjective levels of inequality are only loosely associated, if that (Loveless & Whitefield, 2011; Loveless, 2013; Binelli & Loveless, 2016). For example, research suggests that U.S. citizens underestimate wealth inequality (Norton & Ariely, 2011) but have overestimated the increase in income inequality since 1960 (Chambers et al., 2014; Bartels, 2016). Individuals also appear to be unclear regarding their own position within the national income distribution. In a survey experiment in Argentina, perceived placement within the national income distribution was correlated with respondents’ position in the local income distribution, but not the national one (Cruces, Perez-Truglia, & Tetaz, 2013).

This lack of association raises questions as to how exactly inequality shapes people’s attitudes and behaviours. As Gimpelson and Treisman (2018:30), note:

> Theories […] assume key actors accurately perceive the degree of income inequality. Yet, given how hard it is to estimate distributions of income and property – for skilled professionals, let alone statistically unsophisticated citizens – this assumption is implausible. People may not respond to inequality as posited because, quite simply, they do not know its level.

Rather, I employ a subjective measure of individual equality and inequality using representative survey data. Drawing from the existing literature, which relies primarily on measures of objective inequality, there is little to go by as to what effect one might expect perceptions of individual inequality to have on demand for democracy in Africa. Broadly, two schools of thought exist on the linkage between objective levels of inequality and
democratic support: political-economy approaches on the one hand and survey literature and area studies on the other.

Political economists argue that higher inequality should increase support for democracy, as the masses see democracy as a means of redistribution between the “haves” and the “have-nots.” This is because, by definition, rising inequality should leave more people with less of the overall distribution and (assuming self-interest) more supportive of redistributive measures that, given equal votes and interest representation, they could demand in a democratic regime. This approach is prospective, in that citizens want (more) democracy as a means to redistribute and transfer wealth and income, which they, as the majority, would be able to achieve under democratic rule. The political-economy literature would thus expect that:

\[ H1: \text{Feelings of relative deprivation increase demand for democracy.} \]

Conversely, the survey and area studies literatures assume people are retrospective in their assessment of regimes (Krieckhaus et al., 2014). As such, high levels of inequality will reduce regime support as people become disillusioned with the system. In systems with democratic institutions, the retrospective perspective predicts that citizens will support democracy less when faced with high inequality, as the negative outcome (inequality) is attributed to democracy or democracy is perceived to be unable to solve this problem.

However, research has argued that there may be an effect of inequality on popular support for authoritarianism. As will be discussed in the following section, the dependent variable in this paper – demand for democracy – comprises both variables measuring support for democracy and support for non-democratic alternatives. As such, the literature on support for authoritarianism is fitting to consider here. For example, Solt (2012) finds that high levels of economic inequality produce support for authoritarianism because the experience of hierarchical relations in highly unequal societies leads to greater respect for authority. Solt derives this argument from relative-power theory, which states that inequality of economic resources leads to inequality of power (Solt, 2008). As Solt (2012) notes:

Experiences with authority in the economic sphere should be expected to affect people’s attitudes toward authority more generally. As economic inequality increases, people are more and more trained by the market to expect command and obedience, and these lessons are then applied in other settings as well.

Given these possibilities, we might formulate an opposite expectation to Hypothesis 1:

\[ H2: \text{Feelings of relative deprivation reduce demand for democracy.} \]

In this section, I have briefly overviewed two literatures regarding how economic inequality relates to political-regime preferences. The first – political economy – approach posits that inequality should increase support for democracy, as people see democracy as a vehicle for redistribution. At the individual level, I thus posited that people who feel relatively deprived should want more democracy. Conversely, retrospective approaches and relative-power theory both argue that high inequality could increase support for authoritarianism. Both

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4 The political-economy approaches are largely grounded in democratic-transition research. Based on the seminal Meltzer-Richard (1981) model, distributive-conflict models presume that the poor will see potential gains from redistribution of wealth from the rich and thus favour democracy, since it empowers them. Conversely, the rich should oppose it, since they would bear the costs from these popular demands (Boix, 2003; Rueschemeyer, Stephens, & Stephens, 1992). Other scholars argue that these sentiments in favour of or against democracy depend not just on absolute wealth, but also on the level of inequality. In particular, when inequality is high, the poor will be strongly in favour of democracy, because of its redistributitional potential, while the rich will be even more strongly opposed (Acemoglu & Robinson, 2006; Krieckhaus et al., 2014).
hypotheses will be tested using representative survey data, which I introduce in the next section.

### 3. Data, methodology, and variables

I use Afrobarometer Round 7 survey data to test whether perceptions of individual equality and inequality are correlated with demand for democracy. These data were collected between September 2016 and September 2018 in 33 African countries (N= 44,329). The survey was conducted face to face in the respondent’s choice of language, with nationally representative samples. Country samples range from 1,193 (Guinea) to 2,400 (Tanzania, Ghana).

**Dependent variable: Demand for democracy**

Simply asking people whether they support democracy may not be conclusive. Democracy may mean different things to different people, and thus voicing support for “democracy” may actually mean support for different things. Critics have argued that the commonly used measures of “support for democracy” often lack references to concrete attributes of democracy. Such “vacuous conceptions of democracy” (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007: 639) are problematic, as it is unclear what, if anything, “democracy” means to the respondents, and whether such understandings are consistent across different groups and contexts (Muller & Jukam, 1977; Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). In addition, it is unclear from measuring only “support

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5 To access data used in this paper, see Afrobarometer (2019). For the survey codebook, see Afrobarometer (2020a). For information on the sampling methodology, see Afrobarometer (2020b).

6 My data set includes 34 countries: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Cameroon, Côte d’Ivoire, Eswatini, Gabon, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. However, I could not include Eswatini in my analysis of demand for democracy because one element of the index, the question of whether the respondent approves or disapproves of one-man rule, was not asked in Eswatini. The sample used to predict demand for democracy therefore comprises 33 countries (N=44,329).

7 In earlier survey rounds, Afrobarometer asked respondents what they considered the most essential characteristic of democracy. The surveys included four consecutive questions asking respondents to identify what they considered the most essential characteristic of democracy out of four characteristics that were read out to them each time. Two of the four questions included responses about equality. In response to the first of these questions, 25% of respondents said “government narrowing the gap between rich and poor.” This was the second-most-frequent response after “people choose government leaders in free and fair elections” (33%). The other two response options pertaining to freedom of expression (22%) and government not wasting tax money (14%) were reported less frequently. In response to the second question, respondents most commonly said “government ensuring job opportunities for all” (36%), followed by “government ensuring law and order” (24%). Multiparty competition and media freedom were mentioned by 18% and 17%, respectively. Importantly, the percentages cannot be compared across questions. Also, it must be considered that respondents were presented a closed-question format, making it impossible to ascertain what they would have said without the offered response categories.

Another weakness of the Afrobarometer data is that the term “democracy” is read out in English, French, or Portuguese and is only translated into a local language if the respondent does not understand the original term. Unfortunately, no data are recorded on how often the interviewer is required to translate the term and whether the interviewer is able to use a single local-language term or has to describe democracy to the respondent. However, the Afrobarometer survey does allow interviewers to record questions that they feel the respondents “had problems answering” (Q109 in Round 7). Fifty-nine interviewers noted that respondents had issues regarding “questions about democracy,” without making references to specific questions, while 167 specifically cited Question 28 (support for democracy). Moreover, 99 respondents refused to answer the
for democracy” whether respondents may support democracy but also hold “conflicting values” (Schedler & Sarsfield, 2007: 639). Instead, as Bratton and Mattes (2001: 457) argue, support for democracy is best queried in “concrete terms and in the form of comparisons with plausible alternatives.”

In survey studies, including “plausible alternatives” is referred to as measuring “authentic democratic support.” The premise of this measure is that democratic and non-democratic norms and ideals are inherently incompatible. Thus, someone who prefers democracy but can still accept or see merit in non-democratic forms of governance may display normative and practical support for democracy, but not authentic support. Only supporting democracy practically and rejecting non-democratic alternatives registers as authentic support.

Afrobarometer uses a constructed index called “demand for democracy” to tap authentic support for democracy. Demand for democracy captures whether someone voices support for democracy as a regime type and rejects non-democratic alternatives (one-man, military, and one-party rule).

To measure support for democracy, respondents were asked:

Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.

Seven in 10 respondents (69%) across the sample of 33 countries said that democracy was preferable to any other regime type, while 12% felt that “sometimes” a non-democratic regime was preferable, and a similar number (14%) said that it “doesn’t matter.” However, these numbers hide significant variation between countries (see Appendix 5). While more than eight in 10 respondents in Sierra Leone (84%), Senegal (82%), Zambia (81%), Ghana (81%), and Uganda (81%) support democracy in this way, fewer than half do so in Madagascar (47%) and Tunisia (46%). Grouped by region, support for democracy was highest in East Africa (75%) and West Africa (74%) and lowest in North Africa (59%) (see Appendix 6). The attitude that the regime doesn’t matter was most common in North Africa (20%).

To measure rejection of non-democratic alternatives, respondents were asked:

There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives?
Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?
The army comes in to govern the country?

question. Slightly more than 4% of the sample said they “don’t know” (n=970), although no further details are available as to what exactly respondents may be referring to or whether the question was not understood. Respondents without any formal education (7%) or with primary schooling only (6%) were considerably more likely to say they “don’t know” than those with secondary (2%) or post-secondary (1%) education. This may suggest that those lacking education may not understand the question or the subject.

8 See also Norris (1999) and Dalton (2004).
9 Testing whether respondents prefer democracy as a regime type over other regime forms is typically referred to as the Churchill hypothesis in survey research (Rose, Mishler, & Haerpfer, 1998).
10 See also Bratton, Mattes, & Gyimah (2005) and Sin & Wells (2005).
Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the president can decide everything?

Respondents are then categorised by whether they “disapproved” or “strongly disapprove” of these alternatives on the one hand, or “approve,” “strongly approve,” or “neither approve nor disapprove” of alternatives on the other hand. The former category is assigned a score of 1, while the latter is assigned a score of 0. Likewise, respondents who said that democracy as a regime type is preferable are scored as 1, while those who said that alternatives may be preferable or the regime type doesn’t matter are scored as 0. Combining the two recoded variables produces a scale running from 0 to 4. Someone who is indifferent to or supportive of non-democratic alternatives would score low on this scale, while someone who supports a democratic regime and rejects other alternatives would score high. Accordingly, 0 is coded as “no demand for democracy,” while 4 is coded as “full demand.”

Across the sample of 33 countries, 42% of respondent scored as full demand for democracy, while 28% scored three out of four components (see Figure 2 below). National mean demand for democracy varied significantly (see Appendix 7), ranging from 67% among Mauritians and Zambians to only 17% among Tunisians and 19% among Basotho. On average, Africans were most rejecting of one-man rule (80%), followed by military rule (74%) and one-party rule (72%). But these numbers also hide large variation between countries. For example, only 39% of Liberians rejected military rule, and only 41% of Mozambicans rejected one-man rule. These diverse results emphasise the need to acknowledge clustering by country.

**Figure 2: Demand for democracy | 33 countries | 2016/2018**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Full demand for democracy</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with 3 of 4 components</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with 2 of 4 components</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree with 1 of 4 components</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No demand for democracy</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examined by geographical region, full demand for democracy was highest in East Africa (54%) and lowest in North Africa (28%) (see Appendix 8). Comparing rejection of non-democratic alternatives within each region, West Africans most widely rejected one-man rule (84%) and least opposed military rule (69%), while East Africans found one-man rule most objectionable (90%) and one-party rule least objectionable (72%) among the three alternatives. Southern Africans were least opposed to military rule (67%) and most opposed to one-man rule (74%), while North Africans were least opposed to one-party rule (58%) and equally opposed to military (63%) and one-man rule (64%). In the Central region, respondents least frequently opposed one-party rule (71%) and most strongly rejected one-man rule (83%).
Predictor variables: Perceptions of individual inequality

I compute the predictor variables (perceptions of individual inequality) using an Afrobarometer survey question that asks how respondents think their living conditions compare to others’ in their country. I refer to this question as a measure of individuals’ subjective relative living situation or perceived relative living situation throughout this paper. Substantive responses include “much worse” (1), “worse” (2), “same” (3), “better” (4), and “much better” (5) (see Figure 3). Responses were read out to respondents, but the questionnaire provides no references as to who “others” are or what exactly “living conditions” entail.11

To test the effect of subjective relative living situation, I compute four dummy variables by coding the variable described above into four dichotomous variables. For these four variables, I code “much better,” “better,” “worse,” and “much worse” as 1, and all other categories as 0. I do not include a dummy for the “equal” category, making it a reference category. I do this (rather than including the variable as a continuous or categorical single variable) as it is not clear whether the relation between the predictor variable and the dependent variable is linear. Using a series of dummy variables allows each category on the independent variable to be entered separately.

Across the sample of 33 countries, about one in three respondents (34%) felt their living situation was equal to others’. Two-thirds (65%) said their living situation was different (better or worse), including 11% who felt “very” unequal to others. However, large country differences underlie these numbers (see Appendix 3). While 59% of Mauritians and 57% of Malagasy felt “the same,” only 13% of Malawians and 16% of Ugandans did. At the regional level, North Africans (50%) were most likely to feel equal, followed by Central Africans (39%). Conversely, East Africans were on average least likely to say they felt “the same” (27%) (see Appendix 4).

Figure 3: Perceived lived equality | 33 countries | 2016/201812

11 This variable has been used in the past to measure perceived equality, as by Langer, Stewart, Smedts, & Demarest (2015), who used it in constructing a social cohesion index. Afrobarometer Round 3 asked respondents to assess the economic situation of their ethnic group compared to that of other ethnic groups. Langer & Mikami (2013) used that question in a study exploring why perceived economic group differences differed from objective group differences.

12 N=44,611. Only valid responses are displayed here, but the percentages include 61 people who refused to answer the question and 1,439 who said they “don’t know.”
4. Analysis: Understanding economic determinants of demand for democracy

To test whether perceived lived equality is associated with demand for democracy, I proceed in two steps. First, I run a series of models focused on untangling the main predictors (perceived relative living situation) from related phenomena such as subjective absolute poverty, objective absolute poverty, and country-level income inequality and development. If people who feel relatively deprived have less demand for democracy, it is important to establish whether this correlation is independent of or works in conjunction with how poor people feel they are or how poor they actually are, for example.

Second, I run a series of models that test whether perceived individual inequality is associated with demand for democracy even when we include known explanations of demand for democracy. From the models run in Step 1, it is unclear whether perceptions of individual inequality add something to our understanding of demand for democracy that is unaccounted for by current explanations found in the literature. Here I focus on three groups of explanations — intrinsic, instrumental, and partisan — of why people support democracy as a regime type.

Because of the clustering of the data (significant clustering confirmed by testing the interclass correlation coefficient), all tests are multilevel models (MLMs) using country as the Level 2 unit and individual as the Level 1 unit. Due to the structure of the data at both levels (large N at Level 1 and small N at Level 2), I use restricted maximum likelihood (REML) estimation, which is advised when the case number at Level 2 is small. For both dependent variables, the estimates of covariance parameters were significant at the 1% level.

Results

The analysis shows that how people perceive their relative situation compared to others is significantly associated with how much or little demand for democracy they have (Model 1a displayed in Table 1, below). The results indicate that perceptions of strong relative deprivation and strong relative advantage are significantly associated with demand for democracy. In both cases, the effect is significant and negative. This means that respondents who feel relatively much worse off or much better off have significantly less demand for democracy than those who feel less unequal, and vice versa. In addition, Model 1a shows that those who feel moderately worse off than others also have significantly less demand for democracy than those who feel equal.

What the results also show is that feeling equal to others is not simply the opposite of feeling unequal. The results indicate that the effect of feeling relatively deprived on demand for
democracy is considerably weaker than the effect of feeling relatively advantaged, especially feeling strongly advantaged. What is more, in many cases feeling moderately deprived compared to others was not significantly associated with demand for democracy. This suggests that people who feel only moderately worse off than others have no more or less demand for democracy than people who feel equal. In most cases, it is only people who feel much worse off (strong relative deprivation) who have significantly less demand for democracy than those who feel equal.

People may want democracy more or less, not because they subjectively think they are worse off than others, but because they objectively are worse off than others. I therefore control for absolute poverty with two measures: the Lived Poverty Index and an Asset Index. The Lived Poverty Index is an additive index of five variables that measure how often a respondent or anyone in their family went with basic commodities – enough food, enough water for home use, medical services, enough cooking fuel, and a cash income – in the past year. The index is computed by averaging a respondent’s five responses (never, just once or twice, several times, many times, always). The index is recoded, and categories are created running from “no lived poverty” (coded 0) to “high lived poverty” (coded 3).

The Asset Index reflects how many non-essential goods a respondent has access to or owns personally, including a radio, television, mobile phone, computer, motor vehicle, and bank account. Each variable is coded 0 (no ownership or access), 1 (access but no ownership), or 2 (personal ownership). The scores for the six items were added without any weighting, and the resulting scale was not recoded. The scale runs from 0 (no access or personal ownership to any item) to 12 (personal ownership of all six items). I also control for the respondent’s objective relative situation. At the country level, I control for both income inequality and country-level development. To control for country-level income inequality, I use the Gini coefficient, which is arguably the most widely known and commonly used measure of inequality. To control for country-level development, I use the Human Development Index (HDI). The HDI is a multi-item index comprising scores from dimension indices for life expectancy, education, and per capita gross national income.

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17 The questions ask: Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough food to eat? Gone without enough clean water for home use? Gone without medicines or medical treatment? Gone without enough fuel to cook your food? Gone without a cash income? See Mattes (2008) for a discussion of the Lived Poverty Index.

18 I performed a confirmatory factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) and extracted a single factor (direct oblimin rotation). A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha. The Afrobarometer data are collected based on a clustered, stratified, multi-stage, area probability sample design, and sampling is probability proportionate to population size at each stage (Afrobarometer, 2020). This means that the sample is designed to ensure that each (adult) citizen has the same chance of being selected within a given area. The survey is not designed to sample according to income or wealth distribution. By definition, a random selection proportionate to population size sampling design will under-sample those at the top of income or wealth distributions in more unequal countries or areas, as there are simply far fewer of them.

19 A confirmatory factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) was performed, and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.

20 This index has been used in the past by Langer & Mikami (2013). In a study of perceived horizontal inequalities in Ghana, Zimbabwe, Uganda, Nigeria, and Kenya, the authors use the same set of variables and a similar approach to recoding and call the variable an Asset Index. Langer & Mikami dichotomise the six items and compute an Asset Index ranging from 0 to 6.

21 Arguably, people’s reported absolute poverty level may also be drawn from comparative judgements by respondents. As such, people may be reporting how often they went without a cash income (for example) based on their perception of how often a salient reference group or person went without income. I therefore calculate a score of objective relative poverty by computing the respondent’s relative distance to the national LPI and Asset Index mean score (using the indices described above).
Table 1: Economic determinants of demand for democracy | 33 countries | Afrobarometer Round 7 data (2016/2018)

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2.821*** (0.076)</td>
<td>2.814 (0.075)</td>
<td>2.809 (0.074)</td>
<td>2.778 (0.364)</td>
<td>2.657 (0.079)</td>
<td>3.106 (0.368)</td>
<td>3.009 (0.473)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse= 1</td>
<td>-0.143*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.064*** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.041* (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.037 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.064** (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.021)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse= 1</td>
<td>-0.049*** (0.014)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.02 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.031* (0.014)</td>
<td>0.004 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.031* (0.014)</td>
<td>0.031* (0.014)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better= 1</td>
<td>-0.007 (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.031* (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.04** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.047*** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.031* (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.053*** (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.031* (0.013)</td>
<td>-0.053*** (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much better= 1</td>
<td>-0.174*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.214*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.223*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.244*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.214*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.214*** (0.031)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.031)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative to national LPI mean</td>
<td>-0.054*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.054*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.054*** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative to national Asset Index mean</td>
<td>0.038*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.038*** (0.002)</td>
<td>-0.041*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.038*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived Poverty Index</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.002*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asset Index</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.036*** (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.002*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female= 1</td>
<td>-0.178*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.177*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.152*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.178*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.152*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.178*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.152*** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.152*** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural= 1</td>
<td>-0.029* (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.02 (0.011)</td>
<td>0.019 (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.029* (0.011)</td>
<td>0.024* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.024* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.024* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.024* (0.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>0.109*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.105*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.086*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.109*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.084*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.109*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.084*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.109*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality (Gini)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.009)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>-0.52 (0.657)</td>
<td>-0.439 (0.671)</td>
<td>-0.741 (0.679)</td>
<td>-0.52 (0.657)</td>
<td>-0.439 (0.671)</td>
<td>-0.741 (0.679)</td>
<td>-0.52 (0.657)</td>
<td>-0.439 (0.671)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-country R²</td>
<td>0.008</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.064</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.076</td>
<td>0.060</td>
<td>0.076</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between-country R²</td>
<td>0.006</td>
<td>-0.078</td>
<td>-0.073</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>-0.113</td>
<td>-0.117</td>
<td>-0.091</td>
<td>-0.100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Cell entries are linear mixed model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Some effect sizes have been rounded to 0. *p<=0.05, **p<=0.01, ***p<=0.001
Interestingly, when socio-demographic and economic control variables are introduced in the models, the effect of feelings of relative advantage on demand for democracy remains significant and even increases in magnitude, while the effect for feelings of relative deprivation (both strong and moderate) turns non-significant or decreases in magnitude. For example, the significant, negative association of feeling much better off and demand for democracy increases if one considers a person’s objective relative material well-being (see Model 1c), while it is reduced in magnitude or becomes non-significant for feelings of relative deprivation. Elsewhere (see Model 2a), the association between feeling relatively deprived and demand for democracy switches from negative to positive for feelings of moderate deprivation while the effect of perceived strong relative deprivation is non-significant.

What does this mean? The results tell us that people who feel relatively advantaged, in particular people who feel strongly advantaged, have less demand for democracy than people who feel equal to others. Comparing the effect size to the results obtained for support for democracy, this suggests that those who feel relatively (much) better off than others not only have less support for democracy but are also open to non-democratic regime forms. Conversely, people who feel relatively deprived also have less demand for democracy than people who feel equal to others, but the linkage is far weaker and likely explained in part or in total by how much poverty someone has experienced both subjectively and objectively. Compared to support for democracy, demand for democracy also appears more strongly associated with socio-demographic traits. Here, men and less educated respondents are significantly more supportive of non-democratic regime forms than women and those with higher levels of education.

I find no significant country-level effects. This suggests that people in countries that are more unequal (as per Gini coefficient of income inequality) or less developed (as per HDI) have no more or less demand for democracy than people in more equal or more developed countries.

5. Understanding perceived relative deprivation and advantage in context

But do these explanations give us a better understanding of demand for democracy than current explanations of demand for democracy found in the literature? In this paper, I focus on three alternative explanations of demand democracy: because of what democracy is (intrinsic motivations), because of what democracy does (instrumental motivations), and because democracy allows a person to “win” (partisan motivations).

In the following section I briefly review the operationalisation of each alternative explanation before analysing the perceived individual inequality variables in the context of these alternative explanations (see Table 2 below).

Democracy for ‘what it is’: Intrinsic explanations

Attitudes toward democracy may be tied to intrinsic characteristics of democracy, such as perceptions of civil freedoms and rights as well as free and fair elections.22 To account for such an effect, I include an index comprising variables that measure respondents’ evaluations of how often people in their country have to be careful about what they say about politics, which political organisations they join, and how they vote.23


23 Respondents were asked: In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics? Do people have to be careful about what political organisations they join? Do people have to be careful about how they vote in an election? I conducted both factor analysis and reliability analysis.
Moreover, I include a variable that measures how free and fair respondents believed the most recent national election was and whether they feel (and if so, how often) the government discriminates against their ethnic group. Political and personal freedoms are always to a large extent grounded in the laws of the country. At the country level, I therefore include a control variable – the rule of law index – from the Varieties of Democracy Project, which captures to what extent “laws [are] transparently, independently, predictably, impartially, and equally enforced, and to what extent ... the actions of government officials comply with the law” (Coppedge et al., 2019: 266).

Democracy for ‘what it does’: Instrumental explanations

A different literature argues that support for democracy is mainly instrumental, and support is awarded by individuals for producing positive outputs, i.e. for “what democracy does.” In the African context, high levels of inequality were often inherited from times of colonial rule, when economic, administrative, and societal systems were introduced and upheld to explicitly enrich a minority, both domestically with the colonised state and in the colonial metropolis, while having no concern for the economic conditions of the overwhelming majority (Nafziger & Nafziger, 1988; van de Walle, 2009; Mkandawire, 2010; Heldring & Robinson, 2012; Atkinson, 2014; Alvaredo, Bergeron, & Cassan, 2017). In many cases, the post-colonial legal and administrative systems adopted by the newly independent states mimicked the former colonial power and thereby exacerbated the continuation of high inequality between the political and administrative elites and the wider population (Nafziger & Nafziger, 1988; Burton & Jennings, 2007; Lentz, 2015). It is therefore possible that rather than perceptions of inequality itself (which might be seen as a relic of colonial rule), it is the way in which the government is perceived to be handling the issue that shapes support for democracy among ordinary Africans. To control for this, I use a question asking respondents to evaluate how well the government is handling narrowing gaps between “rich” and “poor.”

I also include two indices that correspond to respondents’ evaluation of how the government is doing in terms of economic performance and service delivery. The economic management index consists of questions regarding managing the economy, improving the living standards of the poor, creating jobs, and keeping prices stable. The service delivery before computing an additive factor variable (“freedoms factor”). A factor analysis (extraction method: principal axis factoring) was performed and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). The items were found to be suitable for index construction: A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.

24 Respondents were asked: On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]?

25 Respondents were asked: How often, if ever, are __________es [respondent’s ethnic group] treated unfairly by the government? Responses are: never (coded as 0), sometimes (1), often (2), always (3). Respondents who refused to answer or said they didn’t know were coded as missing and excluded from the analysis.

26 For details on aggregation method and a list of variables used, see Coppedge et al., 2019: 269.

27 This is the only Afrobarometer question (in Round 6 and Round 7) that explicitly touches on inequality. Respondents were asked: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor? I treat this variable as quasi-metric, and the four-point response scale runs from “very badly” (coded as 1) to “very well” (coded as 4). I do not recode this variable. This variable speaks to a broad sense of inequality but does not allow any further reasoning as to what form of inequality (wealth, income, assets) the respondent may be referring to, whom the respondent may consider “rich” and “poor,” whether the respondent considers him- or herself to belong to either group, or, more broadly, how much inequality a respondent perceives to exist or how much inequality a respondent deems acceptable or desirable.

28 See Appendix 2 for a full description of questions. A factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) was performed, and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.
index reflects how well the government is perceived to be reducing crime, improving basic health services, addressing educational needs, providing water and sanitation, and maintaining roads and bridges. Both indices are based on evaluations of the past 12 months. To account for longer-term evaluations, I also include a variable that reflects whether people feel the country is generally going in the right or wrong direction.

Further, I control for the perceived performance of the president or chief executive. Past research has pointed to the importance of the chief executive in systems of political economy of African states. At the country level, I also control for economic development using the mean score of GDP (per capita) growth in the economy between 2011 and 2017.

**Partisanship**

It is likely that people’s evaluations of “what democracy is” and “what democracy does” is not independent of whether they support the ruling party. Following Bratton and Mattes (2001), I control for whether respondents said they “feel close to” a ruling party (coded 2), a different party (1), or no party (0). The dependent variable – demand for democracy – includes reference categories from which democratic support is distinguished: one-man rule, one-party rule, and military rule. High levels of trust in the president, military, or ruling party may thus motivate people to support non-democratic alternatives that would allow such individuals or organizations to hold more or total power in a non-democratic regime. To control for the role of trust, I include three variables that capture how much people trust the president, the ruling party, and the military.

**Results**

Table 2 below displays the results of three models in which I test whether perceptions of relative situation are significantly associated with demand for democracy above and beyond known covariates of demand for democracy (models 4-6). I then include all covariates in a full model (Model 7).

The results suggest that people who feel better off than others have less demand for democracy than people who feel equally well off. These effects are significant above and beyond the effect of intrinsic, instrumental, and partisan explanations (see models 4-7). The effect is stronger for those who feel much better off ($\beta = -0.25$, Model 7) than for people who feel little or no better off.

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29 See Appendix 2 for a full description of questions. A factor analysis (extraction method: maximum likelihood) was performed, and a single factor extracted (direct oblimin rotation). The items were found to be suitable for index construction: A reliability analysis produced a satisfactory Cronbach’s alpha.

30 Respondents were asked: Let’s start with your general view about the current direction of our country. Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is going in the right direction. So let me ask you about the overall direction of the country: Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction? Response options are: “going in the wrong direction” (coded as 1) and “going in the right direction” (coded as 2). Respondents who refused to answer the question or who said they “don’t know” were excluded from the analyses.

31 These systems – termed “neopatrimonialism” (see e.g. Bratton & van de Walle, 1997; Hyden, 2012; Mkandawire, 2015) – place strong emphasis on the reciprocal connection between patrons in the state (with a “big man” at the top of the network) and clientelist networks attached to these patrons as a means of distributing state resources on the one hand and winning (particularised) public support on the other hand (Chabal & Daloz, 1999; Erdman & Engel, 2006). As such, the role of the executive, embodied in the president or prime minister, may shape people’s attitudes toward democracy.

32 Respondents were asked: Do you feel close to any particular political party? [If “yes”:] Which party is that?

33 See for example Schäfer (2013).

34 Respondents were asked: How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The president? The ruling party? The military? (See Appendix 2 for a full description.) The assumption here is that the president is most likely to lead a “one-man rule.”
who feel only moderately better off ($\beta=-0.072^{**}$, Model 7), but both are consistently significant across all models.

In models 4, 5, and 7, feeling much worse off is also significantly and negatively associated with demand for democracy, although the effect is weaker than the effect for feeling much better off. This suggests that regardless of how people evaluate democracy based on intrinsic or instrumental explanations, feeling much worse off than others reduces how much demand for democracy people have. Only when the partisan orientations of the respondent are considered (in Model 6) are feelings of strong relative deprivation not significantly associated with demand for democracy. In all models, feeling only moderately deprived (“worse off”) is not significantly associated with demand for democracy.

Looking at the full model, people who feel strong and moderate relative advantage, feel strong relative deprivation, have greater lived poverty experiences, or perceive more frequent government discrimination against their ethnic group have less demand for democracy. Moreover, people have less demand for democracy the more they trust the ruling party and the military. This is likely because those who have more trust in the ruling party and military are more supportive of one-party and military rule (which form part of the demand for democracy index). Likewise, people who feel close to the ruling party have more demand for democracy. Overall, the models appear of good fit in explaining both between-country and within-country variance.35

Of course, the data suggest that people with more extreme assessments of their relative living situation form only a small minority (3% of respondents said they felt “much better off” than others and 8% said they felt “much worse off”). Moreover – despite the significant results – the models suggest that feelings of relative deprivation and advantage alone (even strong feelings) account for only a limited share of the variance in support and demand for democracy both within and between countries. The results show that despite significant correlations, feeling relatively deprived or advantaged alone is likely not going to turn people off democracy as a regime form. Of course, it is possible (and warrants over-time analysis in the future) that sustained, generational experiences or perceptions of relative deprivation might be linked more strongly to diminishing support for democracy as a regime type.

The results also suggest that how people perceive the current government to be handling income gaps is significantly correlated with demand for democracy. Here I find that people who have more positive assessments of their government in this regard have less demand for democracy as a regime form, while those who assess their government poorly in reducing income gaps have more demand for democracy. The same result is found for more positive evaluations of the government in other economic matters. This may suggest that people see democracy as a vehicle to improve redistribution, but when the government is doing well in the eyes of the people, non-democratic alternatives (possibly the status quo in some of the countries sampled) are supported.

35 The models for demand for democracy account for more variance in the dependent variable between countries than within countries. Overall, Model 7 accounts for 17.6% of variance in demand for democracy within countries and 27.8% between countries. Among Level 2 variables, only recent economic growth was significantly correlated with demand for democracy ($\beta=0.132^*$, Model 5).
### Table 2: Modelling demand for democracy | 33 countries | Afrobarometer Round 7 data (2016/2018)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>M3: Democracy for what it is</th>
<th>M4: Democracy for what it does</th>
<th>M5: Partisanship performance</th>
<th>Full model</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>3.097 (0.4)</td>
<td>2.096 (0.613)</td>
<td>3.074 (0.464)</td>
<td>2.38 (0.58)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much worse= 1</td>
<td>-0.059* (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.054* (0.023)</td>
<td>-0.028 (0.022)</td>
<td>-0.079** (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worse= 1</td>
<td>0.009 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.006 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.014)</td>
<td>0.002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Better= 1</td>
<td>-0.068*** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.052*** (0.015)</td>
<td>-0.055*** (0.014)</td>
<td>-0.072*** (0.016)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Much better= 1</td>
<td>-0.26*** (0.034)</td>
<td>-0.231*** (0.036)</td>
<td>-0.238*** (0.032)</td>
<td>-0.25*** (0.039)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative to national asset mean</td>
<td>0.031*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.031*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.032*** (0.002)</td>
<td>0.028*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lived Poverty Index</td>
<td>-0.04*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.049*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.052*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.051*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Freedoms index</td>
<td>0 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Free elections</td>
<td>-0.023*** (0.006)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethnic group treated fairly</td>
<td>-0.028*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government handling income gaps</td>
<td>-0.036*** (0.009)</td>
<td>-0.034** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.034** (0.01)</td>
<td>-0.034** (0.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic performance index</td>
<td>-0.018*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.016*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.016*** (0.003)</td>
<td>-0.016*** (0.003)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service delivery index</td>
<td>0 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall direction of the country</td>
<td>-0.015* (0.007)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Performance of the president</td>
<td>-0.001 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.022 (0.015)</td>
<td>0.022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incumbent partisan</td>
<td></td>
<td>0.035*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.034*** (0.007)</td>
<td>0.034*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust president</td>
<td>0.001 (0.007)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.001 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust ruling party</td>
<td>-0.052*** (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.038*** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.038*** (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.038*** (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Trust military</td>
<td>-0.02** (0.006)</td>
<td>-0.015* (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.015* (0.007)</td>
<td>-0.015* (0.007)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>0.001*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
<td>0.003*** (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female= 1</td>
<td>-0.115*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.123*** (0.012)</td>
<td>-0.13*** (0.011)</td>
<td>-0.097*** (0.013)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural= 1</td>
<td>0.021 (0.013)</td>
<td>0.03* (0.013)</td>
<td>0.028* (0.012)</td>
<td>0.032* (0.015)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of education</td>
<td>0.072*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.071*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.076*** (0.003)</td>
<td>0.065*** (0.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rule of law index</td>
<td>0.429 (0.286)</td>
<td>0.425 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.425 (0.29)</td>
<td>0.425</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic growth (mean: 2011-2017)</td>
<td>0.132* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.132* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.132* (0.05)</td>
<td>0.132* (0.05)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income inequality (Gini)</td>
<td>-0.01 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.008)</td>
<td>0.002 (0.008)</td>
<td>-0.008 (0.008)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Human Development Index</td>
<td>0.21 (0.603)</td>
<td>0.619 (0.716)</td>
<td>-0.375 (0.658)</td>
<td>0.804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Within-country $R^2$</td>
<td>0.151</td>
<td>0.127</td>
<td>0.113</td>
<td>0.176</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Between-country $R^2$</td>
<td>0.247</td>
<td>0.059</td>
<td>-0.057</td>
<td>0.278</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Cell entries are linear mixed model coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. Some effect sizes have been rounded to 0. *p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001.
6. Conclusion

Are people who feel left out or left behind disillusioned with democracy, or do they want democracy more as it gives them a possible vehicle for redistribution? Do the self-perceived have-nots lose faith in democracy and turn to alternatives? Much has been said about the growing threat to democracy by those who feel the system is not working for them and about the risk of a growing number of have-nots losing faith in democracy. However, little research in this regard has been done for cases in Africa.

In this paper, I explored whether perceptions of relative living situation are significantly linked to how much people demand democracy. Accounting for country-level clustering of the data, I find that people who feel equal to others have more demand for democracy than people who do not feel equal to others. Conversely, feeling both strongly relatively deprived and strongly relatively advantaged tend to be associated with less demand for democracy. These patterns remain significant even when controlling for other explanations for demand for democracy that have been used in the literature, such as absolute poverty, quality of elections and civil freedoms, and personal traits (education and age). Unlike Solt (2008), who argues that inequality may foster support for non-democratic regime forms, I find no significant relation between country-level income inequality and less demand for democracy. However, at the individual level, I find that people who feel relatively deprived do in fact show less demand for democracy.

Previous research has relied on using objective measures of inequality, usually at the group or country level. I included arguably the most widely used measure of national inequality – the Gini coefficient for income inequality. However, I find no significant effect of the Gini coefficient. The results underline that perceived relative living situation is an important explanation of regime support in Africa, and one that should be included in predictive models in the future.

My findings present an extension of how economic inequality and its effects can be measured, as well as of the study of economic inequality as a determinant of political-regime support. In both regards, Africa has received little prior attention, and this study provides a promising starting point for future research. Given the high levels of inequality in many African countries and the limited success of democratic consolidation in the past decade or two (Lindberg, 2001; Gyimah-Boadi, 2004; Beresford, Berry, & Mann, 2018; Cheeseman, 2018), this research represents an important addition to the literature and may provide valuable insights for academics and policymakers alike.
References


Barrows, W. L. (1976). Ethnic diversity and political instability in black Africa. *Comparative Political Studies, 9*(2), 139-170.


Appendices

Appendix 1: Most essential characteristic of democracy (Afrobarometer Round 5)

In Round 5 of the Afrobarometer survey, respondents were asked:

Many things may be desirable, but not all of them are essential characteristics of democracy. If you have to choose only one of the things that I am going to read, which one would you choose as the most essential characteristic of democracy?

Respondents were asked the same question twice, and each time given four answer options, as well as the possibility to say “none of these” or “don’t know.” The descriptive results of the answers given to both questions are displayed in Figure A.1 below. Percentages can only be compared to other frequencies within the same question, not across the two questions.

Figure A.1: The most essential characteristic of democracy | 35 countries | 2011/2013

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>First question</th>
<th>Second question</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>People choose leaders in free and fair elections</td>
<td>Government ensures job opportunities for all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government narrows gap between rich and poor</td>
<td>Government ensures law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People are free to express political views openly</td>
<td>Multiple parties compete fairly in elections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government does not waste public money</td>
<td>Media is free to criticise government</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages:
- People choose leaders in free and fair elections: 34%
- Government narrows gap between rich and poor: 24%
- People are free to express political views openly: 23%
- Government does not waste public money: 13%
- Government ensures job opportunities for all: 35%
- Government ensures law and order: 23%
- Multiple parties compete fairly in elections: 18%
- Media is free to criticise government: 17%
Appendix 2: Variables used in the analyses (Source: Afrobarometer Round 7)

2.1 Independent variable: Perceived relative living situation

**Question Number:** Q5  
**Question:** In general, how do you rate your living conditions compared to those of other [ENTER NATIONALITY]?  
**Variable Label:** Q5. Your living conditions vs. others  
**Values:** 1-5, 9, 8, -1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Much worse, 2=Worse, 3=Same, 4=Better, 5=Much better, 9=Don’t know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Source:** SAB

2.2 Dependent variables

a. Support for Democracy

**Question Number:** Q30  
**Question:** Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?  
Statement 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.  
Statement 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable.  
Statement 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have.  
**Variable Label:** Q30. Support for democracy  
**Values:** 1-3, 9, 98, -1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Statement 3: Doesn’t matter, 2=Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable, 3=Statement 1: Democracy preferable, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Note:** Interviewer was instructed to “read the question in the language of the interview, but always read ‘democracy’ in English. Translate ‘democracy’ into local language only if respondent does not understand English term.”

b. Demand for democracy

**Question Number:** Q28a  
**Question:** There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Only one political party is allowed to stand for election and hold office?  
**Variable Label:** Q28a. Reject one-party rule  
**Values:** 1-5, 9, 98, -1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Note:** Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number:** Q28B  
**Question:** There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: The army comes in to govern the country?  
**Variable Label:** Q28b. Reject military rule  
**Values:** 1-5, 9, 98, -1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Note:** Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number:** Q28C  
**Question:** There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve of the following alternatives: Elections and Parliament are abolished so that the President can decide everything?  
**Variable Label:** Q28c. Reject one-man rule  
**Values:** 1-5, 9, 98, -1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=Disapprove, 3=Neither approve nor disapprove, 4=Approve, 5=Strongly approve, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Note:** Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.
2.3 Competing explanations

a. Lived Poverty Index

**Question Number:** Q8A
**Question:** Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough food to eat?
**Variable Label:** Q8a. How often gone without food
**Values:** 0-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** NDB

**Question Number:** Q8B
**Question:** Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough clean water for home use?
**Variable Label:** Q8b. How often gone without water
**Values:** 0-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** NDB

**Question Number:** Q8C
**Question:** Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without medicines or medical treatment?
**Variable Label:** Q8c. How often gone without medical care
**Values:** 0-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** NDB

**Question Number:** Q8D
**Question:** Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without enough fuel to cook your food?
**Variable Label:** Q8d. How often gone without cooking fuel
**Values:** 0-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** SAB

**Question Number:** Q8E
**Question:** Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family: Gone without a cash income?
**Variable Label:** Q8e. How often gone without cash income
**Values:** 0-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Just once or twice, 2=Several times, 3=Many times, 4=Always, 9=Don’t know, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** SAB

b. Asset Index

**Question Number:** Q89A
**Question:** Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Radio?
**Variable Label:** Q89a. Own radio
**Values:** 0-2, 8, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0 = No one in household owns, 1 = Yes, someone else in household owns, 2 = Yes, personally owns, 8 = Refused, 9 = Don’t know, -1 = Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q89B
Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Television?
Variable Label: Q89b. Own television
Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0 = No one in household owns, 1 = Yes, someone else in household owns, 2 = Yes, personally owns, 8 = Refused, 9 = Don’t know, -1 = Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q89C
Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Motor vehicle or motorcycle?
Variable Label: Q89c. Own motor vehicle, car, or motorcycle
Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0 = No one in household owns, 1 = Yes, someone else in household owns, 2 = Yes, personally owns, 8 = Refused, 9 = Don’t know, -1 = Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

Question Number: Q89D
Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Computer?
Variable Label: Q89d. Own computer
Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0 = No one in household owns, 1 = Yes, someone else in household owns, 2 = Yes, personally owns, 8 = Refused, 9 = Don’t know, -1 = Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 7

Question Number: Q89E
Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Bank account?
Variable Label: Q89e. Own bank account
Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0 = No one in household owns, 1 = Yes, someone else in household owns, 2 = Yes, personally owns, 8 = Refused, 9 = Don’t know, -1 = Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 7

Question Number: Q89F
Question: Which of these things do you personally own? [If no, ask:] Does anyone else in your household own one: Mobile phone?
Variable Label: Q89f. Own mobile phone
Values: 0-2, 8, 9, -1
Value Labels: 0 = No one in household owns, 1 = Yes, someone else in household owns, 2 = Yes, personally owns, 8 = Refused, 9 = Don’t know, -1 = Missing
Source: Afrobarometer Round 3

c. Freedoms Index

Question Number: Q42A
Question: In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful of what they say about politics?
Variable Label: Q42a. How often careful what you say
Values: 0-3, 9, 8, -1
Value Labels: 0 = Never, 1 = Rarely, 2 = Often, 3 = Always, 9 = Don’t know, 8 = Refused to answer, -1 = Missing
Source: SAB

Question Number: Q42B
**Question:** In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful about what political organizations they join?
**Variable Label:** Q42b. How often careful which organizations joined
**Values:** 0-3, 9, 8, 99, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don’t know, 8=Refused to answer, 99=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing
**Source:** Afrobarometer Round 7

**Question Number:** Q42C
**Question:** In your opinion, how often, in this country: Do people have to be careful about how they vote in an election?
**Variable Label:** Q42c. How often careful how vote
**Values:** 0-3, 9, 8, -1
**Value Labels:** 0=Never, 1=Rarely, 2=Often, 3=Always, 9=Don’t know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** Afrobarometer Round 7

d. Free elections

**Question Number:** Q23
**Question:** On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in [20xx]. Was it:
**Variable Label:** Q23. Freeness and fairness of the last national election
**Values:** 1-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 1=Not free and fair, 2=Free and fair, with major problems, 3=Free and fair, but with minor problems, 4=Completely free and fair, 9=Don’t understand the question, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** Afrobarometer Round 3
**Notes:** Year of last national election was inserted in each country. See country questionnaires for details.

e. Economic performance index

**Question Number:** Q56A
**Question:** Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Managing the economy?
**Variable Label:** Q56a. Handling managing the economy
**Values:** 1-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** SAB
**Note:** Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number:** Q56B
**Question:** Now let’s speak about the present government of this country. How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Improving the living standards of the poor.
**Variable Label:** Q56b. Handling improving living standards of the poor
**Values:** 1-4, 9, 98, -1
**Value Labels:** 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing
**Source:** Afrobarometer Round 4
**Note:** Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number:** Q56C
**Question:** How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Creating jobs?
**Variable Label:** Q56c. Handling creating jobs
**Values:** 1-4, 9, 98, -1
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**Value Labels**: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

**Source**: NDB

**Note**: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number**: Q56D
**Question**: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Keeping prices down?

**Variable Label**: Handling keeping prices down

**Values**: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

**Value Labels**: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

**Source**: NDB

**Note**: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**f. Service delivery index**

**Question Number**: Q56F
**Question**: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Reducing crime?

**Variable Label**: Handling reducing crime

**Values**: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

**Value Labels**: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

**Source**: NDB

**Note**: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number**: Q56G
**Question**: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Improving basic health services?

**Variable Label**: Handling improving basic health services

**Values**: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

**Value Labels**: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

**Source**: NDB

**Note**: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number**: Q56H
**Question**: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Addressing educational needs?

**Variable Label**: Handling addressing educational needs

**Values**: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

**Value Labels**: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

**Source**: NDB

**Note**: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number**: Q56I
**Question**: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Providing water and sanitation services?

**Variable Label**: Handling providing water and sanitation services

**Values**: 1-4, 9, 98, -1

**Value Labels**: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing

**Source**: SAB

**Note**: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

**Question Number**: Q56J
**Question**: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Ensuring everyone has enough to eat?
Variable Label: Q56j. Handling ensuring enough to eat  
Values: 1-4, 9, 98, -1  
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
Source: SAB  
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

g. Government handling inequality  

Question Number: Q56E  
Question: How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven’t you heard enough to say: Narrowing gaps between rich and poor?  
Variable Label: Q56e. Handling narrowing income gaps  
Values: 1-4, 9, 8, -1  
Value Labels: 1=Very badly, 2=Fairly badly, 3=Fairly well, 4=Very well, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
Source: SAB  
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.

h. Performance of the president  

Question Number: Q58A  
Question: Do you approve or disapprove of the way that the following people have performed their jobs over the past twelve months, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say? [NAME OF PRESIDENT]  
Variable Label: Q58a. Performance: President  
Values: 1-4, 7, 9, 8, 99, -1  
Value Labels: 1=Strongly disapprove, 2=disapprove, 3=Approve, 4=Strongly approve, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, 99=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing  
Source: SAB  
Note: Interviewer probed for strength of opinion.  
* The question asked about the most powerful executive role in the country, whether the President or the Prime Minister. If there was a secondary leader, those are included in country-specific questions. Refer to country data sets.  
* The following countries asked about their President: BEN, BFO, BOT, CAM, CDI, CVE, GAB, GAM, GHA, GUI, KEN, LJB, MAD, MLI, MLW, MOZ, NAM, NGR, NIG, SAF, SEN, STP, SRL, SUD, TAN, TOG, UGA, ZAM, ZIM  
* The following countries asked about their Prime Minister: LES, MAU, MRC, TUN  
* Not asked in Swaziland/eSwatini.

i. Direction of country  

Question Number: Q3  
Question: Let’s start with your general view about the current direction of our country. Some people might think the country is going in the wrong direction. Others may feel it is going in the right direction. So let me ask YOU about the overall direction of the country: Would you say that the country is going in the wrong direction or going in the right direction?  
Variable Label: Q3. Overall direction of the country  
Values: 1, 2, 9, 8, -1  
Value Labels: 1=Going in the wrong direction, 2=Going in the right direction 9=Don’t know, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
Source: NDB, Zambia96

j. Ruling-party supporter  

Question Number: Q88A  
Question: Do you feel close to any particular political party?
**Variable Label:** Q88a. Close to political party
**Values:** 0-1, 8, 99, -1

**Value Labels:**
- 0 = No, not close to any party,
- 1 = Yes, feels close to a party,
- 8 = Refused to answer,
- 9 = Don’t know,
- 99 = Not asked in the country,
- -1 = Missing

**Source:** Zambia 96

**Question Number:** Q88B
**Question:** Which party is that?

**Variable Label:** Q88b. Which party
**Values:**
- 100-106 = Nouveau Départ,
- 101=Union fait la Nation (UN),
- 102=Renaissance du Bénin (RB),
- 103=Parti du Renouveau Démocratique (PRD),
- 104=Force Cauris pour un Bénin Emergent (FCBE),
- 105=Alliance ABT,
- 106=PIK-Nouvelle conscience,
- 140=Botswana Congress Party (BCP),
- 141=Botswana Democratic Party (BDP),
- 142=Botswana Movement For Democracy (BMD),
- 143=Botswana National Front (BNF),
- 144=Botswana People’s Party (BPP),
- 146=Umbrella for Democratic Change (UDC+),
- 180=ADF/RDA (Alliance pour la démocratie et la fédération/Rassem),
- 181=CDP (Congrès pour la démocratie et le progrès) de Achille TA,
- 182=Le Faso Autrement de Ablassé Ouedraogo,
- 184=MPP (Mouvement du Peuple pour le Progrès) de Roch Marc Chris,
- 185=NAFA (Nouvelle Alliance du Faso) de Rasmané Ouedraogo,
- 187=ODT (Organisation pour la Démocratie et le Travail) de Maham,
- 188=PAREN (Parti de la Renaissance Nationale) de Laurent BADO,
- 189=PDS/Metba (Parti pour la Démocratie et le Socialisme) de O, 191=UBN (Union pour un Burkina Nouveau) de Djemadjoda Amadou DIC,
- 192=UNIR/PS (Union pour la renaissance/Senat/sarkiste) de Me B,
- 193=UPC (Union pour le Progrès et le Changement) de Zéphirin DIA,
- 220=Movement for Democracy (MPD),
- 221=African Party for Independence of Cape Verde (PAICV),
- 226=Cape Verdean Union Independent and Democratic (UCID),
- 227=Popular Party (PP),
- 260=Convention People’s Party of Cape Verde (CPP),
- 261=National Democratic Congress (NDC),
- 262=New Patriotic Party (NPP),
- 263=People’s National Convention (PNC),
- 264=Progressive People’s Party (PPP),
- 265=Democratic People’s Party (DPP),
- 267=National Democratic Party (NDP),
- 300=Kenya Social Congress (KSC),
- 301=NARC Kenya,
- 302=Orange Democratic Movement (ODM),
- 303=Restore and Build Kenya (RBK),
- 304=SAPNCA,
- 305=The National Alliance (TNA),
- 306=United Democratic Front (UDF),
- 307=United Republic Party (URP),
- 308=Wiper Democratic Movement (WDM-K),
- 309=Jubilee Alliance Party (JAP)/Jubilee Party,
- 340=Democratic Congress (DC),
- 341=All Basotho Convention (ABC),
- 342=Lesotho Congress for Democracy (LCD),
- 343=Basotho National Party (BNP),
- 344=Popular Front for Democracy (PFD),
- 345=National Independent Party (NIP),
- 346=Lesotho People’s Congress (LPC),
- 348=Marematlou Freedom Party (MFP),
- 349=Basotho Congress Party (BCP),
- 352=Alliance of Democrats (AD),
- 353=Movement for Economic Change (MEC),
- 354=Reformed Congress of Lesotho (RCL),
- 356=Alliance of Peace and Democracy (APD) – UPP & LPP,
- 357=National Democratic Congress (NDC),
- 384=Liberal Party (UP),
- 385=Unity Party (UP),
- 386=National Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL),
- 389=Coalition for Democratic Change (CDC),
- 393=All Liberia Coalition Party (ALCOP),
- 394=Liberia Reconstruction Party (LRP),
- 395=National Union for Democratic Progress (NUDP),
- 400=Victory for Change (CVC),
- 408=All Liberian Party (ALP),
- 409=People Unification Party (PUP),
- 410=Alternative National Congress (ANC),
- 422=AME (Antoko Miombon’Ezaka),
- 424=AREMA (Antokin’ny Revélisiona Malagasy),
- 425=AVI (Aasa Vota ny Flammpitsaranana),
- 428=LEADER FANILLO (Libéralisme Économique et Action Démocratique pour la Réconciliation),
- 429=Mahaleo tena,
- 432=MDM (Miara Mientana ho an’ny Demokrasia),
- 433=MONIMA (MOvement National pour l'Indépendance de Madagascar),
- 434=MTS (Malagasy Tonga Saina),
- 435=RPSP-Vaovao (Rassemblement pour la Sociale Démocratie),
- 437=TVG (Tanora malagasy Vonona),
- 438=TM (Tiako i Madagasikara),
- 440=MAPAR (Miara Amin’ny Prezida Andy Rajoelina),
- 441=HVM (Hery Vaovao ho an’i Madagasikara),
- 443=MMM (Malagasy Miari-Miainga),
- 446=Democratic Progressive Party (DPP),
- 452=Malawi Forum for Unity and Development (MAFUNE),
- 453=Malawi Congress Party (MCP),
- 464=National Salvation Front (NSF),
- 467=People’s Party (PP),
- 471=United Democratic Front (UDF),
- 500=ADEMA – PASJ / Dionkounda Traoré / Tiémoko Sangaré,
- 501=ADP – Maliba / Boumbacar Diallo,
- 502=ASMA – CFP / Soumeylou Boubéye Maïga,
- 503=CDS – Mogo Tiyiga / Mamadou Blaise Sangaré,
- 505=CNID – Faso Yiriwa Ton / Montagala Tal,
- 506=CODEM / Ousséni Amion Guindo ou Poulo,
- 507=FARE – An Ka Wuli / Modibo Sidibé,
- 508=MIRIA / mamdou Kassa Traoré,
- 509=MPR / Chouguek Kokala Maïga,
- 510=PAREN / Tiébéï Dréme,
- 511=PDES / ATT,
- 512=RPM / Ibrahim Boumbacar Kéïta ou IBK,
- 513=SADI / Ouumar Mariko /
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Cheick Oumar Sissoko, 514=UDD / Tiéman Hubert Coulibaly, 515=UM-RDA / Badara Aliou Macalou, 516=URD / Soumaila Cissé, 517=YELEMA / Moussa Mara, 540=Frelimo (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique), 541=Renamo (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana), 542=MDM (Movimento Democrático Moçambicano), 543=PDD (Partido para Paz, Democracia e Desenvolvimento), 580=APP (All People’s Party), 582=COD (Congress of Democrats), 583=DPN (Democratic Party of Namibia), 584=DTA (DTA of Namibia), 585=MAG (Monitor Action Group), 587=NEFF (Namibia Economic Freedom Fighters), 588=NUDO (National Unity Democratic Organisation of Namibia), 589=RDP (Rally for Democracy and Progress), 590=RP (Republican Party of Namibia), 591=SWANU (Swan of Namibia), 592=SWAPO (SWAPO Party of Namibia), 593=UDF (United Democratic Front of Namibia), 594=UPM (United People’s Movement), 620=Advanced Congress of Democrats (ACD), 621=All Progressive Congress (APC), 622=Alliance for Democracy (AD), 623=African Democratic Congress (ADC), 624=All Nigeria People’s Party (ANPP), 625=All Progressives Grand Alliance (APGA), 626=All People’s Party (APP), 628=Conscience People’s Congress (CPC), 631=Democratic People’s Party (DPP), 634=Labour Party (LP), 638=People’s Democratic Party (PDP), 639=Progressive People’s Alliance (PPA), 640=Peoples Progressive Party (PPP), 642=Mackay SALL (Alliance for the Republic), 644=Idrissa SECK (REMM), 645=Didgane SENE (Union pour le Renouveau Démocratique), 646=JEF JEL, 671=Abdoulaye BALDE (UCS), 672=Malick GAKOU (Grand Parti), 674=Serigne Mansour SY DJAMIL (Beuss du Niak), 677=Moustapha NIASS (Aliance des Forces du Progrès), 678=Ousmane Tanor DIENG (Parti Socialiste), 690=Africanda (AP), 691=African National Union-Patriotic Front [ZANU-PF], 692=Movement for Democratic Change – Mutambara (MDC-M), 693=Mavambo. Kusile. Dawn [MKD] – Simba Makoni, 694=Zimbabwe African People’s Union-Dabengwa [ZAPU-Dabengwa], 695=MDC People’s Democratic Party [Tendai Biti], 696=Fighting for Democracy & Development (FDD), 700=Afrobarometer Working Papers

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k. Trust

**Question Number:** Q43A  
**Question:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The President?  
**Variable Label:** Q43a. Trust president  
**Values:** 0-3, 9, 8, -1  
**Value Labels:** 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Source:** Zambia 96  
* The question asked about the most powerful executive role in the country, whether the President or the Prime Minister. If there was a secondary leader, those are included in country-specific data sets.  
* The following countries asked about their Prime Minister: BEN, BFO, BOT, CAM, CDI, CVE, GAB, GAM, GHA, GUI, KEN, LIB, MAD, MLI, MLW, MOZ, NAM, NGR, NIG, SAF, SEN, STP, SRL, SUD, TAN, TOG, UGA, ZAM, ZIM  
* The following countries asked about their Prime Minister: LES, MAU, MRC, TUN  
* Not asked in SWZ

**Question Number:** Q43E  
**Question:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The Ruling Party?  
**Variable Label:** Q43e. Trust the ruling party  
**Values:** 0-3, 9, 8, -1  
**Value Labels:** 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, 99=Not applicable, 9998=Refused to answer, 9999=Don’t know, 9996=Not asked in the country, -1=Missing  
**Source:** Adapted from Zambia 96

**Question Number:** Q43H  
**Question:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven’t you heard enough about them to say: The national military?  
**Variable Label:** Q43h. Trust army  
**Values:** 0-3, 9, 8, -1  
**Value Labels:** 0=Not at all, 1=Just a little, 2=Somewhat, 3=A lot, 9=Don’t know/Haven’t heard enough, 8=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Source:** Afrobarometer Round 5
2.4 Control variables

a. Location

**Question Number:** URBRUR  
**Question:** PSU/EA  
**Variable Label:** Urban or Rural Primary Sampling Unit  
**Values:** 1-3, 460  
**Value Labels:** 1=Urban, 2=Rural, 3=Semi-Urban, 460=Peri-Urban  
**Note:** Answered by interviewer

b. Education

**Question Number:** Q97  
**Question:** What is your highest level of education?  
**Variable Label:** Q97. Education of respondent  
**Values:** 0-9, 99, 98, -1  
**Value Labels:** 0=No formal schooling, 1=Informal schooling only (including Koranic schooling), 2=Some primary schooling, 3=Primary school completed, 4=Intermediate school or Some secondary school / high school, 5=Secondary school / high school completed, 6=Post-secondary qualifications, other than university e.g. a diploma or degree from a polytechnic or college, 7=Some university, 8=University completed, 9=Post-graduate, 99=Don’t know [Do not read], 98=Refused to answer, -1=Missing  
**Source:** SAB

c. Age

**Question Number:** Q1  
**Question:** How old are you?  
**Variable Label:** Q1. Age  
**Values:** 18- 99, 103, 106, 998, 999, -1  
**Value Labels:** 998=Refused, 999=Don’t Know, -1=Missing

d. Gender

**Question Number:** Q101  
**Question:** Respondent’s gender  
**Variable Label:** Q101. Gender of respondent  
**Values:** 1, 2, -1  
**Value Labels:** 1=Male, 2=Female, -1=Missing  
**Source:** SAB  
**Note:** Answered by interviewer
Appendix 3: Share of respondents per country who say their living conditions are “the same” as others’ and mean perceived lived equality score (Afrobarometer Round 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Perceived equality (mean)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>2.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Eswatini</td>
<td>34%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>26%</td>
<td>2.2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
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</table>
Appendix 4: Share of respondents per region who say their living conditions are “the same” as others’ (Afrobarometer Round 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Same</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 5: Descriptive statistics of support for democracy by country (Afrobarometer Round 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Statement 1: Democracy preferable</th>
<th>Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable</th>
<th>Statement 3: Doesn’t matter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>84%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>9%</td>
<td>6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Uganda</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d'Ivoire</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gabon</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Niger</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
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<td>Gambia</td>
<td>68%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Namibia</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>13%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>15%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Principe</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mozambique</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-country sample</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix 6: Descriptive statistics of support for democracy by region (Afrobarometer Round 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Statement 1: Democracy preferable</th>
<th>Statement 2: Sometimes non-democratic preferable</th>
<th>Statement 3: Doesn’t matter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>12%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>75%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>9%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>19%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### Appendix 7: Descriptive statistics of demand for democracy by country (Afrobarometer Round 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>% who report full demand for democracy</th>
<th>Mean demand for democracy score</th>
<th>Reject military rule*</th>
<th>Reject one-party rule*</th>
<th>Reject one-man rule*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mauritius</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>3.47</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>89%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zambia</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>3.48</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Botswana</td>
<td>62%</td>
<td>3.44</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>91%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>3.39</td>
<td>51%</td>
<td>47%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senegal</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Côte d’Ivoire</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>3.24</td>
<td>83%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanzania</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sierra Leone</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>3.26</td>
<td>89%</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ghana</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>3.22</td>
<td>86%</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>88%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gambia</td>
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<td>3.23</td>
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<td>91%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>81%</td>
<td>90%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kenya</td>
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<td>85%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Togo</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3.07</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Benin</td>
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<td>3.16</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zimbabwe</td>
<td>44%</td>
<td>2.90</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>92%</td>
<td>78%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Guinea</td>
<td>44%</td>
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<td>80%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>81%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nigeria</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>2.98</td>
<td>79%</td>
<td>61%</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberia</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>3.08</td>
<td>39%</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>88%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cabo Verde</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>3.03</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>São Tomé and Príncipe</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mali</td>
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<td>67%</td>
<td>87%</td>
<td>87%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Malawi</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>3.04</td>
<td>76%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>88%</td>
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<td>2.93</td>
<td>52%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>77%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
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<td>88%</td>
<td>90%</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
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<td>80%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>79%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cameroon</td>
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<td>72%</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>75%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Sudan</td>
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<td>62%</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>23%</td>
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<td>85%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>69%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Burkina Faso</td>
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<td>43%</td>
<td>77%</td>
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<tr>
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<td>41%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Madagascar</td>
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<td>2.53</td>
<td>77%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lesotho</td>
<td>19%</td>
<td>2.44</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>82%</td>
<td>76%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tunisia</td>
<td>17%</td>
<td>2.06</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>65%</td>
<td>61%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33-country sample</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>2.95</td>
<td>74%</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>80%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* % of respondents in each country who said they either “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove”
Appendix 8: Descriptive statistics of demand for democracy by region
(Afrobarometer Round 7)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>% who report full demand for democracy</th>
<th>Mean demand for democracy score</th>
<th>Reject military rule*</th>
<th>Reject one-party rule*</th>
<th>Reject one-man rule*</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Africa</td>
<td>46%</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>81%</td>
<td>69%</td>
<td>84%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Africa</td>
<td>54%</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>72%</td>
<td>85%</td>
<td>90%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Africa</td>
<td>38%</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>73%</td>
<td>74%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Africa</td>
<td>28%</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>63%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>64%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central Africa</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>78%</td>
<td>71%</td>
<td>83%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* % of respondents in each country who said they either “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove”
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