


# Violent extremism in Africa

Citizen perspectives from the Sahel  
epicenter and periphery

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## Introduction

The Sahel<sup>1</sup> is one of Africa's most fragile regions and suffers from multiple longstanding and overlapping challenges, including entrenched poverty, underdevelopment, climate risks, and food insecurity. These chronic vulnerabilities have been exacerbated in recent years by the spread of a byzantine network of extremist and armed groups that have instrumentalized simmering local grievances and inter-community tensions to spread across the region's porous borders.

The fall of the Libyan regime in 2011 and the 2012 Tuareg rebellion in northern Mali were the genesis of ongoing instability in the region. Over the past decade, extremist and armed groups have continued to both entrench themselves in northern Mali and expand their operational footprint into Burkina Faso and Niger.<sup>2</sup> Collectively, these three countries now constitute the core of the Sahel crisis (Cooke, Sanderson, Johnson, & Hubner, 2016).

A variety of bilateral and multilateral military operations in Mali and across the wider Sahel region have been unsuccessful in stemming the violence, and since 2015, the number of terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has risen year on year (ACLED, 2019).

The deteriorating security situation in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has generated increasing concern among bordering West African states about the possibility of further regional spillover of conflict into their respective territories (United Nations, 2020a).

This paper looks at the impact that violent extremist activity has had on citizens in the Sahel epicenter countries of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger as well as the periphery countries of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Senegal, the Gambia, and Togo. Using Afrobarometer Round 7 survey data collected in 34 African countries between late 2016 and late 2018, it examines citizens' perceptions of how governments are handling the violence and looks at potential vulnerability factors that may expose West African states to the spread of violent extremist activity, including governance performance, trust in institutions, civil liberties, and ethnic and religious tensions or marginalization.

The security situation across the Sahel region is highly fluid. Burkina Faso, for example, has seen a rapid deterioration in security since fieldwork for the Round 7 survey was conducted, which would not be captured in the data presented below. However, the findings do provide an important snapshot of public opinion on a range of issues relevant to building more effective counter-terrorism policy.

## Afrobarometer survey

Afrobarometer is a pan-African, nonpartisan survey research network that provides reliable data on African experiences and evaluations of democracy, governance, and quality of life. Seven rounds of surveys were completed in up to 38 countries between 1999 and 2018. Round 8 surveys will cover 34 countries.

Afrobarometer conducts face-to-face interviews in the language of the respondent's choice with nationally representative samples, which yield country-level results with a margin of sampling error of +/-2 to +/-3 percentage points at a 95% confidence level.

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<sup>1</sup> The Sahel is a narrow band of semi-arid land that forms a transition zone between the Sahara to the north and the savannahs to the south. It is made up of flat, barren plains that stretch roughly 5,400 km across Africa, including parts of Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Algeria, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, Sudan, South Sudan, Eritrea, Cameroon, Central African Republic, and Ethiopia (Lichtenbaum, 2019; National Geographic, 2020).

<sup>2</sup> Niger is stretched across several crisis zones. Western Niger has seen the expansion of Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM) and other extremist groups emanating from northern Mali, which are the focus of this paper. However, it has also been impacted along its southern border by the spread of Boko Haram and Islamic State in West Africa from Nigeria.



## Key findings

- About one in 10 citizens in Burkina Faso (10%), Niger (8%), and Mali (8%) said they had personally experienced an armed attack by political or religious extremists during the two previous years, in addition to many who reported having feared such attacks.
- In Mali, more than one-third of citizens reported experiencing direct or indirect violence in the form of “injury or killings” (15%) or “intimidation or threats” (22%) between February 2015 and February 2017.
- Only about one-third (35%) of Malians said their government was handling extremist violence “fairly well” or “very well.” Majorities approved of their governments’ performance on extremist violence in Burkina Faso (53%) and Niger (69%).
- Malians overwhelmingly (94%) said the Malian Armed Forces are “somewhat” or “very” useful in helping the country recover its territorial integrity and national unity. Far fewer said the same about the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) (58%), local self-defense groups (56%), and the French Army (55%). In Burkina Faso, 57% of citizens saw foreign troops as having a positive impact on the security of the country, while more than three-fourths (77%) valued the impact of local security associations.
- Among periphery states that are potentially vulnerable to the spread of Sahel-based violent extremist organizations, citizen trust in the police was lowest in Ghana (39%), Guinea (42%), and Togo (43%) and higher in Benin (52%), Côte d’Ivoire (55%), the Gambia (60%), and Senegal (86%).
- Across these periphery states, citizens in Benin and Togo were also most likely to report experiencing discrimination based on their ethnic identities (21% and 20%, respectively) or their religious affiliation (14% and 13%, respectively).

## The epicenter of the Sahel crisis: Mali, Niger, and Burkina Faso

Since the early 2000s, Islamist militant groups have worked to establish themselves in northern Mali. The vast region is largely ungoverned and home to longstanding illicit trafficking networks (Raineri & Strazzari, 2015). In 2011, Libya’s civil war generated an influx of weaponry into northern Mali and led to the arming of Tuareg rebels, who with jihadist groups, including Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), launched a war against the Malian government with the aim of creating an independent state. Although the Tuareg signed a peace deal with the Malian government in June 2013 and the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed to stabilize the region, insurgent violence still plagues northern and central Mali (Shurkin, Pezard, & Zimmerman, 2017).

Since 2015, instability in Mali has continued to radiate outward and spill across borders, and in 2018, regional instability increased exponentially as conflict intensified in both Burkina Faso and Niger (see map, Figure 1).

The porous borders shared by these three states have allowed Mali-based Islamist militant organizations to expand their operational footprint into Niger and Burkina Faso (USAID, 2009; UNODC, 2018; United Nations, 2018). Across these three states, violent incidents involving Islamist militants doubled every year between 2015 and 2019, with the geographic focus of attacks shifting eastward from Mali to Burkina Faso, especially in the tri-country Liptako-Gourma region (Figure 2).

Between 2017 and 2019, the number of people who died in terrorist attacks annually in these three states rose from 770 to more than 4,000 (Le Roux, 2019). Burkina Faso, once known for its


relative stability in a turbulent region, saw the number of people internally displaced due to terrorist violence rise from 40,000 at the end of 2018 to more than 500,000 at the end of 2019 (United Nations, 2020b).

Furthermore, based on interviews spanning 2017 to 2019 with residents of the Liptako-Gourma region, Assanvo, Dakono, Thérroux-Bénoni, & Maïga (2019) showed that it was not only religion or ideology but also the illicit economy that motivated extremist groups. They participate in stealing livestock, trafficking, mining, and providing services to communities in order to establish themselves, expand, and survive.

**Figure 1: Sahel crisis epicenter states and other regional extremist hotspots in Africa**



**Figure 2: Violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel | Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger | 2019**




Data points represent violent events involving the designated groups in 2019. Data source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

### The impact of conflict on civilians in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger


Rising conflict and insecurity in the region have contributed to a humanitarian crisis as the number of attacks on civilians by armed groups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger has continued to rise over the past three years (Figure 3). The escalation and regionalization of

conflict have made it more difficult to deliver essential services, such as health care, education, and sanitation.

As of 31 May 2021, 10.8 million people across the region were in need of humanitarian assistance, and 1.7 million had been internally displaced as a result of conflict since January 2018 (UNOCHA, 2021). Militant groups routinely target health centers and schools, depriving communities of basic services; more than 4,000 schools and 241 health centers have stopped functioning due to conflict in the region. Insecurity has generated a massive flow of externally displaced persons, as well as a rise in inter-communal violence.



**Figure 3: Attacks on civilians by armed groups in the Sahel** | Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger | 2017-2020



Data source: Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED)

In 14 of the 34 countries that Afrobarometer surveyed during Round 7, respondents were asked whether they had personally feared and/or experienced an armed attack by political or religious extremists during the previous two years. With regard to the experience of extremist violence, Burkina Faso (10%), Niger (8%), and Mali (8%) all featured among the top five countries (Figure 4).


In addition, about four in 10 Burkinabè (40%) and Malians (38%) said they had feared but had not experienced violence by political or religious extremists, while only 12% of Nigeriens reported the same.

Major conflict began in Mali in early 2012, when the Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNL) joined forces with armed Islamist groups in the northern part of the country in an attempt to create an independent homeland for the Tuareg people. The conflict generated major political instability, and on 22 March 2012, President Amadou Toumani Touré was ousted in a coup d'état over his poor handling of the crisis. Multiple peace deals and ceasefires between the government of Mali and the MNL have failed to stem the violence. The instability has also allowed Mali to become a base of operations for several Islamist armed groups, which operate through shifting alliances and regularly attack both civilians and government security forces (ACLED, 2021). Self-defense groups that initially formed to protect their communities from Islamist armed groups have also been implicated in serious human-rights violations and have generated a rise in inter-communal violence (International Crisis Group, 2020).


In 2017, Malian citizens were asked how, if at all, their lives were affected by conflict. More than one-third of Malians reported experiencing direct or indirect violence in the form of "injury or killings" (15%) or "intimidation or threats" (22%) (Figure 5). About four in 10 reported



an adverse impact on their livelihoods through “job loss” (14%), “closure of business” (13%), or “change of occupation” (12%). About two in 10 experienced displacement, either internally (12%) or externally (6%), while one in 10 citizens (10%) said they had supported internally displaced persons (IDPs).




**Figure 4: Fear and experience of violent extremism** | 14 countries | 2016/2018




**Respondents were asked:** *In any society, people will sometimes disagree with one another. These disagreements occasionally escalate into physical violence. Please tell me whether, in the past two years, you have ever personally feared any of the following types of violence: An armed attack by political or religious extremists? [If yes:] Have you actually personally experienced this type of violence in the past two years?*

**Figure 5: Affected by conflict** | Mali | 2017



**Respondents were asked:** *Have you personally or members of your family been affected by the crisis and the conflict of the North?*



## Prioritizing security

Across 34 countries surveyed in 2016/2018, about one in five citizens (18%) cited security-related issues as one of the three most important problems facing their country. In Mali, 43% of citizens cited security as a priority issue – twice as many as in Afrobarometer’s Round 6 survey in 2014 (21%). Burkina Faso saw a slight rise in citizens’ prioritization of security as a major problem (from 12 percent in 2015 to 15 percent in 2017), while Niger saw a decrease from 19 percent in 2015 to 11 percent in 2018 (Table 1).

**Table 1: Security a priority problem** | Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger | 2014-2018

Country	Round 6 survey dates	Security a priority problem	Round 7 survey dates	Security a priority problem
Burkina Faso	April-May 2015	12%	Oct 2017	15%
Mali	Dec 2014	21%	Feb 2017	43%
Niger	April 2015	19%	April-May 2018	11%

**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, what are the most important problems facing this country that government should address? (Note: Respondents could give up to three responses. Table shows % of respondents who cited each issue among their top three problems. “Security-related issues” combines the categories of crime and security, political violence, political instability, ethnic tensions, interstate war, civil war, and terrorism.)*

## Government handling of extremist violence

The security sectors in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger suffer many of the same challenges, including weak institutions, poor civil-military relations, corruption, a lack of means and equipment, and difficulty in controlling their vast borders (Yarga & Ouedraogo, 2008). In recent years, increasing efforts have been made in all three countries to reform and strengthen the capacity of their security and justice sectors to deal with the escalation of terrorism.

In 2013, the United Nations Security Council established the MINUSMA with the mandate to stabilize Mali following the Tuareg rebellion in 2012 (United Nations Peacekeeping, 2020). The same year, following an unexpected advance by Islamist militants from the North toward central Mali, the French military launched Operation Serval, followed shortly by the African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), an Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) military mission sent to support the government against Islamist rebels (United Nations Security Council, 2012).


In 2014, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger established the G5 Sahel to encourage security and development cooperation (International Crisis Group, 2017). In 2017, the Joint Force of the G5 Sahel (FC-G5S) was established to specifically combat terrorist and criminal groups in the region, and at a France-G5 Sahel summit in January 2020, an agreement was signed to improve coordination of troops and intelligence-sharing under a single command structure (Al Jazeera, 2020).

Following Operation Serval against Islamist militants in northern Mali, the French launched Operation Barkhane in August 2014 to strengthen national security forces in the G5 Sahel countries, particularly in terms of their counterterrorism operations. In addition, the United States, Russia, the European Union, and others provide training and support to the G5 Sahel through frameworks such as the U.S. Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (U.S. Department of State, 2019) and the European Union Training Mission in Mali (2020).

Growing violence, banditry, and inter-communal conflict in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger, particularly since 2015, have also prompted the formation of ethnic militias and “self-defense groups” in communities across the region. In some cases, international partners have sought to work with armed self-defense groups against jihadists (International Crisis Group, 2018). However, easy access to firearms has contributed to the growth and militarization of the self-defense groups, and in many cases turned existing inter-communal tensions deadly. There have been multiple allegations of gross human-rights violations and criminal activity by self-defense groups in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger (Human Rights Watch, 2018).

When asked how their government was doing in terms of countering political violence from armed extremist groups, only about one-third (35%) of Malians said their government was handling extremist violence “fairly well” or “very well.” In Burkina Faso, roughly half (53%) of citizens gave their government good marks, whereas in Niger, two-thirds (69%) approved of their government’s performance (Figure 6). As discussed above, Mali has seen widespread extremist violence since at least 2012, while terrorist attacks in Burkina Faso and Niger are more recent and have increased dramatically since Round 7 surveys were conducted (Figure 3).

**Figure 6: Handling extremist violence | Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger | 2016/2018**




**Respondents were asked:** How well or badly would you say the current government is handling the following matters, or haven't you heard enough to say: Countering political violence from armed extremist groups?

In Mali, when citizens were asked how useful various entities are in helping the country regain its territorial integrity and national unity, an overwhelming majority (98%) rated jihadist groups as “not useful” or just “a little useful,” and most felt the same way about armed groups (75%) (Figure 7). The Malian Armed Forces were most widely perceived as useful in helping to create national unity (94%), whereas a little more than half of citizens said MINUSMA (58%), self-defense groups (56%), and the French Army (55%) are useful in this regard.

Criticisms leveled against MINUSMA commonly stem from a perceived lack of clarity surrounding its mission and mandate, a failure of MINUSMA forces to protect local populations from violence, and its contribution to inflating living costs (Leimbach, 2019). Self-defense groups in Mali have been implicated in several attacks on communities, particularly the Peuhl for their alleged support of jihadist groups, which have seen the burning of villages, widespread pillaging, and large-scale livestock theft (Human Rights Watch, 2018). As Leimbach (2019) writes, low levels of trust in both MINUSMA and the French military intervention “could also suggest that based on experiences with colonialism and post-colonial legacy, many Malians think that countries like France do not have Mali’s best interests at heart.”




**Figure 7: Helping to regain unity in Mali | Mali | 2017**



**Respondents were asked:** *In your opinion, how useful are the following in helping Mali recover its territorial integrity and national unity, or haven't you heard enough to say?*


In Burkina Faso, 57% of citizens said foreign troops had a positive impact on the security of the country, whereas more than three-fourths (77%) credited local security associations with being good for the country's security (Figure 8). Again, these findings reflect lower levels of trust toward foreign interventions compared with local security forces among citizens in West Africa.

**Figure 8: Impact of local security associations and foreign troops on security of country | Burkina Faso | 2017**



**Respondents were asked:** *For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you agree or disagree: Local security associations created by the people are good for the security of our country.*

While the cast of security actors in Mali is large, their focus may be too narrow to be effective. As Hichendorff (2019) writes, national political elites and their foreign partners have “tended to define the security crisis in Mali – and the Sahel region in general – through the lens of terrorism, crime, illicit trafficking and irregular migration. These policy priorities depict the nature of Mali's security problems as being predominantly military and correspondingly, require ‘all-military’ responses.”



However, analyses show that some of the primary drivers of conflict in the region are ineffective rule of law and weak security institutions, bad governance and corruption, as well as poor human rights track records, particularly by the security services. Without effectively addressing some of these underlying drivers of conflict, long-term peace and security are unlikely, and the risk of insecurity spreading to other countries in the region remains high (Chauzal, 2020; BBC, 2020).

## Conflict “spillover” and at-risk countries in the region

The proximity of Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, the Gambia, Guinea, Senegal, and Togo to rapidly escalating instability in Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger raises the possibility of spillover of violent extremism from these core Sahelian states into the coastal West Africa region. For organizations such as Jama'a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin' (JNIM) and the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), there are significant financial and strategic incentives to move into West African coastal states, such as access to ports, piracy operations, and new illicit revenue streams and the potential to stage attacks on Western interests, such as hotels, foreign businesses, and tourist attractions in popular coastal cities (Blake, 2020). Côte d'Ivoire experienced such an attack in March 2016 when three AQIM gunmen opened fire at a popular beach resort in Grand-Bassam, killing 19 and injuring 33 others (Sebe, 2016).

In response, West African states such as Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo have taken pre-emptive measures to strengthen their border security. These include the renovation of border posts and the installation of border management information systems to support digital processing of traveler information and the ability to cross-reference suspected terrorist actors against watch lists (United Nations, 2021). However, poor border protection is only one of many risk factors that make West African states vulnerable to the spread of violent extremism.

Lack of trust in institutions, disrespect of civil liberties, as well as ethnic and religious tensions or marginalization have all been shown to be significant drivers of violent extremism (Affa'a-Mindzie, 2013; USAID, 2009; UNODC, 2018; United Nations, 2018). It is therefore useful to look at citizen perceptions on these issues to get a sense of which countries may be at greatest risk for the emergence of violent extremism.

## Trust in institutions


### *Trust in the police and armed forces*

Effective interventions to combat violent extremism depend to a considerable extent on public trust in security forces. The effectiveness of security forces will improve as their relationships with communities improve. For example, as Ateku (2019) writes, the first step in strengthening Ghana against the threat of regional terrorist organizations and transnational criminal networks is to “enhance border control systems that are built on trust and cordial relations between border security officials and local border communities for intelligence information gathering purposes.”

Across the 34 African countries that Afrobarometer surveyed in 2016/2018, on average only half (51%) of citizens said they trust the police “somewhat” or “a lot.” Across the seven countries that are the focus of this section, the average was marginally higher (54%), including 86% of Senegalese. But fewer than half of citizens in Togo (43%), Guinea (42%), and Ghana (39%) said they trust the police (Figure 9).

Africans generally expressed greater trust in the armed forces than in the police. Across 34 countries, two-thirds (65%) of respondents said they trust the army “somewhat” or “a lot.” Again, among the seven West African countries, Senegalese were most trusting (91%). But unlike with regard to the police, half or more of citizens expressed trust in the military in all countries except Togo (43%). Côte d'Ivoire was the only country where more citizens trusted the police (55%) than the armed forces (50%).

**Figure 9: Trust in security forces | 12 countries | 2016/2018**




**Respondents were asked:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: The police? The army? (% "a lot" or "somewhat")

### Trust in the justice system


The justice system plays an important role in preventing the emergence and spread of violent extremism. In a study of 131 countries between 1984 and 2004, Choi (2010) found that popular trust in the justice system and recognition of the law as legitimate reduce people's opportunity and willingness to engage in political violence and decrease the likelihood of any type of terrorist event.

When asked how much they trust courts of law, Guineans and Togolese were least trusting: Only 34% and 36%, respectively, said they trust them "somewhat" or "a lot." Roughly half of citizens in Benin (52%) and Côte d'Ivoire (51%) agreed, while almost two-thirds of Senegalese (64%) and Gambians (63%) expressed trust in the courts (Figure 10).

**Figure 10: Trust in courts of law | 7 West African countries | 2016/2018**



**Respondents were asked:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say: Courts of law?




## Trust in government

Citizens' belief in the legitimacy and efficacy of political institutions is an important part of preventing violent extremism. Research shows that low levels of trust in government correlates with higher levels of political violence, and can lead individuals to withdraw their support for key institutions and disengage from society (Kessels & Nemr, 2016).

Across the seven periphery states that are the focus of this section, respondents were asked about their trust in different levels of government, including the president, Parliament or National Assembly, and local councils. Trust was generally highest in the president, followed by Parliament, and lowest in local councils. Benin was an exception: Trust was equal in all three institutions. In Guinea and Senegal, trust in local councils was somewhat higher than trust in Parliament (Figure 11).

Building trust between governments and communities is critical for effective approaches to preventing and countering violent extremism (Royal United Services Institute, 2016). The above findings suggest that initiatives to address the citizen trust deficit in government in Côte d'Ivoire and Ghana, for example, should begin at the local council level, where levels of trust are lowest.

**Figure 11: Trust in elected officials | 7 West African countries | 2016/2018**



**Respondents were asked:** How much do you trust each of the following, or haven't you heard enough about them to say? (% who said "somewhat/a lot")

## Discrimination and marginalization

In a hypothesis and literature review on drivers of violent extremism, Allan, Glazard, Jespersen, Reddy-Tumu, and Winterbotham (2017) found a "strong relationship between perceived grievances and violent extremism." Evidence suggests that discrimination and


marginalization may fuel both citizen grievances against the state and ethno-religious tensions, as well as help extremist groups in their recruitment efforts by legitimizing propaganda narratives. Similarly, as Ngari and Reva (2017) argue, “A key reason why responses to terrorism have failed in their objectives is that the strategies states employ tend to damage and alienate the very communities that they are meant to help, mainly because of religious or ethnic discrimination.”

Across the seven periphery countries, significant minorities of citizens reported experiencing discrimination based on their ethnic group during the previous year, including 21% of Beninese and 20% of Togolese. Fewer respondents reported ethnicity-based discrimination in Senegal (5%) (Figure 12).

Discrimination based on religion was less common, ranging up to 14% in Benin, 13% in Togo, and 9% in Ghana.

While further examination of the religious and ethnic demographics of each country is required to understand how experiences of discrimination may contribute to political violence, these findings provide a snapshot of potential vulnerabilities in this regard.

**Figure 12: Experienced discrimination based on ethnicity or religion | 7 West African countries | 2016/2018**



**Respondents were asked:** *In the past year, how often, if at all, have you personally been discriminated against or harassed based on any of the following: Your ethnicity? Your religion? (% who said “once or twice,” “several times,” or “many times”)*

## Conclusion

It is clear that neither purely national nor purely militarized efforts have been effective in addressing the expanding threat of violent extremism. In fragile Sahelian states, extremist violence joins a long list of overlapping challenges, including climate change, food insecurity, mass migration, the COVID-19 pandemic, and youth unemployment.

The ability of violent extremist organizations to exploit inter-community tensions and state fragility to expand their operations is an increasing security challenge for many African countries, particularly those within or bordering the Sahel region.

Given the complexity of the crisis, interlinked solutions at the nexus of economic development, security-sector reform, state capacity building, and humanitarian relief will be required to stabilize Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and prevent the crisis from further expanding into neighbouring states.



Among at-risk peripheral states, governments should take pre-emptive steps to address their vulnerabilities to the spread of violent extremism. This is especially true in Benin, Guinea, and Togo, where both trust in security institutions was low and reported levels of marginalization based on ethnic or religious affiliation were higher than the regional average.




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Do your own analysis of Afrobarometer data – on any question, for any country and survey round. It's easy and free at [www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis](http://www.afrobarometer.org/online-data-analysis).

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
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## Appendix



**Table A.1: Afrobarometer Round 7 fieldwork dates and previous survey rounds**

Country	Months when Round 7 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
Benin	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Botswana	June-July 2017	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Burkina Faso	Oct 2017	2008, 2012, 2015
Cameroon	May 2018	2013, 2015
Cape Verde	Nov-Dec 2017	2002, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Côte d'Ivoire	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	2013, 2014
eSwatini	March 2018	2013, 2015
Gabon	Nov 2017	2015
Gambia	July-August 2018	N/A
Ghana	Sept 2017	1999, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Guinea	May 2017	2013, 2015
Kenya	Sept-Oct 2016	2003, 2005, 2008, 2011, 2014
Lesotho	Nov-Dec 2017	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Liberia	June-July 2018	2008, 2012, 2015
Madagascar	Jan-Feb 2018	2005, 2008, 2013, 2015
Malawi	Dec 2016-Jan 2017	1999, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Mali	Feb 2017	2001, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014
Mauritius	Oct-Nov 2017	2012, 2014
Morocco	May 2018	2013, 2015
Mozambique	July-August 2018	2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015
Namibia	Nov 2017	1999, 2003, 2006, 2008, 2012, 2014
Niger	April-May 2018	2013, 2015
Nigeria	April-May 2017	2000, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2015
São Tomé and Príncipe	July 2018	2015
Senegal	Dec 2017	2002, 2005, 2008, 2013, 2014
Sierra Leone	July 2018	2012, 2015
South Africa	August-Sept 2018	2000, 2002, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2015
Sudan	July-August 2018	2013, 2015
Tanzania	April-June 2017	2001, 2003, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2014
Togo	Nov 2017	2012, 2014
Tunisia	April-May 2018	2013, 2015



Country	Months when Round 7 fieldwork was conducted	Previous survey rounds
<b>Uganda</b>	Dec 2016-Jan2017	2000, 2002, 2005, 2008, 2012, 2015
<b>Zambia</b>	April 2017	1999, 2003, 2005, 2009, 2013, 2014
<b>Zimbabwe</b>	Jan-Feb 2017	1999, 2004, 2005, 2009, 2012, 2014



# AFRO BAROMETER

Let the people have a say



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Afrobarometer, a nonprofit corporation with headquarters in Ghana, is a pan-African, non-partisan research network. Regional coordination of national partners in about 35 countries is provided by the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), the Institute for Justice and Reconciliation (IJR) in South Africa, and the Institute for Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi in Kenya. Michigan State University (MSU) and the University of Cape Town (UCT) provide technical support to the network.

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