

Malian Democracy Recovering | Military Rule Still Admired

Afrobarometer Policy Paper 12 | Boniface Dulani

Introduction

Democracy, in the famous words of the British politician Winston Churchill, “is the worst form of government, except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”¹ After experiencing a twin crisis of separatist rebellion and a military coup in 2012, there were serious concerns about the future prospects of democracy in Mali. Would the short, but brutal, experience of authoritarian rule and a separatist struggle make the return to democracy possible in the short to medium term? Would the country rediscover its position as one of Africa’s promising democracies?

Results from a December 2013 Afrobarometer survey suggest that Mali’s short-lived return to authoritarianism has contributed to only a slight increase in public clamor for democracy. Support for democracy has increased especially among groups that bore the brunt of the recent crisis, in the North of the country and among Internally Displaced People. However, this is offset by relatively low levels of support for democracy and rejection of non-democratic alternatives among southerners. The 2013 presidential and legislative elections have further helped to renew confidence in state institutions, as demonstrated by increased trust in key public bodies and increased belief that the new crop of public officials are less prone to corruption. However, given past experience, it is uncertain if this can be sustained.

While most indicators of democracy are trending upwards, the country’s democracy still remains fragile. In 2013, demand for democracy in Mali was not only lower than the African average, but Malians perceived that political leaders are delivering a higher supply of democracy than they are actually demanding, suggesting a surplus of elite authority. Against a background of possible euphoria about the new government and relative peace, the high trust levels in public institutions might also be momentary. Taken together, the overall picture suggests the need for cautious optimism in thinking about democratic prospects in post-conflict Mali.

Key Findings

- Malians' demand for democracy in 2013 remains low compared with the average level for 34 African countries in 2012.² Only 38% both support democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives compared to 45% elsewhere on the continent.
- Malians' demand for, and their perceived supply of democracy have both recently risen. Demand for democracy has increased to 38% in December 2013 from 32% in 2012, while perceived supply has doubled from 24% in 2012 to 49% in 2013.
- Large majorities of Malians continue to reject one-man and one party rule. However, there is more acceptance of military rule, as barely half of citizens (56%) reject the military option.
- Because demand for democracy is much lower than perceived supply, Malians may be willing to accept a surplus of elite authority. Further democratic reforms are thus unlikely to emanate from the grassroots, but are rather dependent on the goodwill of the authorities.
- The groups that bore the brunt of the recent rebellion and occupation (Northerners and internally displaced people) reject military rule at higher rates than do residents of the southern regions and Non-IDPs. 74% of northerners and 71% of IDPs reject military rule compared with rejection rates of 54% among southerners and 55% among people who have not been displaced.
- Malians have retained faith in elections despite the recent crisis: 70% report that they voted in the 2013 presidential elections compared to 66% in the 2007 elections. There do not appear to have been major voting obstacles among northerners, who actually report to have voted in higher numbers than southerners in both the presidential and legislative elections.
- Overall, 86% said that they did not fear becoming a victim of violence or political intimidation during the 2013 election campaigns. More than nine in ten (93%) people said the 2013 presidential elections were completely free and fair or free and fair but with only minor problems.
- Malians now express greater public trust in political institutions and increased confidence of reduced corruption in government, perhaps because of the return of a democratically elected government.

The State of Democracy in Post-Conflict Mali, 2013

Until the 2012 military coup, experts had considered Mali one of Africa's most stable democracies. Over a period of twenty years, for example, Freedom House's annual *Freedom in the World* Reports had consistently rated Mali among the few African countries in the "Free"³ category. By late 2012, however, Mali faced a political crisis of "multiple dimensions."⁴ An armed conflict led by Tuareg separatists and Islamist jihadists threatened to split the country between north and south. A military coup in March 2012 against Amadou Toumani Touré's corrupt and incompetent regime completed the derailment of Mali's two-decade old democratic experiment.

The throngs of Mali citizens⁵ who flocked to the streets of Bamako in March 2012 to celebrate the military overthrow of President Touré's government raised important doubts about the commitment of Malian citizens towards democracy. An Afrobarometer survey in December 2012⁶ found that the proportion of the country's citizens expressing preference for democracy had declined by ten percentage points within a span of four years.⁷ At the same time, rejection of military rule had continued on a downward trend from 2002, with barely half of Malians disapproving the option of the army coming in to govern the country.

A year later in December 2013, Mali was on a path to recovery. The northern conflict was for the moment mostly contained. The country was able to hold presidential elections in July and August 2013 that were won by Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, a former Prime Minister. The coup leaders were meanwhile arrested and taken to court in November 2013 where they were charged with murder and kidnapping.⁸ In December 2013, the country took another step towards a return to democracy by holding legislative elections that were described as largely free and fair.⁹ It was within this evolving context that the Afrobarometer undertook a survey across Mali from 17 December 2013 to 5 January 2014. This paper draws from the results of that survey, focusing specifically on the state of Mali's democracy from the opinions and perspectives of ordinary citizens¹⁰.


Attitudes to Democracy in Mali, 2013

The Afrobarometer uses a demand and supply framework to gauge popular attitudes and commitment to democracy¹¹. On the demand side, this framework asks four related questions: the first measures popular expressions of support for democracy; the other three measure mass rejection of one-party, military and one-man rule. On the supply side, the framework measures public perceptions of the extent of, and satisfaction with, democracy. Taken together, these items form scales of demand for, and supply of democracy.

Demand for Democracy

At the height of the crisis in 2012, support for democracy in Mali dropped to its lowest levels when only 62 percent of the country’s citizens said they preferred it to any other kind of government (Figure 1). However, a year later in December 2013, support for democracy had begun to recover with three quarters (75%) of Malians expressing preference for democracy¹² (Figure 1):

Figure 1: **Support for democracy in Mali**
 | 2002-2013 |



Question wording: Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?

STATEMENT 1: Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.

STATEMENT 2: In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable


STATEMENT 3: For someone like me, it doesn’t matter what kind of government we have

Figures are for those who said “Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government”

Citizens who bore the brunt of the Tuareg rebellion and jihadist occupation, now express the greatest preferences for democracy. Specifically, eight in ten northerners express support for democracy (88%), compared with their southern counterparts, whose support for democracy was fourteen percentage points lower (74%). Another group that was directly affected by the rebellion, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), also express high levels of support for democracy (82%) compared to 75% among the non-IDP population. The combined experience of rebellion and military rule therefore appears to have rekindled enthusiasm and support for democracy, especially among the hardest hit groups in Mali.

In previous Afrobarometer surveys, Malians had demonstrated a consistent pattern in their rejection of non-democratic alternatives¹³: high majorities rejected one-party and one-man rule while a smaller, and declining, majorities rejected military rule. The December 2013 survey results suggest that the experience of rebellion and military rule have not had a notable impact on the appeal of various non-democratic alternatives. Overall rejection of both one-party and one-man rule still remain high while the rejection of military rule remains low (Figure 2):

Figure 2: **Rejection of authoritarian alternatives in Mali**
 | 2002-2013 |



While the overall picture has remained relatively stable over time, the 2013 figures mask important differences. While a higher proportion of Malians appear to countenance military rule, with only 56% rejecting this form of government in December 2013, the groups who faced the brunt of the rebellion and military coup, Northerners and IDPs, are more likely to reject military rule compared to southerners and the non-IDP population (Table 1):

Table 1: **Support for democracy and rejection of non-democratic alternatives**
| Percentage of survey respondents in each category |
| by locality and IDP status in Mali | 2013 |

	Northerners	Southerners	IDPs	Non IDPs	All Malians
Reject one party rule	84	78	83	78	78
Reject military rule	74	54	71	55	56
Reject one-man rule	90	77	84	78	78
Support for democracy	88	74	82	74	75

While barely half (54%) of southerners reject military rule, almost three quarters (74%) of northerners do so. A comparison of attitudes of IDPs and Non-IDPs shows a similar picture, with 71% of IDPs rejecting military rule compared to only 55% among Non-IDPs. Similarly, northerners are more supportive of democracy (88%) than southerners (74%).

Has demand for democracy changed between December 2012 and 2013? It has to be borne in mind that the 2012 Afrobarometer survey was conducted only in the southern part of Mali due to the unstable security situation in the north at the time. The 2013 survey on the other hand covered the entire country, allowing for the opinions and attitudes of northern Malians to be included in the analysis. Any comparisons have therefore to bear this difference in sample populations in mind.

Demand for democracy is a scale constructed from four questions measuring support for democracy and the rejection of the three authoritarian alternatives. Respondents who say they *both* prefer democracy *and* also reject *all three* non-democratic alternatives are held to demand democracy. The logic of the scale is that effective demand requires “more than lip service [i.e. expressed support] to democracy; it also implies that people abandon attachments to old autocratic [modes of governance].”¹⁴

The most notable finding from this analysis is that overall demand for democracy has increased marginally from 32% in 2012 to 38% in 2013. In other words, the proportion of Malians that *both* express preference for democracy *and* simultaneously reject one party, military and one man rule, has increased by eight percentage points.

Although overall demand for democracy in Mali has edged upwards in 2013, it still remains low when compared with the African average of 45% recorded in 34 African countries in 2012.¹⁵ The overall low level of democratic demand in Mali suggests that the country’s democracy remains very fragile. The claims of democratic support among many Mali citizens thus remain shallow, as almost two thirds still remain attached to the vestiges of autocratic rule even if, at the same

time, they profess support for democracy. This may render the country’s path back towards democracy susceptible to authoritarian takeover with little likelihood of popular resistance.

While the survey results have shown that northern Malians and IDPs have embraced democracy, this support might also be conditional on the government’s ability to deliver development and sustain security in the region. The high levels of support among northerners and IDPs, in other words, might be directly influenced by a peace dividend. In the event that armed conflict returns or continues to linger, the more likely that northerners and IDPs might lose confidence in the ability of the democratic regime to handle the situation and thus compel them to look at non-democratic alternatives.

Supply of Democracy

To what extent do Malians regard political elites as supplying the form of government that they want in the post-conflict era? To answer this question, we construct an index of the perceived supply of democracy from two indicators, the first measuring the people’s judgments of the extent of democracy¹⁶ and the second their expressed satisfaction with democracy in practice¹⁷ (Figure 3).

Figure 3: **Extent of, and satisfaction with, democracy in Mali**
 | 2002-2013 |



The coup of March 2012 and the ensuing collapse of democracy in Mali was very surprising given that the country was until then considered one of the most stable democracies on the

continent. This collapse resulted in Freedom House downgrading the country from its previous status of “free” to “not free”¹⁸. Ordinary Africans are just as capable as experts in ascertaining the level of democracy in their countries as evidenced by the fact that less than half (31%) of Malians rated their country in December 2012 as a full or almost full democracy. This was a sharp reversal from 2008, when a previous Afrobarometer survey found that 60% of Malians considered their country to be a full democracy or one with minor problems.¹⁹ At the same time, very few (36%) Malians expressed satisfaction with the way democracy works in their country in 2012.

Following the presidential and parliamentary elections of 2013, however, a slight majority (59%) of Malians acknowledged that their country had begun to recover and had again become either full democracy or one with minor problems (Table 2):

Table 2: **Extent of, and satisfaction with, democracy in Mali by locality and status**
| Percentage of survey respondents in each category | 2013 |

	Northerners	Southerners	IDPs	Non IDPs	All Malians
Perceive extensive democracy	73	58	63	59	59
Express satisfaction with democracy	72	52	61	54	53


Northerners express greater satisfaction than do southerners. This may be explained by the fact that northerners are arguably the biggest beneficiaries of the paring down of the northern rebellion and improvements in security and stability.

To measure the overall supply of democracy, a composite indicator identifies those who *both* say their country is democratic *and* also express satisfaction with democratic performance. The results show that the proportion of those who perceive a supply of democracy has doubled, rising from 24% in 2012 to 49% in December 2013. Indeed, the perceived supply of democracy in 2013 in Mali is higher than the average of 43% for 34 African countries recorded in 2012 (Figure 4).²⁰

While these results suggest Malians are optimistic about progress made on the supply side of democracy, they are also aware that there is a long way to go to regain the levels of democracy

of preceding years. The fact that the perceived supply of democracy in 2013 is still below half suggests that, as much as citizens are willing to give the new government the benefit of the doubt, more reforms are required in order to fully satisfy people’s expectations (Figure 4).

Figure 4: **Demand & supply of democracy in Mali & Africa**
 | 2012 & 2013 |



The fact that the perceived supply of democracy in 2013 (49%) is higher than the popular demand for democracy (38%), highlights the continuing fragility of Mali’s democracy and its continued susceptibility to authoritarian takeover. Malians, in other words, already feel that political elites are in the driver’s seat in determining the type of political regime that Mali will have. In other words, the 11 –point percentage gap between demand and supply represents a surplus of authority. This state of affairs represents a reversal from 2012, when popular demand surpassed perceived elite supply by eight points, suggesting that people wanted more democracy than elites could deliver or, in other words, a deficit of democracy. In the current dispensation, therefore, any further democratic reforms are unlikely to emanate from the grassroots, but are rather dependent on the goodwill of the authorities.

Quality of the Elections & Campaigns

As much as Malians express optimism about democratic recovery at the end of 2013, further progress requires a stable and peaceful political environment; renewed confidence in key democratic institutions, including trust in election management as well as a willingness on the part of the citizens to participate in the political process.

The Afrobarometer survey shows that despite lingering insecurity, the election campaign for the 2013 elections took place in a generally peaceful environment, as 86% of all Malians said they did not fear violence during the campaign compared to only 14% who did. A very large majority (93%) of all respondents reported that the presidential elections of August 2013 were completely free and fair or at least free and fair with only minor problems. These figures represent a sharp increase from the 57% who held the same view about the 2007 elections. The big jump in the rating of the 2013 elections may be partly attributed to popular trust in the Independent Electoral commission (CENI), which jumped from 41% in December 2012 to 81% in December 2013, an increase of 40 percentage points.

Given instability in the north, and the uncertain residential status of IDPs, were these groups able to participate fully in the electoral processes? Contrary to expectations, the results show that most citizens, irrespective of region of residence and IDP status, enjoyed the opportunity to vote in both sets of 2013 elections. In fact, more northerners reported voting in the presidential and parliamentary elections (85 and 84% respectively) than citizens in the southern region of the country, where reported turn-out was 70 and 63% respectively (Table 3).

Table 3: **The quality of elections in Mali**
| Percentage of respondents who said: | 2013 |

	Maliens	Northerners	Southerners	IDPs	Non IDPs
See the campaign period as largely peaceful and violence free	86	91	86	85	87
Claim to have voted in the Aug. 2013 presidential elections	70	85	69	57	71
Claim to have voted in the Dec. 2013 parliamentary elections	63	84	61	55	63
See pres. elections as completely free and fair/ free and fair with minor problems	93	92	93	92	93
See parl. elections as completely free and fair/free and fair with minor problems	87	92	87	71	84

While several studies²¹ have shown that survey respondents often over-report voting in elections, the high figures of reported voting by Northerners are consistent with the finding that residents of this region value democracy more than others in the country. Northerners appear to have embraced democratic opportunity by voting for their preferred leaders.

While northern residents apparently did not face any significant challenges compared to their southern counterparts, IDPs seem to have faced unique obstacles that reduced opportunities to vote, especially in the presidential elections. In all, reported voting in the presidential elections among non-IDPs was fourteen percentage points higher compared to IDPs at 57%. This is perhaps not surprising. At the time of the presidential elections, a high proportion of IDPs were still living in camps or had sought refuge with relations or friends in the south of the country. The proportion of IDPs reporting to have lost their voting cards was higher than that of non-IDPs (23 versus 17%), and twice as many IDPs (14%) reported failing to vote in the presidential elections due to unspecified reasons. By the time of the legislative elections in December 2013, however, many IDPs had returned north, thereby removing some of the barriers that prevented them from voting relative to their non-IDP counterparts.

Democratic Governance

The events leading up to the northern rebellion and the overthrow of the democratically elected government in March 2012 demonstrated that democracy is more than simply about elections. The fact that some of the people who previously twice voted for President Touré took to the streets to celebrate his ouster in 2012 not only suggests a shallow popular commitment to democracy, but also offers an important lesson: the consolidation of democracy on the continent requires attention to a host of factors beyond election day itself. These include popular commitment to the principle of electing leaders through regular and open elections; acceptance of oversight of the executive by the legislature and the courts; support for political pluralism; and the prioritization of accountable government.

Maliens in 2013 overwhelmingly endorsed elections. Almost nine in ten (89%) said that leaders should be elected; six in ten (62%) said that they prefer accountable over effective government; and a similar proportion (61%) said that they support political pluralism in the form of multiple political parties. Although popular endorsement of elections has only marginally increased from 83% in 2012, the fact that it has remained high suggests that the experience of military rule has not led people to reconsider their preferred mode of selecting leaders. Instead, the crisis in the country might instead have actually strengthened popular belief in elections.

Northerners are however almost evenly split over their preference for effective versus accountable government as well as in their support for political pluralism. A level of apprehension is to be expected among this group, given the perceived failure of the Touré government to protect the northern residents from the Tuareg rebellion and Islamist insurgency of 2012. Under these circumstances, strong and effective government can trump accountability and political competition.

Table 4: Attitudes towards democratic governance in Mali

| Percentage of survey respondents who said: | 2013 |

	Maliens	Northerners	Southerners	IDPs	Non IDPs
It is important to hold government accountable	62	47	63	57	62
Leaders should be chosen in regular and free elections	89	90	89	90	89
Support multiparty competition	61	65	61	67	61

Government Accountability

One of the leading causes of the northern rebellion and the justification for the 2012 military coup was the belief that the Touré government had lost legitimacy due to corruption and incompetence. Does the depth of democratic commitment among Malian citizens extend to preference for limited and accountable government? Do they want the rule of law, including being willing to obey laws passed by any legitimate government? The results show that as in 2012, a large proportion of Malians (91%) in 2013 supported the position that citizens should obey laws passed by any elected government, even if the party in power is one they did not vote for. This is similar to the 88% who held the same view in 2012. The experience of war in the north has thus not dimmed confidence in the rule of law among Mali citizens.

While support for rule of law remains high, there is only lukewarm enthusiasm for limited government. Barely more than half of Malians support legislative and judicial oversight of the executive (Table 5). These figures suggest that a significant minority of Malians is somewhat tolerant of a strong and unaccountable leadership, especially in the south, a finding that further confirms the earlier results of lukewarm support for accountable government and multi-party competition.

Moreover, fewer than half of Malians see a role for voters between elections. Asked who should make sure that elected officials – like National Assembly deputies and local government councilors -- do their jobs, few citizens see a role for themselves. Southerners generally see a greater role for the involvement of voters while larger proportion of Northerners prefer to delegate this responsibility to other elected officials or the judiciary. Taken together with the earlier findings showing low demand for democracy are further evidence of the fragile nature of Mali's recovering democracy.

Table 5: **Opinion on government accountability and citizen oversight**
| Percentage of respondents who: | 2013 |

	Maliens	Northerners	Southerners	IDPs	Non IDPs
Agree that citizens should obey the laws, even those by a government they did not vote for	91	97	91	94	91
Support the legislature to make laws for the country even if the president disagrees	56	81	54	66	56
Support the view that the presidents should respect court decisions	58	71	57	63	58
Think voters should hold National Assembly deputies accountable	36	23	37	36	36
Think voters should hold local government councilors accountable	43	37	44	46	43
Think voters should hold the President accountable	33	36	32	33	33

Government Legitimacy

Loss of public confidence in public institutions helped to trigger the overthrow of President Touré’s democratically elected government in 2012. As Whitehouse²² says, President Touré’s subsequent failure to provide strong and effective leadership, to root out corruption, and his government’s mishandling of the rebellion in the north, resulted in a loss of public confidence in key government institutions. As a result, despite winning the 2007 elections with a 71% majority, Malians were willing to grant legitimacy to the coup leaders, in part because they “spoke the rhetoric of restoring true democracy and eliminating corruption.”²³ Not surprisingly, therefore, the 2012 crisis had the net effect of greatly undermining public trust in government institutions.

Among the most notable effects of the return to democratic rule in late 2013 has been renewed public confidence in government institutions. Various government bodies, including the presidency, the National Assembly, the Independent Electoral Commission, (CENI), the Army, the Police, among others, have seen a recovery of public trust between 2012 and 2013. Compared to 2012, overall public trust in the president increased by 46 percentage points,

rising from 44% in 2012 to 90% in 2013. The other top gainers include the National Assembly, which registered an increase of 33 percentage points.

Table 6: **Public trust in government institutions**
| Percentage who say they trust | 2012 & 2013 |

	2012	2013
President	44	90
National Assembly	43	76
Electoral Commission (CENI)	41	81
Local Councils	54	70
President's Party	37	75
Opposition Parties	40	47
Police	48	64
Army	67	85
Courts	46	59
CVJR	NA	80

While increased popular trust in government organs bodes well for political stability in Mali, the numbers need to be viewed with caution. With the 2013 survey being fielded immediately after the 2013 presidential and legislative elections, public opinion might be skewed by the euphoria of a return to democracy and a honeymoon period for President Keita's administration. Indeed, previous survey evidence has shown that new leaders in Mali often enjoy high trust levels at the start of their presidency but that this progressively declines over time. This was the case with President Touré himself, who in 2002, enjoyed 71% popular trust in his first year in office. However, this gradually declined and had almost completely disappeared by the time of the 2012 military coup.²⁴

In yet another positive sign for the reconciliation process in Mali, eight of every ten Malians (80%) expressed trust in the Commission on Truth, Justice and Reconciliation (CVJR). The CVJR was established in March 2013 to promote national cohesion and to recommend actions likely to contribute to the reconciliation of all Malian communities.²⁵ The high levels of popular trust in CVJR is an important indicator of public confidence in this important body if it has to achieve its objective of national reconciliation. Levels of trust are, however, slightly lower among two crucial groups, northerners (75%) and IDPs (74%). While these figures are still very high, it suggests that CVJR, which is still an unknown entity to many Malians, needs to do more to convince this important constituency.

Perceptions of Corruption in 2013

Widespread popular perceptions of corruption also helped to bring down the Touré government. As Whitehouse (2013) notes, the idea that corruption was going unchecked at the highest levels of the state gained popular currency and helped to undermine President Touré's legitimacy.

Although the 2012 Afrobarometer survey was conducted several months after Touré's ouster, it nonetheless captured lingering public doubt about government's commitment to fight corruption. Similar to the findings on trust, the widespread mood by Malians in December 2012 was thus one of a government that was still very corrupt. By December 2013 and compared to twelve months previously, by contrast, all key government offices, from the presidency, the National Assembly, Cabinet, Local Government councilors, Police and Army, were perceived to be more honest and less prone to corruption (Table 7).

Table 7: Perceptions of Honesty Among Public Officials

| Percentage who say no one or only some officials are involved in corruption |
| 2012 & 2013 |

	2012	2013
President & Presidency	45	74
National Assembly Deputies	48	70
Members of Government	45	69
Local Government Councilors	54	67
Police	49	61
Judges and Magistrates	44	61

The most notable improvements in perceptions of corruption were recorded in the presidency, where the 74% of Malians said none or only a few individuals in President Keita's office are involved in corruption. This compares with the 45% who held a similar view in 2012.

While the National Assembly also registered improved perceptions of reduced corruption, it is however telling that there is a notable regional difference. More northerners (83%) than southerners (69%) consider most members of the National Assembly to be honest. The north-south divide on this issue once again underlines the fragility of the Mali transition back to democracy.

Perceptions of corruption can also mirror trust in government institutions in that the public often rates new governments favorably at the beginning of a new leadership's term of office. But the picture often progressively declines over time. To be sure, many Malians see the Keita administration as cleaner than its predecessor; only 23% say that "all" or "most" of the new president's men are corrupt. But how long will Keita enjoy the confidence honeymoon? And will he be able to break the mold established by previous Malian presidents of declining public trust over time?

Conclusion

This paper has found that Mali has embarked on the rediscovery of democracy. After the brief interlude of authoritarian rule in 2012-13, both popular demand for, and the perceived supply of, democracy have increased. However, popular demand still lags behind perceived elite supply, suggesting lingering nostalgia for authoritarianism. Indeed, demand for democracy in 2013 is still very low and remains below the continental average calculated from 34 countries around 2012.

In keeping with Churchill's argument that the virtues of democracy are fully appreciated only after people experience its alternatives, the people most affected by the 2012 crisis, namely northerners and Internally Displaced People, now tend to value democracy more than those less affected. This paper also shows increased public confidence in government institutions, including competitive elections, the rule of law and accountable government. Further evidence suggests increased popular trust in government officials and lower perceptions of corruption.

The situation, however, remains fragile. Demand for democracy is still low. Of particular concern are the relatively low rejections rates for military rule in the country. It thus remains to be seen if the renewed confidence in democracy is going to last.

Endnotes

¹ Winston Churchill, House of Commons speech on Nov. 11, 1947, http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1947/nov/11/parliament-bill#column_206, accessed 10 April 2014

² Michael Bratton and Richard Houessou, “Demand for Democracy is Rising in Africa , But Most Leaders Fail to Deliver,” Afrobarometer Policy Paper No. 11, April 2014.

³ The only exception was 1993/94 when Mali was rated “Partly Free” with an average Freedom House score of 3. See Freedom House, “*Freedom in the World*” annual reports.

⁴ Massa Coulibaly and Michael Bratton, 2013, “Crisis in Mali: Ambivalent Popular Attitudes on the Way Forward,” in *Stability: International Journal of Security & Development*, 2(2): 31, pp. 1-10,

⁵ See Mali coup supporters rally in capital”, “*The Guardian Newspaper*, 28 March 2012, <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/28/mali-coup-supporters-rally>

⁶ Due to the security situation in North Mali, the 2012 Afrobarometer survey was only done in the southern regions of the country. Any reference to that survey therefore refers to southerners.

⁷ Coulibaly and Bratton, 2013, *ibid*

⁸ *BBC News*, 27 November 2013 “Mali's coup leader Sanogo charged with 'murder', <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-25130505> accessed 8 April 2014

⁹ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, 2014

¹⁰ The Afrobarometer is a comparative series of public attitude surveys that measure the public mood on issues of democracy, governance, market reforms and civil society in Africa. The surveys started with 12 countries in 1999 but have since expanded to cover a total of 35 countries, a number of whom have had more than five cycles of surveys. The Mali survey of December 2013 had a national sample size of 2,267¹⁰, including an oversample of 200 in the north of the country and an additional sample of 219 Internally Displaced People (IDPs).

¹¹ See Michael Bratton and Robert Mattes, “Neither Consolidating nor Fully Democratic,” *Afrobarometer Briefing Paper* No. 67

¹² Survey respondents were asked to choose one of three response options : 1) Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government; 2) In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable, and; 3) For someone like me, it doesn't matter what kind of government we have. Supporters of democracy were those who chose option 1.

¹³ Respondents were asked: “There are many ways to govern a country. Would you disapprove or approve the following alternatives: a) only one political party is allowed to stand for elections and hold office; b) the army comes in to govern the country; and, c) elections and Parliament are abolished so that the President can decide everything”. Respondents who said they “strongly disapprove” or “disapprove” each option were those considered as rejecting non-democratic alternatives.

¹⁴ Michael Bratton, (2012) "Trends in popular attitudes to multiparty democracy in Africa, 2000-2012," Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 105

¹⁵ Michael Bratton and Richard Houessou, *ibid.*

¹⁶ Respondents were asked "In your opinion, how much of a democracy is Mali today?" Responses ranged from "A full democracy", "A democracy but with minor problems," "A democracy with major problems," and "Not a democracy." Respondents who perceived extensive democracy were those who said "a full democracy" or "a democracy but with minor problems".

¹⁷ Respondents were asked: "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Mali today?" Responses ranged from "Very satisfied," "Fairly satisfied," "Not very satisfied," and "Not at all satisfied." Satisfied respondents were those who said they were "Very satisfied" or "fairly satisfied."

¹⁸ Freedom House, *Freedom in the World*, 2013:Mali, <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/2013/mali#.U0gNrPmSz-s>

¹⁹ Afrobarometer, 2008, *Mali: Summary of Results*, East Lansing: AB

²⁰ Michael Bratton and Richard Houessou, *ibid.*

²¹ Brian Silver, Barbara A. Anderson, and P.R. Abramson, 1986, "Who over reports voting?", *American Political Science Review*, 80(2): 613-24.

²² Bruce Whitehouse, 2013, "A festival of brigands": in Search of democracy and Political legitimacy in Mali, "in *Strategic Review for Southern Africa, Vol 35, No 2*

²³ Bruce Whitehouse, 2013, *ibid.*

²⁴ Whitehouse, 2013, *ibid.*

²⁵ OSIWA, 2013, "Mali: The Dialogue and Reconciliation Commission is established, but now what?": <http://www.osiwa.org/en/portal/newsroom/573/Mali-The-Dialogue-and-Reconciliation-Commission-is-established-but-now-what.htm#sthash.JuOGBAKM.dpuf>, accessed 6 April 2014.

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