


# **AFRO** **BAROMETER**

**Afrobarometer Paper No.7**

**PUBLIC OPINION AND THE  
CONSOLIDATION OF  
DEMOCRACY IN SOUTHERN  
AFRICA**

by  
Robert Mattes, Michael Bratton,  
Yul Derek Davids and Cherrel Africa

**A comparative series of national public  
attitude surveys on democracy, markets  
and civil society in Africa.**



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POLITICAL REFORM IN AFRICA

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**July 2000**

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# Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa: An Initial Review of Key Findings From the Southern African Democracy Barometer

## Executive Summary

Consolidating the young democracies of Southern Africa depends to a great extent on developing a democratic culture to support, defend, and sustain the practices, procedures, and institutions of representative popular government. Until now, however, we have known very little about what Southern Africans think about democracy, their new democratic institutions, or how they compare democracy to what that had before.

In order to fill this information void, a consortium of national research partners from seven countries across the region has created the Southern Africa Democracy Barometer (SADB). The SADB consists of national research teams at the University of Botswana, Sechaba Consultants of Lesotho, Centre for Social Research at the University of Malawi, the Institute for Public Affairs in Namibia, the Institute for Democracy In South Africa, the Institute for Social and Economic Research at the University of Zambia, and the University of Zimbabwe.

The Democracy Barometer measures public attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, evaluations of the quality of governance and economic performance, perceptions of the consequences of democratic governance on people's everyday lives, and information about a range of actual and potential economic and political behaviours. This project and the larger research consortium are coordinated by the Public Opinion Service of Idasa (the Institute for Democracy In South Africa).

Beginning in September 1999, SADB partners conducted systematic surveys of scientifically chosen random stratified nationally representative samples of 1,200 respondents each 1999 (for more on sampling and fieldwork methodology, see the Appendix to the main report). The first survey began in Namibia in September. By the end of the year, we had completed surveys in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. In early 2000, we completed a survey in Lesotho, and fieldwork is currently underway in South Africa, the seventh and last country to be surveyed in the first round of this project.

### *The Regional Picture*

Results from the first round of the Southern African Democracy Barometer (a nationally representative survey conducted in six Southern African countries in late 1999 and early 2000) present a relatively promising picture of the state of democracy in Southern Africa.

- o There is widespread popular support for democracy in the region. The only exception is in Lesotho, where large numbers of citizens tend to express indifference and apathy toward their form of government rather than authoritarian attitudes.
- o There is little "authoritarian nostalgia" in Southern Africa. In all countries, even in Lesotho where support for democracy is relatively weak, there is strong resistance to the idea of

returning to the authoritarian past (whether it be colonialism, white minority rule, or indigenous one party rule or military dictatorship). There is also little desire to try a range of other imaginable non-democratic alternatives.

- o By large margins, people feel that their present multi-party regimes are responsible for significant increases in political freedom. They are less sure, however, that multi-party government has resulted in increased personal or economic security compared to the old regime.
- o In contrast to the typical academic wisdom, democracy is not a foreign or unknown concept in Southern Africa. Large majorities are able to offer some spontaneous definition of the word.
- o When asked to tell us what democracy means, Southern Africans describe it, by large margins, in positive terms.
- o When they describe democracy, people see it, by and large, as based on civil rights and personal freedoms, popular government, and elections and voting.
- o However, when it comes to the institutions of state and government, public attitudes are much less positive, and tend to vary a great deal by country. State and government institutions receive very mixed ratings when it comes to the key dimensions of trust, responsiveness, corruption in government, and overall job performance. In fact, many Southern Africans feel that the performance of their present governments is no better, or even worse, than their former authoritarian governments on these four dimensions.
- o Importantly, there is a strong sense among people in the region that governments cannot use the legacies of the past regime as an excuse for policy failures or slowness of delivery.
- o The results also point out several areas of concern regarding issues of democratic citizenship.
- o Pending a more detailed and extensive comparison of results with findings from elsewhere in the world, we find relatively low levels of political interest and political participation. Substantial proportions of respondents tell us that they never talk about politics, and are uninterested in government and public affairs.
- o The average respondent feels able to exert control over their own personal life, but when it comes to politics they feel they do not have enough information about government, and are unable to understand what goes on in politics and government. They also tend to feel that they have to practice self-censorship when it comes to individual political expression.
- o Southern Africans do, however, tend to retain a sense of optimism about the positive potential of the vote, and the importance of winning political power through elections.
- o They are relatively active in religious organizations, but relatively inactive in other areas of organized community life.

- o The proportions who claim to have taken part in mass electoral-related activities (like voting, and attending election rallies) are quite high. However, participation in other forms of political activities, such as working for political parties, or writing letters to newspapers, or contacting political or other community leaders is quite low. Minorities have taken part, or are willing to take part in political protest.
- o On a more encouraging note, only small minorities have, or say they would take part in non-compliance with their legal obligations of citizenship.
- o Finally, it appears that any potential anti-democratic entrepreneurs would face a strong wave of negative opinion if they were to threaten democracy by shutting down critical media, dismissing critical judges, banning political parties, or suspending elections. Significant proportions also say they would take various actions in support of democracy, if such a situation were to occur.

The larger message for democracy advocates, and democracy educators, is that the most important areas of priority for work do not appear to lie in convincing Southern Africans about the value of democracy, but rather on building the habits of democratic citizenship.

For elected representatives, policy-makers, and constitutional designers alike, the clear implication of this survey is the dire need to build government institutions that are seen to be trustworthy, free of corruption, responsive, and effective.

## ***Country Profiles***

### ***Botswana***

Based on the profile of attitudes of its citizens, Botswana appears to be a maturing democracy. Several decades of sustained democratic practices have brought about, or have been accompanied by the development of a healthy democratic culture. In fact, Botswana ranks far ahead, on many of *Idasa's* previous measurements, of South Africans in terms of their attitudes toward democracy.

- o Democracy enjoys widespread legitimacy.
- o There is a high degree of demand for democracy as well as a high degree of perceived supply of democracy by the political system.
- o State and government institutions enjoy fairly high levels of trust, and overall job approval. Relative to other governments across the region, government incumbents are seen to be fairly responsive to public opinion, and relatively free of corruption.
- o The large majority of Botswana want their government to prioritize job creation, and smaller though significant proportions mention AIDS and education as key areas requiring government action.

- o If there is any apparent deficit, it is that Batswana are not very politically active or politically interested. Whether this is a reflection of the larger ‘culture’ or a reflection of acquiescence to a political system that “works” will be answered with further research.
- o However, relative to the rest of the region, Batswana retain faith in the positive impact of elections and voting
- o Indeed, if democracy were under threat, significant proportions of Batswana are likely to become actively involved in its defense.

### *Lesotho*

The overall profile of Basotho attitudes toward democracy, the political system, and citizenship are relatively negative and pessimistic in comparison to the rest of the region. But without any prior, comparable survey evidence, it is difficult to say whether this is the result of basic cultural predispositions to politics and authority, or are more a reflection of popular reactions to the current political crisis in Lesotho.

- o In terms of attitudes toward democracy, Lesotho is extremely different from the other five countries in the survey. There is very little demand for democracy. Basotho also feel that their present arrangement is not producing much democracy.
- o On one hand, while most Basotho reject a range of non-democratic alternatives to their present regime, they are less likely to do so than respondents from any other country in the survey. On the other hand, there is relatively little expressed preference for a non-democratic system. In fact, the situation seems to be much more one of indifference, apathy, or confusion about democracy and the present status of the political system.
- o There appear to be serious problems of legitimacy, with relatively low levels of popular trust in government institutions, and relatively little sense that national institutions are interested in public opinion.
- o On a positive note, government institutions in Lesotho are seen to be relatively free of official corruption.
- o Basotho want their government to concentrate its priorities in the areas of job creation, crime and security, and food delivery.
- o Basotho are the least interested and least involved in politics of all the countries we sampled in the survey. They also tend to feel that they are unable to interact with and influence the political system and tend not to participate in politics.

### *Malawi*

When viewed on the national level, the Malawi results send very promising signs of its ability to move toward a political system where democracy is widely legitimated. Yet, the overall results mask important regional cleavages and significant pockets of support for authoritarian rule that are only visible once one looks at the results on a regional basis.

- o By wide margins, Malawians believe that democracy is always preferable. Not only is there a relatively high demand for democracy in Malawi, there are also relatively high levels of perceived supply of democracy by the political system.



- o But while large majorities of Malawians say democracy is always preferable, it is also true we find the highest levels of “authoritarian nostalgia” in the survey in Malawi (about one-fifth of all Malawians, and even higher in specific regions).
- o The fact that many more Malawians might support an unelected leader if democracy were not seen to be “working” is also cause for concern.
- o With regard to the political system, another sign of concern are the relatively high levels of perceived corruption in government.
- o Malawians cite a wide range of problems that they want government to prioritize. The most extensive areas of agreement are on improving the economy, health care, fighting crime, and providing food.
- o Another optimistic note is that of all Southern Africans interviewed, Malawians are the likely to feel they can influence the political system, and have a positive impact via voting and elections.
- o Malawians are also relatively active in terms of civic life and political participation.

### ***Namibia***

In many ways, the results from Namibia present an odd case if only because it is the only country in the survey where the perceived “supply” of democracy by the political system is higher than citizens’ “demand” for democracy.

- o While more Namibians see democracy as “the only game in town,” than do not, they are the least likely (with the exception of Lesotho) to support democracy. And while they reject a range of non-democratic alternatives, they are the least likely to do so.
- o Large proportions of Namibians feel that their system is democratic and are satisfied with the way democracy works in Namibia. Yet these proportions are larger than those who actually demand democracy.
- o Namibians are the most satisfied of all countries in the survey with their overall political system. They very satisfied with the performance of President Sam Nujoma and the SWAPO government and invest them with high levels of trust. They also see relatively low levels of corruption in government.
- o Namibians want their government to place its priorities on issues of job creation, education, and provision of services.

### ***Zambia***

- o Democracy is widely supported in Zambia, and there are also relatively high levels of perceived supply of democracy.
- o Zambians are apparently unconcerned about the significant flaws of the 1996 elections (though one could speculate that people would have been more concerned if the object of the abuses had been a legitimate, popular opposition leader rather than the symbol of the discredited former regime.
- o There is little desire to return to the past regime of one-party rule, and little interest in other non-democratic alternatives.

- o Zambians have very low levels of trust in their political institutions and relatively high perceptions of corruption in government.
- o Yet, even though Zambians are not overly enthusiastic about their present political system, there is little nostalgia for the Kaunda, UNIP one-party regime. On balance, substantial proportions of Zambians see their multi-party government as more effective than UNIP one party regime and more responsive to public opinion, though it does not compare so favorably in terms of corruption and trustworthiness.
- o Zambians want government to place priority on health care, job creation, education, and improving conditions of farmers and agriculture.
- o Zambians are the least likely of all Southern African interviewed to feel they can make things better through voting and elections.
- o Conversely, they are the most active in civic associational life, especially church organizations.
- o Finally, Zambians demonstrate the highest levels of potential in the survey to take action in defense of democracy if it were under threat.

### ***Zimbabwe***

Any discussion of the Zimbabwe results must be prefaced by the reminder that that the fieldwork was done in September-October 1999, before the constitutional referendum, farm invasions, or general election campaign.

- o Zimbabweans express a high level of “demand” for democracy, yet also display a very low degree of perceived “supply” of democracy from their political system.
- o There is a widespread sense of disillusionment and cynicism about the political system. And it is important to note that the public mood is not just “anti-Mugabe,” but expresses a generalized discontent with the larger system of one party dominant ZANU-PF rule. There are severe problems of legitimacy, very low levels of trust, little sense that government is concerned with public opinion, and widespread perceptions of extensive corruption in government. Government institutions also receive very low levels of job approval.
- o Many people see government as no different, or even worse than old white minority regime in terms of trust, performance, corruption, and responsiveness.
- o The vast majority of Zimbabweans want their government to place its priorities on improving the economy, and creating jobs. As of September-October 1999, issues concerning land and land reform were mentioned by just one-in-one hundred respondents.
- o In terms of citizenship, Zimbabweans feel especially unable to influence the political system, and are the least likely of all Southern Africans to feel they can improve things through voting and elections.
- o At the same time, Zimbabweans are the most active of all Southern Africans in civic associational life, and have a significant record of political participation.

# **Public Opinion and the Consolidation of Democracy in Southern Africa: An Initial Review of Key Findings**

## **From the Southern African Democracy Barometer**

### ***I***

#### ***Introduction***

Nowhere during the worldwide “third wave of democracy” was the move away from military and civilian dictatorship toward competitive elections and multi-party systems more unexpected than in Africa. Yet since 1990 forty countries across the continent experimented with transitions to democracy, with twenty-two eventually reaching a successful founding election. In Southern Africa, already possessing three existing multi-party systems in Botswana, Zimbabwe and Mauritius, eight countries achieved successful transitions to founding elections in the past decade (Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997).

Yet many of these democratization processes are incomplete and some have even undergone reversals. Even when states have implemented regular elections and secured the conditions for political competition, pluralism, and the protection of human rights, democracy remains far from consolidated. Thus, the region has been left with a wide range of political systems.

First of all, continental Southern Africa contains four emerging “liberal democracies”: Larry Diamond (1999) defines liberal democracies as those that combine genuine political competition with a full range of political freedoms and civil rights. As of 1999, based on ratings of political and economic rights, South Africa, Botswana, Malawi and Namibia were all rated by Freedom House as “free” and thus fell in this category. Yet even these countries run the risk of eventually degenerating to what Diamond (1996) once called “semi” democracies because the existence of single dominant political parties may come, over time to limit competition in practice. The region also contains two functioning “electoral democracies”: that is countries with genuine political competition, yet which fall deficient in their protection of rights. As of 1998-1999, Mozambique and Lesotho were rated as “partly free” by Freedom House and thus fell into this category. The region also contains what are called “pseudo” or “virtual” democracies. In these countries, elections may be held and opposition parties exist, but competition, pluralism and rights of association, speech and media are actively constrained by the state. Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe are rated as “partly free” by Freedom House but score sufficiently badly on political rights fall into the “pseudo-democracy” category (see Diamond, 1996, Joseph, 1998, Diamond, 1999).<sup>1</sup>

The *transitions* from authoritarianism toward democracy in Southern Africa were driven by a unique set of external and internal circumstances and actors (Sisk, 1994; and Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997). However the *consolidation* of a new democratic system may depend on an altogether different set of factors and conditions that can be broadly divided into two sets.<sup>2</sup> The

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<sup>1</sup> This discussion excludes authoritarian, military regimes, or where the regime is involved in a serious civil war (i.e. Angola, Congo and Swaziland).

<sup>2</sup> It should be noted that some scholars doubt whether any democracy is ever consolidate in a permanent sense, and choose instead to speak of democratic *endurance* (see Przeworski et al, 1996).

first set of factors consists of the quality of its political procedures (such as elections, the observance and enforcement of the rule of law, protection of rights) and of its formal institutions (such as executives, legislatures, courts, and sub-national governments). The second set of factors consists of the nature of citizens and civil society and the degree to which they yield a political culture that will support and sustain democratic practices and institutions.

Thus, over the past twenty years, the scholarly study of the consolidation of young democracies has roughly divided into two broad traditions. The first has focused on evaluating the performance of political practices and institutions and the degree to which they become “institutionalised” or “habituated” in the political system, as well as how the best procedures and institutions can be crafted through constitutional design (e.g. Horowitz, 1991, Lijphart, 1985 & 1990; and Sisk, 1994).

The second tradition focuses on the practices of civil society and the attitudes and values of the citizenry (Almond & Verba, 1963; Inglehart, 1996). The basic assumption here is that regardless of how well designed its political institutions and processes, a sustainable democracy requires people who are willing to support, defend and sustain democratic practices. In other words, a democracy requires democrats; it requires citizens. As Richard Rose and his colleagues have recently argued, if political institutions are the “hardware” of a democratic system, what people think about democracy and those institutions constitute the “software” of that system. And as all systems designers know, software is just as important as hardware (Rose et al, 1999, p. 7).

Within the political culture approach to democratic consolidation, we find yet again two distinct approaches. The first is rooted in the path set out in the very first cross-national surveys on democratic culture conducted by Gabriel Almond and Sydney Verba in the early 1960s (1963). Here, the focus is on assessing the extent of a democratic culture by measuring a set of social-psychological orientations of the democratic personality (see Almond & Verba, 1963; and see the work of James Gibson, e.g. Gibson, Duch & Tedin, 1997). For Almond and Verba, the optimal civic culture consisted of a mix of what they called “participant” and “subject” orientations amongst its citizenry: people who were engaged with the democratic system, but not did not place unreasonable demands on it, who trusted government but were not blindly loyal, etc.... Later work in this tradition based itself more explicitly in the democratic theory of Robert Dahl, and attempted to operationalise a range of psychosocial attributes of the “democratic personality.” A democrat was someone who is pragmatic, individualist, tolerant, flexible, etc.... Thus, a political culture was democratic to the extent that it consisted of citizens with democratic personalities.

A second, quite different approach to this question bases itself in the definition of democratic consolidation advanced by Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (1996). They argue that democracy can only be considered as consolidated once it is “legitimated” or seen by all significant political actors and an overwhelming majority of citizens as “the only game in town.” Empirical analysts adopting this approach to consolidation and political culture have chosen to measure the extent of legitimation not by assessing social-psychological orientations or predispositions (i.e. the democratic personality), but by testing whether citizens support democracy because they see it as better than the alternatives (Rose et al, 1998).

## *The Southern African Democracy Barometer*

Do the emerging democracies Southern Africa possess a critical mass of citizens sufficient to support, sustain, and defend the institutions of popular self-government? The answer is “no” according to one recent influential analysis that argues that Africans are “subjects” not citizens (Mamdani, 1996). The answer is also “no” based on the conclusions of the structural, macro-economic analyses of the correlates of democracy: Africa simply has too few educated, middle class citizens to provide what appear to be the key prerequisites of stable democracy (Lipset, 1960; Przeworski, et al, 1996). Yet there is actually very little in the way of systematic evidence about the political culture of Southern Africa. We simply are not able to say with any degree of certainty what Southern Africans think about democracy, their nascent democratic institutions, and how they compare it to what they had before.<sup>3</sup>

The Southern African Democracy Barometer (SADB) was formed precisely to fill this void. The SADB consists of national research teams at universities and nong-governmental organisations across the region. The National Investigators are: Mogopodi Lekorwe (Botswana), Thuso Green (Lesotho), Stanley Khaila (Malawi), Christiaan Keulder (Namibia), Robert Mattes (South Africa), Neo Simutanyi (Zambia), and Annie Barbara Chikwanha-Dzenga (Zimbabwe).<sup>4</sup>

Based on the second approach to political culture outlined above, we see citizen support for democracy not as a set of favorable attitudes toward democratic practices, but rather as a choice made by citizens in favour of democracy over its alternatives. Thus, the citizen does not necessarily need to possess favourable pre-dispositions toward elections, free speech, or multi-party competition; rather they only need to choose democracy and its key constituent elements as preferable to alternative regime types. This is what Richard Rose has called the “Churchill Hypothesis” (Rose et al, 1999) stemming from Winston Churchill’s famous dictum. Churchill called democracy the “the worst form of government,” then added “except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time.”

Thus, SADB surveys measure public attitudes on democracy and its alternatives, evaluations of the quality of governance and economic performance, perceptions of the consequences of democratic governance on people’s everyday lives, and information about a range of actual and potential economic and political behaviours. Beginning in September 1999, SADB national research partners conducted systematic surveys of scientifically chosen random stratified nationally representative samples of 1,200 respondents each. The first survey began in Namibia in September 1999 (for more on sampling and fieldwork methodology, see the Appendix). By the end of the year, we had completed surveys in Zimbabwe, Botswana, Malawi and Zambia. In early 2000, we completed a survey in Lesotho, and fieldwork is currently underway in South Africa, the last country to be surveyed in the first round of this project.

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<sup>3</sup> For the beginnings of systematic, over-time measurement and analysis in South Africa see Mattes & Thiel (1998) and Mattes, Taylor & Thiel (1998); for Zambia, see Bratton (1997); and on a cross-continental basis, see Bratton & Mattes (2000).

<sup>4</sup> Lekorwe is at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Botswana; Green is at Sechaba Consultants; Khaila is at the Centre for Social Research, University of Malawi; Keulder is at the Institute for Public Affairs; Mattes is at the Institute for Democracy In South Africa, Simutanyi is at the Institute for Social and Economic Research, University of Zambia; and Chikwanha-Dzenga is at the Department of Political and Administrative Studies, University of Zimbabwe.

We anticipate that the results of these surveys will provide elected representatives, policy makers, democracy advocates and scholars with crucial information about the present state and future of democratic governance in Southern Africa. And by allowing Southern Africans to define their own regional democratic norms, the project should provide ordinary people a voice independent of politicians,' traditional leaders' and journalists' assertions about public opinion.

The Southern African Democracy Barometer contains a wide range of data much of it not contained in this report. This report is the first publication of results from the SADB and focuses on key findings about Southern Africans' support for democracy, their evaluations of their political systems, and their views and behaviours with regard to the demands and duties of democratic citizenship. It is a preliminary discussion of this data. It does not pretend to capture the totality of democratic culture in the region, to compare Southern Africans' views with the increasingly large volume of opinion data from around the world, or to capture the complex linkages among people's attitudes or between their attitudes and the broader socio-political environment in which they live. Such questions will be the focus of subsequent Afro-Barometer Series publications, as well as other papers and reports based on this data.

## *II*

### *Democratic Legitimacy*

Measuring the extent to which democracy is legitimated requires the analyst to understand the extent to which people are committed to key component features of a democratic regime, and also to understand the extent to which they choose democracy as a regime form against its alternatives. Thus, we measure a Churchillian type of support for democracy in three ways. First, we attempt to measure the degree to which people think a political regime called “democracy” is preferable to other regime types. Second, we assess what people understand as a regime called “democracy?” And third, we measure the extent to which people support constituent elements of democracy against their alternatives (without using the word “democracy”).

#### *Support for Democracy*

First of all, we report the responses to a question that has been widely used by opinion researchers in Southern Europe and Latin America. It asks people whether democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government, whether they could imagine a situation where non-democratic forms of government would be preferable, or whether it really doesn’t matter to a person such as themselves (see the bottom of the Table for actual wording).

What we found was that in five of the six countries surveyed, majorities ranging in size from just over eight-in-ten to just under six-in-ten who say that “democracy is always preferable.” Only in one country does support dip below a majority to only four in ten. This yields an average (mean) support of 64.8 percent across the six countries. For comparison, the mean scores for six Eastern and Central European countries surveyed in 1995 was 65 percent and for four Latin American countries, 63 percent (Mishler & Rose, 1998: 13; Linz & Stepan, 1996: 222).<sup>5</sup>

However, there are important variations by country to these responses:

- o Large majorities in Botswana (82%) and Zambia (74%) say that democracy is always preferable. By attitudinal criteria alone, this puts both these countries near the threshold of a consolidated or consolidating democracy.
- o Seven-in-ten Zimbabweans (70%) say democracy is preferable, as do two-thirds of Malawians (66%).
- o Support dips in Namibia, where only 58% say that democracy is always preferable.
- o It is by far the lowest in Lesotho where only 39% support democracy unequivocally.

“Authoritarian nostalgia” is highest in Malawi where one in five (22%) endorse the possibility of authoritarian rule. The figure goes as high as three in ten in Malawi’s Central Region (30%), the homeland and political base of Dr. Hastings Banda, the country’s former strongman.

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<sup>5</sup> Except where noted, cross-national averages, or means are calculated as the raw mean of aggregate country percentages. This has the effect of weighting each country sample as if it were the same size and are not corrected for the country’s population size.

Acquiescence or apathy is highest in Lesotho and Namibia. Almost one quarter (23%) of Basotho say the choice between democratic and non-democratic rule makes no difference to them. Another quarter (24%) of Basotho and one out-of-every five Namibians (19%) also say that they do not know the answer to the question, figures four times higher than for other countries.

### *Support for Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government.	82.4	70.5	74.0	65.5	38.7	57.7
In some circumstances, a non-democratic government can be preferable to democratic government.	6.7	10.7	8.8	21.6	11.0	11.7
For someone like me, a democratic or non-democratic regime makes no difference.	5.6	13.1	12.3	10.8	22.7	11.6
Don't know	2.5	4.7	4.0	2.2	23.9	19.0

We also used a second question, asked over the last few years in South Africa to tap a relatively higher level of commitment. The item asserts that “sometimes democracy does not work” and then asks whether democracy is still best or whether an unelected leader would be preferable. What “does not work” means was deliberately left unspecified in order to allow people to fill in their mind whatever it means to them for a system of government “not to work.”

First of all, with one exception, the pro-democratic responses are fewer than those obtained by the previous question. The extent of “slippage” from a relatively easier form of support to a more difficult form is greatest in Zambia, Botswana and Namibia (reductions of 20, 17 and 15 percentage points, respectively). Support in Malawi falls by 7 percentage points and in Lesotho, already at a very low level, it goes down by only 3 percentage points. Zimbabweans, however, are even slightly more demanding of democracy as the only game in town when the alternative is expressed as an unelected leader.

Second, even when democracy is specified to be “not working,” democracy is supported by large majorities in Zimbabwe (74%) and Botswana (65%) as well as by substantial majorities in Malawi (59%) and Zambia (54%). However, in Namibia (43%) and Lesotho (34%) support for democracy becomes a minority position. Indeed, under such a hypothetical situation, the largest proportion of Namibians (exactly 50%) and four-in-ten Basotho (42%) – as well as 40% of Malawians -- say they would prefer a strong, unelected leader. Furthermore, an additional 11% of Basotho say they do not agree with either formulation as put to them.

### *Commitment to Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Democracy always best: Agree / Strongly Agree	65.4	73.9	54.3	58.6	34.1	42.7
Need Strong Leader Agree / Strongly Agree	29.1	19.0	29.5	40.2	41.8	50.0
Don't know	4.1	4.8	1.7	0.1	10.0	7.3
Agree With Neither (Volunteered)	1.0	1.8	1.7	0.0	11.6	0.0

*Sometimes democracy does not work. When this happens, some people say that we need a strong leader who does not have to bother with elections. Others say that even when things don't work, democracy is always best. What do you think? With which statement to you agree with most: Need strong leader; or Democracy Always Best?*



## *What Does “Democracy” Mean?*

Now that we have examined the extent of support for a type of political regime called “democracy,” the next question we need to examine is what Southern Africans understand “democracy” to mean. When being introduced into contexts with little experience of it this regime type, the popular acceptance of competitive multi-party, representative democracy may be affected by people’s own perceptions of what democracy is, or what Walter Lippmann once called their “picture in the head.” (Lippmann, 1922). Many analysts have complained that democracy (at least in its representative, multi-party meaning) is a foreign, northern concept, imposed on unwilling southerners.

If democratization is a western, or northern concept being imposed on unwilling Africans, we would expect that people in Southern Africa would have: first, a limited awareness of the term “democracy”; second, culturally distinct understandings of democracy; third, negative understandings of democracy; and fourth, low degrees of support for the key institutions of representative, multi-party democracy.

The first way we attempted to get at this question was to simply asked people: “What, if anything, do you understand by the word ‘democracy’? What comes to mind when you hear the word?” Although the questionnaire and interview was always conducted in the local language of the respondent’s choice the actual word “democracy” was always presented in English in four countries. In Namibia, Oshivambo interviews used the recognised word *oDemocracy*. Only in Botswana did we use a translation because the national research partners felt that people were more likely to be familiar with the Setswana phrase describing democracy.

In attempting to capture specific understandings of democracy, respondents were free to offer answers in their own words. Rather than trying to fit diverse interpretations into a narrow set of predetermined categories, we transcribed all answers verbatim and coded the responses after the fact. We did this especially because we did not want to overlook any distinctive meanings that Southern Africans might attach to democracy. We particularly wanted to avoid an imported, Western-oriented conceptual framework that might crowd out any indigenous interpretations.

### *Awareness of the Term “Democracy”*

First, “democracy” is a recognisable concept to most of the Southern Africans that we interviewed. Across the six countries surveyed, an average of almost three-quarters of all respondents (72.7%) was able to volunteer a definition of the term. Thus, by no stretch of the imagination can democracy be described as a strange and incomprehensible concept to Southern Africans.

Second, even though democracy appears to be a familiar concept to many Southern Africans, there are nonetheless important cross-national variations. Recognition of “democracy” is very high in four countries: almost nine-in-ten Malawians (87%), eight in ten Zimbabweans (81%) and Zambians (77%) and seven-in-ten Batswana (71%) are able to supply some definition of the

concept. The proportion drops below this threshold in Namibia where only 66 percent can provide some response. Lesotho is even lower where only 55 percent of Basotho are able to provide an answer.

*Awareness of the Term “Democracy”*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Able To Supply Meaning	71.1	80.9	77.0	86.7	54.6	65.7
Don't know / Cant Explain / Unable to explain	22.0	17.4	17.2	7.8	41.5	26.9
No Response	6.9	1.7	5.8	5.5	3.9	7.4

Third, while a large majority of respondents were able to give us some form of reaction to the concept, far lower proportions offered multiple responses (we allowed respondents to give up to three responses to this question). On average, only one in five respondents (20.5%) ventured a second definition, and only one in twenty (5.5%) provided a third response. This suggests that while there is widespread recognition of the term, we should not overestimate the depth of awareness or complexity of understanding. Thus, while certainly not an alien or unknown concept, popular understandings of democracy in Southern Africa may be quite vague or “thin.”

*Ability to Provide Multiple Definitions of Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Able to Supply A Second Meaning	27.6	20.3	14.9	22.8	8.3	29.1
Able to Supply A Third Meaning	7.6	5.8	1.8	7.5	1.0	9.1

*Positive or Negative Connotations of “Democracy”*

Do Southern Africans have a negative or positive understanding of “democracy?” We took respondents spontaneous responses and coded them according to whether they conveyed a positive, negative, or neutral / null connotation.

First of all, and in contrast to the view of democracy as an imposed, alien concept, Southern Africans have an overwhelmingly positive image of democracy. Malawians are most likely to view democracy in a positive light (eight out of ten), and approximately seven in ten attach positive connotations in Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana. The proportion drops in Namibia (65%) and in Lesotho, only a minority of respondents (45%) gave us a positive view.

Second, no more than one out of one hundred respondents in any country surveyed provided a negative definition. Even in Lesotho, where only a minority express a positive view, only one percent gave us a definition that expressed a negative or hostile view of democracy. Overall, less than one in two hundred respondents volunteered that democracy was a “foreign concept,” an instrument of “domination,” or an artifact of “colonialism.”

At worst, small minorities of respondents did offer what we coded as “null” or “neutral” meanings. These were responses that did not contain any direct, or overtly negative, or critical meaning. We registered non-trivial proportions that actively volunteered the answer that democracy meant “nothing” or was “meaningless” in Zimbabwe (11%), Lesotho (9%), Zambia (3%) and Botswana (2%).

*Positive – Negative Perceptions of Term “Democracy”*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>First Response</i>						
Positive Meanings	68.8	69.6	72.1	82.9	45.2	65.1
Negative Meanings	0.4	0.3	0.9	0.9	0.7	0.3
Null / Neutral Meanings	1.9	11.0	4.0	3.0	8.7	0.3
<i>Second Response</i>						
Positive Meanings	27.3	19.8	14.7	22.4	7.3	29.1
Negative Meanings	0.2	0.3	0.0	0.1	0.3	0.0
Null / Neutral Meanings	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.3	0.7	0.0
<i>Third Response</i>						
Positive Meanings	7.6	5.7	1.8	7.4	0.8	9.1
Negative Meanings	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Null / Neutral Meanings	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0

*What, if anything, do you understand by the word “democracy”? What comes to mind when you hear the word?*

*Interpretations of “Democracy”*

Besides the positive or negative valence attached to the concept of democracy, what exactly do Southern Africans think it means? Those writers, analysts and observers who have posited the existence of a peculiar, African understanding of democracy have tended to suggest two sets of alternative mental frameworks. The first is the putative tendency for Africans to see democracy as a quest for equalising social and economic outcomes in which political procedures such as constitutions and multiparty elections are mere formalities (Ake, 1996). The second is the putative tendency in the post-colonial period for Africans to understand democracy as a form of collective freedom of the new nation from European colonial rule (see MacPherson, 1967). In this sense, personal freedoms and rights would be seen to be much less important than national independence and rule by the “people” seen collectively. As can be seen below, neither of these arguments finds much support from the responses of our respondents.

First, when unprompted, Southern Africans overwhelmingly see democracy in political and liberal terms.

- o With two exceptions democracy is most frequently seen in terms of civil liberties or personal freedoms. This liberal understanding is most evident in Malawi (79%), Namibia (72%) and Zambia (65%). Civil liberties and personal freedoms are also mentioned most frequently, though at far lower absolute levels in Zimbabwe (30%). Civil liberties and freedoms are the second most frequently mentioned response in Botswana (30%) and Lesotho (17%).
- o In Botswana and Lesotho, people most frequently understand democracy as participation in decision-making (e.g. “government by the people”). One-third of Botswana (34%) gave this response, as did one-fifth of Basotho (21%). Democracy as popular rule is the second most frequently mentioned response in Zimbabwe (16%) and Zambia (12%).
- o Voting, electoral choice and multi-party choice is the second most frequently cited definition in Malawi (14%) and Namibia (10%), which may be a reflection that Malawi had just finished an election and Namibia was preparing for one at the time of the survey.

It should be noted that this is no simple, “minimalist” understanding that is merely satisfied with elections and voting. Rather this understanding, while overwhelmingly political, contains expansive elements like rights, popular participation in decision-making, and multi-party competition, things that electoral democracies the world over, let alone in Southern Africa, have had a difficult time delivering.<sup>6</sup>

*Understandings of the Term “Democracy”*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Positive Meanings</i>						
Civil Liberties / Personal Freedoms	29.6	30.2	64.5	78.7	17.4	71.6
Government By the People, For the People, Of the People	33.7	15.9	12.0	5.3	21.3	3.3
Voting / Electoral Choice / Multi-Party Competition	8.0	5.6	7.6	14.2	0.4	10.4
Peace / Unity	18.7	8.2	2.1	2.2	6.2	6.8
Social / Economic Development	3.2	4.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.6
Equality / Justice	7.7	7.2	0.8	0.8	1.2	9.4
Governance / Effectiveness / Accountability / Transparency	2.8	5.8	1.0	1.8	2.6	0.0
National Independence	2.2	1.8	0.4	1.1	1.2	5.0
Majority Rule	0.6	16.8	0.8	0.4	0.0	0.0
Rule of Law	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.2
Personal Security	0.5	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.4	0.5
Group Rights / Freedoms	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
Power Sharing / Government of National Unity	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.3	0.0
Other Positive Meanings	0.0	0.0	0.9	5.4	1.8	0.0
<i>Negative Meanings</i>						
Colonialism / Foreign Concept / Domination	0.3	0.3	0.2	0.3	0.1	0.3
Other Negative Meanings	0.3	0.4	0.8	0.7	1.1	0.1
<i>Null / Neutral Meanings</i>						
Nothing	2.0	7.6	2.9	0.1	7.0	0.0
Democracy Is Meaningless	0.1	3.7	0.5	0.1	0.0	0.0
Change of Government / Leadership / Laws	0.0	0.0	0.4	2.6	0.8	0.0
Too Afraid to Give Opinion	0.0	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.4
Does Not Matter	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.1	0.0
Other Null / Neutral Meanings	0.0	0.0	0.5	0.7	1.8	0.0
Refused / Won't Explain	0.3	0.1	1.7	0.1	0.1	0.0

*What, if anything, do you understand by the word “democracy”? What comes to mind when you hear the word?*  
(All three responses added together)

Second, there is very little evidence of a unique distinctive African collective / communal or economic / substantive understanding of democracy. The following tables gather together any responses from the previous table that might conceivably provide evidence for these arguments (because these arguments to some extent overlap so do some of the responses marshalled for these tables). Less than one-half of one percent of respondents make reference to group rights. And even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the collectivist argument and assume that all

<sup>6</sup> For a discussion of the growth of electoral, or “illiberal” democracy, see Zakaria (1997); also see Diamond (1996).

references to equality, justice, unity, independence, and majority rule implied group conceptions of all these terms, they do not come close to the frequency with which individual rights are mentioned. At most, one in ten Batswana, Zimbabweans and Namibians link economic outcomes to their understanding of democracy, when unprompted.

#### *Unique African Understandings of Democracy?*

<i>Q28a-c</i>	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Potential Communal / Collective Understandings</i>						
Peace / Unity	18.7	8.2	2.1	2.2	6.2	6.8
Equality / Justice	7.7	7.2	0.8	0.8	1.2	9.4
National Independence	2.2	1.8	0.4	1.1	1.2	5.0
Majority Rule	0.6	16.8	0.8	0.4	0.0	0.0
Group Rights / Freedoms	0.2	0.1	0.1	0.2	0.1	0.3
<i>Potential Social / Economic Understandings</i>						
Equality / Justice	7.7	7.2	0.8	0.8	1.2	9.4
Social / Economic Development	3.2	4.3	2.0	2.0	2.0	2.6

#### *Components of Democracy*

We also assessed this question in a second way. Building on a set of questions first used in South Africa in 1995, we listed a series of political or procedural elements of classic liberal democratic theory (majority rule, regular elections, multi-party competition, and freedom of speech and dissent) as well as a number of economic or substantive components often cited by the proponents of social democracy (universal access to basic necessities, full employment, universal access to education, and income equality). Noting that “people associate democracy with many diverse meanings,” we asked respondents whether each of these aspects was “essential,” “important,” “not very important,” or “not at all important,” in order for a society to be called democratic.

First of all, the responses suggest that when prompted, Southern Africans provide understandings of democracy that have a far heavier economic-substantive content than when offering unprompted, spontaneous responses. When political and economic components are put side by side, Southern Africans across countries are consistently *more likely to select economic components as essential* (especially basic necessities, full employment, and equal education) *than political components* (with the exception of majority rule). This suggests that Southern African conceptions of democracy at least *include* important substantive components of economic delivery.

Second, with regard to perceptions of political components, “majority rule” is the political component most often cited as essential in every country. Importantly, multi-party competition is cited as essential least often (with the exception of Botswana).

Third, in four countries, no political component is seen as an element of democracy. In Malawi majorities select majority rule and freedom of speech and dissent and in Zimbabwe, majorities select all four components as essential

There are also specific areas of particular concern. Obviously reflecting widespread popular disenchantment with its recent election debacle, only 32% of Basotho say regular elections are

essential to democracy. And probably stemming from serious questions about the conduct of its last election in Zambia, as well as the lack of legitimate opposition in Zambia and Namibia, only one-third of Zambians (36%) and Namibians (37%) think regular elections are essential. Also stemming from the lack of legitimate opposition in their respective countries and the governing party's lock on electoral success, only one-fifth to one-third of Namibians (22%), Basotho (35%) and Zambia (38%) say that multi-party competition is an essential aspect. In Namibia, only 26% say that freedom to criticise the government is essential (perhaps reflective of the state of emergency that existed at the time of the survey).

Fourth, with regard to economic components, universal access to basic necessities is mentioned most often in four countries, while jobs were cited most frequently in Lesotho and education in Namibia. Notably, a small gap between rich and poor receives the least emphasis in each country.

#### *Understanding of Various Components of Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Majority rule	47.2	66.8	46.7	65.6	41.0	42.0
Complete freedom for anyone to criticise the government	40.8	59.5	40.3	57.8	39.2	26.0
Regular elections	45.9	60.6	36.3	47.1	32.0	37.1
At least two political parties competing with each other	44.6	58.0	37.5	45.0	35.2	22.0
Basic necessities like shelter, food and water for everyone	52.3	68.6	57.3	77.0	60.1	51.5
Jobs for everyone	48.6	67.3	45.3	54.6	63.6	53.4
Equality in education	50.6	62.4	43.8	67.5	56.4	56.4
A small income gap between rich and poor	33.7	50.7	29.2	50.2	36.5	26.6

*People associate democracy with many diverse meanings such as the ones I will mention now. In order for a society to be called democratic, is each of these:  
(% Essential)*

The fifth key finding is that there are consistent differences across respondents in their emphasis on the political components (majority rule, free speech, regular elections, multi-party competition) on one hand, and the economic components (access to basic necessities, full employment, equal education and economic equality) on the other. A statistical test known as Factor Analysis demonstrates that people's responses to these eight items tap two separate underlying dimensions. An examination of which items "load" or correlate with the two dimensions reveals a neat divide along political / procedural versus economic / substantive lines.

In order to summarise these separate dimensions, we created two scales measuring the degree to which political and economic components were important to democracy (each scale ranges from 1 to 4 where 1 means "not important at all" and 4 means "essential"). The validity of each scale was confirmed by Factor Analysis and the reliability by Reliability Analysis.

Across the region, the strongest emphasis on political procedures is found in Zimbabwe, most certainly because of the scarcity of these political goods in that country (this is demonstrated by various responses to various questions in Section III of this report). Basotho are the least likely to cite classic political procedures as essential for democracy.

### *Political Components of Democracy Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	3.51	1112	.5968
Botswana	3.32	1109	.5667
Malawi	3.28	1180	.6774
Zambia	3.25	1089	.5843
Namibia	3.07	1037	.5683
Lesotho	2.95	776	.8720
Total	3.25	6303	.6636

In terms of economic perceptions of democracy, Zimbabweans are also more likely to say that economic factors are essential aspects of democracy while Zambians are the least likely to see economics as important.

### *Economic Components of Democracy*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	3.55	1081	.5478
Lesotho	3.50	830	.6929
Malawi	3.46	1185	.5528
Namibia	3.34	1088	.4997
Botswana	3.33	1107	.5670
Zambia	3.29	1112	.5457
Total	3.40	6403	.5724

### *Non-Democratic Alternatives*

Aside from what people understand by the term (their “picture in the head”), a second and equally important question is the extent to which people support the practices commonly associated with democracy (such as civilian rule through elected representatives, multi-party competition, representative legislatures, and checks and balances among representative institutions). To what extent are Southern Africans willing to abandon these principles and move to their undemocratic antitheses (one party rule, traditional rule, military rule, presidential dictatorship, rule by unelected technocrats, or simply returning to the non-democratic *ancien regime*). To assess this we modified a scale used in Central and Eastern Europe that assesses support for non-democratic alternatives to the present system (in which the present system is characterised not as “democracy” but as “our present system with elections and many political parties”) (Rose et al, 1999).

The responses to the items yield several important findings. First, across the six countries surveyed, Southern Africans roundly reject authoritarian alternatives. Viewed in this way, there is little nostalgia to return to an authoritarian past, or to try some new dictatorial alternative. Southern Africans reject rule by the “Big Man,” by the single party, by the military, traditional rule, or a return to the previous non-democratic regime.

- o Majorities ranging from 89% and 57% of national publics disapprove of dictatorial, Presidential rule
- o Between 94% and 59% disapprove military rule;

- o Between 78% and 51% disapprove of a one-party state;
- o Between 80% and 55% disapprove of traditional rule on a national basis;
- o And between 77% and 65% disapprove of returning to the previous non-democratic regime.<sup>7</sup>

Second, only with respect to the option of technocratic rule, whereby economic decision-making is reserved to “economic experts,” is there any modicum of support for a non-democratic form of decision-making. Majorities reject this form of rule in Zambia (59%) and Botswana (52%). However, only minorities would oppose a shift to this form of regime in Lesotho (49%), (41%), Malawi (39%) and Zimbabwe (34%). This suggests that many Southern Africans do not feel sufficiently confident of their grasp of the operations of the national economy and would rather leave these decisions to those more qualified than them.

### *Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives*

<i>Q53 – q 58</i>	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
If only one political party, or candidates from only one party, were allowed to stand for elections and hold office?	77.5	73.8	79.8	76.5	50.8	62.5
If all decisions were made by a council of Elders, Traditional Leaders or Chiefs	73.7	62.7	79.7	71.2	58.7	54.5
If the army came in to govern the country?	84.6	79.2	94.0	82.4	69.6	58.7
If parliament and political parties were abolished, so that the President could decide everything?	86.1	77.5	89.3	67.0	68.9	57.0
If economic experts rather than an elected government or parliament made all important decisions about the economy.	51.6	33.6	58.9	38.9	48.8	40.5
IF [ the country returned to the previous regime ]	70.6	73.2	75.9	72.1	64.6	77.1

*Our current system of governing with regular elections and more than one political party is not the only one \_\_\_\_\_ has ever had. Some people say that we would be better off if we had a different system of government. How much would you disapprove, neither disapprove nor approve, or approve of the following alternatives to our current system of government with at least two political parties and regular elections?  
(% “Strongly disapprove” / “Disapprove”)*

Third, a factor analysis of the responses demonstrates that, with the exception of people’s feelings about technocratic rule, Southern Africans were responding to all these options in a common way. That is, while respondents were making distinctions between the various items (as evidenced by the different levels of aggregate responses), they were also reacting to them as variations on the same common theme: non-democratic rule. This in itself has at several important implications.

- o It confirms that when people say they prefer a democratic regime to something else, they are not just registering random responses, or socially accepted responses.
- o It also confirms that even though people may have positive views about traditional leadership, as a form of national government they see it in the same light as one party rule, military rule, a presidential strong man, or a return to the colonial or authoritarian past.

<sup>7</sup> In Botswana this was expressed as a return to British colonial rule; in Zimbabwe, a return to the Smith regime; for Zambia, it was return to rule under Kaunda; for Malawi, a return to the rule under the MCP government; for Lesotho, it was a return to military rule; and for Namibia, a return to rule by South Africa.



- o It suggests that people do not see technocratic dominance of national economic decisions as an anti-democratic or authoritarian aspect.

Fourth, based on an index ranging from 1 to 5 (where 1 means strong approval and 5 means strong disapproval) average rejection of non-democratic alternatives is highest in Zambia (4.3), Botswana (at 4.2), and Zimbabwe (4.2) (none of which are statistically different from one another as demonstrated by an Analysis of Variance). Rejection of non-democratic rule is weakest in Lesotho (3.89) and Namibia (3.8) (though in both of these countries, opposition to returning to military dictatorship or colonial rule by South Africa attracts substantially higher amounts of opposition. In fact, on the issue of a return to colonial rule by South Africa, Namibians are more vocal in their opposition to going backward than any other country in the study.

Fourth, with the exception of the item on returning to the previous system of non-democratic government, Zambians are most likely to reject each form of authoritarianism. And even on the issue of returning to life under the Kaunda regime, opposition is very high with three-quarters of Zambians opposed to any such idea.

*Rejection of Non-Democratic Alternatives Index*

Country	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zambia	4.30	1108	.7064
Botswana	4.22	957	.8306
Zimbabwe	4.19	1078	.8104
Malawi	4.13	1078	.8319
Lesotho	3.89	895	1.0486
Namibia	3.82	942	.8866
Total	4.10	6141	.8680

*Evaluating the Democratic Content of the Present Regime*

The questions just reviewed can be seen as expressions of “demand” for democracy. But even though we have found high levels of demand for democracy, and low levels of demand for contending regime types, what about the perceived “supply” of democracy? How much democracy do people feel is being produced by their political system?

*The Extent of Democracy*

We used two questions to assess people’s perceptions of the extent of how democratic their political system is. First of all, we asked people to evaluate the freeness and fairness of their most recent election. The results show that election administrators still have some distance to travel in creating a widespread sense that elections are free and fair.

- o Only in Botswana (54%) does more than a simple majority see their last election as completely democratic. However, once we add in the 28% who say it was free and fair with “minor problems,” eight-in-ten Botswana could be said to be largely satisfied with the conduct of their most recent election. Three-quarters of Namibians (75%) fall into the same category with respect to their 1999 elections.

- o Of note, 65% of Zambians are relatively satisfied with the conduct of their most recent elections in 1996. It should be remembered that this election was boycotted by the largest opposition party and former ruling party (UNIP), over constitutional amendments banning its leader, and most prominent opposition leader, former President Kenneth Kaunda (for similar findings, see Bratton, 1997).
- o Opinion is much more mixed in Lesotho, whose 1998 election was apparently unproblematic, but an extremely disproportional ratio of votes to seats called the legitimacy of the results into question among opposition supporters, which in turn led to mounting unrest, a coup attempt, and eventual military intervention by SADC. One-third of Basotho feel the election was completely free and fair, almost three in ten felt their were minor (17%) or major (11%) problems, and just under one-in-five (18%) feel the election was not free and fair.
- o There are more important problems in Malawi where the 1999 election results were being challenged in court. There, one-in-three people feel that it was free and fair “with several major problems” (13%) or that it simply was “not free and fair” (21%).
- o In Zimbabwe, less than one-in-three Zimbabweans evidence any degree of satisfaction with their 1996 election. Almost one-half of all Zimbabweans say that there were “major problems” (21%) or that it was not free or fair (26%).

*How Democratic Was the Last Election?*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Completely Free and Fair	54.5	16.2	42.8	46.2	37.3	49.6
Free and fair, with some minor problems	28.3	14.5	22.3	16.6	16.9	28.4
On the whole, free and fair but with several major problems	6.5	20.9	9.6	12.7	11.0	7.8
Not free or fair	3.4	25.5	7.8	21.3	18.0	3.3
Don't know	6.8	22.2	15.3	3.1	16.7	10.8

*On the whole, how would you rate the freeness and fairness of the last national election, held in \_\_\_\_? Was it: \_\_\_\_?*

We also asked respondents for an overall evaluation of the democratic extent of their political system. In no country does a simple majority feel their societies have achieved full democracy.

- o 46% of Botswana say that the way their country is governed is “completely democratic” far more than in any of the other countries surveyed. And when added together with the 36% who say that it is largely democratic but “with minor problems,” this means that almost eight out of ten Botswana perceive a healthy supply of democracy from their government.
- o Seven-in-ten Namibians feel that their country is fully or largely democratic, though the single largest group (40%) falls in the category that sees some exceptions.
- o Only six-in-ten Malawians (62%) and Zambians (62%) see their government as fully or largely democratic. 23% of Malawians see “major problems,” and another 12% say it is “not a democracy.” 20% of Zambians say there are major problems and another 7% say it is not a democracy.
- o More serious problems exist in Lesotho where just over one-third (36%) feel the country is either democratic, or democratic with minor problems. 13 percent say there are major problems, 17 percent say that it is not a democracy. Perhaps as problematic, almost one-third (31%) of the sample say they do not know how democratic the country is.
- o If problems exist in Lesotho, they are even worse in Zimbabwe where almost four-in-ten say the country is not a democracy. 17 percent say there are “major problems” with their

democracy, and 12 percent even *volunteered* that they do not understand the question (this was virtually the only question in the survey where Zimbabweans chose this option in large numbers). Thus, it appears that people either had difficulty thinking of Zimbabwe in these terms (given the long period of enforced on party dominance), or simply had a difficult time admitting what may be a painful admission to people who so obviously want their country to be democratic and have been told for many years that they live in a democracy.

*How Democratic Is the Way Your Country Is Governed*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Completely democratic	45.8	9.0	24.4	33.8	23.6	29.6
Democratic, but with some minor exceptions	36.2	17.8	37.8	28.2	12.6	41.4
Democratic, with some major exceptions	7.6	17.2	20.1	22.6	12.8	15.1
Not a democracy	5.0	37.9	7.1	12.3	17.3	2.7
Do not understand question DO NOT READ	1.2	12.1	2.3	0.8	2.6	3.7
Don't know DO NOT READ	4.0	5.2	7.0	2.2	30.8	7.6

*On the whole, is the way \_\_\_\_\_ is governed: READ OUT OPTIONS*

A factor analysis of the responses to both these question suggests that people’s responses were drawing on a common underlying impression about the quality and extent of democracy in their own country. Thus, the responses to the two items can be combined together to form a reliable four point scale running from 1 to 4 (where 1 is the view that elections are not free and fair, and the country is not democratic, and 4 is the view that there are no problems with either).

Batswana see their political system as more democratic than other southern Africans (3.4 out of a possible 4) followed by Namibians (3.3). Malawians (2.9) and Basotho (2.8) give significantly lower estimations of the extent of democracy in their country. Finally, Zimbabweans have the lowest estimates of the extent of democracy (2.13 out of 4), but are below the midpoint (2.5) and thus on balance, tend to think their country is either not democratic or has severe problems in this respect.

*Extent of Democracy Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Botswana	3.37	1062	.6739
Namibia	3.25	943	.6405
Zambia	3.07	916	.7463
Malawi	2.89	1140	.9754
Lesotho	2.78	699	.9778
Zimbabwe	2.13	803	.9067
Total	2.95	5563	.9131

*Has Multi-Party Politics Delivered More Freedom and Rights?*

Regardless of their current evaluation of the extent of democracy delivered by the present multi-party government, people’s ultimate satisfaction and support for democracy may depend more on the extent that they see their political system is better than what they had before, and more specifically, has secured a greater degree of freedoms and rights than the previous regime. Thus,

we used a scale of questions first asked in Central and Eastern Europe that measures the extent to which people feel that their multi-party regimes have delivered increased political freedoms (see Rose et al, 1999). Thus, we asked people whether there is more freedom of speech, of political association, of voting and from arbitrary arrest under the new dispensation. However, given our concern with competing political and economic understandings of democracy in Africa, we modified the scale to measure a number of economic rights as well. Thus, we also asked respondents whether people were now more equal (both in terms of treatment by government, as well as in overall condition), safer from crime and violence, had greater access to basic necessities, or were more likely to have adequate standard of livings.

The findings suggest at least three key factors at work in people's responses. The first is time: with the exception of Lesotho, those countries with more recent transitions from authoritarian rule (e.g. Malawi, Zambia and Namibia) are more likely to register a sense that they enjoy increased political freedoms (the same is also true for economic rights in Malawi and Namibia).

The second factor at play may have to do with the harshness of the previous regime. Emerging from a particularly harsh form of eccentric, almost totalitarian autocracy under Banda, Malawians are consistently most likely to feel that they enjoy greater political freedoms under their multi-party regime. And emerging from the South African-imposed system of *apartheid* that governed a whole range of one's economic (as well as political) life, Namibians are consistently most likely to see improvements in economic rights.

A third key finding emanating from these results is that across each country, appreciation of increased political freedoms is consistently higher than for increased economic rights. Thus, Southern Africans are aware that transitions from autocracy to multi-party rule have brought greater political freedom even as they are not so certain that it has improved the quality of their economic lives.

### *Perceived Increases in Freedoms and Rights Under Multi-Party Politics*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Anyone can freely say what he or she thinks	57.0	54.2	76.1	88.9	56.0	79.9
People can join any political organisation they choose.	59.6	63.2	84.0	93.3	63.3	85.4
People can live without fear of being arrested by the police if they have not done anything wrong.	57.3	63.9	73.7	84.6	59.3	78.7
Each person can freely choose who to vote for without feeling forced by others	60.1	62.5	81.7	94.0	65.8	85.7
Everybody is treated equally and fairly by government.	49.1	43.9	43.8	57.4	47.2	64.8
People are safe from crime and violence	43.4	32.6	35.4	14.4	39.9	51.7
People have an adequate standard of living.	45.3	28.4	27.8	50.5	41.8	57.4
People have access to basic necessities (like food and water)	50.8	35.7	36.0	59.9	45.6	61.1
_____ are equal to one another	42.9	36.9	32.9	49.1	40.3	66.3

*Some people say that today, under our current system of government, our political and overall life is better than it was under \_\_\_\_\_. Others say things are no better, or even worse. For each of these following matters, would you say things today are worse, about the same, or better?  
(% "much better / better")*

A fourth key finding comes from a factor analysis of the responses to these items that indicates that they actually tap two different underlying dimensions, one reflecting evaluations of increased political freedoms and the other measuring perceptions of increased economic rights. This is another indication that people in Southern Africa are quite able to make separate evaluations about the consequences of their country's respective democratic experiments and do not simply make one "package" assessment of democracy. Thus, we constructed two indices that calculate an average (mean) level of appreciation of increases in political freedom, and of economic rights, under multi-party democracy.

When it comes to political evaluations, Malawians are the most likely to feel that their multi-party regime has brought greater freedoms (4.5 on a scale of 1 to 5). While Zimbabweans, on balance, do feel that they enjoy more political freedom under the post-independence Mugabe regime than under the UDI / Ian Smith regime, they are the least optimistic of all Southern Africans.

*Political Freedoms Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Malawi	4.46	1178	.6842
Namibia	4.20	1098	.6935
Botswana	4.18	762	.6490
Lesotho	4.04	941	1.0831
Zambia	4.02	1138	.7546
Zimbabwe	3.60	1054	.8302
Total	4.09	6171	.8362

A comparison of the overall mean score for political freedoms (4.1) to that of economic rights (3.3) is another reflection of the fact that Southern Africans are far more likely to agree that multi-party democracy has brought political than economic gains. The much higher standard deviation for increased economic rights (1.0541 compared to .8362 for political freedoms) also demonstrates that there is far more disagreement among people about the economic consequences of multi-partyism, which also reflects the quite different economic trajectories of post-authoritarian Southern Africa.

In terms of economics, Botswana are the most likely to feel that democracy has brought (or accompanied) improvements in their economic conditions than compared to life under British colonial rule. This is a clear reflection of the decades of sustained growth experienced by Botswana following its independence. Zimbabweans and Zambians are least likely to feel that the quality of their economic lives has improved under their multi-party regimes. In fact, the mean score in both cases (2.8) lies below the midpoint of the scale, meaning that the average Zimbabwean and Zambian feels that their economic lives have either remained the same or deteriorated under Mugabe and Chiluba.

### *Economic Rights*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Botswana	3.71	731	.8266
Namibia	3.63	1011	.7934
Lesotho	3.41	901	1.2890
Malawi	3.12	1176	1.0104
Zimbabwe	2.83	1040	.9920
Zambia	2.76	1083	.9475
Total	3.21	5942	1.0541

### *Satisfaction With Democracy*

Regardless of their perceptions of how democratic their multi-party regimes are, or the extent to which multi-party systems have brought increased political freedoms and economic rights, how satisfied are Southern Africans with the way democracy works in practice in their country?

There is substantial variation in satisfaction with democracy across the countries surveyed. It is quite high in Botswana (where three quarters -- 75% -- are “satisfied” or “very satisfied”) and Namibia (64%), and relatively high in Zambia (59%) and Malawi (57%).

There are much larger problems in Lesotho where just over one-third say they are satisfied with the way democracy works in their country (38%). However, almost as many people say they cannot answer the question (27%) as say they are dissatisfied (31%). We believe this reflects the tentative nature of Lesotho’s political system at the time of the survey where subsequent to the civil unrest and foreign military intervention that followed its 1998 election, the elected majority party government co-exists uncomfortably with an appointed, multi-party interim political authority. Quite understandably, many people simply are not sure of the status of their political system at this point. That this reflects confusion rather than a belief that the system is not democratic is shown by the fact that only 4% went out of their way to tell us that the system is not a democracy.

However, the worst picture is seen in Zimbabwe where less than one-fifth of respondents (18%) said in October-November 1999 that they were satisfied with the way democracy works in their country. In fact, an equally large proportion of respondents (17%) of Zimbabweans refused to answer the question on its own terms, and instead volunteered the response that “Zimbabwe is not a democracy.” A further 7% said they did not know.

### *Satisfaction With Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Very satisfied / Fairly satisfied	74.6	18.2	58.8	57.2	38.4	64.2
Not very satisfied / Not at all satisfied	21.7	56.9	35.2	39.0	30.5	25.3
_____ is not a democracy (Volunteered)	0.8	16.8	0.7	1.7	4.2	0.5
Don't know	2.8	6.8	3.7	1.8	26.5	9.9

*Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in \_\_\_\_\_?*

## *A Demand and Supply Model of Democracy*

Putting these last few questions together allows us to construct a useful picture of the expressed “demand” for democracy and its perceived “supply” in six Southern African states.

In Botswana, Malawi and Zambia, there appears to be a relative equilibrium of demand for democracy and perceived supply. In Botswana, that equilibrium exists at very high levels, and three quarters of Botswana are satisfied with this status. In Malawi and Zambia, the equilibrium occurs at modestly high levels, and majorities are satisfied.

In Namibia, there is a noticeable disequilibrium. Namibians exhibit relatively weak demand for democracy, yet feel their country is governed democratically, and are relatively satisfied with the way democracy works there. This raises a few different possibilities. It might be that the regime is providing more democracy than the people want; or, it might be that while Namibians are not wildly fond of democracy, they are willing to consume whatever output the de facto single party regime produces that it chooses to call democracy.

At present, Lesotho appears to enjoy equilibrium at fairly low levels of demand and supply. Minorities demand democracy (though most people also reject the non-democratic alternatives we posed to them), and a minority also feel that their government is democratic (though they do perceive a significant amount of political liberalisation compared to life under the military regime).

In Zimbabwe, there is a more severe disequilibrium. Put simply, Zimbabweans long for democracy, but are adamant that they are not getting it. They are very dissatisfied with the situation.

### *Expressed Demand and Perceived Supply of Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia	
<i>Demand</i>							
Support Democracy	82	71	74	66	39	58	
Commitment to Democracy	65	74	54	61	34	43	
Reject Non-Democratic Alternatives <sup>8</sup>	79	73	84	73	63	62	
<i>Supply</i>							
Elections Free and Fair	83	31	65	63	54	78	
Country Is Governed Democratically	82	27	62	62	36	71	
Political Freedoms Have Increased <sup>9</sup>	59	61	79	90	61	83	
<i>Satisfaction</i>							
Satisfaction	75	18	59	57	38	64	

<sup>8</sup> Average of five items measuring rejection of non-democratic alternative regimes.

<sup>9</sup> Average of four items measuring perceived increases in political freedom under multi-party regime.

### **III**

## ***Attitudes Toward State and Government***

The previous section tapped public attitudes toward a regime called democracy. However, democracy does not exist in a vacuum. The quality of democracy as well as public support for democracy is dependent on the performance of the state and government. Thus, in this section, we turn our attention to public attitudes toward the state (the set of institutions that survive over time and that are, at least in theory independent of the government of the day) as well as attitudes toward the government.

### ***State Legitimacy***

Legitimate political systems are those that can depend on compliance from citizens, business, and civil society. Just as we speak of democratic legitimation as the sense that democracy is “the only game in town,” state legitimation can be seen as the sense that there is no alternative set of structures or institutions that people see as able to make authoritative, binding societal decisions. Legitimacy “endows governmental decisions with moral oughtness” (Eldridge, 1977: 8). It is the sense that rule-makers have the right to make laws, and that those laws ought to be obeyed (Tyler, 1990: 27-28). More specifically, this sense comprises the belief that those in power (the incumbents of government institutions) have a right to make binding decisions because: (1) they are duly elected to that office by widely accepted procedures; (2) they exercise power in a widely accepted way; and (3) that the rules that govern the state (e.g. the constitution) reflect widely accepted values and norms.

Legitimacy is important because governments cannot make every decision based on consensus, and it cannot afford to take a vote on every policy decision it faces especially those decisions that are matters of executive and administrative policy (rather than legislation). Almost all legislative and administrative policy outcomes will be opposed by significant minorities and sometimes even by majorities. As Lincoln said, “You can’t please all the people, all of the time.” Legitimacy is what enables a state to obtain compliance for those decisions without having to resort to force. It constitutes a form of “diffuse” support for a political system, a form of support that does not have to be earned but rather inheres in the institutions of the political system rather than the current occupants of those institutions (which is referred to as “specific” support) (Easton, 1965).

While specific support is based on short-term satisfaction with government actions and policy outputs, diffuse support is said to be based largely on longer-term, affective attachments to authority usually learned in childhood, attachments that are unrelated to cost-benefit calculations. According to Easton, diffuse support constitutes a “reserve of support that enables a system to weather the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against input demands. It is a kind of support that a system does not have to buy with more or less direct benefits (Easton, 1965: 273).

A legitimate political system is likely to be a more stable political system. Legitimacy acts as a buffer to cushion the system against shocks from short-term dissatisfaction with policy and performance (Easton, 1965). It should bring about more cooperative behaviour on the part of its



citizens; they are more likely to obey the law and refrain from anti-system behaviour (e.g. protest) if they view the sources of those laws as legitimate (Tyler, 1990: 30-33).

But it not clear whether we should expect to find legitimate institutions in Southern Africa. First of all, one of the legacies of the “Big Man” rule of the neo-patrimonial state was that Presidents and ruling single parties had had little reason to develop an independent state (Bratton & Van De Walle, 1997). Thus, most citizens may not have learned to differentiate between the incumbents, and the state institutions. Second, with spiralling debt, devaluing currencies, deteriorating government delivery and retracting welfare systems, the governments of Southern Africa have probably been in a prolonged cycle of increasing public dissatisfaction for the past decade. In any political system, diffuse support is almost certainly connected to policy performance over the long term. It is difficult to imagine that a people (no matter how much an initial “cushion” of support for authority exists) will indefinitely support political institutions that fail to deliver (Mattes & Christie, 1997: 208).

What do the survey responses say about the components of state legitimacy in Southern Africa? While it seems that most Southern Africans have positive views of their political systems on these matters only in one or two instances does it appear that they are large enough to suggest widespread agreement on the legitimacy of the political system.

- o Across the board, majorities ranging from eight-in-ten to just over a majority agree that their present government was elected through acceptable procedures.
- o With the exception of Zimbabwe, majorities ranging from three-quarter to one-half of publics agree that their governments exercise power in an acceptable way.
- o And, with the exception of Zimbabwe, majorities and pluralities ranging from just over six-in-ten to just under one-half agree that their country’s constitution expresses the broader values of the society.
- o However, when it comes to what should be the defining feature of legitimacy, the sense that government decisions should be binding on people regardless of whether they agree with the decision, agreement is much lower ranging between four-in-ten and only two-in-ten.

From one perspective, the lower level of agreement with the last item could indicate that while people may feel that their political systems formally meet the conditions of legitimacy, they have not yet developed that sense of attachment that brings about widespread acceptance of unpopular decisions. From another perspective, it may indicate that people feel that government cannot just do whatever it wants, but must take public opinion into account when making decisions. In fact, a factor analysis of these items indicates that while responses to these four items do tap one common underlying dimension, views toward this last statement are the most weakly related to the underling factor.

### *State Legitimacy*

	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Our government was elected to power by accepted procedures.	82.0	57.8	70.5	65.4	53.6	78.1
Our government exercises power in an acceptable way	72.7	23.8	56.8	61.8	49.7	70.3
Our constitution expresses the values and aspirations of the Zambian people.	62.4	22.6	49.5	56.4	48.6	65.5
Our government has the right to make decisions that all people have to abide by whether or not they agree with them.	37.3	20.2	32.8	29.1	43.6	40.5

Here are some things people often say about our current political system. For each of the following statements, please tell me whether you *disagree*, *neither disagree nor agree*, or *agree*? (% “Strongly Agree” / “Agree”)

Namibians and Batswana accord their government the highest average levels of agreement. We also see important cross-national variations. The lowest levels of agreement are found in Zimbabwe. In fact, the mean level of agreement (2.5 on a scale of 1 to 5) falls below the midpoint of 3, and thus suggest that the political system there is *illegitimate*.

### *Legitimacy Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	3.72	974	.7263
Botswana	3.61	1043	.8014
Lesotho	3.53	784	1.3872
Zambia	3.35	971	.9101
Malawi	3.25	1112	1.1179
Zimbabwe	2.51	962	.9709
Total	3.32	5846	1.0712

### *Trust In State and Government Institutions*

An attitude widely seen by social scientists to be closely related to legitimacy is a sense of trust in the occupants of political institutions. Again, this is related to the notion that citizens do not have to watch their leaders constantly, that they can trust them to act in their interests in the great majority of cases where democratic leaders are unable to canvass public opinion. The survey responses reveal that trust in the institutions of government varies quite drastically, both across institutions as well as across country.

First, the overtly political institutions of the President / Prime Minister, Parliament and Local Governments enjoy far lower levels of popular trust than do the more technocratic, more purely “state” institutions. Moreover, with the exception of Malawi, Lesotho and Namibia, none of these government institutions are trusted by a simple majority of the public.

Second, the effects of “big man’ in the public mind can only be argued to exist in Namibia where more than seven-in-ten Namibians trust President Sam Nujoma (almost the same level of trust given by South Africans to Nelson Mandela in a 1998 Idasa survey). Only one half of Malawians trust President Bakili Maluzi, just over four in ten Batswana say they trust President Festus Mogae and four-in-ten Basotho trust Prime Minister Bethuel Mosisili. At the most extreme, less than one-in-five Zimbabweans trust President Robert Mugabe.

Third, either local government councils or Parliament are consistently the *least* trusted institution in each country.

Fourth, the Army and the State Broadcasters are, on average, the most trusted institutions in Southern Africa. The State Broadcaster is the most trusted institution in Namibia and Lesotho, and is trusted by an average of 60.2 percent across all countries. The army is the most trusted institution in Botswana, Malawi and Zimbabwe, and is trusted by 58.8 percent across all countries. In every country except Namibia and Lesotho, it is one of the three most trusted institutions, and in every country with the notable exception of Lesotho it is trusted by a majority of the public. Zambia provides the most unique profile where the courts of law are the most trusted institution.

Finally, it should be noted that across many of these institutions, the proportions of those who say they do not know enough about the institution to have an opinion are quite high.

#### *Trust In Institutions*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
The President / Prime Minister	43.6	19.4	37.4	50.0	40.4	72.5
Parliament	46.2	17.0	23.1	32.8	29.7	50.7
Your local government	41.3	28.1	20.4	NA	18.2	47.3*
The Army	71.2	52.2	53.3	71.1	39.2	66.0
The police	60.0	35.5	37.5	41.7	40.4	68.9
Courts of law	64.3	42.2	63.6	47.1	42.2	63.6
Electoral Commission	54.1	25.9	44.5	49.0	31.6	65.8
State Broadcasting Corporation	70.8	40.0	57.5	56.2	52.7	84.0
Government Press / Newspapers	67.2	31.1	46.9	34.5	36.6	NA
Independent Press / Newspapers	62.1	42.2	43.2	36.3	32.3	62.0

(For President, Parliament, and Local Government: “How much of the time can you trust \_\_\_\_\_ to do what is right? Is it never, only some of the time, most of the time, just about always, or haven’t you heard enough about him / it to know?” For others: “What about the following institutions? How much of the time can you trust them to do what is right? Is it never, only some of the time, most of the time, just about always, or don’t you know enough about them to know?”

(% “Always” + “Most of the time”)

\* Namibia (n = 1060)

A factor analysis of the responses to these items reveals two underlying dimensions, one tapping trust in political institutions (Local Government, Parliament, and President) and another expressing trust in state institutions (Army, Police, Courts, Electoral Commission and State Broadcaster). We then constructed an index summarizing public trust toward each of these sets of institutions.

The differing mean scores also convey the significantly higher levels of trust in apolitical, state institutions (2.8 on a scale of 1 to 4) than partisan, political institutions (2.4).

There are important national variations, and the rank-order of the national differences are almost identical on each scale. Namibians, followed by Batswana express the greatest degree of trust in both state and political institutions, and Zimbabweans the least.

#### *Trust In State Institutions Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	3.13	937	.6891
Botswana	2.99	809	.6488
Malawi	2.72	1009	.8892
Zambia	2.65	773	.6516
Lesotho	2.62	651	.9030
Zimbabwe	2.34	750	.7923
Total	2.76	4929	.8107

#### *Trust In Political Institutions Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	2.90	801	.7205
Botswana	2.59	739	.7427
Malawi*	2.44	1122	.8472
Lesotho	2.46	384	.9392
Zambia	2.12	988	.6832
Zimbabwe	1.91	934	.7133
Total	2.36	3848	.8258

*For Malawi, mean only reports average trust in President and Parliament. For all other countries, mean represents average score for trust in President, Parliament, and Local Government. Total excludes Malawi.*

### ***Perceptions of Democratic Governance***

Whether or not people feel that the political system is legitimate and trustworthy may have a lot to do, over the long haul, with how well people feel the government has performed in vital areas, such as guaranteeing security and peace, and maintaining and improving the general welfare of the country. In the short run, however, two other important evaluations that may shape perceptions of government legitimacy are, first, the sense that the incumbents of state offices are responsive to public opinion, broadly, and second, the sense that state institutions are transparent and practice “good government.”

#### *Responsiveness*

In order to measure people’s sense of the degree to which government institutions are responsive to public opinion, we asked respondents “how interested” they felt the President, Parliament and their Local Government was “in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think?”

First of all, we see that only in Malawi and Namibia do we find large majorities who feel that any their political institutions are responsive to public opinion. Moderate majorities share this opinion in Botswana. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, only minorities share this view.

Second, the President is, ironically, seen as the most responsive institution in Zambia, Malawi and Namibia. Local government is most frequently seen as responsive in Zimbabwe and Lesotho.

#### *Responsiveness of Institutions*

<i>Q64, q68, q73</i>	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia	South Africa
How interested do you think the President is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think?	53.2	25.4	46.0	62.7	40.2	78.2	72.4
How interested do you think parliament is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Are they:	56.4	25.8	35.9	47.1	32.3	59.0	59.0
How interested do you think your local councillor is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Is he/she	47.2	37.6	43.6	NA	59.0	48.6	44.9

*How interested do you think the \_\_\_\_\_ is in what happens to you or hearing what people like you think? Is he / it not at all interested, not very interested, interested, very interested, or haven't you heard enough about him / it to know?*  
(% "Very interested" / "Interested")

\* Namibia (n = 1065)

Third, based on a reliable index of perceived responsiveness to public opinion, Namibians (3.0) are most likely to feel that their political institutions are responsive to public opinion, followed by Botswana (2.8) and Malawi (2.7). Zimbabweans are least likely to view their institutions in this light.

#### *Responsiveness of Political Institutions Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	2.96	782	.6978
Botswana	2.78	651	.6839
Malawi*	2.65	1121	.8587
Lesotho	2.40	576	1.0123
Zambia	2.24	941	.7991
Zimbabwe	2.00	934	.7660
Total*	2.44	3886	.8674

*For Malawi, mean only reports average responsiveness of President and Parliament. For all other countries, mean represents average score for trust in President, Parliament, and Local Government. Total excludes Malawi.*

## Corruption

The other key short-term evaluation that may shape perceptions of government legitimacy and trustworthiness is the sense that government officials are involved in corruption. We defined corruption as “where those in government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for themselves, or expect people to pay them money or a gift to do their job.” Then we asked respondents how many officials in various institutions and levels of government they felt were involved in corruption. We want to emphasize that this question only measures *perceptions* of official corruption and is not itself a measure of the actual extent of unethical behavior in government (see the following section on *Personal Experience With Government Corruption*).

First of all, with the possible exceptions of Namibia and Lesotho, we see that perceptions of official corruption are fairly extensive across the region. Thus, regardless of whether these perceptions are accurate, most governments across the countries surveyed confront an important political challenge. Such negative perceptions can only be ignored at the risk of damaging faith in democratic government.

Second, the results indicate that perceptions of corruption in government differ much more by country than they do by institution or level of government, which suggests that citizens tend to adopt a more generalized view of corruption in government in their country, rather than one that is institution specific. However, they do make distinctions between institutions. In Zimbabwe and Zambia, respondents most frequently feel that “all / almost all” or “most” senior officials in “the government” are involved in corruption, while in Botswana, Malawi, Lesotho and Namibia, ordinary civil servants are most likely to be seen as corrupt.

Local government is seen as containing less corrupt officials than other institutions in Lesotho, Namibia, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. Zambians and Malawians see their parliaments as the least corrupt institution.

### *Perceptions of Government Corruption*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
How many officials in the Government do you think are involved in corruption? READ OUT	31.9	69.0	51.4	42.5	27.9	19.6
What about corruption? How many people in parliament do you think are involved in corruption? Is it: READ OUT	28.9	63.0	39.5	30.8	20.3	18.9
How many civil servants, or those who work in government offices and ministries do you think are involved in corruption. Is it: READ OUT	31.5	65.3	49.7	45.9	29.9	24.4
What about corruption? How many officials in your local government do you think are involved in corruption?	20.1	50.8	42.0	NA	10.9	17.2*

*“What about corruption? (Corruption is where those in government and the civil service take money or gifts from the people and use it for themselves, or expect people to pay them extra money or a gift to do their job).”*

(% “Almost All” / “Most-A Lot”)

\*Namibia (n = 1034)

Third, based on the results in the table above as well as a scale that reliably summarises perceptions of corruption across institutions, we see that Zimbabweans have especially cynical views of the probity of their political leaders. Anywhere from one-half to seven-in-ten Zimbabweans feel that “all / almost all” or “most” officials are corrupt. They have an average score of 3.2 on a four-point scale (where 1 is the belief that no officials are involved in corruption and 4 the belief that all officials are corrupt). Zambians are also fairly cynical about their leaders where anywhere from four-in-ten to one-half of people think most or almost all officials are corrupt, and have an average of 2.9 out of 4. Namibians have the most optimistic view of their leaders (2.2 on a scale of 4). Yet even here, between one-fifth and one-fourth of Namibians say that almost all or most officials in government, parliament, the civil service, and local government are involved in corruption

#### *Perceived Corruption In Political Institutions Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	3.20	828	.6815
Zambia	2.89	716	.7521
Malawi*	2.54	823	.6749
Botswana	2.41	541	.6559
Lesotho	2.41	310	.7156
Namibia	2.18	618	.6972
Total*	2.68	3015	.7950

*For Malawi, mean only reports average perceived corruption in Government, Parliament and Civil Service. For all other countries, mean represents average score for perceived corruption in Government, Parliament, Civil Service, and Local Government. Total excludes Malawi.*

#### *Personal Experience With Government Corruption*

Where do these perceptions come from? While a full exploration of this question was beyond the scope of this project, we did make some initial forays into this question by asking about the most obvious possibility: that is, people may have negative perceptions of government corruption because they themselves have been a victim of such behaviour. Thus we asked people whether, in the past year, they had been forced to pay a bribe, give a gift or perform some favour in order to get various forms of government welfare.

First, the results clearly indicate that perceptions of corruption are only tenuously linked to actual personal experience with corruption. At its least extreme, the extent of the average perception of corruption in government is four times higher than the extent of the average of actual experience with corruption (in Namibia). At best, it is forty times higher (in Botswana).

To what can we attribute these widely negative perceptions? They could stem from respondents having heard about their friends’ and neighbours’ experiences with corruption and bribery, or from their exposure to media reports of a smaller number of high profile incidences of corruption. Or they simply could be the result of excessive cynicism about official behaviour. Answering these questions will require further analysis of these results, as well as gathering new data in specially designed surveys focusing on corruption.

Second, finding employment (presumably in getting a government job or in getting government assistance in finding employment) appears to be the area in which citizens are most likely to be bribed four countries (Botswana, Malawi, Zambia, and Lesotho). However, government administration of housing and / or land distribution seems to offer the greatest potential for corruption in Namibia and, importantly, Zimbabwe. A note of caution, however, needs to be raised about sampling error. With a sample size of 1,200 and very small percentage point differences between these results, many of these observed differences may be the result of normal sampling error than rather than real differences among the total population.

#### *Personal Experience With Government Corruption*

	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
A job	1.0	9.5	5.1	4.5	6.1	2.8
A government maintenance payment, pension payment or loan	0.5	13.1	3.3	3.5	2.2	4.4
Electricity or water	0.4	11.3	2.6	2.6	1.3	6.8
Housing or land	0.7	14.0	3.4	2.9	2.4	8.0

*In the past year, have you or anyone in your family had to pay money to government officials (besides paying rates or taxes), give them a gift, or do them a favour, in order to get the following?  
(% "Once or Twice," / "A Few Times" / "Often")*

Third, Botswana exhibits by far the lowest incidence of corruption (at least with regard to the areas we asked about). Only one-out-of-every-one-hundred Batswana say they had to pay a bribe in order to get help to get a job, and even less in other areas. In contrast, reported experience with corruption and bribery is ten times higher in Zimbabwe where an average of one-out-of-ten Zimbabweans say they were subjected to corruption in these areas. The consistently low average scores in the table below are simply a reflection that, by far, the most common response to each of the four questions was that people had “never” been asked for a bribe or a favour.

#### *Personal Experience with Corruption Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	1.22	1151	.5693
Namibia	1.10	1142	.3698
Malawi	1.06	1202	.2604
Zambia	1.06	1130	.2847
Lesotho	1.05	1130	.2296
Botswana	1.01	1156	.1738
Total	1.09	6911	.3460

### **Government Performance**

A final important area of citizens’ evaluations of the political system are their opinions about how the government is doing it job, both generally as well as in specific performance areas.

#### *General Government Performance*

We begin by reporting the responses to our question about general impressions of how well the President, Parliament and Local Government had “performed their job over the past twelve



months?” We found important differences by institution and level of government, as well as country.

First of all, in five of six countries, the President receives the highest job approval ratings. The most favourable go to Namibia’s Nujoma (79%), Zambia’s Chiluba (64%), Malawi’s Muluzi (63%) and Botswana’s Mogae (57%). Lesotho’s head of government, Bethuel Mosisili received slightly less than majority support at (49%). By far, Zimbabweans gave the worst ratings to Robert Mugabe were less than one-in-five approved of his performance in the previous year (21%).

Only in Botswana does the Parliament receive the highest ratings (64% approval), about five percentage points above that of the President. In every country, except Zimbabwe, local government receives the *worst* job performance ratings.

Second, one might ordinarily think that regardless of whether citizens agree with the specific day to day policies or decisions of the incumbents of political institutions, they preferably should be able to trust those incumbents to do what is right, most of the time. However, a comparison of trust ratings and job approval demonstrates that, across all countries and institutions, more people approve of the current performance government institutions than trust them.

#### *Institutional Job Approval*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
President	56.9	21.1	63.7	63.0	49.2	78.6
Parliament	64.1	18.1	46.3	47.5	38.2	64.2
Local Government	53.9	32.6	38.6	NA	38.1	57.3*

*What about the way the \_\_\_\_\_ has performed his / its job over the past twelve months?*  
(% “Strongly Approve”/ “Approve”)

\*Namibia N = 1046

Third, Namibians give their political institutions the highest job performance evaluations in the region (3.1 on a 4 point scale, where 1 is strongly disapprove and 4 is strongly approve). Among those who offer an opinion, the average response of Zambia (2.) falls below the midpoint (of 2.5). Zimbabweans give government institutions, by far, the worst evaluations of the countries surveyed, with an average score of 1.9 out of 4.

### *General Job Approval Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	3.07	735	.6616
Botswana	2.83	730	.6074
Malawi*	2.62	1098	.8527
Lesotho	2.60	335	1.0176
Zambia	2.44	961	.7156
Zimbabwe	1.89	884	.7280
Total*	2.53	3646	.8351

*For Malawi, mean only reports average job approval for Government, Parliament, and Civil Service. For all other countries, mean represents average job approval score for Government, Parliament, Civil Service, and Local Government. Total excludes Malawi.*

### *Specific Government Performance*

We also asked people to give us separate judgements on government performance across a wide range of government policy areas. The results indicate a tremendous amount of variation in how people evaluate government performance.

First, Southern Africans are not overly enthusiastic about the performance of their government on specific issues. In only one country (Botswana) does the government receive a positive rating from popular ratings on most issues. Across countries, an average of more than 50 percent give positive ratings to their government in only two of nine issue areas.

Second, in four of six cases, national governments receive the most favourable ratings with regard to the provision of education (and in all cases, it is one of the three most popular performance areas with an average approval rating of 56.6 percent). Governments across the region also tend to get the most positive ratings in water and electricity provision (an average of 50.1 per cent) and health services (an average of 49.8 percent).

In all cases, controlling inflation is one of the three most unpopular performance areas (and has the lowest average positive rating of only 24.7 percent). Housing, job creation and economic management receive the next most negative responses (35.6, 35.7, and 35.8 percent average positive ratings respectively).

### *Issue Specific Government Performance*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Creating jobs	51.6	20.1	26.0	30.8	38.3	47.1
Building houses	43.7	25.9	35.6	38.2	11.8	58.1
Ensuring that prices remain stable	41.0	14.2	28.0	7.8	19.8	37.6
Reducing crime	63.1	31.0	34.6	21.9	43.6	46.3
Improving health services	69.4	34.8	36.9	45.7	50.1	62.1
Addressing the educational needs of all _____s	70.9	45.8	42.6	62.1	56.5	61.6
Managing the economy	60.4	15.9	32.6	25.2	35.5	45.4
Delivering basic services like water and electricity	69.4	36.2	39.9	65.4	35.0	54.6
Making sure everyone has enough land	57.1	21.7	49.1	50.6	32.1	38.7

*Now let's speak about the present government of this country. How well would you say the government is handling the following matters? Would you say very well, fairly well, not very well or not at all well, or haven't you heard enough about this to have an opinion?*

*(% "Fairly well / very well")*

Third, the government of Botswana receives the most consistently favourable ratings, getting a majority positive rating from popular majorities on seven of nine issue areas (and receives an average of 2.7 on a scale of 1 to 4 where 1 is not at all well, and 4 is very well). Namibia actually receives a slightly higher index score, but only because this score excludes the considerable number of Namibians who did not offer an opinion. In all other countries, the average score of those who offer an opinion falls below the midpoint of 2.5. As with other evaluations of the political system, Zimbabweans are extremely negative.

### *Specific Job Performance Index*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	2.70	647	.6570
Botswana	2.65	873	.5866
Malawi	2.17	1025	.6823
Lesotho	2.06	556	.9219
Zambia	2.17	1014	.6948
Zimbabwe	1.84	967	.5947
Total	2.25	5082	.7448

### *The Economy*

In modern political systems, one of the principal areas of government responsibility is overall management of the economy. As we saw above, outside of Botswana, and to a lesser extent Namibia, governments in Southern Africa do not receive positive views in these areas.

We also asked respondents a series of questions about their views of the present national economic situation, whether things have improved or become worse over the last month, and whether they expect things to get better in the next year.

Surveys in South Africa over the past few years have shown that even though perceptions of present economic conditions and recent trends are relatively negative, optimism about the future remains quite high. The next table (which shows the positive replies from 5 point scales that include middle, neutral category) demonstrates that this is not the case. With the possible

exception of Lesotho, there are no clear, consistent differences between present evaluations, recent trends, and future prospects.

#### *Evaluations of Economic Conditions*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
At the moment, are you <u>dissatisfied</u> , <u>neither dissatisfied nor satisfied</u> , or <u>satisfied</u> with economic conditions in _____?	31.6	3.0	18.7	25.6	11.8	40.7
How do economic conditions in _____ now compare to one year ago? Are they:	25.9	2.9	18.9	24.1	20.3	39.7
What about in twelve months time? Do you expect economic conditions in _____ to be <u>worse</u> , the <u>same</u> , or <u>better</u> than they are now?	31.4	5.6	15.7	25.3	25.8	44.3

(% "Very Satisfied / Satisfied")

(% "Much Better / Better")

(% "Much Better / Better")

Another key economic evaluation identified by public opinion research as a key determinant of political behaviour has been "relative deprivation," or a person's sense that regardless of how well they or the country is doing, they might be doing worse than others. The following table reports the proportions who say they, or their "group"<sup>10</sup> is doing worse than others, or other groups in the country. What we find is that by a significant margin most people (outside of Namibia) feel they are personally doing worse than their fellow citizens, but that much smaller proportions feel that their "group" is doing worse than other groups.

#### *Sense of Relative Deprivation*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Now let us speak about your personal economic conditions. Would you say they are <u>worse</u> , the <u>same</u> , or <u>better</u> than other _____? ?	53.2	74.6	57.0	53.0	66.0	37.1
Are _____s' [YOUR IDENTITY GROUP] economic conditions <u>worse</u> , the <u>same as</u> , or <u>better</u> than other groups in this country?	14.0	52.6	33.5	32.6	44.9	23.4

(" Much Worse / Worse")

(" Much Worse / Worse")

A factor analysis of all these items demonstrates that people's responses tap from the same underlying dimension and can be reliably aggregated into a single five point scale (where 1 means that people are very pessimistic about economic trends and have strong feelings of relative deprivation, and 5 means they are very optimistic and think they are doing better than others). Among those who answered all five items, Namibians are the only people have, on

<sup>10</sup> In a separate question, we asked people which group they identified with, and then asked them several questions about how that group is doing politically and economically. These data will be reported in a future *Afrobarometer Series* report.

balance, positive views about economic conditions (the mean of 3.2 is above the midpoint of 3). The average response of respondents in all other countries fall below the midpoint. Consistent with the other views summarised earlier, Zimbabweans views are especially negative. As seen in the table above, the proportions of those Zimbabweans who are satisfied with the economy, feel it has improved over the past year, and expect it to improve in the forthcoming year, are 3, 3, and 6 percent respectively.

### ***Economic Evaluations Index***

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	3.22	840	.7211
Botswana	2.84	862	.6725
Malawi	2.53	1031	.8332
Zambia	2.41	916	.7448
Lesotho	2.22	727	.8664
Zimbabwe	1.63	1055	.5990
Total	2.45	5431	.8966

### ***Comparing Government in the Present Political System With the Past***

Research in Central and Eastern Europe has demonstrated that regardless of how negative citizens were toward their new multi-party political systems, what was more important was that they were still viewed more positively than the former communist regimes (Rose et al, 1999). In Section II, we reviewed responses to questions that asked people whether they enjoyed more political freedom and economic rights under the present multi-party regime than under their former colonial or authoritarian systems. Here, we review responses to questions that ask people whether their present governments were more or less trustworthy, responsive, corrupt, and effective, than government in the former regime, or whether they were about the same.

In every case, with the exception of Lesotho, Southern Africans are more likely to feel that multi-party government is more responsive and more effective, than to say that multi-party government is more trustworthy, or less corrupt. Malawi's government receives very positive comparisons to the Banda government (with the exception of corruption). Namibia's SWAPO government receives consistently favorable comparisons with the South African administration. The Chiluba MMD government and the BDP government of Botswana are seen as relatively more effective and responsive than the Kaunda UNIP regime or British colonialism.

*Comparisons With Previous Government*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Effective in the way it performs its job	44.9	23.4	46.4	53.0	34.4	49.5
Interested in hearing what people like you think	42.7	31.7	43.0	58.1	37.1	53.5
Less Corrupt	22.2	19.4	27.4	29.4	36.1	41.0
Trustworthy	29.9	20.8	33.1	47.2	35.6	47.5

*You have told us how you feel about the effectiveness of the way government performs its job, its interest in what you think, corruption, and your trust in government. But how does this compare to the government that this country had \_\_\_\_\_? Is government today more, about the same or less \_\_\_\_\_ as under [the previous regime]?*

(% “Much More Effective” / “More Effective”)  
 (% Much More Interested / More Interested”)  
 (% Much Less Corrupt / Less Corrupt”)  
 (% Much More Trustworthy / More Trustworthy”)

Factor analysis demonstrates that perceptions of whether the present government is more effective, responsive and trustworthy than government under the former regime reflect a common underlying attitude or dimension. However, perceptions of whether it was more or less corrupt are not related to the other three. Thus, we constructed an aggregate index summarising responses to these three items. Among those who offered an opinion, Batswana have the most positive favorable views of their present government. But Namibians, Malawians and even Basotho also tend to have more positive views of their new government when compared to the past (all with mean scores above the midpoint of 3 on the five point scale). Zambians, and especially Zimbabweans, tend to give their present government relatively negative ratings compared to the old regime when it comes to performance, responsiveness and trust.

*Comparing Government Under the Present System to the Old System*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Botswana	3.52	716	.9714
Namibia	3.43	1031	.9606
Malawi	3.21	1177	1.3140
Lesotho	3.08	913	1.5884
Zambia	2.95	1092	1.1596
Zimbabwe	2.58	1047	.9489
Total	3.11	5976	1.2228

***Should Government Be Able to Overcome Problems Inherited From the Past?***

The old regime is important politically because existing multi-party government may be judged relative to the past. But the past is also an important factor because government often justify difficulties in achieving change and in delivery by referring to the problems inherited from the past, whether that past be colonialism, white minority rule, military rule or dictatorship. What do the citizens think? How much patience to they have with government under multi-party politics? To what extent must it deliver now, and to what extent will people excuse failures or slowness in delivery due to the legacies of the past?

We offered people two statements, one stating that “it will take years for our system of government to deal with the problems inherited” from the past. The other states that the system of government should be able to address problems now “regardless of who caused them.”

The results indicate that there is little sympathy anywhere in the region for government that excuse their own policy failures by blaming them on the past. At most, three-in-ten citizens (in Namibia) agree that it might take years to deal with the problems of the past. But even in Namibia, almost one-half of the public agrees that the SWAPO government ought to be able to deal with the legacies of South African colonial apartheid. Elsewhere, majorities ranging from six-in-ten to seven-in-ten agree that their government ought to be able to deal with the legacies of the past now.

*Should Government Be Able to Overcome Problems Inherited From the Past?*

Q102	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
It will take years for our system of government to deal with the problems inherited from [the previous regime] Strongly Agree.	9.8	16.0	16.6	19.0	13.4	17.0
Agree	4.8	8.4	7.6	4.2	6.9	24.4
Agree	14.3	11.4	19.5	8.8	3.2	15.3
Strongly Agree Our system of government ought to be able to deal with problems right now regardless of who caused them.	45.8	58.3	51.8	63.0	55.1	32.9
Don't Know	16.9	3.2	1.7	1.8	14.4	10.1
Agree With Neither	6.3	1.7	2.1	3.0	6.1	0.0

(% Strongly Agree / Agree)

***Most Important Problems: The People's Agenda***

Now that we have seen how people think their political systems has performed, and how its performance compares with previous governments and regimes, what exactly do people want government to do? We asked people “What are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?” We offered them no response alternatives; their answers were completely spontaneous, and they could give us up to three answers, which we transcribed verbatim. The tables below offer an after-the-fact aggregation of responses into similar categories. These tables offer us a concise description of citizens’ priorities for government action, or what we have called “the people’s agenda.”

While there are a few key problems mentioned by sizeable proportions of people in several different countries (such as job creation, crime, and the economy), the variation in how people conceive and name the key problems confronting their country is substantial.

One of the most noticeable points of difference is in the sheer size of the public agenda. No less than twelve different issues or problems were cited by at least 10% of the different country samples as key priorities for government action.

Yet the size of this agenda varied widely from country to country. In Malawi, no less than eleven different issues are mentioned as important problems by at least 10% of respondents. Zambians and Botswana cite seven issues, and Namibians five. In contrast, only three problems each are mentioned by 10% or more of Basotho or Zimbabweans.

Here is a review of key issues mentioned by substantial proportions of country samples:

- o “*Job Creation*” By far the most widely cited problem, it is mentioned by majorities in Botswana, Lesotho and Namibia and substantial pluralities in Zimbabwe and Zambia. This issue receives relatively little emphasis on only in Malawi.
- o “*The Economy*” Interestingly, Idasa surveys over the years have shown relatively small portions of South Africans who use frame issues of macro-economics in this way, preferring rather to concentrate on constituent elements such as job creation or housing. In contrast, three quarters of Zimbabweans think about problems of macroeconomics (e.g. growth, prices) as the key challenge requiring government action as do almost one half of Malawians.
- o “*Education*” Almost one-half of Namibians cites this problem as do three-in-ten Zambians.
- o “*Crime*” A prominent concern in South Africa, this is prioritised by as much as one-quarter of the public only in Malawi and Lesotho.
- o “*Health Care*” This is cited by four-in-ten Zambians, and one-quarter of Malawians.
- o “*Farming / Agriculture*” Mentioned by one-quarter of Zambians.
- o “*Food*” Problems of food, hunger and nutrition are cited by one-quarter of Malawians and one-in-five Basotho, but less than a tenth of citizens in any other country.
- o “*AIDS*” Given the scope of this problem in Southern Africa, perhaps the most surprising thing is that is not mentioned by more people. One quarter of Botswana and just over one-in-ten Namibians cites this problem as one of the top three facing the country. Yet only one-in-twenty Zimbabweans mention this, one-in-fifty Malawians, and one-tenth of one percent in Lesotho, and no Zambians.
- o “*General Services*” Referring to services other than water and sewage, this problem is cited by one-in-five Namibians, by one-in-twenty Malawians but by no more than 2 percent in any other country.

Beside the problems that people prioritise, an equally fascinating question is which problems are not mentioned, or are mentioned by only very small proportions of people.

- o “*Land*” Given the legacies of settler colonialism, it is probably the most glaring omission from this list. In Zimbabwe, the scene of several months of political conflict and violent clashes over hundreds of farm invasions, only 1.1 percent of the Zimbabwean respondents told us in September / October 1999 (before these invasions began) that land was one of the most important issues requiring government action. No more than two percent in any other country mention this as a priority issue.
- o “*War*” Given the increasing regionalization of military conflicts in Angola and Congo, and Northern Namibia, it is significant that only a handful of Botswana and Zimbabweans, and no respondents at all in other countries mention this problem.
- o “*Corruption*” Considering the widespread perceptions of official corruption reported earlier, it may surprise some that no more than five percent in Malawi, and smaller percentages elsewhere, cite this as a government priority.



*Most Important Problems (All Problems Mentioned by at least 10%)*

Botswana	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Job Creation (58%)	Economy (74%)	Health (41%)	Economy (48%)	Job Creation (63%)	Job Creation (54%)
AIDS (24%)	Job Creation (37%)	Job Creation (32%)	Health (29%)	Crime / Security (28%)	Education (46%)
Education (20%)	Health (18%)	Education (31%)	Crime / Security (28%)	Food (20%)	General Services (21%)
Poverty / Destitution (17%)		Farming / Agriculture (26%)	Food (26%)		Health (18%)
Health (15%)		Economy (20%)	Transportati on (16%)		AIDS (14%)
Farming / Agriculture (14%)		Transportati on (18%)	Water (16%)		
Crime / Security (12%)		Poverty / Destitution (14%)	Farming / Agriculture (13%)		
			Education (12%)		
			Poverty / Destitution (11%)		
			Job Creation (11%)		
			General Services (10%)		

*Most Important Problems (All Problems Mentioned)*

<i>Qs50a-c</i>	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Job Creation	58.4	37.4	31.8	10.9	63.4	54.1
Economy	7.0	74.2	19.7	47.6	3.1	7.3
Education	20.0	9.4	30.5	12.4	5.7	45.9
Crime and Security	12.3	6.2	8.5	28.0	27.6	0.7
Health	14.9	17.5	40.5	28.5	7.6	17.6
Poverty / Destitution	17.4	9.1	13.5	10.9	8.8	7.3
Farming / Agriculture	13.7	1.1	26.3	13.1	3.8	8.5
Food	1.7	7.5	8.4	25.5	19.8	4.2
AIDS	24.1	4.3	0.0	1.8	0.1	13.9
Water	3.5	8.9	8.5	15.5	7.3	0.0
Transportation	1.8	7.2	17.8	16.2	9.9	0.8
General Services	2.1	0.8	0.9	10.1	1.6	20.6
Welfare	7.6	2.1	3.2	2.4	4.1	6.0
Development	5.6	2.4	1.5	0.7	1.8	3.4
Wages	2.2	5.1	3.1	3.3	0.1	0.0
Housing	2.9	5.4	2.5	0.2	0.1	3.5
Corruption	2.6	3.7	1.8	4.8	1.5	2.4
Democracy	1.2	1.8	1.8	1.1	1.0	1.3
Traditional / Moral Values	2.5	7.6	0.0	0.8	0.2	1.1
Discrimination / Equality	2.2	3.3	0.5	0.9	0.4	3.3
Governance	2.6	2.5	2.0	1.4	0.6	1.0
Infrastructure	1.2	1.7	2.4	3.3	0.3	0.0
Violence	0.2	0.2	.0	0.0	0.4	0.9
Labour	1.2	0.4	1.5	0.6	0.1	0.0
Land	0.0	1.1	0.3	0.8	0.1	1.8
Rates / Taxes	0.1	1.7	0.4	0.1	0.1	0.0
Population Explosion	0.1	0.4	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.4
Electricity	0.6	0.7	2.0	0.7	1.1	0.0
Sanitation	0.0	0.3	0.8	0.1	0.7	0.0
Rights	0.0	0.4	0.0	0.1	0.0	0.0
Environment	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.3	0.0	0.1
Immigration	1.2	0.0	0.2	0.0	0.3	0.0
Inequality	0.3	0.0	0.0	0.3	0.1	0.0
National Unity	0.6	0.1	0.3	0.8	0.3	0.0
Political Violence	0.2	0.6	0.3	0.5	2.6	3.2
Political Tension	0.3	0.3	0.0	0.4	3.4	0.0
War (International)	0.5	0.2	0.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
Traditional leaders	0.1	0.0	0.1	0.1	0.0	0.1

*What are the most important problems facing this country that government should address?*

## **IV**

### ***Democratic Citizenship***

While scholars may differ on exactly how active and involved citizens must be, nearly everyone agrees that, ultimately, sustainable democracies require citizens, and not subjects. A consolidated democracy is one where citizens not only believe that democracy is “the only game in town” but must do the types of things that support and sustain democratic practices, procedures and institutions.

The typical view of the democratic citizen is someone who is interested in politics, feels able and willing to interact with the political system when they need to, or when it is required of them. Ultimately, it is citizens who must stand up and defend an aspiring or young democracy when it is under threat (as seen over the past two decades in the Philippines and Russia). In contrast, the typical image of Africans is that they are subjects, not citizens. They are usually seen as fatalistic about life in general, and disinterested and apathetic about politics and government (or at least, western forms of post-colonial government). Yet we know very little about how Africans actually feel about politics, and democratic politics specifically.

This final section examines the extent to which Southern Africans are interested in politics, know who their leaders are, get political news through the media, and feel competent to play an active role in politics. It also assesses the frequency with which Southern Africans are involved in community life, interact with the political system, protest, and comply with the duties and obligations of citizenship. Finally, we assess the potential for Southern Africans to defend their nascent democracies should they come under threat.

#### ***Political Interest and Political Knowledge***

##### ***Interest***

Do Southern Africans have sufficient interest in politics to play a meaningful role in a democratic system? To get at this, we asked citizens how often they discuss politics with their friends as well as how often they followed politics and public affairs.

We find that large segments of publics in the countries surveyed are fairly disinterested in political affairs.

Anywhere from one-third to six-in-ten say they “never” talk about politics. Only one quarter to approximately fifteen percent of national samples say they “frequently” talk about politics with friends.

Between one-quarter and just over a third of citizens say they follow politics “hardly at all.” When we add in those who say they follow politics “only now and then,” anywhere from one-third to six-in-ten could be said to be relatively inattentive to political affairs. Only between fifteen percent and one-fifth of Southern Africans say they follow politics either “always or “most of the time.”

### *Discuss Politics*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Frequently	14.2	25.1	14.3	18.6	12.6	19.8
Occasionally	37.0	37.8	40.1	45.1	26.8	41.0
Never	45.1	33.8	43.6	35.8	59.0	37.2

*When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters...?*

### *Follow Politics*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Always, Most of the time	14.7	20.6	22.2	17.5	31.0	18.1
Some of the time	22.8	27.1	32.4	31.7	17.4	49.0
Only now and then	20.8	16.8	16.9	29.5	20.4	14.2
Hardly at all	37.8	29.9	26.1	20.3	29.4	12.1

*Some people seem to follow what's going on in government and public affairs most of the time, whether there's an election going on or not. Others aren't that interested. Would you say you follow what's going on in government and public affairs*

After reducing the four point political interest scale to a three point scale (by collapsing the “some of the time” and “only now and then” categories into one middle category)<sup>11</sup> we were able to create a reliable index of political interest by combining it with the question on political discussion with a three point scale (where 1 equals very low levels of interest and 3 very high levels). We find that Namibians and Zimbabweans display the highest average levels of political interest, and Botswana and Basotho, the lowest.

### *Political Interest Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	1.96	1072	.5179
Zimbabwe	1.92	1111	.6592
Malawi	1.90	1190	.5606
Zambia	1.84	1149	.5753
Lesotho	1.77	1144	.5973
Botswana	1.73	1116	.6140
Total	1.88	4489	.5966

### *Political Knowledge*

In order to gauge people’s awareness of the formal political system, we asked them to tell us the names of the Vice / Deputy President, the Minister of Finance, the Member of Parliament for their constituency, and the name of their local councillor.

- o Knowledge of the second most powerful person in the country (the Vice President / Deputy President) is quite widespread, ranging between eight-in-ten and seven-in-ten.
- o Awareness of parliamentary representatives was also very high in two of the region’s political systems that use the constituency system, ranging from seven to eight-in-ten in Malawi and Botswana. However, just over one-half of Zimbabweans could correctly identify

<sup>11</sup> This does not appear to do any great violence to the variable as the three point scale correlates with highly with the four point scale ( $r = .94$ ).

the name of their Member of Parliament. In Namibia, which has a proportional representation system where MPs do not represent constituencies, we asked people whether they knew the name of their regional councillor in Namibia's system of regional government: only one-in-four Namibians knew the name of this person.

- o In order to examine whether awareness increases as government is brought closer to the people, we also asked people about their local government representative. Malawi does not yet have a system of elected local government. In Namibia which has local government in most populated areas, less than one-in-ten of those who lived in these areas knew the correct name of their councillor. However, the picture looked quite different in Zimbabwe and Botswana, where over one-half of respondents could name their councillor.
- o Finally, we also asked about the person who, at least in Southern Africa, is probably the second most influential person in government, the Minister of Finance. Importantly, awareness of this key cabinet member is significantly lower than for the legally second highest (but often politically impotent) position of Vice President. In Zimbabwe, four-in-ten could cite the name of the Finance Minister, possibly reflecting the high level of publicity given to their Economic Structural Adjustment Programme (ESAP) in the government controlled media. Slightly more than one-third of Namibians could name their Finance Minister, one-in-four Malawians and only fourteen percent of Botswana.

#### *Political Knowledge*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Vice President / Prime Minister	82.9	72.9	54.8	79.4	40.6	68.4
The Minister of Finance	14.3	41.9	25.3	26.3	6.1	35.7
Member of parliament for this constituency	73.2	54.0	33.1	84.2	0.8	20.2*
Your local councillor	52.9	56.6	22.8	NA	9.7	6.5**

*Can you tell me who presently holds the following offices?*

*(Excludes all cases where it was not possible to determine whether the answer was right or wrong)*

*\* Regional Councillor*

*\*\* N = 619 (Excludes those Who Don't Live in Area With local Government)*

It is important to note that, at least across the six countries surveyed, it is not possible to construct a valid or reliable factor or scale out of these four items, or any combination of three of them. What this means is that knowledge of one type of official does not readily translate into knowledge of another type. In this respect, people do not seem to be generalists, either knowing, or not knowing various types of political leadership, but rather "specialise" from one type to another.

#### *Media Use*

One way that people can come to learn about their leaders and the broader political system is through the mass media. However, the news media is very weakly developed in Southern Africa, and often dominated by the state. This is especially true of electronic media.

In order to assess the degree to which the potential of the mass media might to disseminate political information to citizens, we asked respondents how often they received news from radio, television, and newspapers.

- o Radio is the most widely accessible and used source of news by Southern Africans. Anywhere from eight-in ten (Namibia) to just over one half (Lesotho) of Southern Africans say they get news from radio at least a few times a week.
- o Television use for news varies widely across the region and probably reflects highly differential rates of access. It ranges from under one-in-ten (in Malawi) who say they watch TV news at least a few times a week, to four-in-ten (in Zimbabwe). By way of comparison, a 1997 Idasa survey found that 72% of South Africans watched television news at least a few times a week.
- o While there is significant variation in the extent to which people from different countries receive information from newspapers, it is smaller than with television. Between one-in-ten (Lesotho) to almost one-half (Botswana) say they get their news from papers at least a few times a week. We also see some other interesting patterns. In Botswana (48%) and Malawi (20%) more people receive news from newspapers than from television. In Zimbabwe (40%) and Namibia (34%), the proportions are about the same. By contrast, the 1997 Idasa survey showed that the proportion of South Africans (46%) who received their news from newspapers was much lower than from television.

#### *Media Use*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Radio</i>						
Everyday / A Few Times A Week	81.3	75.7	66.6	74.7	55.0	85.5
Never	8.0	12.9	23.0	14.6	23.7	7.1
<i>Television</i>						
Everyday / A Few Times A Week	29.6	40.9	34.9	7.6	11.4	36.3
Never	50.8	37.0	58.3	86.2	77.6	52.2
<i>Newspapers</i>						
Everyday / A Few Times A Week	47.6	40.1	22.9	19.3	9.6	34.1
Never	31.7	32.3	58.3	60.8	67.9	44.5

While it was possible to construct one single scale out of all three items, we found that its reliability increased by a sufficient increment when the item on radio listenership was removed.<sup>12</sup> This is probably due to two things. First of all, access to radio is much more widespread than the other two media, which gives it a quite different profile of users. Second, and not unrelated to the first, radio news is probably received quite differently than news from television and newspaper. It is probably more passive, in the sense that one can hear news throughout the day at work or wherever with the radio playing in the background. Receiving news from television and newspapers on the other hand probably requires a much greater effort on the part of viewers or readers to seek out news content.

The scales demonstrate that obtaining news from radio is greatest in Namibia and Botswana, and lowest in Lesotho. People get news from television and newspapers most frequently in Zimbabwe and Botswana and least in Malawi and Lesotho.

<sup>12</sup> With the three item scale, Kronbach's Alpha reliability coefficient = .70. For the two item scale, Alpha = .78.

### *Average Radio Listenership*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	3.36	1174	1.1480
Botswana	3.21	1189	1.2039
Zimbabwe	3.09	1180	1.4201
Malawi	3.03	1208	1.4574
Zambia	2.66	1181	1.6126
Lesotho	2.35	1174	1.6019
Total	2.95	7106	1.4606

### *Television – Newspaper Use Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	1.89	1156	1.5474
Botswana	1.67	1164	1.3682
Zambia	1.27	1165	1.4969
Namibia	1.54	1170	1.6027
Malawi	.66	1183	1.0642
Lesotho	.59	1163	1.0128
Total	1.27	7001	1.4521

### *Political Competence and Efficacy*

Social scientists often speak of a feeling of “political competence,” by which they mean people’s sense that they are sufficiently able to participate in political life.

We tested for a larger sense of efficacy by asking people whether they agree or disagree with a statement that asserted that they had “little or not control over what happens” to their life.

- o Majorities disagree with this statement in four countries, indicating that Southern Africans, on balance, tend to feel relatively efficacious about their ability to control their destinies. Zimbabweans, however, are divided almost equally on this matter with 45.4 percent agreeing and 40.6 percent disagreeing (the questions was not asked in the Namibian instrument).

### *Control Over Life*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>You feel you have little or no control over what happens to your life.</i>						
Strongly Agree / Agree	37.9	45.4	35.8	31.4	35.1	NA
Neither Agree nor disagree	7.5	6.7	4.2	5.2	4.1	NA
Strongly Disagree / Disagree	52.8	40.6	58.3	62.4	57.1	NA

Three other key components of a sense of political efficacy are the degree to which people feel they have enough information about political affairs, feel they can understand politics and government, and feel that they are able to speak their minds with regard to politics. Where Southern Africans tend to feel they are able to control their overall lives, they do not feel they have enough information about politics, or that they can understand what goes in politics and government. Clear majorities also feel that they are not able to speak their minds about politics freely in three countries, and near majorities in two other countries.

Between one-half to almost two-thirds of national samples agree or strongly agree that they do not have enough information about political life and government.

Even higher proportions agree with the statement that political and governmental affairs are so complicated that they “can’t really understand what’s going on.”

- o Between one-third and seven-in-ten respondents across the various country samples agree that they have to be “very careful of what they do and say with regard to politics.”
- o Malawians are least likely to feel they need to “be careful” (with an average score of 3.5 on a 1 to 5 scale). However, for the other three countries, the average respondent tended to agree that they had to watch what they said and did politically. Almost six-in-ten Zimbabweans agree that they need to watch what they say.

### *Political Competence*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>You think that you do not have enough information about political life and the actions of government.</i>						
Strongly Agree / Agree	56.6	63.3	63.4	55.1	79.6	50.9
Neither Agree nor disagree	8.3	7.9	5.3	4.3	4.0	11.1
Strongly Disagree / Disagree	33.3	25.7	28.0	39.9	13.2	34.3
<i>Sometimes political and government affairs seem so complicated that you can't really understand what's going on.</i>						
Strongly Agree / Agree	66.4	62.8	73.0	65.2	77.2	54.6
Neither Agree nor disagree	8.0	8.0	5.5	3.6	4.9	14.2
Strongly Disagree / Disagree	22.5	24.9	30.3	30.3	4.7	26.2
<i>In this country, you must be very careful of what you say and do with regard to politics.</i>						
Strongly Agree / Agree	49.0	59.2	52.4	32.6	72.2	48.4
Neither Agree nor disagree	13.9	6.9	4.5	6.4	5.1	14.3
Strongly Disagree / Disagree	31.4	27.6	37.8	58.8	14.4	31.2

These three items can be combined to form a reliable scale that runs from 1 to 5.<sup>13</sup> Namibians and Malawians feel most competent to participate in political life and Basotho the least. However, we should remember that even the Namibian (2.95) and Malawian (2.75) averages are below the midpoint of 3, indicating that even in those countries, the average person does not feel sufficiently competent to play an active role in politics.

### *Citizenship Efficacy Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Malawi	2.95	1170	1.0055
Namibia	2.75	1064	.9242
Botswana	2.61	1117	.9461
Zambia	2.52	1114	.9276
Zimbabwe	2.40	1114	1.1535
Lesotho	1.75	1062	1.0812
Total	2.50	6641	1.0765

### *Efficacy of Voting and Elections*

Besides their sense of their own personal competence, what do Southern Africans think about the efficacy of democracy’s chief institutions: voting and elections. Do they feel they can make use

<sup>13</sup> Alpha = .66. When the item on control over your life is included in this scale, Alpha = .58.



of democratic politics to make a positive impact on their lives? To get at this, we gave respondents two sets of paired statements.

Given the paucity of electoral turnover or close partisan competition in southern Africa, it might surprise some to find that Southern Africans retain a general optimism about the impact of voting. Majorities ranging from seven-in-ten to one-half agree with the statement that “The way you vote could make things better in the future.” People also feel that the possession of political power is an important and relevant issue in their lives. Between eight-in-ten and one-half of respondents agree that “It is important who is in power because it can make a difference to what happens.” In each case, the largest proportion of people “strongly agreed” with the statement.

- o Malawians and Batswana are the most optimistic both about the positive impact of voting as well as who holds power. We believe that this reflects the fact that, at least at the time of the survey, these two countries had the most competitive party systems, and thus the possibility of change in government is not as hypothetical as it is in other countries.
- o Zimbabweans and Zambians are most likely to agree that “no matter how they vote, it won’t make things any better.” Zimbabwean and Basotho are most likely to feel that “It doesn’t really matter who is in power” because things do not change. We believe that this, similarly, reflects two facts. First of all, at the time of the survey, Zimbabweans had not come close to seeing a democratic change of power since their founding election (almost two decades). Second, as can be seen also in several other questions, many Zimbabweans do not feel that the Mugabe government has improved their lives significantly over the Smith / minority government regime, thus contributing to a feeling that life goes much the same way regardless of who controls the government.

*Efficacy of Voting*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
They way you vote could make things better in the future Strongly agree	51.9	40.3	37.9	57.0	51.9	43.6
Agree	18.8	12.8	14.9	11.2	6.1	11.9
Agree	5.9	10.9	14.7	7.0	6.6	19.5
Strongly Agree No matter how you vote, it won’t make things any better in the future	21.5	31.2	28.7	20.3	21.8	17.8

*Efficacy of Elections*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
It is important who is in power because it can make a difference to what happens Strongly Agree	47.4	37.9	43.3	65.0	34.9	40.5
Agree	18.8	14.8	5.6	11.6	17.4	22.6
Agree	5.9	10.6	4.8	5.1	14.8	8.3
Strongly Agree It doesn’t really matter who is in power, because in the end things go on much the same	21.5	30.4	34.2	14.2	27.5	13.5

## *Civic Participation*

Now we turn our attention to what citizens are actually doing. First of all, we look at the extent to which people are active at the community level. In order to measure civic activism, we asked people whether they had attended meetings of various forms of community organisations over the past year, and if so whether it was “often” “a few times” or just “once or twice.”

First, the responses indicate that levels of civic activism in Southern Africa vary greatly by the type of organisation.

- o Participation in religious and church organisations is significantly higher than for any other type of group (except in Namibia), yet varies greatly. Anywhere from almost three-in-four to only one-in-five reported attending meetings of a church group (other than formal services) at least a few times in the past year. Attendance in church meetings is, by far, highest in Zambia and lowest in Lesotho.
- o However, only between one-third and fifteen percent said they had attended meetings of a community self-help group, or a group concerned with community issues at least a few times. Self-help group meetings are most regularly attended in Malawi and least in Lesotho. Meetings of community issue-oriented groups are most frequently attended in Namibia, and least in Lesotho.
- o Even lower proportions ranging from one quarter to one-in-ten say they had gone to a meeting of a local commercial organisation, or a group that did things for their community. Local commercial organisations are most popular in Zimbabwe and Malawi, and against, least attended in Lesotho. Community service or welfare organisations are most popular in Namibia and Malawi and least in Botswana.
- o Finally, proportions ranging from 16 percent to 3 percent say they had attended a trade union meeting at least a few times in the past year. Trade union meetings are attended most frequently in Zimbabwe and least in Malawi.

### *Frequency of Organisational Civic Participation*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Church group (other than religious services)	34.4	48.6	72.5	49.5	21.4	42.8
local self-help association	15.7	31.4	23.2	34.7	13.0	23.7
Group concerned with local matters such as schools, housing or rates	18.6	33.5	30.7	29.5	11.9	44.0
local commercial organisation such as a business group or farmers' association	10.9	23.0	16.1	22.8	8.2	17.1
Group that does things for the community	13.0	22.8	22.9	27.7	18.0	29.7
a trade union	10.7	15.6	6.5	3.0	6.1	7.5

*Over the past year, how often have you attended meetings of a \_\_\_\_\_?  
(% “Often” / “A Few Times”)*

Second, factor Analysis confirms that the responses to all these items can be combined together to create a valid and reliable summary measure of community activism. There are few national differences. The key national difference appears to be between Zimbabweans, Zambians, Malawians and Namibians (whose average levels of community activism are statistically indistinguishable from one another), and Botswana and Basotho (who are significantly less activist). Across all countries, the mean response (1.7) indicates that the average person had attended an average of only one or two meetings of any group.

#### *Civic Participation Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	1.84	1125	.7128
Zambia	1.83	1138	.6974
Malawi	1.83	1161	.7281
Namibia	1.80	1072	.6502
Botswana	1.49	1127	.6416
Lesotho	1.41	1164	.6895
Total	1.70	6787	.6895

#### *Political Participation*

Besides voting, democratic politics affords citizens with a range of other avenues and channels for participating in the system. We asked people whether they had taken part in four different types of political action, and if so whether it was “often” “a few times” or just “once or twice.” Yet it is possible that many people who may not ever have done these things have not done so simply because they never had the reason or opportunity. Thus we asked those who said they had never take part in a form of protest whether they “would do it if they had the chance” or whether they “would never do this.”

As with civic activism, we find that levels of political participation vary quite widely by the type of activity, as well as by country.

- o The proportions of those who have attended an election rally range from seven-in-ten in Malawi) to only two-in-ten (in Lesotho).
- o Between one-fifth and one-tenth of survey respondents say they have done work for a political candidate or party.
- o Between just over one-half (in Zimbabwe) and one-quarter (Botswana) say they have participated with other people on some important community or national issue (other than an election).
- o Only between fifteen percent (in Zimbabwe) and three percent (in Lesotho) say they have written a letter to a newspaper.

- o Finally, between three-in-ten (Zimbabwe) and one-in-ten (Malawi and Botswana) say they had made contact with a state official or community leader in the past year.

### *Political Participation*

	Botswana	Zimbabwe	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Attend an election rally</i>						
Have Done	39.5	46.6	43.2	71.2	19.0	54.0
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	30.8	22.8	25.0	12.7	33.8	20.4
<i>Work for a political candidate or party</i>						
Have Done	10.2	20.1	10.9	9.7	12.0	16.2
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	37.2	28.4	31.1	46.0	39.4	34.6
<i>Participate with others to address an important problem affecting the community or nation (other than an election).</i>						
Have Done	27.3	55.4	37.8	42.1	37.7	50.9
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	44.4	25.8	29.0	35.7	41.7	22.5
<i>Write a letter to a newspaper</i>						
Have Done	5.8	14.7	5.6	4.6	2.9	9.3
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	47.5	38.2	44.6	50.7	47.7	39.0

*Here is a list of things that people sometimes do as citizens. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not?*

Excluding contacting political and community leaders, responses to these items indicate that they reflect a common underlying dimension of political activism. Malawians (largely on the strength of their attendance at election rallies) and Zimbabweans are the most participant respondents in terms of normal procedural politics. Excepting election rallies, Zimbabweans are the most likely to have actually participated in the other three activities. However, large proportions of Malawians remain ready to participate in these actions across the board, given the chance. Botswana and Basotho are the least participant in these terms.

### *Political Participation Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Malawi	2.41	1201	.7622
Zimbabwe	2.40	1139	.9694
Namibia	2.26	1096	.8744
Zambia	2.08	1123	.8184
Botswana	2.03	1133	.8393
Lesotho	2.01	1100	.8212
Total	2.20	6792	.8646

As mentioned above, we also asked people how often they had made contact with government or political party officials about some problem, or to give them their view, as well as other community leaders.

We found significant variation by country, as well as by type of leader. Anywhere from just under one-third in Namibia and Zimbabwe say they made contact with a government or party official in the past year, compared to less than one-in-ten in Malawi and Botswana.

Contact with other community leaders was slightly or substantially higher than for political leaders in each country. Four-in-ten Namibians and close to one-third of Zimbabweans say they

had made contact with community leaders to give them opinion about some issue. Only one-in-ten Batswana had any contact with community leaders.

#### *Contact With the State / Community Leadership*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
a government or political party official	8.9	29.3	21.7	9.0	13.9	30.1
Any <u>other</u> influential person such as a church or community leader	10.9	32.0	30.8	23.9	14.4	39.2

*In the past year, have you contacted \_\_\_\_\_ about some important problem or to give them your views? IF YES Was it Just Once or Twice, A few times or Frequently.*  
 (% "Once or Twice" / "A Few Times" / "Frequently")

In five countries, elected local councillors were the most frequently contacted (with a high of 22% of Zimbabweans having made contact with a local councillor). In Malawi, with no local government system, people made contact with Members of Parliament (5%) most frequently.

Church leaders were the types of community leader most frequently contacted in four countries (with a high of one-in-four Zambians who had contacted a church leader to give them their opinion about something). With regard to traditional leaders, 10% of Malawians had made contact with a chief or headman and an additional 1% had attended a traditional council meeting. 9% of Zimbabweans had made contact and an additional 3% had attended a council meeting. In Botswana, well known for its "Kgotla" system of government, only 2% reported having contacted a traditional leader and another 1% had been to a traditional council meeting.

#### *Type of Officials Contacted*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Elected local councillor	4.6	22.0	9.7	0.2	8.2	11.7
Elected regional or provincial representative	0.1	1.0	0.9	0.2	0.8	2.5
Elected member of parliament	1.8	6.8	7.3	5.0	4.6	0.9
Local council meeting or hearing	1.1	1.8	0.7	0.2	1.9	3.8
Regional, Provincial Legislative meeting or hearing	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.0	0.6	0.4
National parliament meeting or hearing	0.0	0.6	0.0	0.0	0.4	0.3
National government hearing or meeting	0.2	0.6	0.2	0.2	0.3	3.7
Local council official	0.3	2.7	2.6	0.1	1.0	4.5
Regional, provincial official	0.2	0.9	0.4	0.1	0.4	0.4
National government official, civil servant	0.3	1.0	0.6	0.5	0.6	1.2
Political Party official	0.3	1.5	1.6	2.1	0.7	2.1

#### *Type of "Other Influential Person" Contacted*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Church leader, official /	7.5	9.1	24.8	13.9	5.5	12.5
Community leader /	2.4	12.4	4.8	3.1	5.4	13.5
Trade Union official /	0.4	1.0	0.6	0.4	0.7	0.8
Traditional leader /	1.9	9.1	1.9	10.1	9.5	12.9
Traditional council meeting /	0.7	2.6	0.8	0.8	1.0	3.0

## Political Protest

A more non-procedural way that citizens may become involved in political action is through protest. We asked people whether they had ever taken part in four different types of protest action, and if so whether it was “often” “a few times” or just “once or twice.” As with political participation, it is possible that many people who may not ever have done these things have not done so simply because they never had the reason or opportunity. Thus we asked those who said they had never take part in a form of protest whether they “would do it if they had the chance” or whether they “would never do this.” We see wide variation across countries as well as across the type of protest action.

- o Participation in protest marches and demonstrations varies from over one-in-five (in Zimbabwe and Namibia) to three percent (in Lesotho). An additional twenty to twenty-five percent in each country said that they would take this action if they had the chance.
- o Anywhere from fifteen percent (again in Zimbabwe) to just one-in-one hundred (Lesotho) say they have taken part in boycotts of rates, services or taxes. An additional ten to twenty five percent in each country said they would do this if they had the chance.
- o Sit-ins, or disruptions of government offices or meetings have been used by at most one-in-ten (in Zimbabwe) to less than one percent in Botswana and Lesotho. The proportions of those saying they would take part in this behaviour if they had the chance is more variable ranging from one-in-five in Zimbabwe to less than one-in-ten in Lesotho.
- o Finally, those claiming to have taken part in the use of force or violence range from five percent (Zimbabwe) to less than one (Botswana). An additional seventeen percent of Zimbabweans say they would do this if they had the chance, while as few as four percent of Basotho say they might do this.

## Political Protest

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Attend a demonstration or protest march</i>						
Have Done	9.6	23.3	9.1	5.9	3.4	21.3
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	27.0	24.2	20.8	26.7	24.8	22.0
<i>Participate in a boycott of rates, services or taxes</i>						
Have Done	3.4	15.8	3.2	2.4	0.9	13.3
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	22.4	27.2	16.9	24.3	10.4	18.5
<i>Take part in a sit-in, disruption of government meeting or offices</i>						
Have Done	0.9	10.4	2.1	0.9	0.9	7.2
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	12.4	22.6	10.3	15.2	7.1	15.8
<i>Use force or violent methods (such as damaging public property)</i>						
Have Done	0.3	6.5	1.1	0.6	1.1	3.9
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	7.3	17.7	7.4	8.9	4.2	7.0

*Here are a number of different actions people might take if government were to do something they thought was wrong or harmful. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not.*

The answers about participation in these four forms of protest can be combined into a valid and reliable scale. This indicates that across the four countries in question, the same type of people who were most likely to participate in one form of protest were also most likely to take part in another. The average (mean) response is to say that people have taken part in an action only once or twice.

The highest average levels of participation in political protest are found in Zimbabwe, followed by Namibia, while the lowest is in Lesotho. The Namibian responses are understandable as they probably reflect the popular character of the internal struggle against colonialism and apartheid.

However, the high level of protest participation in Zimbabwe is perhaps less expected, given the two decades that have passed since independence. There are three possibilities for this. First of all, this could be a residual of very levels of protest during that period. Second, it could be a reflection of mobilised protest orchestrated by the state against political opponents. Finally, it could be a reflection of very recent history and mounting protests against the Mugabe regime. Further analysis is needed to answer this conclusively.

Even though Malawi’s transition is the most recent in this set of countries, the very low levels of popular participation in protest activity is a reflection of the very short, and urban centred nature of the movement against Banda ( Bratton & Van de Walle, 1997).

#### *Political Protest Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zimbabwe	1.67	1113	.8789
Namibia	1.46	1098	.6926
Botswana	1.26	1148	.4147
Malawi	1.25	1196	.4102
Zambia	1.24	1127	.4415
Lesotho	1.17	987	.3749
Total	1.34	6669	.5924

#### *Citizen Compliance*

A different form of citizens action, which has the potential of taking the form of political expression, is the extent to which people comply with the law. And even if one’s choice whether to comply has no political content, it certainly is a fundamental part of democratic citizenship. It also reflects on the legitimacy of government, and its ability to enforce the law.

Thus we asked people whether they had taken part in four different types of *non-compliance or fraud* and if so, whether it was “often” “a few times” or just “once or twice.” As with the previous scales on political participation, it is possible that many people who never have done these things simply because they never had the reason or opportunity. Thus we also asked those who said they had never take part in a form of protest whether they “would do it if they had the chance” or whether they “would never do this.”

The most obvious finding is that, based on these responses, Southern Africans are largely law-abiding when it comes to the duties of citizenship. However, the results again evidence a great deal of variation by country and to a lesser extent by the type of action in question.

- o The proportions of those who admit to having claimed some sort of government benefit to which they were not entitled (what, in essence, could be construed as fraud), runs from approximately sixteen percent (in Zimbabwe and Namibia) to less than two percent of

respondents in Botswana and Malawi. The proportions who say they would do so if they had the chance runs from one-half of all respondents in Lesotho to just one-in-twenty Zambians.

- o The proportions that admit to having avoided paying fees or rates to local government follow roughly the same contours, ranging from fifteen percent (in Namibia) to less than two percent (in Zambia, Lesotho and Botswana). The additional proportions saying they would do this if they had the chance range from fifteen percent in Zimbabwe to five percent in Zambia and Lesotho.
- o One in ten Zimbabweans and Namibians say they have avoided paying income taxes compared to just one-in-twenty Malawians and Basotho, and one-in-one hundred Batswana. The patterns of potential non-payment of income tax change with Basotho and Zimbabweans most likely to say they would do if they could (fifteen percent); approximately only one in twenty Batswana and Zambians are similarly likely.
- o Finally, one-in-ten Zimbabweans and Namibians say that they have obtained services (like electricity and water) without paying for them, another form of citizen fraud, compared to just one to two percent in Malawi, Botswana and Lesotho. Here we see yet a another slightly different profile to the patterns of potential fraud: almost one in five Namibians and fifteen percent of Basotho say they would do this if they had the chance, compared to just one-in-five Zambians and Malawians.

#### *Non-Compliance*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Claim government benefits to which you are not entitled (like a pension, maintenance, or unemployment payment)</i>						
Have Done	1.2	16.8	2.1	1.3	5.1	16.2
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	7.8	12.5	5.2	16.8	51.5	15.5
<i>Avoid paying Development Levy or Property Taxes</i>						
Have Done	1.1	12.4	2.1	5.0	1.3	15.1
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	6.7	14.9	4.9	12.0	4.8	11.8
<i>Avoid paying income taxes</i>						
Have Done	0.9	10.3	2.1	3.7	1.8	9.9
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	6.5	15.5	4.6	10.5	14.9	11.7
<i>Get services like electricity or water without paying for them</i>						
Have Done	1.1	9.7	1.9	1.7	1.1	11.1
Would Do It If I Had the Chance	7.3	13.4	4.3	6.1	16.6	19.4

*We would like to remind you that your responses to this interview are confidential. Here is a list of actions ordinary people are taking in a political system. For each of these, please tell me whether you have engaged in this activity or not.*

When combined, the responses to these four questions create a valid and reliable five-point scale (where 1 means “never” having done these things and five means having done it “often”). This scale takes into account differences in frequency in terms of how often people have broken the law, as well as potential illegal activity. On average, Namibians and Zimbabweans are the most likely to engage in non-compliance. Batswana, Zambians and Malawians are equally the least unlikely to do so.



### *Non-Compliance Scale (5pt scale)*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Namibia	1.60	968	.9237
Lesotho	1.33	390	.5479
Zimbabwe	1.58	1004	1.0381
Malawi	1.19	937	.5300
Zambia	1.15	887	.5262
Botswana	1.11	1061	.4317
Total	1.33	5247	.7511

### ***Defending Democracy***

In a young, fragile democracy, one of the most important behaviours that democratic citizens may be called upon to perform is to stand up and defend their young democracy if it is under attack. Widespread citizen action at key junctures has been crucial in defending nascent democracies against authoritarian reversals in places as diverse as the Philippines and Russia (see Gibson, 1997).

Citizens – *qua* citizens, can make their mark in this area in one of two ways. The first is to merely *have an opinion* for or against the moves of some undemocratic entrepreneur and thus help shape the climate of opinion that may discourage or promote such behaviours. Second, people can *actually do something* about this opinion from merely speaking to someone about it, contacting the media or a government official, or even joining a protest march.

We posed four scenarios of attempts by anti-democratic elites to limit democracy and then asked people, first, whether they would support or oppose such moves, and second, what, if anything, they think they would do about it.

The popular wisdom has it that the average Southern African couldn't care less what type of government they lived under. In contrast, the responses demonstrate that, far from it, respondents in the six countries surveyed would have a definite opinion about government anti-democratic moves, and would be highly opposed, and also that large segments of the public say they would actually do something about it.

- o Three-quarters to nine-in-ten Southern Africans say they would oppose government attempts to shut down critical news media.
- o Between eight-in-ten and three quarters of respondents in Zambia, Botswana, Lesotho and Malawi would oppose attempts to dismiss judges who hand down rulings critical of the government. Six-in-ten Namibians would also oppose such moves.
- o Between ninety percent and seventy percent would oppose moves to ban political parties.
- o Finally, between nine and seven-in-ten respondents across the region would oppose a suspension of parliament and cancellation of elections.

### *Opposition to Anti Democratic Initiatives*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
Shut down newspapers, or radio or television stations that were critical of it.	90.2	75.0	93.1	93.5	80.8	80.7
Dismissed judges who ruled against the government	84.8	74.3	91.6	85.2	80.6	58.5
Banned political parties	87.5	74.3	91.7	88.4	65.0	69.9
Suspended the parliament and cancelled the next elections	90.7	75.2	92.2	89.8	72.0	72.4

*If the government were to take the following actions, would you support it, neither support nor oppose, or oppose it? (% Oppose / Strongly Oppose)*

These response, when combined, form a valid and reliable index of opposition to anti-democratic moves (with a five point scale where 1 means strong support for anti-democratic initiatives, and 5 means strong opposition). While the average levels of attitudinal opposition to anti-democratic initiatives is very high in each country, taking into account differences in intensity (i.e. “oppose” versus “strongly oppose”), Batswana, Zambians and Malawians would be the most strongly opposed to anti-democratic actions, and Namibians the least.

### *Opposition to Anti-Democratic Initiatives Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Botswana	4.54	1068	.6342
Zambia	4.48	1132	.6622
Malawi	4.46	1178	.6935
Zimbabwe	4.31	1079	.8515
Lesotho	4.27	1009	1.0375
Namibia	4.02	991	.8180
Total	4.35	6157	8075

However, having an opinion opposing some attempt to limit or end democracy is only a weak form of citizen defence of democracy. After we asked people about whether they would defend or oppose each type of anti-democratic action, we then asked them “What if anything would you do about it?”

Regardless of how they felt about attempts to curb or end democracy an average of approximately one-fifth of Batswana say they would not actually do anything, as well as about one-third of Namibians, just over one-third of Zimbabweans, four-in-ten Malawians and Zambians, and just under one-half of Basotho. And additional percentages, consistently highest in Botswana (around fifteen percent), say they are unsure what they would do.

### *Action In Defence of Democracy*

	Botswana	Zim	Zambia	Malawi	Lesotho	Namibia
<i>Shut down newspapers, or radio or television stations that were critical of it.</i>						
Do nothing	21.7	36.9	15.5	40.2	47.2	29.2
Don't know	15.1	5.3	4.5	1.7	8.2	8.4
Do Something						
* Speak to others about it /	29.3	26.1	28.1	20.4	13.6	24.8
* Write newspaper	7.6	9.3	7.9	6.8	9.6	8.0
* Phone radio or TV programme	3.5	3.2	3.6	3.4	4.4	11.2

* Contact government official or representative	18.1	8.1	26.4	24.8	9.8	19.9
* Join march or demonstration	19.7	21.0	16.0	11.8	8.4	11.8
<i>Dismissed judges who ruled against the government</i>						
Do nothing	22.9	38.9	17.1	45.9	49.4	37.0
Don't know	17.0	5.8	5.8	1.8	8.7	8.5
Do Something						
* Speak to others about it /	24.9	27.0	29.8	20.0	11.5	22.7
* Write newspaper	7.8	6.8	7.9	6.1	9.6	8.5
* Phone radio or TV programme	2.9	2.3	2.6	1.5	4.7	10.7
* Contact government official or representative	17.1	7.8	25.8	23.4	9.2	18.3
* Join march or demonstration	19.0	20.2	15.1	9.9	7.4	6.8
<i>Banned political parties</i>						
Do nothing	21.1	38.3	17.3	42.0	49.7	32.7
Don't know	15.6	5.9	5.1	2.2	7.8	9.0
Do Something						
Speak to others about it /	26.2	25.3	28.2	21.4	13.4	24.9
* Write newspaper	7.3	8.9	9.3	7.5	9.7	8.4
* Phone radio or TV programme	2.4	3.3	3.5	2.9	5.2	12.1
* Contact government official or representative	17.2	6.2	25.3	21.7	8.5	17.8
* Join march or demonstration	21.4	21.6	15.3	14.2	7.1	9.2
<i>Suspended the parliament and cancelled the next elections</i>						
Do nothing	22.0	39.1	15.9	40.6	49.8	39.1
Don't know	15.4	6.2	5.9	2.2	8.5	8.9
Do Something						
* Speak to others about it /	26.8	23.2	29.8	21.7	12.2	24.1
* Write newspaper	7.3	8.1	8.6	7.1	9.4	9.3
* Phone radio or TV programme	3.1	4.2	3.2	3.3	4.3	12.8
* Contact government official or representative	15.7	5.8	25.5	21.8	8.2	18.7
* Join march or demonstration	21.8	23.1	16.0	13.6	7.2	12.2

*All Actions Mentioned Added Together*

While respondents could mention as many different actions as they wanted, we combine the first mentioned responses to each of these situations and found that it was possible to create a reliable three point scale (where 1 means do nothing, 2 means don't know and 3 means do something). We find that while Zambians and Batswana may not be very active in forms of political participation, they are consistently most likely to take action in the face of anti-democratic initiatives.

#### *Taking Action During A Threat to Democracy Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zambia	2.61	1123	.6813
Botswana	2.41	1190	.7344
Namibia	2.26	1115	.7721
Zimbabwe	2.16	1147	.8617
Malawi	2.13	1177	.8863
Lesotho	1.83	1020	.8666
Total	2.24	6772	.8367

Yet we know that at least some of these moves are taken by people to support the anti-democratic action. An examination of the results also demonstrates that it is those who would be opposed to anti-democratic initiatives who are most likely to act on those opinions, but those who would support such authoritarian actions are also likely to do something in support (though to a lesser degree). Thus, we then constructed a measure of behaviour that differentiates whether the action is performed to support or oppose anti-democratic initiatives.<sup>14</sup> Those who support such moves and would “do something” in support are coded 1. Those who support such moves, but either don’t know what they would do, or would do nothing, receive a score of 2. Those who do not know how they stand on these issues are coded as 3 regardless of whether they would do anything or not. Those who would oppose authoritarian measures but would do nothing, or don’t know what they would do are coded 5. Finally, those who would oppose anti-democratic initiatives and would do something, are scored as 5.

Again, we see that Zambians are the most likely to act against anti-democratic actions (an average of about sixty percent). Almost one-half of Batswana would potentially take action in opposition to anti-democratic action, as would four-in-ten Malawians. While the figures are considerably lower in Zimbabwe, Namibia and Lesotho, the proportions who would potentially stand up for democracy are in absolute terms, quite large and would present potential authoritarians with a considerable adversary.

*Defending Authoritarianism vs. Defending Democracy*

	Botswana	Malawi	Namibia	Zambia	Zimbabwe	Lesotho
Support Anti-Democratic Action / Act	0.0	0.1	1.6	0.7	0.4	0.6
Support Anti-Democratic Action / Do Nothing	0.7	0.8	0.3	0.4	0.6	1.3
Neutral Toward Anti-Democratic Action	19.8	25.7	53.5	15.9	34.1	45.5
Oppose Anti-Democratic Action / Do nothing	13.7	33.4	19.4	22.7	31.8	34.3
Oppose Anti-Democratic Action / Take Action	47.7	40.0	25.3	60.1	33.0	18.3
N =	1104	1185	1095	1141	1160	1155

*Defending Authoritarianism vs. Defending Democracy Scale*

Country of Respondent	Mean	N	Std. Deviation
Zambia	4.42	1141	.8162
Botswana	4.26	1104	.7971
Malawi	4.12	1185	.8265
Zimbabwe	3.96	1160	.8566
Lesotho	3.68	1155	.8030
Namibia	3.67	1095	.9099
Total	4.02	6840	.88034

<sup>14</sup> First of all, we took the summary index of people’s opposition to anti-democratic initiatives and reduced it to a three point scale (support / neutral / oppose). We also took the index of action during anti-democratic initiatives in response to such events and reduced it to a three point scale (do nothing / don’t know / do something). Then we created a new variable based on a person’s joint scores on both these items.

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# Appendix

## *Sampling Protocol*

### *Introduction*

This document describes the sample design and sampling procedure used in the Southern African Democracy Barometer. The study was conducted from 25<sup>th</sup> September 1999 through 30<sup>th</sup> April 2000 in six Southern African countries: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe.

*Table 1: Fieldwork Schedule*

Country	Fieldwork dates
Namibia	25 September – 15 October 1999
Zimbabwe	11 October – 5 November 1999
Zambia	29 October – 30 November 1999
Botswana	5 November – 30 November 1999
Malawi	29 November – 31 December 1999
Lesotho	28 March – 30 April 2000

The purpose of the design was to draw a representative sample of all citizens of voting age in each of these countries. The target sample size for each country was 1200 respondents which would allow inferences to the population of each respective country at a 95 percent confidence level with a margin of error no greater than plus or minus 3 percentage points. The actual number of questionnaires completed for all the countries was 7,168.

*Table 2: Country sample distribution*

Country	Target sample size	Questionnaires completed
Namibia	1200	1183
Zimbabwe	1200	1200
Zambia	1200	1200
Botswana	1200	1200
Malawi	1200	1208
Lesotho	1200	1177
TOTAL	7200	7168

### *Sample Universe*

The sample universe included all citizens of Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Namibia, Zambia and Zimbabwe who were 18 years old or older on the day of the survey interview. Persons who were under-age or who were not citizens of these countries were excluded from the sample. Nor did the survey consider people living in institutionalized settings (students in dormitories, persons in prisons, nursing homes, etc.). Also excluded were any areas of these countries determined to be either inaccessible and / or not relevant to the study, such as areas experiencing armed conflict or natural disasters, national parks and game reserves.

### *Sample Design*

The sample design was a multi-stage, stratified, area cluster probability sample. The objective of the design was to give every sample element (i.e. eligible adults) an *equal* chance of being included in the sample. This objective was met by using methods of *random* selection at every stage of sampling.

In a series of hierarchical steps, geographically defined *sampling units* of decreasing size were selected as follows:

1. The sample was *stratified* by key social characteristics in the population such as region, and locale (urban or rural)

2. Random sampling was conducted with *probability proportionate to size* (PPS) so that more populated geographical units had a proportionally greater probability of being chosen.

Sampling took place in four stages:

1. A first-stage to *stratify* and randomly select *primary sampling units*;
2. A second-stage to randomly select *sampling start-points*;
3. A third stage to randomly choose housing units (*households*);
4. A final stage involving the random selection of individual *respondents*.

This appendix addresses the sample design according to these stages, focussing first on the selection of primary units and secondary start-points and, next, on the selection of households and respondents.

#### *Stage One: Selection of Primary Sampling Units (PSUs)*

The primary sampling units (PSU's) were set as the smallest, well-defined geographic units for which population data was available. In all cases they were Census Enumerator Areas (or EAs). Recent census data and mapping materials were available for PSU's for all the countries. PSUs were then stratified by area (region or province) and then by type of areas (urban or rural). Random sampling was then conducted with probability proportionate to population size (PPS) so that more populated geographical units had a proportionally greater probability of being chosen from a given strata, or list of all PSUs (e.g. all urban PSUs in a particular province). It should be noted that in Malawi, an extra step was added to PSU selection. Rather than sampling from all 27 districts, 15 districts were initially randomly chosen and then sampling occurred within those districts.

To use the PPS method, lists of EA's were prepared with their populations numbered cumulatively by population size. We then randomly selected an EA as a starting point and then selected next EA using an interval determined by the sampling ratio.

A total of 150 PSU's were chosen for the survey from the master sampling frame in each country. This number of 150 PSU's / EA's was arrived at both scientifically and pragmatically. On one hand we estimated the number of PSU / EA's needed to capture each country's major social variations. On the other hand, we calculated the maximum number of PSU's / EA's that could be comfortably covered given the resources available. We estimated that four teams of four enumerators each could cover 150 PSU's / EA's within 21 days (including two days for rest and travel) in the field, given variations in geography and transportation conditions.

*Table 3: Distribution of PSU of Botswana*

Region / District	No. Urban PSU	No. Rural PSU	Total No. of PSU
Gaborone	22	0	22
Lobatse	4	0	4
Francistown	11	0	11
Jwaneng	2	0	2
Selibe-Phikwe	6	0	6
Southeast	0	7	7
Kweneng	0	27	27
Central	0	66	66
Kgalagadi	0	5	5
<b>Total</b>	<b>45</b>	<b>105</b>	<b>150</b>



Table 4: Distribution of PSU of Lesotho

Region / District	No. Urban PSU	No. Rural PSU	Total No. of PSU
Botha-Bothe	1	8	9
Leribe	5	20	25
Berea	4	15	19
Maseru	11	20	31
Mafeteng	2	15	17
Mohale's Hoek	1	14	15
Quthing:	1	9	10
Qacha's Nek	0	5	5
Mokhotlong:	1	7	8
Thaba-Tseka	1	10	11
Total	27	123	150

Table 5: Distribution of PSU of Namibia

Region / District	No. Urban PSU	No. Rural PSU	Total No. of PSU
Caprivi	2	7	9
Erongo	4	2	6
Hardap	3	5	8
Karas	3	4	7
Khomas	15	2	17
Kunene	2	5	7
Ohangwena	0	19	19
Okavango	2	10	12
Omaheke	2	5	7
Omusati	0	20	20
Oshana	4	10	14
Oshikoto	2	11	13
Otjozondjupa	5	6	11
Total	44	106	150

Table 6: Distribution of PSU of Zambia

Region / District	No. Urban PSU	No. Rural PSU	Total No. of PSU
Central Province	5	10	15
Copperbelt	25	4	29
Eastern Province	2	17	19
North-Western	2	7	9
Southern Province	4	15	19
Lusaka	16	3	19
Northern Province	3	15	18
Western Province	2	10	12
Luapula	2	8	10
Total	61	89	150

Table 7: Distribution of PSU of Zimbabwe

Region / District	No. Urban PSU	No. Rural PSU	Total No. of PSU
Bulawayo	9	0	9
Manicaland	2	20	22
Midlands	4	15	19
Mashonaland West	4	12	16
Mashonaland Central	2	11	13
Mashonaland East	2	13	15
Matabeleland North	2	7	9
Matabeleland South	2	6	8
Masvingo	2	16	18
Harare	21	0	21
Total	50	100	150

*Table 8: Distribution of PSU of Malawi*

Region	District	Urban and Rural PSU's
Northern	Mzimba	12
	Nkhata	4
	Chitipa	3
Central	Lilongwe	32
	Kasungu	11
	Ntcheu	9
	Salima	6
	Ntchisi	4
South	Blantyre	21
	Zomba	14
	Mulanje	11
	Chikwawa	9
	Chiradzulu	6
	Nsanje	5
	Mwanza	4
<b>Total</b>		<b>151</b>

The total sample of PSU's / EA's for each country was then plotted on a national map. Where the sample was scattered as to be logistically unfeasible or where other factors prevented access to the sampled area, we exercised a replacement rule: it was replaced by a similar, randomly selected PSU (i.e. falling within the same stratum and with similar socio-economic characteristics).

#### *Stage Two: Selecting Sampling Start Points (SSP's)*

A sampling start point (SSP) was randomly selected within each PSU. Thus the number of start points (150) was the same as the number of PSU. Start points were selected by superimposing a grid on census maps for each selected parish and finding the coordinates of two randomly selected numbers along the vertical and horizontal axes of the grid. This point was then marked on the map, and given to the field team for that area. The fieldwork team then located the nearest housing settlements to this point, and travelled there. Because we did not know the actual condition on the ground in all the PSUs, a second sampling start point was provided in case the SSP turned out to be inaccessible or otherwise inappropriate.

#### *Stage Three: Selecting Households*

Within the settlement, the field supervisor selected a prominent feature like a street corner, a school, a water source or a church, being careful to avoid a pattern in the features selected. The four fieldworkers were instructed to walk away from the starting point in the following directions: Fieldworker 1 towards the sun, Fieldworker 2 away from the sun, Fieldworker 3 at right angles to No.1, Fieldworker 4 in the opposite direction from No. 3.

Each fieldworker was instructed to choose the fifth dwelling on the right as the target household for the interview. If the start point was a block of flats, or if the walk pattern included a block of flats, the enumerator was instructed to stop at every fifth flat, starting alternately at the top middle and bottom of the building.

Sometimes, in sparsely populated rural areas, there were only a few households around a given start-point. In these cases, the following guidelines applied. If there were 15 or fewer households within walking distance of the start point, the field team assigned only one fieldworker. If there were 16-30 households there, two fieldworkers could be assigned. And so on. Only if there were 100 or more households within walking distance would the whole team (four fieldworkers) cover a single settlement area. If only part could be dropped at the randomly selected start point, then the rest of the team moved to the nearest housing settlement in any direction.

After completing an interview, and if the Enumerator was instructed to complete two or more returns, he or she adopted the following procedure. Continue walking in the same direction. Again choose the fifth dwelling on the right, and so on. If the settlement came to an end and there were no more houses, the enumerator was instructed to turn at right angles to the right and keep walking, again looking for the fifth dwelling on the right. This procedure was repeated until an eligible household was found.

Households were defined as a group of persons living together who ate from the same kitchen. When counting dwellings, enumerators were instructed to include separate compounds for multiple spouses or backyard dwellings for relatives, renters or household workers as separate dwellings

#### *Stage Four: Selecting Individual Respondents*

Once the household was chosen, the fieldworker determined from the previous interview whether a man or woman was to be interviewed. The gender of respondents was alternated for every interview. The fieldworker then listed the names of all household members of that gender who were 18 years and older, even those not presently at home but who would return to the house that evening. From that list (which was numbered), the fieldworker randomly selected the actual person to be interviewed by asking a household member to choose a numbered card from a blind deck. The enumerator could interview only the person whose number was selected and no one else in that household.

If there was no one at home in the selected household on the first try, or if the designated respondent was not at home, the enumerator was instructed to make at least one more trip to the household before replacing the household. We only replaced households, not respondents within households. If the person were not at home after another call, the enumerator would replace that household with the very next household found in the direction of the walk pattern. If the person selected or that particular household refused to be interviewed that household was replaced with the next fifth house in the walking pattern. If the enumerator found that the person selected did not speak any of the nine languages used for interviews, then the household would be replaced with the next fifth household on the walk pattern.

#### *Quality Control*

After the fieldworkers had completed interviews, the supervisors went through every return to check for accuracy and completeness. In addition supervisors would randomly choose one completed interview per fieldworker per day and return to the household to check the walk pattern and to verify with the respondents that questions had been asked correctly and the answers recorded accurately.