

# AFRO BAROMETER


Afrobarometer Paper No.10

## **POPULAR ECONOMIC VALUES AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

By:

Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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## **ABSTRACT**

### **POPULAR ECONOMIC VALUES AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA**

The Afrobarometer contributes new insights into the nature, extent and sources of popular economic orientations in Southern Africa. Surveys conducted in seven countries in 1999-2000 indicate that mass publics do not automatically reject the constituent policies of structural adjustment or the economic values that underlie them. Public opinion varies greatly and cannot be neatly characterized as simply pro- or anti- reform. Nor do people derive their economic values and attitudes from their own immediate material circumstances. While liberal economic attitudes are reduced by poverty, such attitudes are increased by exposure to education and the news media. Moreover, the respondent's race and nationality shape support for economic reform, with whites in Zimbabwe and South Africa being the most supportive. A racially polarized distribution of policy preferences, however, poses a challenge for the future viability of a market-based development strategy in the region.

# POPULAR ECONOMIC VALUES AND ECONOMIC REFORM IN SOUTHERN AFRICA<sup>1</sup>

## INTRODUCTION

We live in an era of shrinking states and expanding markets. At its core, the phenomenon of globalization is based on the idea that economic production, distribution, and exchange are handled better by market forces than by administrative commands. The countries of Southern Africa have not been immune to these trends in development strategy. Since the early 1980s, governments in this region have more or less voluntarily (and with more or less heavy-handed encouragement from international financial institutions) embarked on programs to liberalize their economies.<sup>2</sup>

Yet very little is known about the attitudes of ordinary African citizens toward economic reform. Without the benefit of much empirical evidence, commentators often assert that Africans are either “for” or “against” (usually “against”) adjustment. But have Southern Africans even heard about their government’s structural adjustment program? How do they position themselves *vis a vis* various adjustment policies? Are they satisfied with the condition of their national economy and their government’s performance at macro-economic management? At root, what kind of economic values do they profess: do they believe in self-reliance and individual initiative or are they prone to turn to the state as the provider of public welfare? Are these attitudes and values based on an individual’s economic status or other social attributes?

Answers to such questions will indicate whether people in the region are attached to state planning or whether they embrace the risk and opportunities associated with market-based economies. Moreover, answers will indicate whether neo-liberal economic policies face latent popular opposition or support.

By measuring the prevailing economic culture, Afrobarometer surveys<sup>3</sup> seek to rectify the shortage of reliable information on mass attitudes towards the economy and policy reform in Africa. In this report, we first summarize the responses to several batteries of identical survey questions asked across seven Southern African countries between September 1999 (Zimbabwe) and July 2000 (South Africa). We cover four main topics: Living Conditions, Economic Evaluations, Economic Values, and Support for Adjustment Policies. Second, we sketch out a possible explanation of popular support for (or rejection of) adjustment policies with special reference to the economic factors we have reviewed.

## LIVING CONDITIONS

We begin by detailing Southern Africans’ living conditions. Data are drawn from respondents’ answers to survey questions about employment, their quality of housing, the availability of basic goods and services, and the extent to which people are able to secure a range of basic needs. With these facts, we paint a picture of living standards that supplements official statistics<sup>4</sup> and then situate them in their distinctive local and regional contexts. We also set the scene for explaining why popular attitudes towards the economy vary in Southern Africa, not only across country, but also by economic status and racial group.

## Employment

According to the surveys, unemployment and underemployment are widespread in the region. The Afrobarometer asked people a three-part question. First, were they working? If so, was it part-time or full-time? And if not, were they looking for work?<sup>5</sup>

As indicated in the table below, the unemployment rate in most countries in Southern Africa ranges in a band from 33 percent in Zimbabwe to 45 percent in Botswana. Lesotho stands far outside this band at an astounding 76 percent. We are confident in these figures because our estimate for South Africa (36 percent of the workforce aged 18 years of age and above) is virtually identical to the 37 percent estimated by the most recent official labor force survey.<sup>6</sup>

### *Employment, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	South. Africa
Unemployed (not looking)	29	30	65	36	43	42	26
Unemployed (looking)	32	53	15	30	21	19	27
Employed, part-time (not looking)	2	1	2	2	2	6	4
Employed, part-time (looking)	7	4	2	5	5	7	10
Employed, full-time (not looking)	18	7	12	19	17	18	22
Employed, part-time (looking)	11	4	4	7	10	7	10
Don't know, refused etc.	1	1	0	1	2	1	1
<b>Unemployment Rate</b>	<b>45%</b>	<b>76%</b>	<b>42%</b>	<b>47%</b>	<b>38%</b>	<b>33%</b>	<b>36%</b>

*Do you have a job that pays a weekly or monthly cash income? Is it full-time or part-time? And are you looking for a cash job (or looking for another one if you are presently working)?*

Across the region, unemployment is significantly higher among women (52 percent) than men (39 percent). There are also big differences between rural unemployment (53 percent) and joblessness among the urban workforce (35 percent). In South Africa, unemployment is much higher among blacks (41 percent), Coloureds (35 percent), and Indians (30 percent) than among whites (8 percent). And the gender gap in employment (46 percent for women versus 29 percent for men) is much wider in South Africa than in the region as a whole.

Lesotho's extraordinary level of unemployment might be traced to the fact that many employed males reside semi-permanently outside of the country while working in the South African mines and other industries. However, 81 percent of Basotho women are also unemployed, far higher than the regional average of 52 percent, which suggests that unemployment would be exceptionally high in this country even if absent men had been present during the survey. At the same time, the irregular delivery of remittances from labor migrants may force a higher than average number of female heads of households into the labor force. As such, the female work force in Lesotho (69 percent of all women are working or looking for work) is as large as in South Africa (70 percent) and Botswana (67 percent), two much more developed economies, and significantly larger than other countries with more similar economies (e.g. Malawi, at 27 percent). There is also a much smaller gender gap in Lesotho's rate of unemployment than the rest of the region.

Job opportunities, however, are often fractional and temporary, especially in the region's industrialized economies. For example, approximately one third of all current employment is part-time in Zimbabwe (34 percent), Lesotho (31 percent), and South Africa (30 percent). Needless to say, part-time jobs do not provide full salaries and usually lack benefits. Second, many jobs are temporary. Across the region, 14 percent of those who currently enjoy full time employment went without a cash job for at least one month in the previous year, a figure that goes as high as 18 percent in Zambia and 22 percent in Lesotho. Four in ten Southern Africans (40 percent) with part time jobs were unemployed for at least one

month during the previous year, rising to 51 percent in Malawi and Namibia and 58 percent in Lesotho.

## Housing and Household Services

As another indicator of living standards, Afrobarometer fieldworkers observed the quality of people's shelter. The proportion of the population living in unimproved "traditional" housing, usually constructed of mud and thatch, varies greatly across the region. More than one-third of the population occupies traditional houses in Namibia, Malawi, and Zambia, compared with less than one in ten in Botswana and South Africa. Improved houses -- for example, with cement or brick walls, windows (sometimes even with glazing), and metal or tile roofs -- are most common in Botswana (84 percent) and available to more than half the population in all countries except Namibia. Across the region, 84 percent of all urban residents live in an improved, formal house, compared to only 52 percent of rural dwellers. Fully 41 percent of rural Southern Africans still live in traditional dwellings.

Sub-standard shelter in the form of temporary shack-type dwellings is most common in countries with an *apartheid* legacy of population displacement, namely Namibia and South Africa. Unsurprisingly, race and shelter are closely associated, not only in South Africa, but across the region.<sup>7</sup> Over 95 percent of whites live in improved houses (87 percent in single family dwellings), as do 99 percent of Indians (25 percent in blocks of flats). By contrast, only 62 percent of blacks live in improved houses. Virtually all those living in traditional houses or temporary structures are black (98 percent).

### *Housing and Household Services, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Traditional house	9	29	41	50	35	33	9
Improved house	84	65	58	36	56	63	69
Apartment (in flats, hostel, house)	1	5	0	2	1	2	6
Temporary structure	1	1	1	8	5	1	13
Piped water connection	58	7	18	39	29	39	68
Electricity connection	28	4	16	33	38	42	78
Nearby school	90	77	93	78	93	94	88

Slightly different patterns apply for household services. South Africans enjoy the best access to water and electricity, though substantial proportions in Botswana and Zimbabwe also obtain these services. Only in South Africa (68 percent) and Botswana (58 percent) do large majorities of people have piped water into their household. Beside these two countries, the figures run from 39 percent in Zimbabwe to just seven percent in Lesotho. The South African result represents a massive increase in the availability of piped household water over the last few years since, as recently as 1995, the government estimated that only 21 percent of all households had access to piped water.<sup>8</sup>

And only in South Africa (78 percent) do wide proportions of households enjoy access to electricity. This figure actually outstrips the original target of 72 percent by 2000 set by South Africa's Reconstruction and Development Program (RDP) in 1994, a target that required 450,000 new hook-ups per year.<sup>9</sup> Elsewhere in the region, the figures run from 42 percent (Zimbabwe) to just four percent in Lesotho. Overall people living in Lesotho have fewer household services than anyone else in the region, including even Namibians, Zambians, and Malawians.

While *apartheid* has left blacks with fewer household services than other racial groups in South Africa, the RDP has made them better off than people elsewhere in the region. For example, 59 percent of black South Africans report piped water in the home and 70 percent report electricity connections, figures that exceed national aggregates anywhere else in the Southern subcontinent.



However, when it comes to access to nearby school services, South Africans in general, and blacks in particular, rank only fifth in the region. Four countries have figures in top decile (Zimbabwe, 94 percent; Zambia, 93 percent; Malawi, 93 percent; and Botswana, 90 percent). South Africa is at 89 percent. Namibia (78 percent) and Lesotho (77 percent) lag well behind the others.

## Poverty

In order to measure poverty, we presented survey respondents with a list of basic needs and asked: “In the last twelve months, how often have you or your family gone without (these things)?”<sup>10</sup> The tables below display the proportions of people who say that they “sometimes” or “often” do without.

Southern Africa is a region characterized by widespread poverty. Significant proportions of people say that they or their family have gone without basic necessities at least occasionally, if not frequently. Southern Africans were most likely to have been short of cash income (on average, 66 percent in each country) and least likely to experience homelessness (9 percent).<sup>11</sup> Between these extremes, significant proportions of people sometimes or often went without food (an average of 49 percent in each country), medical treatment (46 percent), clean water (36 percent), and fuel for heating or cooking (36 percent).

### *Shortages of Basic Goods and Services, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Shelter	6	4	5	14	13	16	5
Enough fuel to heat your home or cook your food cooking	31	43	29	41	38	40	28
Enough clean water with which to drink and cook	16	46	30	47	50	41	24
Medicine or medical treatment that you needed.	16	38	49	58	69	54	38
Enough food to eat	49	60	38	54	61	50	34
A cash income	52	77	69	69	80	71	47

In the last twelve months, how often have you or your family gone without: \_\_\_\_\_? Was it often, sometimes, rarely or never? (Percentage saying “sometimes” or “often” with reference to the previous twelve months)

Cross-national differences in the nature of poverty are partly related to each country’s natural resource endowment.<sup>12</sup> For example, Basotho are most likely to report shortages of fuel for heating homes and cooking food, reflecting the sparse supplies of natural firewood in this high-altitude country. And Namibians, who contend with the most arid environment in the region, are very likely to lack access to a reliable household water supply. However, Zambians consistently report the most frequent shortfalls of water, health care, food and income, which implies that this country suffers the most widespread, integrated, and deep-seated poverty. In Zambia’s case, extensive poverty appears to derive less from the natural environment -- which is relatively bountiful -- than from the under-performance of its government and people. Indeed, the fact that well managed development programs can overcome an unpromising natural resource base is illustrated by Botswana’s strong record of meeting felt needs for clean water and health care.

The demographic distribution of poverty within South Africa is revealing. Along every dimension of basic need, reported shortages follow the racial rankings ordained by *apartheid*. Black respondents say they are more needy than Coloured and Indian respondents, who in turn report more unfulfilled needs than whites. These racial differences also suggest that people’s responses to these questions reflect absolute need rather than relative deprivation. It might be expected that wealthier people would adjust and expand their definition of what constitutes “enough” food, or water, or necessary medical treatment. However, if this were so, we would

expect to find substantially more white South Africans complaining that they were not able to obtain sufficiency in these items.

*Shortages of Basic Goods and Services, South Africa, 2000*

	African	Coloured	Indian	White
Shelter	7	2	2	1
Clean water to drink	33	4	2	2
Fuel for heating or cooking	37	10	6	2
Necessary medical treatment	37	26	15	11
Food to feed your family	43	23	10	4
A cash income	59	22	18	10

Percentage saying "sometimes" or "often" with reference to the previous twelve months

For summary purposes, we constructed an *index of poverty* based on the respondent's access to all six basic goods and services. The index enables us to validly and reliably infer an average poverty score for each person, or for each country.<sup>13</sup> But besides statistical convenience, this scale demonstrates that respondents who report regular shortages on one item are likely to report shortages on all the rest. In short, poverty is a mutually reinforcing web of deprivations.

We then sought to explain the prevalence of poverty across the region using multivariate regression analysis.<sup>14</sup> In this case, a small set of variables measuring employment, rural-urban location, level of formal education, age, gender, race, and nationality account for just over one-quarter of the variance in the overall poverty measure (see Appendix, Model, Model A). Controlling for all factors simultaneously, education has the largest impact on poverty of any measured variable. In other words, within each country and race group, within both rural or urban populations, and at equal levels of employment or housing status, the more people have been exposed to formal education, the less likely they are to face shortages of basic needs. At the same time, controlling for all other factors, urban dwellers are much less likely to experience poverty than rural Southern Africans. Employment is also strongly associated with lower levels of poverty. Among other implications, this finding draws attention to the lack of official programs to provide unemployment benefits across the region (except in South Africa), and the very limited impact of these benefits in keeping the unemployed out of poverty.

Moreover, significant cross-national and racial differences remain. Controlling for education or employment does not eliminate the impact of race or citizenship.<sup>15</sup> Compared to black respondents across the region, being white, Coloured or Indian is associated with sharply reduced levels of poverty, largely reflecting the impact of *apartheid* privileges in South Africa and Namibia. And, compared to South Africans, being a resident of Botswana (and to a lesser extent Malawi) is associated with a *reduction* in poverty. However, being from Zambia, Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Lesotho is associated with an *increase* in poverty compared to South Africa.

Some comment is necessary on the significance and interpretation of this finding since we will observe it repeatedly in subsequent analyzes. We do not maintain that there is something essential to race or nationality that accounts for these results. Rather, we see race and country as summary, proxy measures of a variety of differing socialization and historical experiences, as well as current perceptions of interest, that are as yet unmeasured and poorly analyzed.

## ECONOMIC EVALUATIONS

Beyond Southern Africans' personal economic circumstances, how do they view current economic conditions in their countries? The Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents to evaluate current national economic conditions, recent trends and future prospects, and their personal economic situations compared to other citizens.

### Economic Satisfaction

Across Southern Africa, the end of the millennium (1999-2000) was seen as a tough time. In no country was a majority of citizens satisfied with the current condition of the national economy. Only in Namibia did respondents proclaim themselves more satisfied (41 percent) than dissatisfied (30 percent), though large proportions were uninformed or undecided about the state of their national economy. Everywhere else the economic mood was negative, overwhelmingly so in Zimbabwe (a massive 94 percent dissatisfied) but also markedly so in Lesotho and Zambia. Even in Botswana, which possesses the highest per capita gross national product in the region after South Africa, less than one-third of respondents (32 percent) were content with national economic conditions.

#### *Satisfaction with Current National Economic Conditions, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Verv dissatisfied / dissatisfied	55	77	69	30	74	94	68
Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied	9	4	4	16	6	3	16
Satisfied / verv satisfied	32	12	26	41	19	3	15
Don't know	4	8	1	14	2	1	2

*At the moment, are you dissatisfied, neither dissatisfied nor satisfied, or satisfied with economic conditions in \_\_\_\_\_? Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

These negative assessments appear to be based on comparisons with the past. In other words, people are dissatisfied with national economic conditions in part because they think "things ain't what they used to be." Evidence for this interpretation can be found in the extremely high correlation between contemporary and retrospective economic assessments.<sup>16</sup> In other words, those who are dissatisfied with current economic conditions are the same people who think that economic conditions have recently worsened. Again, Namibians were the only Southern Africans to consider that their economy was on an upward trajectory. In this instance, Botswana, who experienced the highest GNP growth rates in the sample during the 1990s tended to see their economy as essentially holding steady. All other Southern Africans perceived economic declines over the previous year. This was true even of South Africans, whose economy was recovering following the severe impacts of the international monetary crisis of 1998.

#### *Evaluations of Past National Economic Conditions, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Worse / Much worse	30	49	54	19	57	92	60
About the same	37	22	20	25	20	4	24
Better / Much better	26	20	24	40	19	3	15
Don't know	7	9	2	16	4	1	1

*How do economic conditions in \_\_\_\_\_ now compare to one year ago? Are they:*

What about the future? Cross-national patterns begin to change slightly when people are asked about their prospective economic expectations. While Namibians remained the most optimistic (44 percent), a slight plurality of Botswana now also believed that their economy would improve over the next 12 months (31 percent). Zimbabweans again anchored the bottom of the scale: in late 1999 they could

hardly have been more pessimistic: only six percent expected the national economy to get better anytime soon.

#### *Expectations of Future National Economic Conditions, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Worse / Much worse	25	31	48	16	54	84	45
About the same	26	14	17	18	14	7	21
Better / Much better	31	26	25	44	16	6	28
Don't know	17	30	10	22	16	4	6

*What about in twelve months time? Do you expect economic conditions in \_\_\_\_\_ to be worse, the same, or better than they are now? (Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding )*

Comparisons with data from previous surveys in South Africa reveal an important turnabout in popular expectations in that country. The July/August 2000 Afrobarometer survey represents a significant decline in economic confidence. With the possible exception of the period following the monetary crisis of mid-1998, public optimism about the country's economic future has always been quite high. Since 1994, optimistic expectations have provided a significant degree of buoyancy to an otherwise lukewarm set of economic evaluations, particularly among black South Africans. We also know from previous research that future economic expectations explain a good deal of South Africans' support for democracy.<sup>17</sup> This only adds greater import to the fact that optimistic economic expectations dropped by over twenty percentage points from just before the June 1999 election to July/August 2000. And while optimism decreased amongst South Africans of all races, amongst blacks it dove from 63 percent in April 1999 to 34 percent in mid 2000.

#### *Evaluations of the National Economy In South Africa (1995 to 2000)*

	Sept / Nov 1995	June / July 1997	September 1998	Oct / Nov 1998	Feb / March 1999	April 1999	Aug / Sept 2000
Past Year	30	27	25	32	29	31	15
Present	NA	21	17	25	20	20	15
Future	NA	44	34	50	47	51	29

*% who say the national economy has improved over the past year*

*% satisfied with present economic conditions*

*% who expect the national economy to improve in the future.*

### **Relative Deprivation**

Turning to personal (as opposed to national) economic conditions, we tried to discover how respondents saw themselves in relation to others: "Would you say that (your personal economic conditions) are worse, the same as, or better than other (people in your country)?" This interpersonal evaluation (often called "relative deprivation") has been identified by public opinion researchers as a key determinant of political behavior.<sup>18</sup>

Interestingly, by a significant margin in every country except Namibia, most respondents saw themselves as worse off than their fellow citizens. The constituency expressing a sense of relative deprivation was a clear majority in five countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Zambia. The inclusion of Botswana on this list suggests that, at least from a subjective perspective, economic growth in that country has not eliminated perceptions of social inequality. In fact, that very economic growth, applied unevenly, may have raised expectations and highlighted disparities in advancement. In other words, it is quite possible for a country to do better even while its citizens feel relatively worse off.

### Comparison of Personal Economic Conditions, Southern Africa, 1999-2000

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Much worse/worse than others	53	66	53	37	57	65	49
About the same as others	25	17	18	21	17	13	33
Better/much better than others	19	15	29	35	24	10	16
Don't know	3	2	0	8	3	2	1

Now let us speak about your personal economic conditions. Would you say they are *worse*, the *same*, or *better* than others (Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding )

Two important points should be highlighted in the South African data. First, among countries that keep reliable records of the income gap between the “haves” and the “have-nots,” South Africa ranks as one of the most unequal societies in the world, second only to Brazil. Yet one-third of the South African respondents say that they are doing “about as same as others,” the highest proportion in the region. Available evidence suggests that when making comparisons with others, South Africans refer primarily to people in their own communities (and because of *apartheid* housing patterns this means people from their own race group) rather than comparing themselves with historically advantaged whites. In fact, since 1997, the levels of black South Africans who feel deprived have actually been *lower* than other groups, an apparently astounding inversion of the true nature of economic realities in that country.

At the same time, the proportions of South Africans, especially blacks, who feel relatively deprived has increased sharply since 1997. One possible explanation is that the government’s home- grown structural adjustment package, GEAR (Growth, Employment, and Redistribution Program) and the accelerated development of a black middle class has exacerbated intra-racial inequalities. In absolute terms, there are now more blacks than whites in the top two categories in the country’s official Living Standards Measure. And by most estimates, the gap between poor and wealthy blacks is now wider than between whites and blacks as a whole. The increased visibility of income inequalities among blacks may well have begun to generate a growing sense of deprivation and frustration amongst those left behind.

### Relative Personal Condition Compared to Other SAs (by Race 1994 to 2000)

	1995	1997	2000
Total	32	13	50
Black	35	10	48
White	24	21	60
Coloured	30	22	42
Indian	16	23	54

% worse / much worse

### Government Management of the Economy

What do the residents of the Southern Africa region think about government management of the economy? The Afrobarometer surveys asked a range of questions about the government’s “handling” of various policy areas, and we present the economic items in this battery.

Economic dissatisfaction is matched, at best, by lukewarm evaluations of government performance at economic management. In only two countries (Botswana and Namibia) did government receive, on balance, a positive rating in most policy areas. As with many other evaluations of their political and economic crisis, Zimbabweans were extremely negative.

Across the region, governments receive most favorable ratings with regard to the provision of education (a cross national average of 55 percent approval), water and electricity (52 percent) and health services (52 percent). Government performance in controlling inflation (24 percent) receives the lowest average score across countries, and in each country is one of the three most unpopular performance areas. Job creation (32 percent) and macro-economic management (35 percent) also receive negative responses.

## Public Evaluations of Government Management of the Economy, Southern Africa, 1999-2000

	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia	South Africa
Creating jobs	52	20	26	32	38	47	10
Ensuring that prices remain stable	41	14	28	8	20	38	17
Improving health services	69	35	37	46	50	62	43
Addressing the educational needs of all	71	46	43	62	57	62	49
Managing the economy	60	16	33	25	36	45	28
Delivering basic services like water and electricity	69	36	40	65	35	55	61
<b>Average</b>	<b>60</b>	<b>28</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>40</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>35</b>

Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well would you say the government is handling the following matters? Would you say very well, fairly well, not very well or not at all well, or haven't you heard enough about this to have an opinion? (% "fairly well / very well")

### Explaining Economic Evaluations

Why were Southern Africans so melancholy about economic trends in 1999-2000? One possible answer is that pessimistic sentiments directly reflected the personal economic situations in which people found themselves. Another explanation might highlight people's knowledge and awareness of larger economic developments beyond their own circumstances.

We first constructed an *index of national economic evaluations* that summarizes present, retrospective, and prospective evaluations.<sup>19</sup> We then used multiple regression analysis to examine the collective and individual impact of a range of factors derived from demography (country of residence, race, rural-urban status, and gender), personal economic status (quality of housing, employment, and poverty) as well as knowledge and awareness (extent of formal education, level of interest in politics, and the extent to which people use newspapers and television for news).

The results may be surprising. To be sure, the greater a person's level of poverty, the less they are satisfied with national economic conditions and trends. Yet poverty's impact on economic evaluations is modest. And it makes absolutely no difference to economic satisfaction as to whether one is employed, lives in a good house, is rural or urban, educated or uneducated. Nor does it matter how much one uses the news media (though there is a very slight impact of political interest). There is a clear tendency for older Southern Africans to be more negative about economic trends. We also see the persistent impact of cross-national and racial differences on the index of national economic evaluations. All other things being equal (e.g. education, employment or poverty) white, Coloured and Indian respondents are significantly more pessimistic than blacks. Botswana and Namibians are more optimistic than South Africans, while Zimbabweans, Basotho and Zambians are less optimistic (See Appendix, Model B).

What leads a person to feel relatively deprived? In search of an answer, we regressed perceptions of relative deprivation on the same set of independent variables used above. In this case, the most important factor is the level of poverty: the greater the level of experienced poverty the more likely one is to feel deprived compared to other citizens. Consistent with this finding, those who are employed are *less* likely to see themselves as relatively deprived. When we turn to knowledge and awareness, we see that – other things being equal – greater exposure to news media, higher levels of formal education, and higher levels of interest in politics are also all associated with *lower* levels of relative deprivation. At first glance, this may seem counterintuitive since greater awareness of how the rest of the country is doing might be expected to increase relative deprivation. But it appears that heightened exposure to the national economy as well as more education enables people to understand the broader national picture, the challenges facing the entire country, and conclude that “we are all in the same boat.”

Again, important racial and national differences remain even once we take these other factors into account. White and Indian respondents are more likely to perceive relative deprivation than blacks.

Zimbabweans and Basotho are more likely to feel relatively deprived than South Africans. And Namibians, Malawians and Zambians are less likely to feel this way than are South Africans (See Appendix, Model C).

Finally, what factors are associated with popular evaluations of government economic performance? To answer this, we first constructed a summary *index of government economic performance* that provides a reliable average score of popular evaluations across six policy areas.<sup>20</sup> We then regressed these scores on the same set of independent variables. The results confirm that those who experience greater poverty are less likely to approve of government economic performance. Interestingly, those with full time jobs are also less likely to approve of government performance, as are urban respondents and older respondents. In terms of knowledge and awareness, higher levels of formal education lead to lower levels of approval, but higher levels of media use lead to *greater* approval. Taking all other factors into account, white, Coloured and Indian respondents are less approving of government economic management than blacks. *Ceteris paribus*, Namibians, Batswana and Basotho are more satisfied with their governments' performance than are South Africans, while Zimbabweans are less satisfied than South Africans (see Appendix, Model D).

These findings are both encouraging and sobering. In a region marked by widespread poverty, it is encouraging that popular assessments of economic conditions or government economic management are not simply reflections of personal circumstances, though they are certainly shaped by them. People seem to be able to draw distinctions between how they as individuals or households are doing, and the overall direction of the national economy and the government's management of that economy. People without jobs or who live in unimproved houses do not feel substantially worse about economic conditions and prospects than their more privileged counterparts, suggesting that they have not abandoned hope. This disconnection between personal circumstances, national trends, and government macro-economic management provides political elites with a measure of leeway, since it moderates political demands.

But the other side of this coin is that citizens may be hard to satisfy. Even when people do find jobs, are able to afford better housing, or escape poverty, they may not necessarily become any more optimistic about the economy or government performance. They apparently look to a larger set of factors to decide about the direction of the national economy than changes in the health of their household budget.<sup>21</sup>

Consistent and persistent racial differences in economic satisfaction are probably related to the effects of the drastic turnabout in political and economic power that have occurred in South Africa and Namibia. Even at the same levels of education or economic status, people of different races see themselves and the country going in very different directions. Blacks and whites may compare present trends and government performance not just with the previous year, but with how life used to be under *apartheid*. Across a whole range of areas, the same government policies (employment equity, to name just one example) may have very different implications for the interests of white versus black workers. In addition, racial stereotypes of black government may color minority groups' level of confidence in a majority-dominated government's ability to run the economy.

Finally, enduring cross-national differences reflect macro-economic and political trends in particular countries that are not captured by indicators of personal economic circumstances. For instance, the consistently negative impact of living in Zimbabwe is a good example. Regardless of real changes in personal circumstances, the policies of the Mugabe government have drastically reshaped Zimbabweans view of the country's economic prospects and stretched their patience to the limits.

Along these lines, we expected to find a positive correlation between a country's GDP growth rate, 1990-99 and the proportion of respondents who report satisfaction with the national economy. Although this relationship exists for the 12-country Afrobarometer sample, the correlation for the seven Southern African countries is weak and insignificant.<sup>22</sup> Instead, popular satisfaction with national economic conditions in Southern Africa is related to the extent of state intervention in the economy (measured as the

annual average percentage of GDP (1990-99) accounted for by government consumption).<sup>23</sup> This suggests that Southern Africans derive economic satisfaction in response to interventions by a welfare-oriented state, a topic we now explore.

## ECONOMIC VALUES

Where do Southern Africans position themselves in the great debate over the relevant roles of states and markets? Do they see themselves as autonomous economic agents, or would people prefer to rely on government as the chief source of well-being? Does the enduring poverty lead Southern Africans to value state intervention and regulation, or alternatively, have failed efforts at state planning created a receptive audience for neo-liberal economic policies, even among the poor?

### Self-Reliance or Dependence?

To begin an exploration of economic values, the Afrobarometer surveys asked respondents to choose between two options: should ordinary people be responsible for their own success and well-being in life or should government take the main responsibility for ensuring public welfare? The results are mixed. At one extreme stands Malawi, where almost three-quarters value self-reliance (73 percent); at the other end is Zimbabwe, where just over one-third does so (37 percent). If there is any tendency in the data, it is for a slight majority to favor self-reliance in the region as a whole (a cross national average of 51 percent), as illustrated by the pattern of public preferences in Botswana, Zambia, and South Africa. Thus, across most countries in the region, we find significant minorities who would prefer government to act as the guarantor of improved living conditions. Interestingly, these figures are almost identical to responses to a similar item asked in seven former Soviet Republics in 1989.<sup>24</sup>

What explains any cross-national differences? The frequency of self-reliant sentiments is essentially unrelated to a country's level of national wealth, the growth rate of its economy, or the proportions of its population employed in agriculture or industry. Instead, based on the contrasting cases of Malawi and Zimbabwe, popular attitudes toward self-reliance appear to be connected to the prevailing policy regime. Historically, the government of independent Malawi – especially under the minimalist economic policies of Hastings Banda – has provided relatively few services to its predominantly rural population of self-provisioning peasants. In Zimbabwe after 1980, however, the Mugabe government embarked on major spending programs to extend agricultural, educational and medical programs to the rural hinterlands, the political base of the ZANU-PF party. These distinctive policy regimes, and the politicians' promises that accompanied them, have helped to create divergent expectations about the extent to which people can rely on government.

### *Self Reliance versus Dependence, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
People should be responsible for their own success and well being.	48	43	73	54	50	37	52
Government should bear the main responsibility for ensuring the success and well being of people.	43	53	25	40	43	59	47
Do not agree with either	4	2	2	1	1	3	1
Don't know	6	2	0	5	5	1	1

*Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*



## Freedom to Earn or Controls on Income Inequality?

If people use their own initiative to get ahead economically, one likely result is that some will gain more than others. Given the reputedly egalitarian nature of African traditions, it might be expected that there would be little popular tolerance for income inequalities. To tap this, we again asked respondents to choose between two options: Should people be free to earn as much as they can, even if this leads to large differences of income? Or should government place limits on how much rich people can earn, even if this discourages some people from working hard?

Southern Africans were surer of themselves in this instance. In six out of seven countries (and by absolute majorities in five of the six), more people valued freedom to maximize income than called for government restraints on the rich. This suggests a need to reconsider, or at least temper, the typical claim about egalitarian preferences among Africans. Once more, Malawians were the most economically liberal and Zimbabweans expressed the most communitarian views. The fact that Botswana were again ambiguous suggests not only that many citizens of Botswana prefer to rely on the largesse of a well-endowed and interventionist state, but that they harbour concerns that the country's present development strategy is exacerbating income inequality.

### *Tolerance of Income Inequality, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
People should be free to earn as much as they can, even if this leads to large differences in income.	48	59	72	65	59	45	64
Government should place limits on how much rich people can earn, even if this discourages some people from working hard.	41	34	22	24	35	51	32
Do not agree with either	3	4	4	4	4	2	2
Don't know	9	4	2	7	3	3	2

*Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

## Who is Responsible for Job Creation?

Given the widespread unemployment observed earlier in this paper and its strong connection to poverty, we wondered whether respondents thought that the government or the people themselves were responsible for generating employment. The same general patterns obtained, with Malawians and Namibians exhibiting strong preferences for individual entrepreneurship; however, majorities preferred government job provision in South Africa, Lesotho and, again, Zimbabwe.

### *Responsibility for Job Creation*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	South Africa
The best way to create jobs is to encourage people to start their own large or small businesses.	57	39	68	63	47	41	42
The government should help to provide employment for everyone who wants to work.	38	57	30	31	48	55	57
Do Not Agree With Either	1	12	2	1	3	1	1
Don't Know	3	2	1	4	1	2	1

*Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

## Tolerance for Economic Risk

In a market economy, reward often entails risk. We wondered whether Southern Africans are willing

to stake personal resources in their quest for private income-earning opportunities. Would they invest their own savings or borrow money to pursue an idea for a business? Or would they avoid trying to start a new business because it might lose money? On this issue, the respondents seemed to cast doubt aside. Everywhere, clear majorities (over 75 percent in five countries) said that they would be willing to risk money by investing in a personal enterprise. While Malawi again led the pack, even Zimbabweans strongly favored the entrepreneurial option. Indeed the findings are so overwhelmingly risk-oriented that we are led to query whether they are accurate, especially since vulnerable populations are supposed to be risk-averse.<sup>25</sup> On one hand, the choice to invest capital may be too hypothetical for many respondents to envisage. Or they may take a relaxed attitude to borrowing, thinking that it only jeopardizes someone else's money. On the other hand, tolerance for economic risk may be more widespread than usually thought among Southern Africans, most of whom say they would like to take advantage of new opportunities to start their own (small or large) businesses.

*Tolerance for Economic Risk, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
If a person has a good idea for business, they should invest their own savings or borrow money to try and make it succeed.	78	59	89	52	80	77	77
There is no sense in trying to start a new business because it might lose money.	13	27	10	35	10	16	20
Do not agree with either	2	6	1	4	6	3	2
Don't know	7	8	0	9	3	3	2

*Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

To summarize, significant proportions of Southern Africans value various aspects of personal economic independence. They recognize that, as individuals, they have roles to play in economic development. By slim margins they would prefer to rely on their own efforts to ensure personal well being than to wait for government provision, and to create jobs through entrepreneurship. By a substantial margin they accept income inequality as the price of economic opportunity; and overwhelmingly they say that they would take risks to get ahead economically.

**State or Market?**

Are these micro-level attitudes, which refer to basic values about the role of individuals in the economy, matched by preferences for markets (rather than states) as the appropriate way to organize the macro-economy? Not necessarily. Remember that we reported earlier on the positive connection between the extent of state intervention and the level of popular economic satisfaction. The Afrobarometer surveys reveal various ways in which people remain committed to the role of the state and express skepticism about free markets.

Respondents were asked to say who should take the main responsibility for delivering a list of important economic services: should it be government, private business, individuals, or some combination of these providers? People overwhelmingly preferred government to take charge. The list of relevant economic services is provided in the table below in the order prioritized by respondents. First, a majority of people in every Southern African country wants government to be responsible for providing seasonal agricultural credit to farmers (at a regional average of 67 percent). This preference probably reflects a well-founded conviction that private banks will rarely make loans to medium- and small-scale agricultural producers. Second, almost as many people (63 percent) want government to be the principal dispenser of schools and health clinics. Knowing that faith-based service providers (e.g. mission stations) have greatly reduced coverage of these services in recent years, rural people may have a hard time even imagining private sector alternatives to government schools and clinics. As such, the majority of

citizens are consistently committed to public education and medicine as the preferred modalities in every country.

*Preference for Public Provision of Services, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Helping farmers borrow money to improve production of livestock and crops.	76	84	70	51	76	62	53
Providing schools and clinics	67	69	50	72	57	53	76
Buying and selling [the main national commodity ]	77	49	38	43	75	42	45
Creating jobs	48	74	52	41	57	48	47
Reducing crime	31	68	50	42	60	48	53
Building houses	35	45	28	40	44	35	63

*Here is a list of things that are important for the development of our country. In your opinion, who should take the main responsibility for these things? Is it government, private business, individuals, or some combination of these?  
Percentage choosing "government"*

On average, though by a slimmer majority (53 percent), Southern Africans even prefer that the government direct the marketing of the country's main export commodity.<sup>26</sup> This is a somewhat surprising result given the poor performance of many para-statal marketing boards at operating profitably in the sagging crop and mineral markets of the 1970s and 1980s. It also indicates that the privatization of public corporations, or the liberalization of their markets during the 1990s, has not met with widespread public approval. Only in Malawi does public sentiment tilt toward the involvement of private businesses or individual merchants in commodity trading, in this case in the buying and selling of burley tobacco.

By the same margin (52 percent), people see the government as responsible for providing employment. Only an average of seven percent in each country see the private sector (businesses and individuals) as the main providers, though 40 percent consider employment generation as a shared public-private responsibility. Basotho, who possess few paid alternatives to migrant labor organized through bilateral government agreements, display the heaviest commitment to public employment (74 percent). Not surprisingly, people are more likely to regard individual and corporate entrepreneurs as contributors to job creation in the countries that have the largest private sectors. Indeed, absolute majorities (over 50 percent) see job creation as a shared public-private responsibility in Botswana, Namibia, South Africa, and Zimbabwe.

When it comes to reducing crime, Southern Africans seem to be groping for creative solutions. Respondents see this task as a purely governmental function in just two countries: Lesotho (68 percent) and Zambia (60 percent). Everywhere else, significant proportions see crime control as a *shared* responsibility, especially in Zimbabwe (51 percent), Namibia (56 percent), and Botswana (65 percent). South Africa, which has experienced severe increases in crime since 1994 and is now one of the most violent societies in the world, has the most active efforts to combat crime through public-private partnerships. Yet respondents still think that *government* should play the primary role (53 percent). Interestingly, in all countries where mass opinion supports the idea of institutional partnership for this critical public function, respondents think that three-way partnerships (government-business-individuals = 22 percent) are preferable to two-way partnerships (government and individuals = 15 percent, government and business = 3 percent). Government-business partnerships for crime control are almost twice as popular in South Africa (5 percent) than in the region as a whole.

The only economic function that is broadly seen as a private responsibility is building houses. On

average across the region, an average of just 41 percent across all countries regard domestic dwelling construction as a government duty. The regional average is pulled up by South Africa, the one country where a majority of people (63 percent) think that the state is obliged to build houses. This orientation reflects both the policy legacy of *apartheid*, in which public construction projects were a cornerstone of residential segregation, and the ANC-government's crash program of house building begun in 1994 under the RDP. Otherwise, most people in the region think housing is most properly provided by individuals operating in an open market, rather than by the state. On this issue, Malawians (only 28 percent favor a government monopoly), along with Batswana and Zimbabweans (35 percent), are the most market-oriented of all.

## Explaining Economic Values

What shapes these economic values? Are they simply a function of an individual's economic conditions, with poor people more likely to depend on government? Or are values affected by economic evaluations? For example, does dissatisfaction with a government mismanagement of the economy lead people to prefer an expanded role for markets?

In an effort to find answers, we first created an *index of personal economic independence* that summarizes respondents' values on self-reliance, job creation, and freedom to earn.<sup>27</sup> To try to explain these values, we regressed the index on the same set of independent variables described earlier, adding to them the respondents' evaluations of the economy and government management.

As might be expected, those who live in poverty are less likely to value personal economic independence and more likely to turn the state to provide for their welfare.<sup>28</sup> Conversely, greater exposure to knowledge and information (as measured by formal education, exposure to news media, interest in politics, and political efficacy) increases personal economic independence. Also, those who are more satisfied with government management of the economy and with national economic trends are more likely to value independence while those who feel economically deprived are less likely to do so. Significant cross-national differences remain even after controlling for all the factors just mentioned. Citizens of every country except Zimbabwe are more likely to value personal economic independence than are South Africans. Also, whites are more likely to value independence than blacks, even after controlling for all other factors (See Appendix, Model E).

To explore why Southern Africans seem to prefer states above markets in the provision of most economic services we developed an *index of preference for service provision*. It summarizes preferences for private versus public delivery mechanisms for the six economic functions reviewed above (agricultural credit, schools and clinics, export marketing, job creation, reducing crime, and building houses).<sup>29</sup> We then used the same set of independent variables to try and predict the index.

Again, those who endure poverty are less likely to prefer private provision of economic services, though employment status and housing conditions make no difference. Similarly, exposure to information and knowledge lead to greater preferences for private provision. In fact, formal education is a stronger predictor than even poverty, with higher levels of education leading to greater preference for private provision. Other factors such as greater media use and political efficacy, as well as satisfaction with economic trends also contribute to preferences for private provision. Cross national, and some racial differences also play an independent role. Citizens of every country except Botswana and Zambia are more likely to favor private provision than South Africans; and whites and Asians are more likely to prefer private provision than blacks, controlling for all other factors (See Appendix, Model F).

## ECONOMIC POLICY PREFERENCES

### Awareness of Adjustment

We turn, finally, to consider what Southern Africans think about market liberalization. An obvious starting point is to ask whether people have ever heard about their country's economic structural adjustment program (SAP). Because there was no identifiable adjustment program, per se, in Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia, research teams in those countries did not ask this and related questions. Thus, for a few items, we can only present responses for four countries.

#### *Knowledge of Structural Adjustment Programs, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Malawi	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Yes, I have heard about the SAP	51	42	85	13
No, I have not heard about the SAP	47	54	13	80
Don't know	2	4	2	7

*Have you ever heard anything about the government's Structural Adjustment Program, or haven't you had a chance to hear or read about this yet?*

There is more variation in awareness of adjustment than on any other item studied here.<sup>30</sup> At one extreme, 85 percent of Zimbabweans claim to have heard of the country's Economic Structural Adjustment Program, known colloquially as ESAP. Introduced in 1991, ESAP aimed at liberalizing trade by reducing import tariffs and providing incentives to promote exports. But widespread drought and uncontrolled budget deficits meant that reform was followed by recession and inflation, notably in food prices.<sup>31</sup> The government repeatedly tried to blame these consequences on the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, at whose instigation the adjustment programs had been introduced. As such, ESAP terminology entered public discourse and popular culture ("Elastic Stomach Adjustment Program!", "Eat Sadza And Perish!"), including pop songs.<sup>32</sup> Thus, many Zimbabweans learned about the program, usually attaching to it a negative connotation.

At the other extreme, only 13 percent of South Africans recognize the Growth, Employment and Redistribution policy, commonly known as GEAR. This stands in stark contrast to the program's prominent visibility in elite debate. Launched in 1996, GEAR was a home-grown, macro-economic policy document that was consistent with the preferences of international financial institutions, foreign investors and local business community. It aimed to create a competitive platform for export-led growth, a fiscally disciplined public budget, a flexible labor market, and the privatization or streamlining of public agencies.<sup>33</sup> It has consistently drawn the ire of the alliance partners of the governing African National Congress, the South African Congress of Trade Unions, and the South African Communist Party. Perhaps because it downplayed social redistribution in favor of economic growth, GEAR never gained the public currency of the RDP. Indeed, by claiming that GEAR was simply a means to implement the goals of the RDP, the government never actively publicized the adjustment program that was the cornerstone of its macro-economic strategy. It is in this context that South Africans' stunningly low public awareness of GEAR must be understood.

Malawi and Zambia are more representative of the region as a whole in that about half of the adult population have heard of the national economic structural adjustment program and about half have not. Some policy makers might see this as a setback: after years of sustained efforts to induce government to reorient their economies toward the market, large proportions of intended beneficiaries in at least three Southern African countries claim to be ignorant that such a strategy even exists. On the other hand, other policy makers might see this as a blessing; public awareness of the government's adoption of an adjustment program may be damaging as it signals the government's impotence in the face of international pressure and an externally imposed constraint on democratic choice.<sup>34</sup>

Beyond mere name recognition, however, Southern Africans undoubtedly know about adjustment as they come into contact with specific policy reforms and experience the consequences on their lives. In the next section we break down the economic reform package by asking people whether they support or reject various component policies.

## Support for Adjustment

Without the benefit of much empirical evidence, commentators often assert that Africans are either “for” or “against” (usually “against”) adjustment. But structural adjustment is a complex package of reforms that citizens do not have to accept or reject in wholesale fashion. Accordingly, we broke the typical adjustment package into four constituent policy elements that ordinary people would tend to encounter: user fees, consumer prices, privatisation, and reduction in the size of the civil service.

First, we examine preferences toward user fees. A major goal of economic stabilization is to reduce public budget deficits. A standard method for controlling runaway expenditures is to introduce cost-sharing in the provision of public services. Citizens who use such services are asked to pay a fee that helps to offset the real cost of service delivery. As part of economic reform programs in the Southern Africa region, fees have been introduced for basic health care services, which usually require outpatients to contribute to the cost of medical consultations or prescription drugs.

We asked respondents to choose: Is it better to be able to visit clinics and get medicines for free, even if the standards of health care are low? Or is it better to raise health care standards, even if you have to pay medical fees? Perhaps in sharp contrast to what we might expect, in all seven countries, more people preferred the reform option (impose fees, raise standards) to the *status quo ante* (no fees, low standards). In some cases the reform constituency was far larger than the anti-reform faction (see Lesotho, Botswana and South Africa) but in other places the reform majority was slim (see Malawi and Namibia). Despite the fact that people grumble about the burden of paying user fees for social services, they are nonetheless willing to do so. In return, however, they insist that standards of services must rise.

*Attitudes towards User Fees for Health Care, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
It is better to raise health care standards, even if we have to pay medical fees.	56	66	48	49	51	58	59
It is better to be able to visit clinics and get medicine for free, even if it means we cannot raise health care standards.	35	29	44	44	43	36	37
Do not agree with either	4	2	7	4	5	6	2
Don't know	5	3	0	3	2	2	2

*Percentage agreeing “somewhat” or “strongly”*

*Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

Second, we look at attitudes toward market pricing. In several Southern African countries in the 1980s, subsidies for staple foodstuffs and other basic consumer goods ballooned to the largest item in the government budget. Economic stabilization has required the removal of subsidies for basic consumer goods, allowing prices to find their own levels in the marketplace. One happy side effect of “getting the prices right” for consumer goods is that supplies usually expand to meet demand, thus putting an end to policy-induced shortages. Goods flood onto once-empty supermarket shelves. While consumers may have to pay higher prices for these goods, they no longer have to queue up in the early hours of the morning, as Zambians did just to buy bread.

The survey choice here was: Is it better to have a variety of goods available in the market, even if

Prices are high? Or is it better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods? In this instance we find a measure of support for market-oriented reform, but it is far from resounding or widespread. To be sure, people prefer market pricing to the combination of price subsidies and shortages in four countries (Botswana, Namibia, Zambia, and South Africa). This evidence of popular support for “getting the prices right” is offset by the fact that this policy reform is supported by a clear majority in only one country: Zambia. Zambia’s exceptionalism is probably due to popular memories of severe policy-induced consumer goods shortages during the 1980s, leading Zambians to reject the hardships associated with the old economic regime. But in Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Malawi, where markets have never been so distorted as to induce sustained shortages of staple foods, people remain more solidly attached to price controls. And while a balance of South Africans do prefer market pricing, the large minority supporting price controls in this country is also probably connected with its lack of experience with severe shortages.

*Attitudes towards Market Pricing, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
It is better to have a wide variety of goods and many goods in the market, even if prices are high.	50	38	41	45	59	43	49
It is better to have low prices, even if there are shortages of goods.	32	45	52	34	31	50	43
Do not agree with either	7	8	6	15	8	2	3
Don't know	11	8	1	7	2	5	5

*Percentage agreeing “somewhat” or “strongly”  
Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

Third, we turn to public opinion on privatization. We asked: Should the government sell its factories, businesses and farms to private companies and individuals? Or should it retain ownership of these enterprises? The Southern African responses amount to a strong anti-reform reaction. In contrast to support for basic efforts to stabilize public budgets, we find little popular support for the institutional reforms associated with economic structural adjustment. For example, there is little mass enthusiasm for the state to divest itself of public corporations. Nowhere in the region do majorities favor privatization. In many places, this policy is rejected by a large margin. In Zambia, for example, where the survey took place shortly before the government finalized its sale of the copper mines, two out of three citizens opposed the divestment of public companies. Only in Botswana (where the diamond mines have long been under joint ownership) do more people prefer privatization.

*Attitudes towards Privatization, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
It is better for the government to sell its businesses to private companies and individuals.	49	29	32	31	29	42	44
Do not agree with either	3	6	3	3	3	3	2
The government should retain ownership of its factories, businesses and farms.	36	61	56	57	66	48	49
Don't know	13	5	8	8	3	8	5

*Percentage agreeing “somewhat” or “strongly”  
Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

Fourth, and finally, we examine attitudes to public sector reform. Many economists now acknowledge that political and managerial reforms are necessary in order to restore growth to African economies. Even international financial institutions based in Washington, D.C. have come to include good governance initiatives

in their adjustment and poverty alleviation programs.<sup>35</sup> A core element in these initiatives is the rehabilitation of run-down civil service institutions by reducing the size of the personnel establishment and improving professionalism and efficiency. Inevitably, some public employees will lose their jobs in the process, even as others become better trained, better paid, and better motivated.

To get at this aspect of public sector reform, respondents were asked to choose between the following statements. Either “The government cannot afford so many public employees, so it should lay some of them off”; or “All civil servants should keep their jobs, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country.” The results show that there is even less support for civil service retrenchment (32 percent) than for privatization (37 percent), with barely one out of five people in four countries supporting this policy. The only exception is Zimbabwe, where more than half (51 percent) approve of retrenchment. Our interpretation of this anomaly is that Zimbabweans are reacting against the abusive patronage practices of ZANU-PF which have bloated government bodies with unqualified political appointees and closed public employment to those deemed politically disloyal.

*Attitudes toward Civil Service Retrenchment, Southern Africa, 1999-2000*

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
The government cannot afford so many public employees and should lay off / retrench some of them.	21	23	21	20	34	51	43
The number of people who work for government should not be reduced, even if paying their salaries is costly to the country.	69	69	73	65	58	41	49
Do not agree with either	4	4	4	7	4	4	4
Don't know	6	4	2	7	3	5	3

*Percentage agreeing “somewhat” or “strongly”  
Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding*

In sum, we find that Southern Africans support some market-oriented policy reforms, but oppose others. They support (or at least acquiesce to) reforms to introduce market prices for consumer goods and health care services. But they resist adjustments that would alter the structure of public institutions especially, we suspect, where such reforms threaten the availability of public employment.

## **Evaluations of Adjustment**

With reference to the next two tables, three brief observations are in order about the popularly perceived impact of SAPs in Southern Africa. First, because many citizens (especially in South Africa) are unaware of their government’s macro-economic strategy, they cannot offer a meaningful assessment of its effects. They thereby find themselves excluded from national policy debates about the appropriate roles for markets and the state in economic development.

Second, negative evaluations of economic structural adjustment greatly outweigh positive evaluations in every country. Negative evaluations are twice as likely as positive ones in South Africa and more than ten times as likely in Zimbabwe.



### Impact of Adjustment on Self, Southern Africa, 1999-2000

	Malawi	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Made my life worse / much worse	25	25	76	2
No effect	12	7	4	7
Made my life better / much better	9	8	3	1
Don't know / Not applicable	44	60	17	90

What effect do you think it has had on the way you live your life? Has it made it worse, had no effect, or made it better, or haven't you heard enough about this to say? (% "better / much better") Totals may not equal 100 percent due to rounding

### Impact of Adjustment on Others, Southern Africa, 1999-2000

	Malawi	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
The Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) has hurt most people and only benefited a minority.	32	31	77	7
The Structural Adjustment Program (ESAP) has helped most people; only a minority have suffered.	11	8	7	4
Don't know/Not applicable	57	61	16	89

Third, adverse convictions prevail whether people are asked about effects on themselves or others. Since these responses are virtually indistinguishable, we suppose that people project from their own experiences to infer consequences for others.<sup>36</sup> Either way, people consistently say that adjustment has made their lives worse (or hurt most people) rather than made their lives better (or helped most people).

### Explaining Support for Economic Reform

We end by probing the reasons for popular policy preferences. As a first step, we construct an additive *index of support for economic reforms*, which is a simple count of the number of constituent parts of the reform program that people say they support.<sup>37</sup> Overall, average support across all four components is highest in Zimbabwe (51 percent) and lowest in Malawi and Namibia (36 percent).

### Average Support for Adjustment, Southern Africa, 1999-2000

	Botswana	Lesotho	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	S. Africa
Support User Fees	56	66	48	49	51	58	59
Support Market Pricing	50	38	41	45	59	43	49
Support Privatization	49	29	32	31	29	42	44
Support Civil Service Retrenchment	21	23	21	20	34	51	43
MEAN: <b>Support Adjustment (Rank)</b>	<b>44 (3)</b>	<b>39 (5)</b>	<b>36 (6)</b>	<b>36 (6)</b>	<b>43 (4)</b>	<b>49 (1)</b>	<b>49 (1)</b>

Percentage agreeing "somewhat" or "strongly", derived from previous tables

However, the additive scale demonstrates the low levels of support overall: only 15 percent of Zimbabweans agree with all four components, and 20 percent agree with three items.

### Support for Components of Economic Reform

Number of Components Supported	Botswana	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Lesotho	South Africa
0	13	18	15	15	16	13	9
1	27	37	44	31	24	36	27
2	34	31	25	27	25	36	32
3	21	12	14	18	20	14	23
4	5	2	3	9	15	2	9

We then conducted a multivariate analysis to explain (the index of) support for economic reform using all the independent variables discussed earlier as well as economic values. Consistent with earlier findings, poverty plays an important role in reducing support for economic reform, though employment and housing conditions again have no independent effect. At the same time, exposure to knowledge and information increases support for adjustment. The economic values reviewed in the previous section also play important roles. As people come to tolerate economic risk, to value personal economic independence, and to prefer private provision of economic services, the more components of economic reform they support. And, as previously, cross-national and racial differences in support for reform remain even after taking all these other factors into consideration. White and Asian respondents are more supportive of reform than black Southern Africans. And Zimbabweans and Zambians are more supportive of reform than South Africans, while Malawians and Namibians are less so (See Appendix, Model G).

## CONCLUSIONS

Many factors will determine whether market-based economies take root in Southern Africa, including key macro-level considerations like the availability of investment capital, the protection of property rights, and the quality of governance. But economic reform cannot be sustained if it does not win popular acceptance. Thus, popular attitudes toward market values and policies will have an important impact on the prospects for economic recovery in the region.

The 1999-2000 Afrobarometer surveys contribute new insights into the nature, extent and sources of popular values in Southern Africa, while at the same time identifying puzzles about the persistent variations in economic orientations across racial groups and countries.

First, Southern African publics do not automatically reject the constituent policies of structural adjustment or the market values that underlie them. Public opinion on these matters varies widely and cannot be neatly characterized as simply pro- or anti-reform. To a significant degree, Southern Africans embrace the values upon which economic liberalization is based, such as personal economic independence. At the same time, they think the state should continue to take prime responsibility in providing developmental services in the agricultural, educational and health sectors, and in creating jobs.

With respect to the component policies of structural adjustment, Southern Africans express discriminating attitudes. On one hand, they accept the necessity of “getting the prices right” by expressing willingness to pay user fees in order to maintain service standards and, to some extent, to endure higher market prices if this leads to a reliable supply of consumer goods. At the same time, however, there is strong undercurrent of popular resistance to the “institutional reforms” like the privatization of public enterprises and the downsizing of the civil service. Until people see the evidence that free markets can do better than the state in ensuring employment, economic liberalization will proceed with only a tentative mass constituency.

Secondly, our research points to the sources of mass stances on structural adjustment. Poverty, which is quite widespread in the region, has a consistent and important impact, reducing liberal economic values and limiting support for policies of economic reform. Ironically, the very economic conditions that adjustment is intended to ameliorate are themselves important obstacles to developing constituencies for reform.

Nevertheless, public opinion on economic liberalization also derives from other factors, such as people’s exposure to formal education and the news media. And people do not simply derive their values and attitudes from their own immediate material circumstances. Taken together, these findings suggest that, apart from the truly destitute, upwardly-mobile and self-motivated segments of the population are primed to take advantage of new economic opportunities. While Southern Africans insist on a large, core role for the state in a mixed economy, people who are well educated and attentive to the mass media are more open to market principles and policies. It is among these groups, and through the schools and media, that reformers can find

new sources of support for economic reform.

Finally, our inability to explain away cross-racial and national differences in economic attitudes presents a call for future research.<sup>38</sup> It is striking that whites in South Africa are considerably more likely than blacks to support user fees for medical services (81 percent versus 58 percent), the downsizing of the civil service (77 percent versus 40 percent), and the privatization of public corporations like (88 percent versus 37 percent). Such differences between racial groups survive controls for all other considerations (including education and media use) and, in relation to support for economic reform, are more powerful even than nationality effects (See Appendix, Model G).

Rather than simply accepting race or nationality as “causes” in their own right, one must probe their meaning and implications. We suspect that both factors serve in part as proxy measures for the level of integration of the individual into the cash and market economy. Thus, support for economic reform is most widespread in Zimbabwe and South Africa, the economies with the largest private sectors in the region. Moreover, the importance of race and nationality draws attention to the dramatic transformation of the opportunity structure in the former settler colonies. Affirmative action in hiring and promotions has led to an Africanization of the civil service and public corporations, leading blacks to defend these policies and institutions. Similarly, blacks for the first time feel they have access to a range of government benefits such as housing and health care that are far better than anything they might have enjoyed before. Whites, by contrast, can no longer rely on job reservation policies for privileged access to public employment or easy access for their children to university. Therefore they have become latter-day converts to the notion of free markets in labor, which reward the advantages in education and training bestowed on them under previous regimes.

But a racially polarized distribution of policy preferences poses a challenge for the future acceptability of a market-based development strategy. Will the existence of a core constituency for market reform among white property owners serve as a model for the development of the economies of Southern African as a whole? Or will the market-based strategy become politically discredited because it is perceived as perpetuating a system that has led to deep social inequality based on race? It is in the resolution of this tension that the future economic prospects of the region in large part depend.

## Endnotes

<sup>1</sup> This paper has profited from thoughtful comments and suggestions offered by participants at presentation at the Institute of Democracy in South Africa and the Seminar Series of the Department of Political Studies, University of Cape Town. We would also like to thank Jeremy Seekings for useful comments on the text. The authors, however, bear all responsibility for any errors of fact or interpretation.

2. The opening volley in the market reform debate was *Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Africa* (Washington D.C. World Bank, 1981). Progress was tracked in *Adjustment in Africa: Reforms, Results and the Road Ahead* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1994). For an analysis of adjustment's effects, see David E. Sahn, Paul A. Dorosh, and Stephen D. Younger, *Structural Adjustment Reconsidered: Economic Policy and Poverty in Africa* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

3. The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of national public attitude surveys on democracy, markets and civil society in Africa. It is jointly managed by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA), the Ghana Center for Democratic Development (CDD), and Michigan State University (MSU). National surveys are implemented by partner research institutions in each country. To enable comparisons across countries and across time, every survey asks the same questions. The Southern African surveys discussed in this paper come from the Southern African Democracy Barometer, a project within the larger Afrobarometer supported by the United States Agency for International Development's Regional Center for Southern Africa. The sample sizes for each country are as follows: Botswana = 1200, Lesotho = 1177, Malawi = 1208, Namibia = 1183, South Africa = 2200, Zambia = 1200, and Zimbabwe = 1200. The margin of sampling error is plus or minus 3 percentage points (2.2 percent in South Africa). Samples were designed using a common, multi-stage, stratified, area cluster approach. Random selection methods were used at each stage, with probability proportional to population size where appropriate. Sampling frames were constructed in the first stages from the most up-to-date census figures or projections available, and thereafter from census maps, systematic walk patterns, and project-generated lists of household members. With the exception of South Africa, each country samples was self-weighted and sufficiently representative of national characteristics on key socio-economic indicators (gender, age, region) that weighting was not necessary.

4. See World Bank, *African development Indicators, 2001* (Washington D.C., World Bank, 2001).

<sup>5</sup> Our unemployment estimate is derived by the following formula:

$$\frac{\% \text{ Not Working But Looking for Work}}{100\% - \% \text{ Not Working and Not Looking For Work}}$$

<sup>6</sup> The official estimate (see Statistics SA, *Labor Force Survey*, September 2000) uses both a "narrow definition" (which only counts the unemployed who are actively seeking work) and a "broad definition" (which also includes the unemployed who would like to work but who are not actively seeking work).

$$\frac{\% \text{ Not Working But Looking for Work Or Would Like to Work}}{100\% - \% \text{ Not Working and Not Looking For Work and Do Not Want To Work}}$$

In February 2001, the official estimate of the narrow rate was 25.8% and the broad rate was 35.9%. See Jonathan Katzenellenbogen, "Jobless Figures Remain Over 25%," *Business Day* 27 June 2001, p. 3.

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An objection might be raised about purported similarities between official and Afrobarometer results since our method appears to use the narrow definition. However, the narrow definition has quite a stringent definition of job-seeking (e.g. respondents must have sought work within the last four weeks). The Afrobarometer surveys merely ask people whether they were looking for work without specifying a time period. Thus we feel the item captures both those who are actively looking for work and those who want to work but are discouraged. One other difference is that the official data are based on respondents aged 16-64, whereas ours covers all individuals 18 years and older. For a discussion of these two approaches, see Liv Torres, Haroon Borat, Murray Leibbrandt & Fuad Cassim, "Poverty and the Labor Market," *Poverty and Inequality In South Africa*, pp. 82-84.

<sup>7</sup> Beside 320 interviews with white respondents in South Africa, an additional 125 were scattered across Namibia, Botswana, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 220 interviews with people of mixed race ("Coloureds") were conducted in South Africa, and another 60 mostly in Namibia, but a handful each in Malawi, Zimbabwe and Zambia. Finally 100 interviews with Asians were conducted in South Africa, plus another 8 in Namibia, Botswana and Zimbabwe.

<sup>8</sup> Reconstruction and Development Program, *Key Indicators of Poverty* (Pretoria: Reconstruction and Development Program, 1995) in Stavros Stavrou, "Infrastructural Services," *Poverty and Inequality In South Africa*, Julian. May, ed. (Cape Town: David Philip Publishers / London: Zed Books, 2000), p. 143.

<sup>9</sup> Stavrou, "Infrastructural Services," p. 152.

<sup>10</sup> This approach to living conditions – measuring what people have to do without, rather than what they have – is broadly based on Richard Rose, "Getting Things Done with Social Capital: New Russia Barometer VII", *Studies in Public Policy No.303* (Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, Center for the Study of Public Policy, 1998). See also Richard Rose & Christian Haerpfer, "New Democracies Barometer V: A 12 Nation Survey" *Studies in Public Policy, No. 306*.

<sup>11</sup> These estimates almost assuredly underestimate the true rate of homelessness since they are derived from a *household* based sample. In other words, Afrobarometer interviewers only selected people currently living in households.

<sup>12</sup> At the bivariate levels, cross national differences account for just over ten percent of the variance in personal experience with poverty (Eta Squared = .12; Eta = .35, sig. = .001).

<sup>13</sup> This scale was verified through factor analysis and reliability analysis. These tests indicated that the item on homelessness should be removed, but that the rest of the items formed one factor that explained 49 percent of the total variance (Eigenvalue = 2.46) and a reliability score (Kronbach's Alpha) of .74. The item that most strongly defined the scale was cash shortages (a loading of .71) and the weakest was water shortages (with a loading of .50). For a fuller discussion of this scale and its applications, see Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton and Yul Derek Davids, "Poverty, Survival and Politics In Southern Africa," *Afrobarometer Series* (forthcoming).

<sup>14</sup> Multiple regression is a tool that helps determine how well a set of predictor variables correlates with a dependent variables (in this case poverty). It also isolates the relative effect of specific independent variables on the dependent variable while simultaneously controlling for the correlation of that variable with all the other independent variables.

<sup>15</sup> This took the form of a multivariate regression equation where individuals' levels of poverty were regressed on factors measuring gender, age, employment, education and rural/urban status, as well as a

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series of dummy variables measuring race (with black as the excluded group for comparison) and country (with South Africa as the excluded group). Decisions over which category of a discrete variable to exclude from the series of dummy variables are arbitrary. We used the criteria of excluding the category represented by the most respondents in the sample as well as in the population.

16 Pearson's correlation = .750, sig. =.000.

<sup>17</sup> Robert Mattes and Hermann Thiel, "Consolidation and Public Opinion in South Africa," *Journal of Democracy*, January 9/1 (1998), 95-110.

<sup>18</sup> See for example, Ted Robert Gurr, *Why Men Rebel* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).

<sup>19</sup> Factor Analysis extracted one factor underlying retrospective, present and prospective economic evaluations. The factor explains 73 percent of the common variance (Eigenvalue = 2.19). The three items load almost equally on the factor: retrospective (.85), prospective (.75) and present (.72).

<sup>20</sup> Factor analysis indicated that these six items form one valid factor that explains 55 percent of the total variance (Eigenvalue = 3.72) with a reliability score (Kronbach's Alpha) of .83. The item that most strongly defined the scale was government performance providing health care (a loading of .76) and the weakest was the provision of water and electricity (with a loading of .57).

<sup>21</sup> For more on the role of "sociotropic" economic evaluations, see Donald Kinder and Brodrick Kiewet, "Sociotropic Politics: The American Case", *British Journal of Political Science*, 11, 1981.

<sup>22</sup> For all Afrobarometer countries, Pearson's  $r = .595$ , sig. = .041. The additional countries are Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Tanzania and Uganda. Note that the level of analysis is the country, not the individual respondent (n= 12).

<sup>23</sup> Pearson's  $r = .770$ , sig =.043 (n =7).

<sup>24</sup> Ada Finifter and Ellen Mickiewicz, "Redefining the Political System of the USSR: Mass Support for Political Change," *American Political Science Review*, 86, 4 (December 1992), 857-74.

<sup>25</sup> For a recent contribution, see Stefan Dercon, "Income Risk, Coping Strategies and Safety Nets", *Center for the Study of African Economies, Working Paper 2000-26* (Oxford, University of Oxford, 2000). At the same time, while we do find a relationship, the bivariate association is very modest if not weak between risk acceptance (reduced to a two point scale) and poverty (Pearson's  $r = -.11$ , sig = .01).

<sup>26</sup> The actual commodity mentioned in the question differed from country to country: Botswana and Namibia - diamonds; Lesotho - water; Malawi and Zimbabwe - tobacco; South Africa - gold.; Zambia - copper.

<sup>27</sup> Because respondents tended to agree "strongly" rather than "somewhat" with these statements, thus concentrating responses on the extremities of four-point scales, we reduced them to two-point scales combining "strongly agree" and "agree" with each statement. Factor Analysis indicated that the item on risk acceptance did not fit with these three items, but that the rest of the items formed one factor that explained 52 percent of the total variance (Eigenvalue = 1.55), though with a barely acceptable reliability score (Kronbach's Alpha) of .53. The item that most strongly defined the scale was self-reliance (a loading of .67) and the weakest was government regulation of earnings (with a loading of .41). Ordinarily, we would only use indices with a reliability of .60, but the effectiveness of this construct in helping to explain

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popular support for economic reform (as discussed below), argued for its inclusion in the analysis.

<sup>28</sup> Recall that poverty is measured using the index of poverty (i.e. shortages of five basic needs). Note that the respondent's employment status and housing conditions make no meaningful difference.

<sup>29</sup> In order to create this scale, we constructed new items with a score of 1 if the person favored government provision, 2 if they favored any form of public-private partnership, and 3 if they favored solely private provision. Factor analysis indicated that all the items formed one unrotated factor that explains 35.5 percent of the common variance with a reliability (Kronbach's Alpha) of .63. The item that most strongly defined the scale was job creation (factor loading of .57) and the weakest was marketing of key export commodities (.37).

<sup>30</sup> The contingency coefficient for SAP awareness by country is .832, sig. = .000.

<sup>31</sup> Tor Skalnaes, *The Politics of Economic Reform in Zimbabwe: Continuity and Change in Development* (London, Macmillan, 1995), pp. 134-145.

<sup>32</sup> Maurice Taonezvi Vambe, "Popular Songs and Social Realities in Post-Independence Zimbabwe", *African Studies Review*, 43, 2, September 2000, 80-81.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Bratton and Chris Landsberg, "South Africa" in Shephard Forman and Stewart Patrick, *Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post-Conflict Recovery* (Boulder, Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2000), 268-9.

<sup>34</sup> Guillermo O'Donnell, "Do Economists Really Know Best?" *The Global Resurgence of Democracy*, 2d. ed., Larry Diamond & Marc Plattner, eds (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999).

<sup>35</sup> For example, World Bank, *Can Africa Claim the 21<sup>st</sup> Century?* (Washington D.C.: World Bank, 2000), especially Ch.2.

<sup>36</sup> Pearson's correlation = .990, sig. = .000.

<sup>37</sup> All those who said they did not know, or agreed with neither option, were added together with those who preferred the non-reform option.

<sup>38</sup> Christopher Achen, "Social Psychology, Demographic Variables and the Linear Regression: breaking the Iron Triangle In Voter Research," *Political Behavior*, 1992, 14, 3.

## APPENDIX: Multivariate Regression Models

Dependent Variables:            Model A: Poverty  
    Model B: Economic Satisfaction  
    Model C: Relative Deprivation  
    Model D: Approval of Government Economic Management  
    Model E: Personal Economic Independence  
    Model F: Favor Private Provision of Development Services  
    Model G: Support for Economic Reform

	<b>Model A</b>	<b>Model B</b>	<b>Model C</b>	<b>Model D</b>	<b>Model E</b>	<b>Model F</b>	<b>Model G</b>
Constant (b)	2.918	3.097	2.967	2.723	1.294	1.306	1.015
<i>Living Conditions</i>							
Poverty	.	-13***	.24***	-.18***	-.12***	-.05***	-.08***
Employment	-.10***	.00	-.03**	-.03**	.01	.02	.03*
Improved House	.	.01	-.02	-.02	.00	.01	-.01
<i>Economic Evaluations</i>							
Economic Satisfaction	.	.	.	.	.04*	.03	.01
Relative Deprivation	.	.	.	.	-.05**	-.00	-.02
Govt. Econ. Management	.	.	.	.	.05**	.02	.01
<i>Economic Values</i>							
Risk Acceptance	.	.	.	.	-.06***	.03*	.06***
Value Econ. Independence	.	.	.	.	.	.	.07***
Favor Private Provision	.	.	.	.	.	.	.09***
<i>Political Attitudes</i>							
Political Interest	.	-.02	-.03	.02	.06***	.01	.01
Political Efficacy	.	.	.	.	.03	.03	.02
Trust in Government	.	.	.	.	-.01	-.03	-.01
Interpersonal Trust	.	.	.	.	.02	-.00	-.03
<i>Socio-Demographics</i>							
Rural/Urban	-.14***	-.02	.01	-.04*	.02	.00	.02
Education	-.19***	-.02	-.03*	-.06***	.07***	.12***	.04*
News Media Use	.	.01	-.06***	.05**	.07***	.09***	.13***
Age	.02	-.06***	-.04***	-.05***	.00	-.00	-.01
Gender	.02	.01	.00	.02	-.00	.03*	.01
<i>Race</i>							
Asian	-.11***	-.10***	.04***	-.15***	-.01	-.08***	.03*
Coloured	-.14***	-.03*	.02	-.06***	.01	-.01	.03*
White	-.17***	-.15***	.09***	-.18***	.09***	.00	.15***
<i>Nationality</i>							
Batswana	-.17***	.11***	.02	.19***	.05**	.00	.06***
Basotho	-.05***	-.05***	.05***	.02	.06***	.04*	.04*
Malawian	-.04***	-.03	-.07***	-.01	.30***	.24***	-.05*
Namibian	.06***	.25***	-.14***	.22***	.10***	.07***	-.02
Zambian	.16***	-.03*	-.06***	.04**	.07***	.00	.07***
Zimbabwean	.08***	-.34***	.16***	-.15***	-.02	.14***	.12***



N	8215	6602	7530	6548	4498	4466	4185
<i>Adjusted R Squared</i>	.27	.26	.15	.19	.15	.09	.15
S.E. of Regression	.6941	.9074	1.0567	.6618	.9623	.3675	1.0257

**Notes**

1. Figures for each independent variable are standardized regression coefficients  
i.e. Bs or Betas (except constants, which are unstandardized b's)
2. \*\*\* = statistical significance at the .001 level  
\*\* = statistical significance at the .01 level  
\* = statistical significance at the .05 level
3. If cells contain a dot (.), the independent variable was not included in the regression model.