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POLITICAL PARTICIAPTION IN AFRICA: PARTICIPATORY INEQUALITIES AND THE ROLE OF RESOURCES

by Ann-Sofie Isaksson

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by Ann-Sofie Isaksson

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Political participation in Africa:
Participatory inequalities and the role of resources

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to examine the role of individual resource endowments for explaining individual and group variation in African political participation. Drawing on new data for more than 27 000 respondents in 20 emerging African democracies, the empirical findings suggest surprisingly weak explanatory power of the resource perspective, both for explaining individual variation and observed group inequalities in participation. In several cases, the relatively resource poor groups participate to a greater extent than the relatively resource rich.

Keywords: Political participation, Resources, Group inequalities, Africa, Afrobarometer.

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Introduction

Political equality – that the preferences of each citizen should count equally – is at the heart of democracy. Unfortunately, the notion of 'one person one vote' is not sufficient to ensure political equality in this sense; one has to take account of who participates in the political process and whose preferences are represented in politics.

This paper explores political participation in Africa. Drawing on new data on over 27 000 respondents in 20 emerging African democracies, the aim is to examine the role of individual resource endowments for explaining individual and group variation in African political participation. The empirical findings suggest that the resource perspective, which stresses that participation is costly and requires inputs in terms of individual resources like skills and time (Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995), does a surprisingly poor job at explaining individual variation and observed group inequalities in participation; in several cases, we actually see the relatively resource poor groups participating to a larger extent than the more resource rich.

Widespread political participation, defined as citizen acts to influence the selection of and/or the actions taken by political representatives, has an intrinsic democratic value. In fact, it makes sense to argue that democracy requires political participation to be legitimate (Bratton et al., 2005). It is widely agreed, however, that the propensity to participate politically is not evenly distributed across citizens (Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995; Lijphart, 1997; Bartels, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 2005). Rather, studies of Western democracies suggest that those who participate constitute an unrepresentative set of citizens, disproportionally coming from more advantaged groups in society. If policy preferences also vary across socio-economic groups (see e.g. Verba and Nie, 1972; Verba et al., 1978), and elected officials are more responsive to the preferences of those who participate politically than to those who do not (see e.g. Bartels, 2005; Gilens, 2005; Griffin and Newman, 2005), skewed participation risks translating into skewed government policy. This is very troubling, since it suggests that inequality of influence and resources is cumulative (Dahl, 1961); economic inequality may cause inequality in terms of political participation, which in turn may imply that policies increasingly address the preferences of more well-off citizens, thus adding to economic inequality (Bartels, 2005). Due to this feedback, broad-based political participation is not only very important due to its intrinsic democratic value; it is also highly relevant from an economic perspective. Being aware of group inequalities in participation and understanding the reasons for non-participation is therefore central.

A sizeable literature examines the determinants of political participation at the macro, meso and micro levels. Notably though, previous studies have largely focused on Western democracies (see e.g. Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980; Brady et al., 1995; and Verba et al., 1995), while relatively little effort has been made to explain mass political participation in developing countries. It is not surprising that the work on African political participation is scarce.[1] The African democracies are young and evolving, and until recently there have not been any reliable and comparable data on democratic attitudes and behaviour in Africa. We cannot assume, however, that patterns of participation that have gradually evolved since the spread of democratisation in the mid 19th century should be the same as those found in the newly established democracies in post-independence Africa (Norris, 2002).

In particular, it seems reasonable that the resource perspective, pioneered by the U.S.-based work of Brady, Verba and Schlozman (Brady et al., 1995), should be especially relevant in developing countries, where citizens are likely to have a weaker resource base and where poorly developed infrastructure should lead to high participation costs. Moreover, understanding the patterns of political participation in Africa – where poverty is widespread and democratic institutions are still emerging – seems particularly important. For

[1] Bratton (1999) examines determinants of political participation in Zambia, Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) investigate correlates of electoral participation in a pooled sample of ten African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright (2007) consider macro level factors affecting electoral turnout in a cross-country framework, and Bratton et al. (2010) compare voting patterns across Africa, Asia and Latin America.

poverty reduction, it appears central that the democratic process represents the many and not the few. And, if political participation is required to legitimise democracy, then studying its determinants in the African context, where the democratic states are younger and more fragile, should be critical (Kuenzi and Lambright, 2007).

To my knowledge, this is the first study that closely examines the role of individual resource differentials for explaining individual variation and group inequalities in African political participation. As such, and using new and comprehensive data, it will add to our understanding of the prerequisites for broad-based citizen engagement in the emerging African democracies.

Resources and participatory inequalities

The resource perspective, stressing the role of individual resources for meeting the costs of participating, was developed by Brady, Verba and Schlozman in the mid 1990s (Brady et al., 1995; Verba et al., 1995). Earlier studies of political participation linked socio-economic status to participation – often finding the better educated and those with higher incomes to be more likely to participate (Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980). However, in their influential work on American political participation, Brady, Verba and Schlozman developed this thinking, discussing the causal mechanisms that link socio-economic status to participation. Their findings highlight the differential resource requirements for different forms of participation, for instance indicating that in the U.S., resources in terms of time, money and civic skills matter less for voting than for other political acts.

Being interested in the role of individual resources for meeting the costs of participating, we assume that individuals evaluate the costs and benefits of participating politically, and decide to participate when the expected net benefit of doing so is positive. The benefits of political activity refer to the motivational forces behind the decision to take part, such as conflicting interests stimulating engagement (see the discussion in Solt, 2008), the perception of one's participation being decisive, or a will to conform to participatory norms (see e.g. La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998; and Knack and Kropf, 1998). The costs of political participation refer to its demands in terms of e.g. time, money, knowledge and information. By taking account of how resource differences among people differentially constrain their ability to meet the costs of participating, one could potentially explain a stratified pattern of political activity (Verba et al., 1995). If participation is costly, the individual's decision on whether or not to take part is, just as the decision to consume any good, constrained by a budget restriction determined by the individual's resource base (Solt, 2008). By considering the effects of resources on political participation, one can assess the impact of relaxing the budget constraint relevant for participation.

Against this background, the resource perspective seems particularly important when studying political participation in developing countries with young democratic systems. Compared to citizens in more established democracies, citizens in these countries may face higher participation costs as a result of poorly developed infrastructure (e.g. political infrastructure in terms of polling stations, community meeting halls etc.; physical infrastructure enabling citizens to reach the nearest political infrastructure; and infrastructure for information transmission), or they may have a less developed individual resource base. Both would result in the resource constraint relevant for political participation more often being binding, meaning that the impact of resources on participation should be especially important.

Existing empirical results are far from unambiguous. Comparisons across Western democracies suggest no consistent relationship between education and income on the one hand and political participation on the other (Verba et al., 1978; Norris, 2002). Similarly, the sparse evidence available for developing countries offers no clear-cut picture. Evaluating a survey of around 400 Zambian citizens Bratton (1999) finds no effect of income and mixed effects of education. Studying the determinants of political participation in rural India, Krishna (2002) finds no effect of wealth but a positive effect of education. Investigating correlates of voting in a sample with respondents from ten African countries, Kuenzi and Lambright (2005), like Krishna, find education but not income to be positively related to voting. Comparing voting patterns in Africa, Asia and

Latin America, Bratton et al. (2010), finally, find no effect of economic standing and mixed effects of education.

The present study focuses on resources in terms of time, money, human capital and information, all of which appear important for political participation in a developing country context. Political participation will always involve investments of time. With little time at hand, you will be restricted in terms of political activity, and arguably particularly so in a developing country with poorly developed infrastructure. In a developing country with widespread poverty, lack of money may restrict an individual from travelling to the polling station or the community meeting hall or from being able to devote time to political participation. Human capital, next, helps the individual understand the political process and build civic skills such as communication and organisational abilities, and hence facilitates political participation (Verba et al., 1995). In a developing country context, where illiteracy is sometimes widespread, this issue should be particularly pressing. Illiterate citizens have trouble making sense of information about the political process and are constrained in terms of communicating their views. Information, finally, is often put forth as an important cost of political participation (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). How do you vote? For whom do you vote? In what other ways, and for what purpose, should you participate politically? Processing information of this type requires resources in terms of time and human capital. However, considering that we also need the information to be *available*, it appears suitable to consider information access as a resource in its own right. Again, this issue should be particularly pertinent in a developing country context where access to information sources like TV, newspapers, radio and the Internet cannot be taken for granted.

Presumably, differences in individual resource endowments could give rise to individual variation in political participation. By the same reasoning, if political participation is costly and the resources needed to meet these costs are differentially available to different groups, this could reasonably give rise to systematic group inequalities in participation. By concentrating political influence to certain segments of citizens, group inequalities in participation could affect what policy issues are brought to the agenda and thereby risk reinforcing existing inequalities. Hence, it is interesting to consider group inequalities in participation, and to what extent the resource perspective could help explain these.

The present paper focuses on group affiliations in terms of ethnicity, gender, residential location and age – all of which stand out as potentially important dimensions of group inequalities in African political participation. With respect to ethnicity, much of the existing literature on political behaviour in Africa stresses the close relation between voting behaviour and ethnic identities (Mozaffar et al., 2003; Posner, 2004; Cheeseman and Ford, 2007; McLaughlin, 2007; Eifert et al., 2009). However, while there is substantial research on the ethnic motives behind vote choice, there are no studies examining whether the likelihood of voting is linked to ethnicity. Turning to gender, it has been suggested that in Western countries, the traditional gender-gap in terms of political participation – with women being less likely to participate politically – is in the process of closing (Inglehart and Norris, 2000). The sparse evidence available for developing countries (see e.g. Bratton, 1999; Krishna, 2002; Bratton and Logan, 2006; Bratton et al., 2010), however, suggests that there might still be important gender differentials in terms of political participation in Africa. Rural-urban divides are interesting to look at considering modernisation ideas suggesting that those who migrate to towns are 'agents of change' and thus more likely to be politically active (Bratton et al., 2005). At the same time, and interesting for our purposes, compared to urban citizens, people living in rural areas often tend to be poorer. Will we, as a result, observe the latter to be less politically active? The sparse existing findings for Africa, if anything, seem to suggest the opposite (Bratton, 1999; Kuenzi and Lambright, 2005; Bratton et al., 2010). Finally, it seems likely that life cycle and generational effects will lead to age variation in political participation. Examining the determinants of voting in 22 Western countries, Norris (2002) finds older respondents to be more likely to vote. For Africa, the results of Bratton et al. (2005, 2010) and Kuenzi and Lambright (2005) suggest that older respondents are more likely to vote.

A wealth of factors could presumably generate participatory inequalities across these groups; age differences in participation could be due to different historical experiences of democracy, rural-urban participation differences could be the result of regional variation in infrastructure, a gender gap in political participation

could arise because of differences in participatory norms, etc. At the same time, however, it seems plausible that resources that are potentially relevant for political participation, such as skills and time, could be differentially available to men and women, rural and urban citizens, people from different ethnic groups, or to individuals in different cohorts or at different life stages. If this is the case, to what extent does it affect the capacity of these groups to participate politically? The present paper evaluates the explanatory power of the resource perspective.

Data and empirical setup

The aim of the present paper is to examine the role of individual resource differentials for explaining individual and group variation in African political participation. To this end, I employ new data from the Afrobarometer survey. The Afrobarometer is a comprehensive multi-country survey project collecting data on political and economic attitudes and behaviour of African citizens. As such, it provides a unique opportunity to study mass political participation in a large African multi-country sample. The fourth and most recent wave of the survey, which is used here, was conducted in 2008-2009 and covers over 27 000 respondents from 20 African countries – Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Namibia, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The survey covers a representative sample of each country's voting age population (with a standard sample size of 1200 observations per country, except in Nigeria, South Africa and Uganda where sample sizes are around twice this size) and asks a standard set of questions in all countries, thus allowing for cross-national comparisons.[2] I estimate the following benchmark probit model for the political participation PP_{ic} of individual *i* in country *c*:

$$prob\left[PP_{ic}=1\right]=\Phi\left(\alpha_c' G_{ic}+\beta_c' R_{ic}+\delta_c' X_{ic}+\gamma' D_{ic}\right).$$

That is, the probability that individual *i* in country *c* participates is taken to depend on a vector of group affiliations G_{ic}, a vector of resources R_{ic}, a set of individual controls X_{ic}, and region fixed effects D_{ic}. $\Phi(\cdot)$ denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function.

In the present paper, the individual citizen is thus the unit of analysis. Of course, this is not to say that there is not important country variation in the level and determinants of political participation. Our 20 African sample countries have in common that they are relatively young democracies and that they are poor by international standards. As discussed above, these conditions are relevant when assessing the resource perspective, since they may imply that the resource constraints relevant for political participation more often are binding. At the same time, however, our sample countries are by no means homogenous. Unfortunately though, there is a trade-off between scope and depth, and focusing on 20 countries I am unable to closely examine individual country experiences (for a brief overview of the post-independence democratic development of our sample countries, see Table A1; for in-depth accounts of recent democratic developments in Africa see e.g. Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997; and Lindberg, 2006). However, considering that macro level determinants of participation – such as countries' historical experiences, institutional arrangements and economic and political conditions – are likely to affect not only the average level of political participation but also the association between our focus micro level factors and participation, pooled sample estimations accounting for country or region fixed effects will be complemented by individual country estimations, allowing us to consider country variation in parameter estimates.

Dependent variable

Our outcome variable of interest is political participation. As noted in Section 1, we can think of political participation as citizen acts to influence the selection of and/or the actions taken by political representatives. As such, it can take many forms. On top of voting, which is the most common, and in a sense, the most basic

[2] Note, however, that the Afrobarometer is not meant to be generalised to all of Sub-Saharan Africa. The selection of countries is intentionally biased towards liberalising regimes, meaning that authoritarian regimes and countries in conflict are under-represented (Afrobarometer Network, 2007).

form of political participation (Verba et al., 1995), citizens can work in election campaigns, engage in the local community, contact political leaders, attend demonstrations etc. Important for our purposes, political acts like these can vary in what individual resources they require. Moreover, they presumably vary in what information they display, in the extent to which they are mainstream or unconventional, in whether they are undertaken alone or in groups, and in the extent to which they are unequally distributed across citizens (for further discussion see e.g. Verba et al., 1995; and Lijphart, 1997). Acknowledging that political participation is a multidimensional concept that encompasses a wide and heterogeneous set of activities, we cannot claim to capture it in full. What we can do, however, is to make sure to consider both electoral and inter-electoral participation, i.e. voting as well as political activity taking place between elections. Studying participation in the emerging African democracies, where important aspects of political activity take place informally (Bratton et al., 2005), this should be particularly important.

Hence, I consider two alternative dependent variables: voting (electoral participation) and attending community meetings (inter-electoral participation). For voting, I create a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent reports to have voted in the most recent [year 200X] national election and zero otherwise. Those who were too young to vote at the time of the election are excluded from the estimation. The data contains information on several forms of inter-electoral participation. However, considering how diverse these activities are – presumably varying on all dimensions described above – using a composite inter-electoral participation index would hide substantial heterogeneity. Instead, I choose to focus on the most common form of inter-electoral participation in the data, namely attending community meetings. I create a dummy variable taking the value one if the respondent reports to have attended a community meeting during the past year, and zero otherwise (for full variable descriptions, see Table A2). In Section 4.3, however, I evaluate to what extent the results can be generalised to other forms of inter-electoral participation.

Looking at Figures 1-2, we can note that there is a great deal of country variation in political participation. The share of respondents who report to have voted in the last election ranges from 64 percent in Zambia to 92 percent in Benin, and the share of respondents who report to have attended a community meeting during the past year ranges from 32 percent in Cape Verde to 92 percent in Madagascar. In Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar and Zimbabwe attending community meetings is actually more common than voting, highlighting the importance of not focusing solely on electoral participation when studying African political participation. In the remaining countries, however, voting is the more common political act.

With respect to the high share of respondents reporting to vote, a few notes are in order. Importantly, our self-reported voting shares are not strictly comparable to official country turnout figures, which tend to be lower (see Table A3). First of all, the voting survey question simply asks the respondent whether he/she voted in the 'last [year 200X] national election'. Hence, in the many cases where parliamentary and presidential elections are held concurrently we do not know which of the two the respondent refers to. Moreover, if the respondent voted in only one of these two elections, it seems likely that he/she would remember and report the one election he/she in fact took part in, meaning that self-reported voting shares would be inflated compared to the official turnout rates.[3] Second, differences could arise due to sampling. Although the Afrobarometer is meant to be nationally representative with respect to each country's voting age population, it is not unreasonable to assume that there might be some over-sampling of individuals, say those with a steady address, who are also more likely to vote. Still, however, considering that casting a ballot is often viewed as a civic duty, to some extent the discrepancy between self-reported voting shares and official turnout rates is most likely due to survey respondents over-reporting voting. Hopefully though, the degree of over-reporting does not vary systematically across groups, so as to bias our estimates. In Section 4.3 I evaluate the sensitivity of results to respondents over-reporting voting.

[3] The fact that our voting measure excludes those who claim not to remember whether they voted could also inflate the self-reported voting shares. Arguably, it is convenient to opt for this response if, in fact, you did not vote. However, considering that very few respondents (around 0.5%) actually chose the 'don't know' response category, the possible consequences for self-reported voting shares should be minor.

Figure 1: Share of respondents reporting to have voted in the last election



Figure 2: Share of respondents reporting to have attended a community meeting during the past year



Explanatory variables

Being interested in the extent to which resource differentials can help explain individual and group variation in political participation our explanatory variables can be divided into group affiliations, resource indicators, and regional and individual controls. As noted, the group affiliations considered are gender, urban/rural residence, age and ethnicity. Dummy variables are used to indicate whether the respondent is female and whether he/she lives in a rural area. Age is simply measured as age in years (plus the square term of age in years). With respect to ethnicity, I follow Bratton et al. (2005) and Cheeseman and Ford (2007) in using a question about the respondent's home language as a proxy for ethnic affiliations. The salience of ethnic divisions, the number of ethnic groups, and the relationships between specific ethnic groups will of course vary widely across societies. However, considering that we look at 20 countries it is useful to have a simple indicator that is easy to compare across countries. For this reason, I classify an ethnic group as 'major' if its home language is spoken by the largest segment of respondents in the country, and use a dummy variable to indicate whether the respondent belongs to this group. Looking at the individual country estimations – as opposed to the pooled sample where this variable contains too much heterogeneity to be useful – this

indicator should provide a rough proxy for ethnic affiliations, and thus allow for evaluation of participatory inequalities along ethnic lines. In Section 4.3 I evaluate the sensitivity of results to using a more detailed ethnic measure.

The resource indicators capture individual resource endowments in terms of human capital, money, information and time. To measure human capital I use dummies indicating whether the respondent's highest level of education is at primary, secondary or post-secondary level (using respondents with no schooling as the reference category). To capture economic standing, I follow Bratton et al. (2005) and create a 'lived poverty index' based on the responses to the question, 'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, (b) enough clean water for home use, (c) medicines or medical treatment, (d) enough fuel to cook your food?', with response categories ranging from 0 for 'never' to 4 for 'always' for each item. Similarly, to proxy for resources in terms of information, I create an index based on responses to the question, 'How often do you get news from the following sources: a) radio, b) television, and c) newspapers?', with response categories ranging from 0 for 'never' to 4 for 'every day'. To proxy for time availability, finally, I include a dummy variable indicating whether the respondent has full-time employment. While individuals in full-time employment tend to be more resource rich in terms of money and human capital, they arguably have less time on their hands. In Section 4.3 I evaluate the sensitivity of results to using a time proxy also capturing work within the household.

Being concerned with the role of resources for meeting the costs of participating politically implies that we are interested in evaluating causal effects. Here, a few notes are in order. Whereas reverse causality from participation to our resource variables should not be a major concern – childhood education precedes political involvement, and it seems a fair assumption that for the absolute majority of adults, work- and family-related decisions are prior to political participation[4] – we need to consider endogeneity in the form of omitted variable bias. And while the comprehensive data material at hand has obvious advantages in terms of external validity – it covers real life political decisions of over 27000 respondents across 20 African countries – it offers no source of exogenous variation in resource endowments that could help us ensure internal validity. Hence, to evaluate the effects of our resource variables on participation we need to consider our theoretical priors and carefully control for confounding factors.

The theoretical predictions are clear. Thinking of resources as means to meet the costs of participation, more is better – having more of the relevant resources should ease the resource constraint on participating, and thus enable more participation. To be able to evaluate the role of resources for meeting the costs of participating, however, requires holding the costs and benefits of participating constant.

First of all, we need to control for contextual variation in the costs and benefits of political participation. Comparing across countries, participation costs and benefits are likely to vary with factors like democratic tradition, economic conditions, and political institutions (see e.g. Jackman, 1987; Lijphart 1997; Norris, 2002; Posner and Simon, 2002; Kostadinova, 2003; Fornos et al., 2004; and Lindberg, 2006b). However, even if the interest is in within country variation in participation, as in the present paper, assuming homogenous participation costs and benefits appears inappropriate. For instance, participation costs should vary depending on access to political and physical infrastructure, e.g. distance to the nearest polling station and the quality of the road or path to get there. Similarly, the perceived benefits of political participation could presumably vary within countries depending on e.g. the salience of local policy concerns and community variation in participatory norms. If the concerned resource endowments also vary systematically across regions, this could bias our estimates. Country and (246) sub-national region dummies[5] should help pick up the influence of contextual factors affecting the costs and benefits of political participation.

[4] Although we cannot rule out that someone can choose, say, a line of work as a result of political engagement (Verba et al. (1995) this ought to be quite rare. Moreover, whereas you might seek information more often before an election if you plan to vote, the information variable focuses on information exposure on a more regular basis.

[5] The 246 sub-national region dummies refer to the first-order administrative division in a country, in the survey manual denoted 'region/province' (Afrobarometer Network, 2007). Since the number and size of regional units vary across

Second, we need to control for individual level factors potentially contaminating the resource estimates. In particular, it seems reasonable to suppose that people with different resource endowments also vary in terms of needs, networks, and policy preferences – factors that may also affect participation. With respect to need, the poor may be more susceptible to clientelist appeals of political representatives, which in turn may stimulate participation (for studies on clientelism in African politics, see e.g. Wantchekon, 2003; Lindberg and Morrison, 2008; and Vicente, 2008). To proxy for the influence of clientelism, I include a variable on the respondent's attitudes towards clientelist activity (assuming that people who are more favourable to clientelism also are more likely to accept/seek clientelist offers). Regarding network effects, a person's education and employment status will influence what people he/she comes in contact with, and certain socio-economic groups may be more inclined to discuss politics and may hold stronger norms of democratic participation. Consider the case of education. It should help the individual develop the human capital needed to meet the costs of participation and to build politically relevant social capital (La Due Lake and Huckfeldt, 1998). Being interested in isolating the effect of the former, one would have to control for the latter. To proxy for politically relevant social capital, I include a variable indicating whether the respondent discusses politics with friends. With respect to policy preferences, it is not unreasonable to assume that resource endowments affect what policy issues lie close at heart, and that policy preferences could motivate political participation. In particular, it seems plausible that your economic standing will not only determine whether you can afford to take the bus to the polling station, it will also help define your pecuniary interest in distributional conflict – potentially an important motivation behind participation (see the discussion in Solt, 2008). To control for distributional policy preferences, I use a question asking the respondent to rate how the government deals with narrowing the gap between rich and poor. In addition, information need not only capture information *availability*, but could also pick up a tendency to *seek out* information, meaning that both participation and information exposure could be influenced by omitted variables related to civic engagement. To control for civic-mindedness, I include a control for political interest. Importantly, these variables should not be interpreted causally,[6] but are included in separate estimations as proxies for omitted factors that could otherwise bias our resource estimates.

Results

To get a picture of potential group inequalities in African political participation we start by comparing participation rates across groups. We then move on to assess to what extent the resource perspective can explain individual variation and observed group inequalities in participation.

Group inequalities in political participation

A quick look at the participation group means (Table 1, Panel A), immediately reveals that in our 20 sample countries, women tend to be less politically active than men, rural citizens participate to a greater extent than their urban counterparts and older people participate more than younger individuals. Conditioning on all group affiliations and country of residence (Table 2, Regressions 1 and 5), this pattern remains intact. Women are less likely to participate, the gender gap being 9 percentage points for attending community meetings and 3 for voting. Older citizens tend to participate to a greater extent than younger; the probability of participating peaks at the age of 60 for voting and at 55 for attending community meetings (but a 70 year old individual, with mean values on the remaining independent variables, is still over 10 percentage points more likely to vote than an equivalent person at the age of 30). Those living in rural as opposed to urban areas are 5 percentage points more likely to vote and 13 percentage points more likely to attend community meetings. With respect to ethnic divides, finally, the pooled sample estimates do not indicate any ethnic inequalities in participation. Considering the country heterogeneity in the salience of, and the relation

countries they are not strictly comparable. Nevertheless, they help us control for sub-national variation in factors affecting the costs and benefits of participation.

[6] Not only are these factors likely to affect participation, it is also reasonable to assume that participating politically stimulates political interest, helps build politically relevant social capital, makes a person more exposed to clientelist appeals, as well as possibly contributes to stronger views on certain policy issues. Also, political interest and to some extent politically relevant social capital are very proximate to our outcome measure political participation, and thus are presumably driven by a similar set of explanatory factors.

between, the major and minor ethnic groups in a country, however, it is difficult to say much about ethnic differences when looking at the pooled sample; we need to consider the individual country estimates.

Turning to the individual country sub-samples (see Panel A in Tables A4-A5), there are signs of ethnic differences in voting in 8 out of 20 countries (in half of these the difference is only weakly statistically significant, however), and for community meetings in 7 countries.[7] The gender gap observed in the pooled sample is more widespread. Whereas the lower propensity to vote among women seems to be driven by 9 countries in particular (Burkina Faso, Ghana, Kenya, Madagascar, Mali, Nigeria, Uganda, Zimbabwe and Zambia),[8] with the largest gap – 12 percentage points – found in Nigeria, lower female community meeting attendance is observed in 13 out of our 20 sample countries, the gap ranging from 5 percentage points in Tanzania to over 21 in Nigeria. Similarly, whereas the greater propensity to vote among rural citizens is observed in 8 countries, for community meetings the greater participation rate among rural citizens is widespread (the greatest gap – 31 percentage points – is found in Zimbabwe). The pattern that older citizens are more likely to participate, finally, is observed in all (for voting) or nearly all (for attending community meetings) countries.

With respect to group inequalities in African political participation, some interesting findings thus stand out. First, while the gender gap in terms of political participation might be in the process of closing in Western countries (Inglehart and Norris, 2000), these estimates suggest that it is still prevalent in Africa. This is true for electoral but even more so for inter-electoral participation. Second, older citizens consistently participate to a larger extent than younger. Third – and somewhat surprisingly considering modernisation ideas suggesting that those who migrate to towns are 'agents of change' and thus more likely to be politically active (Bratton et al., 2005) – rural citizens are on average more active than their urban counterparts. Finally, and interestingly considering the large literature stressing the relation between ethnic identities and African voting behaviour, there is comparatively little evidence of ethnic inequalities in participation. The next section evaluates to what extent individual resource differentials can help explain individual variation and observed group inequalities in participation.

Participatory inequalities and the individual resource base

When introducing the resource variables into the regressions (Table 2, Regressions 2 and 6), time does not stand out as relevant for meeting the costs of political participation. The indicator included to capture restricted time availability – if the respondent is employed full time – is not significantly related to attending community meetings, and actually positively related to voting. Viewing time as a resource relevant for political participation, and believing that people in full-time employment are comparatively restricted in terms of the time they have to spend on political activity, this is surprising. Looking at the individual country estimations (Panel B, Tables A4-A5) does not change this picture. While in some countries we observe a positive and in a couple of countries a negative association between political participation and working full-time, in the majority of countries we observe no statistically significant relation between the two.

Similarly, money does not come out as a resource relevant for meeting the costs of political participation. Poverty is not significantly related to voting, and whereas it is related to community meeting attendance, the association is in the unexpected direction if thinking of money as a resource constraining participation – the poorer you are, the more likely you are to attend community meetings (on average, a one standard deviation higher poverty index score implies an approximately 2 percentage point higher probability to attend community meetings). These results are mirrored in the individual country sub-samples (Panel B, Tables A4-A5); while in the majority of countries poverty is not significantly related to voting (when it is, the association tends to be weakly statistically significant and of varying sign), it is in 8 countries positively associated with attending community meetings.

[7] Considering that I compare 20 countries, and that the relations between ethnic groups in a particular country is a complex matter that requires substantial knowledge of local history and conditions, I abstract from interpreting the sign of the effects and only note whether there are in fact signs of participatory inequalities.

[8] In Botswana and Senegal, however, it seems women are actually more likely to vote.

Turning to resources in terms of human capital, education stands out as relevant for taking part in community meetings, but not for voting. Compared to people with no schooling, a person with primary school education is 3 percentage points more likely to attend community meetings. For individuals with secondary or post-secondary education the difference is about twice that (the difference is statistically significant). Hence, the pooled sample results indicate that community meeting attendance increases with education. Looking at the individual country estimations, there are signs of this pattern in 9 countries.[9] For voting, however, the picture is different. According to the pooled sample results people with no schooling vote to the same extent as people with primary, secondary or post-secondary education. Looking at the individual country estimations, education is positively related to voting in 5 countries – however, only in Namibia does more than one of the educational dummies come out positive and significant, and in Ghana and to some extent in Malawi there is actually a negative association between education and voting. Believing that human capital is required for citizens to understand the election process – who the candidates are, what they stand for etc. – the lack of a clear positive association between education and voting is surprising. At the least, one would expect to see a difference between citizens who are illiterate and citizens who can read and write, but the results seem to indicate otherwise.

Access to information, finally, is in the pooled sample estimations positively related to both voting and attending community meetings. The marginal effects are quite modest though (on average, a one standard deviation higher score in the information index implies a roughly 1 percentage point higher probability to vote and a 2 percentage point higher probability to attend community meetings), and looking at the individual country estimations the pattern can be observed in a relatively limited number of countries (4 countries for voting and 7 countries for attending community meetings).[10]

To sum up the results so far, it seems the resource perspective does a relatively poor job at explaining individual variation in participation. If a resource is relevant for meeting the costs of participation, more of that resource should mean more participation. If anything, however, the estimations suggest that having *little* time (i.e. working full-time) and *little* money (i.e. being poorer) is associated with *more* participation. Hence, rather than constraining participation, it seems working full-time and being poor is related to motivational factors that stimulate participation. Education and information, on the other hand, come out as potentially relevant for meeting the costs of participation. However, education seems to matter only for taking part in community meetings, and whereas information appears to matter for both voting and attending community meetings it has relatively modest effects.

Our next question is whether differential resource endowments can help explain the observed group inequalities in political participation. Comparing pooled sample group means in terms of the individual resource endowments (Table 1, Panel B), we can note that with the exception of our proxy for time availability, women, older citizens and people living in rural areas tend to be more resource poor than their respective comparison groups. In some cases the differences are quite substantial; whereas 64 percent of urban citizens have reached at least secondary school, the figure in rural areas is almost half that.[11] Given our priors that the concerned resources are relevant for meeting the costs of participating politically, one would thus expect that these groups participate comparatively little. We know that this is true for women. For older people and citizens living in rural areas, on the other hand, we have seen the opposite – i.e. relatively high participation rates.

[9] In Ghana and Zambia, however, there is actually a negative relationship between education and attending community meetings, although only weakly statistically significant.
[10] In Botswana information exposure is actually negatively related to voting.
[11] To ease interpretation, I focus simply on the share of respondents with at least some secondary school.

Table 1: Group means (pooled sample)

Panel A: Group means in political participation

	Residential		Gender		Ethnic		Age			Full
	Rural	Urban	Male	Female	Major	Non-major	<30	30-49	>49	sample
Voting	0.792	0.736	0.792	0.752	0.759	0.784	0.656	0.816	0.852	0.772
Meeting	0.721	0.547	0.703	0.610	0.645	0.668	0.556	0.709	0.751	0.657

Panel B: Group means in resources

	Residential		Gender		Ethnic		Age			Full
	Rural	Urban	Male	Female	Major	Non-major	<30	30-49	>49	sample
Education*	0.345	0.643	0.502	0.407	0.441	0.467	0.599	0.423	0.225	0.454
Information	-0.346	0.535	0.107	-0.154	-0.025†	-0.022†	0.082	-0.024	-0.239	-0.023
Poverty	0.082	-0.153	-0.020	0.012	-0.010†	0.001†	-0.101	0.033	0.115	-0.004
Full-time	0.141	0.234	0.214	0.135	0.164	0.185	0.136	0.229	0.138	0.175

Observations are weighted using combined within×across weights. The within country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to region, urban-rural distribution etc. The across country weights adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200). *Refers to having some secondary school or more education. †Indicates that the difference in group means is not statistically significant. For the remaining groups, the respective group difference in means are statistically significant at the 1% level, except for male vs. female poverty where the difference is statistically significant at the 5% level (for the age categories, the significance test is based on an F-test of all parameters being equal to zero).

Table 2: Political participation in Africa: Group inequalities and resource differentials (probit marginal effects)

Dependent variable is:	(1) Voting	(2) Voting	(3) Voting	(4) Voting	(5) Meeting	(6) Meeting	(7) Meeting	(8) Meeting
Groups								
Rural	0.049***	0.058***	0.045***	0.042***	0.127***	0.150***	0.108***	0.104***
	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.010)	(0.010)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)
Female	-0.026***	-0.022***	-0.022***	-0.013*	-0.085***	-0.074***	-0.075***	-0.060***
	(0.006)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.008)
Age	0.020***	0.020***	0.020***	0.019***	0.022***	0.021***	0.021***	0.021***
	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)	(0.001)
Age squared	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***	-0.000***
	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)	(0.000)
Major ethnic	0.006	0.007	0.018*	0.015	-0.009	-0.008	0.020	0.018
	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.008)	(0.008)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Resources								
Poverty		0.002	0.004	0.004		0.019***	0.017***	0.017***
		(0.003)	(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)
Full-time		0.019**	0.015*	0.013		0.002	0.007	0.005
		(0.008)	(0.009)	(0.008)		(0.010)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education_Primary		0.008	0.013	0.006		0.029**	0.030**	0.020*
		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)		(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.012)
Education_Secondary		0.003	0.012	0.001		0.045***	0.049***	0.036**
		(0.012)	(0.014)	(0.014)		(0.013)	(0.016)	(0.016)
Education_Post-secondary		-0.011	-0.002	-0.021		0.063***	0.067***	0.043**
		(0.015)	(0.017)	(0.017)		(0.016)	(0.018)	(0.018)
Information		0.012***	0.016***	0.008*		0.022***	0.033***	0.020***
		(0.004)	(0.005)	(0.005)		(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.007)
Regional controls								
Country dummies	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes	no	no
Region dummies	no	no	yes	yes	no	no	yes	yes
Individual Controls	no	no	no	yes	no	no	no	yes
Observations	23140	23140	23070	23070	25893	25893	25893	25893

Notes: Standard errors in parentheses (in Estimations 1-2 and 5-6 robust standard errors, and in Estimations 3-4 and 7-8 standard errors clustered by the 246 regions); *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using combined within×across country weights. The within country weights adjust the samples to be nationally representative with respect to gender, region, urban-rural distribution etc. The across country weights adjust all country samples to the same size (N=1200). For a description of the individual controls see Table A2.

In line with this, accounting for resource differentials appears to help explain the lower participation among women compared to men, but not the relatively high participation rates among older people and citizens living in rural areas. Introducing the resource variables into the regression, the observed gender gap shrinks somewhat. Still, though, important variation remains unexplained, and in several of the individual country estimations the gender gap actually remains stable to inclusion of the resource variables. With respect to the relatively high participation rates among older people and citizens living in rural areas, controlling for the individual resource base, the age effects remain stable, and the unexplained rural-urban participation divide becomes even wider (a similar pattern is observed in the majority of country sub-samples). Similarly, in the individual countries where we found ethnic differences in participation, introducing the resource variables does little to explain observed divides.

Hence, with the exception of the relatively low participation rate among women, accounting for individual resource endowments does not help us understand observed group inequalities in political participation. Seemingly, the key to explaining these group inequalities in political participation lies outside the resource perspective. These results should not necessarily be taken at face value, however; to evaluate the explanatory power of resources as a means of meeting the costs of participating we need to control for systematic variation in the costs and benefits of participating.

Regional fixed effects should pick up the influence of contextual factors that could create regional variation in the costs and benefits of political participation. Yet, when introducing region dummies and clustering standard errors at the regional level (see Table 2, Regressions 3 and 7), the results remain largely intact.[12] Where the resource variables had no statistically significant effect, they still have no statistically significant effect. And where they did have a statistically significant effect, the effects are still there and in most cases remain stable (the information effects become larger though, seemingly suggesting that regional variation in information availability obscures the relation between participation and individual information exposure). Similarly, accounting for regional variation the observed group inequalities in terms of gender, age and urban-rural location remain (although the latter drop in size).[13]

When controlling for contextual variation in participation, there is still the possibility that our resource variables pick up omitted individual level factors affecting the decision to participate politically. However, when in line with the discussion in Section 3.2, including controls for social capital, political interest, clientelist experience and distributional policy preferences (Regressions 4 and 8), the resource estimates remain qualitatively the same.

Time and money still do not come out as a factors constraining political participation. The poor are still equally likely to vote and more likely to attend community meetings, and although the unexpected positive association between having full-time employment and voting is no longer there (seemingly indicating that this relationship was driven by omitted variables now captured by our individual controls), there are still no signs of a negative association between political participation and being full-time employed. Hence, controlling for people in full-time employment having access to more politically relevant social capital or being more civic-minded – factors which could counteract the supposed negative effect of having little time – working full-time still does not stand out as a factor constraining political participation. The positive effects of education (on attending community meetings) and information (on both voting and attending community

[12] Conditioning on individual group affiliations and resource endowments, the absolute majority of country and region dummies (not presented) still come out statistically significant, pointing to the importance of macro and meso level determinants of participation. Although interesting, the present paper focuses on the role of micro level resource endowments, and view the country and region fixed effects merely as controls for contextual variation in factors affecting the cost and benefits of participation.

[13] Accounting for regional variation, we can observe a weakly statistically significant difference between majority and minority ethnic groups in terms of voting, with citizens belonging to majority ethnic groups reporting slightly higher turnout. Controlling for regional fixed effects in the individual country estimations (the results are available upon request), however, participatory inequalities across ethnic groups are observed in few countries (5 for voting, and 4 for attending community meetings).

meetings) remain, but drop in size. Hence, accounting for higher levels of social capital among the well-educated and a tendency of civic minded individuals to seek information, resources in terms of human capital and information still seem relevant for meeting the costs of participation.

The aim of this exercise was to ensure that the effects (or lack of effects) of our resource variables are not driven by omitted factors related to the individual resource base, as opposed to what we are trying to measure, i.e. the importance (or lack of importance) of the respective resources for meeting the costs of participating. The fact that the resource estimates remain largely intact in the face of controls closely related to participation as well as resource endowments should make us more confident on this point.[14]

Sensitivity of results

The results so far indicate systematic participatory inequalities based on gender, age and residential location, but comparatively little inequality along ethnic lines. Moreover, they suggest that the resource perspective has surprisingly weak explanatory power, both for explaining individual variation and group inequalities in participation. This section explores the robustness of our findings (the results are available upon request).

To begin with, could the results be contingent on our choice of group affiliation and resource indicators? To get an ethnic affiliation measure that is simple and comparable across countries, we focused on whether or not the respondents belong to a majority ethnic group. This measure is quite crude, however, for example hiding possible variation across different minority ethnic groups in a country. Is this why we observed limited ethnic inequalities in participation? To approach this issue, I introduce another group level, now distinguishing between majority, minority and middle ethnic groups.[15] Using this more detailed measure does not change the results markedly; in the majority of countries there is still no evidence of participatory inequalities along ethnic lines.

Turning to the resource variables, in the benchmark setup, we used an information index as a proxy for informational resources and found that information was the only of our resource variables that seemed to matter for both voting and attending community meetings. Being an index covering the extent to which the respondent gets news from a variety of sources, the indicator has the advantage that it contains a lot of information. However, if instead of using the information index we focus on the most common information source – radio – we get similar results, with more straightforward interpretations. Those who report to own a radio are 4 percentage points more likely to vote and 6 percentage points more likely to attend community meetings (conditional on poverty and the other resource variables). Controlling for political interest and politically relevant social capital does not change this pattern. Moreover, using the alternative information proxy does not affect the extent to which the resource variables help explain the group inequalities in participation.

The result that the poor are, if anything, more likely to participate was stable to the inclusion of regional and individual level controls, but what if we use an alternative indicator to capture economic standing? If instead of the poverty index – which is a relative poverty measure – we use a poverty dummy classifying

[14] Due to the endogeneity concerns discussed in Section 3.2, I view these indicators merely as proxies for omitted variables and do not interpret their estimates. For the same reasons, I refrain from interpreting the effect of including the individual level controls on the marginal effects of the group affiliation variables. For instance, it is not evident what to make of the fact that the 'female effects' drop in size when including the individual controls. Although women being isolated from networks for communication about politics seems like a sensible explanation for lower female participation, we cannot rule out reverse causality, i.e. that women participate less and therefore tend to have more limited access to this form of politically relevant social capital. Similarly, to explain lower female participation with lower political interest among women seems unsatisfactory, and naturally raises the question of why women would be less interested in politics.

[15] A respondent is coded as belonging to a middle ethnic group if his/her home language is cited as home language by at least 10% of the respondents from his/her country (but is not the language cited as the home language by the largest segment of respondents), and as belonging to a minority ethnic group if his/her home language is cited as the home language by less than 10% of the respondents from his/her country.

respondents as poor if their family has gone without enough food 'several times' or more often during the past year, the results suggest that the poor are more likely to both vote and to attend community meetings. Again, using the alternative resource measures does not affect the capacity of the resource variables to explain the group inequalities in participation.

Our time indicator, finally, did not stand out as relevant for participation. Focusing on whether a person has full-time paid employment the variable is meant to capture time availability. On the other hand, it does not capture self-employment or work within the household. Arguably, these activities – although time consuming – involve a greater flexibility of time use, allowing for a break to go to the polls or to visit the community meeting hall. The ideal, however, would be to have a measure of reported time use on different activities, including both working to earn money and working in the household. Round 2 of the Afrobarometer – although lacking a number of our other focus indicators, most notably the question on voting – actually has this information. Using this data, it turns out that reporting to spend a lot of time working – within as well as outside the household – is positively correlated with attending community meetings. That is, busier people participate more, meaning that again, time does not stand out as a major constraint on participation.

With respect to our dependent variables, we know that turnout figures based on self-reported voting are higher than official turnout statistics. As discussed in Section 4.3, the figures are not strictly comparable and the discrepancy is most likely due to several factors. One of these, however, is presumably that respondents tend to over-report voting. Although applying to a small number of observations (less than 0.5% of the effective sample), a potential concern could be that our voting indicator excludes those who claim not to remember whether they voted. Presumably, this response could serve as an escape from having to admit that you did not vote, meaning that non-voters would be over-represented among the excluded observations. In an alternative voting regression I therefore use a voting indicator which assumes that these respondents in fact did not vote (i.e. instead of being coded as missing values, they are given zeros on the voting dummy). The results remain unchanged. To further evaluate the sensitivity of the results to respondents over-reporting voting, in an alternative estimation I restrict the sample to include only respondents from the five countries with the smallest discrepancy between self-reported voting share and official turnout (Cape Verde, Ghana, Liberia, Namibia and Zambia).[16] Reassuringly, the main results stand. Similarly, if restricting the sample to only include observations where the interviewer judges the respondent as honest (based on the question: 'What was the respondent's attitude towards you during the interview? Was he/she: honest, in between, or misleading?' with 79 percent of the respondents being judged as 'honest', 19 as 'in between' and 2 as 'misleading')[17] does not change the basic results.

Another concern would be if people's voting behaviour (or tendency to over-report voting) is affected by restricted civil liberties or democratic practices in their country of residence. Reasonably, an individual could have plenty of resources in terms of time, money, information and human capital, but still abstain from voting due to voter intimidation or as a result of perceiving the election as unfair (see e.g. Lindberg, 2004; and Collier and Vicente, 2009). To check if this is why we find that the resource perspective has relatively weak explanatory power, in two alternative voting regressions I restrict the sample to include only countries judged as 'free' by Freedom House, and countries with Polity IV democracy scores higher than five (see Table A1). The basic results stand.[18]

Our second dependent variable – community meeting attendance – is meant to shed light on political participation taking place between elections. Looking at our data, attending community meetings constitutes an important form of inter-electoral participation. What could be a potential concern, however, is that we have no information on the issues addressed in the meetings referred to or on the extent to which our

[16] In cases where presidential and parliamentary elections are held concurrently and their official turnout rates differ, the higher official turnout rate of the two is used in the calculation (considering that it seems more likely that the survey respondent refers to the more popular and widely known of the two elections).

[17] Being a subjective judgement on part of the interviewer we cannot be sure that this assessment is true and fair. Nevertheless, the question is useful as a rough check of data reliability.

[18] Interestingly, however, focusing on these more democratic countries there is no gender gap in voting.

respondents take active part in the discussions. With respect to the former, considering that the survey question on community meeting attendance is part of a block of queries asking about 'actions that people take as citizens' it seems likely that attending community meetings is interpreted as a form of civic engagement, rather than as taking part in, say, a social gathering. Nevertheless, it is not evident that the meetings referred to always deal with issues of a clearly political nature. With regard to the latter, simply showing up at a meeting to some extent involves a decision to take part. Still, though, we cannot be sure whether respondents who report to have attended community meetings took active part in the same or attended passively. If attending community meetings is a passive form of political participation, maybe this is why we find the individual resource endowments to be of limited relevance?

To check if the findings are relevant for different forms of inter-electoral political participation, and not just for attending community meetings, I construct a composite variable based on the first principal component of three binary indicators revealing if during the past year the respondent has 1) attended a community meeting, 2) joined others to raise an issue, and 3) taken part in a demonstration or protest march. Using this indicator as dependent variable in an OLS estimation the results remain qualitatively the same. As it seems, the findings obtained when focusing on community meeting attendance could be relevant for other forms of inter-electoral participation as well.

Conclusions

Motivated by the importance of broad-based citizen engagement for equitable democratic development and by the very sparse existing evidence on patterns of political participation in the emerging African democracies, the aim of this study was to examine the role of individual resource endowments for explaining individual and group variation in African political participation.

Empirical analysis of a unique data material, covering political and economic attitudes and behaviour of over 27 000 respondents across 20 African countries, suggested surprisingly weak explanatory power of the resource perspective, both for explaining individual variation and observed group inequalities in participation. The estimations offer no support for the view that time and money are resources relevant for meeting the costs of participating. If anything, they suggest that the poor are more likely to participate politically. And while education and information seem to bear some relevance for meeting the costs of participation, education matters only for attending community meetings, and the information effects are modest and only observed in a limited number of the country sub-samples.

Correspondingly, the results clearly indicate that the observed group inequalities in terms of political participation are not simply the result of systematic differences in individual resource endowments. The estimations reveal systematic participatory inequalities based on gender, age and residential location, but – against the background of the large literature stressing the relation between ethnic identities and African voting behaviour – comparatively little evidence of ethnic inequalities in participation. And with the exception of the relatively low participation rate among women, for which resource differentials appear to have some explanatory power, accounting for individual resource endowments does not help explain the observed participatory inequalities. In fact, we actually see the relatively resource-poor groups – older citizens and people living in rural areas – participating to a larger extent than their more resource rich counterparts. Hence, in spite of the argument that in developing countries higher participation costs and more limited individual resources should result in the resource constraint relevant for political participation more often being binding, the resource approach does a surprisingly poor job at explaining both individual and group variation in political participation.

The main results are robust over a wide range of alternative specifications. They remain intact to regional controls included to account for contextual variation in the costs and benefits of political participation, to individual controls included as proxies for omitted variables related to the person's resource base as well as to the decision to take part, to the use of alternative group and resource indicators, to using an alternative measure for inter-electoral participation, and to restricting the sample to only include respondents from countries with a small discrepancy between self-reported and official turnout, to respondents judged as

honest, and to respondents from countries with relatively well-functioning democracies. Breaking down the pooled sample into the individual country sub-samples, however, it is important to note that whereas the main patterns can be observed in a wide range of countries there is also significant country heterogeneity.

So what can we take from this? Are comparatively high participation rates among relatively resource poor groups good news? To some extent yes; we want to avoid a scenario where higher participation among the resource rich reinforces existing inequalities. Still, participatory inequalities – in any shape or form – could be seen as problematic since they imply that those who participate politically are not representative of the public. Also, if the relatively resource poor participate to a greater extent than the comparatively resource rich, this naturally raises the question why. Focusing on the relevance of resources for meeting the costs of participating, the present paper explores factors enabling participation rather than the motivations behind the choice to participate. If high participation among resource poor groups, such as rural citizens, is a sign of the often suggested importance of personalised relationships and clientelist appeals in African politics, this would not come across as good news. Neither would a scenario where the resource rich do not participate to the same extent because they are able to influence outcomes via alternative – corrupt – means. To be able to evaluate and tackle systematic participatory inequalities, we need to understand the basis of existing disparities. While the provision of information and education might stimulate general political engagement, and presumably help citizens make more informed choices, the results of the present paper suggest a need to go beyond these measures to tackle participatory inequalities. We need further knowledge about the nature of, and the motivations behind, political participation in Africa.

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Appendix

Table A1: Post-independence democratic development

Country	Coloniser	Indep.	Post-independence democratic development[1]	First multi-party election[2]	Polity IV score[3]	Freedom house rating[4]
Benin	France	1960	1960-91 Military rule, one party rule, and restricted democratic practices. 1991- Democracy	1991	7	Free (2)
Botswana	UK	1966	1966- Democracy	1965	8	Free (2)
Burkina Faso	France	1960	1960-78 Military rule, one party rule, and restricted democratic practices. 1978-80 Democracy. 1980-2002 Military regime / restricted democratic practice. 2002- Emerging democracy.	1978	2	Partly free (4.5)
Cape Verde	Portugal	1975	1975-90 One party rule.1991-Democracy	1991	n.a.	Free (1)
Ghana	UK	1957	1957-92 Periods of democracy, military rule, one party rule, and restricted democratic practices. 1992- Democracy / Emerging Democracy	1956	8	Free (2)
Kenya	UK	1963	1963-2002 Emerging democracy, one party rule, restricted democratic practices. 2002- Democ.	1992	7	Partly free (3)
Lesotho	UK	1966	1966-70 Democracy, 1970-93 Military rule and restricted democratic practices, 1993-2002 Democracy/Emerging democracy. 2002- democracy	1965	8	Free (2.5)
Liberia	US	1847	1847-1984 Emerging democracy, one party, military rule. 1984-97 Restricted democ. practice / transitional governments. 1997-2001 Emerging democ. 2001-06 Restricted democ. practice / transitional governments. 2006- Democracy.	2005	7	Partly free (4.5)
Madagascar	France	1960	1960-89 Periods of military rule, one party rule, and restricted democratic practices. 1989-93 Multiparty transition, 1993-Democracy	1989	7	Partly free (3)
Malawi	UK	1964	1964-93 One party rule, 1994- democracy	1994	6	Partly free (4)
Mali	France	1960	1960-91 Military and one party rule. 1992- Democracy	1992	7	Free (2)
Mozambique	Portugal	1975	1975-90 One party rule,1990-94 Multiparty transition, 1994- Democracy	1994	6	Partly free (3.5)
Namibia	S. Africa	1990	1990- Democracy	1989	6	Partly free (2.5)
Nigeria	UK	1960	1960-99 Democ., military rule, restricted democratic practices. 1999- Dem./Emerging democ.	1979	4	Partly free (4)
Senegal	France	1960	1960-2000 Periods of emerging democracy, one party rule, and restricted democratic practices. 2000- Democracy	1978	8	Free (2.5)
South Africa	UK	1961	1910-94 Restricted Democratic Practice, 1994- Democracy	1994	9	Free (1.5)
Tanzania	UK	1964	1964-92 One Party rule, 1992-1995 Multiparty transition, 1995- Emerging Democracy	2000	2	Partly Free (3.5)
Uganda	UK	1962	1962-66 Democracy, 1966-96 Periods of military rule, one party rule, and restricted democratic practices, 1996- Restricted democratic practice	1962	1	Partly Free (4.5)
Zambia	UK	1964	1964-90 Emerging Democ. / one party rule, 1991-2006 Democ./ Emerging democ., 2006- Democ.	1991	5	Partly free (4)
Zimbabwe	UK	1980	1980-87 Emerging Democracy, 1987- Restricted Democratic Practice	1979	1	Not free (6.5)

[1]From the African Elections Database (2010); [2]First post-independence multi-party parliamentary election judged as 'free' or 'partly free' by the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2010) (or first equivalent election held in a period in which the country is judged as a democracy by the African Elections Database); [3]Polity IV (Polity IV project, 2010) democracy score for 2005 (for 2006 in Liberia due to democratic transition in 2005), 0-10 with higher values meaning better democracy (see Marshall and Jaggers, 2002); [4]Freedom house combined political rights and civil liberties rating from 2005, 1-7 with 1-2.5 judged as 'free', 3-5 as 'partly free', and 5.5-7 as 'not free' (see Freedom House, 2010).

Table A2: Variable descriptions

Dependent variables

Voting: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to have voted in the 'most recent [20XX] national elections'; zero otherwise. 'Don't know'/'Can't remember' responses, as well as those who were too young to vote at the time of the election (including those turning 18 during the year of the election), are coded as missing values.

Meeting: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to have attended a community meeting during the past year; zero otherwise ('don't know'/'can't remember' responses coded as missing values).

Group affiliations

Female: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent is female; zero otherwise.

Rural: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent lives in a rural area; zero otherwise.

Age variables: Age in years and age squared.

Ethnic affiliations (based on the question, 'What is your home language?'):

Major ethnic: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent's self-reported home language is the language cited as home language by the largest segment of respondents in country; zero otherwise.

Resource endowments

Education (based on question of what is the respondent's highest level of education):

No-school: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has no formal schooling; zero otherwise (used as reference category in estimation). Education_Primary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent's highest level of education is at primary school level (including those with incomplete primary); zero otherwise. Education_Secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent's highest level of education is at secondary school level (including those with incomplete secondary); zero otherwise. Education_Post-secondary: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent's highest level of education is at post-secondary school level (including those with incomplete post-secondary); zero otherwise.

Poverty: A poverty index with mean zero and standard deviation one, higher values meaning that you are poorer. Constructed as the first principal component of the answers to, 'Over the past year, how often, if ever, have you or anyone in your family gone without: (a) enough food to eat, (b) enough clean water for home use, (c) medicines or medical treatment, (d) enough fuel to cook your food?', with response categories ranging from 0 for 'never' to 4 for 'always' for each item.

Information: An index with mean zero and standard deviation one, higher values meaning that the person has greater access to information. Constructed as the first principal component of the responses to, 'How often do you get news from the following sources: (a) radio, (b) television and (c) newspapers?' with response categories ranging from 0 for 'never' to 4 for 'every day'.

Full-time: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent has full-time paid employment; zero otherwise (if no employment or part-time employment).

Individual controls

Social capital: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent reports to occasionally or frequently discuss politics with friends/family; zero if reporting to never do so.

Pol. interest: Dummy variable equal to one if the respondent claims to be somewhat or very interested in public affairs; zero if not at all or not very interested.

Clientelism: Dummy variable equal to one if in the choice between statement (a) 'since leaders represent everyone, they should not favour their own family or group', and (b) 'once in office, leaders are obliged to help their home community', the respondents agrees/strongly agrees with statement (b). The dummy variable takes the value zero if instead the respondent agrees/strongly agrees with (a), agrees with neither statement or chooses the 'don't know' response category.

Policy preferences: Three dummies based on the question 'how well or badly would you say the current government is handling narrowing gaps between rich and poor?'. Bad inc. gap: Dummy equal to one if the respondent thinks the government handles narrowing gap between rich and poor very badly or fairly badly. Good inc. gap: Dummy equal to one if the respondents think the government handles narrowing gap between rich and poor very well or fairly well. Undecided: Dummy equal to one if the respondent is undecided with respect to the above question (used as reference category in estimation).

Regional controls

Country dummies: 20 countries.

Region dummies: 246 sub-national regions.

Table A3: Official turnout versus self-reported voting

Country	Official turnout (% of voting age population) in last national election prior to the survey[1]	% share of respondents reporting to have voted in last national election[2]
Benin	2007 Parliamentary: 62	92
Botswana	2004 Parliamentary: 44	67
Burkina Faso	2007 Parliamentary: 40	75
Cape Verde	2006 Presidential: 79; 2006 Parliamentary: 80	85
Ghana	2004 Presidential: 80; 2004 Parliamentary: 80	90
Kenya	2007 Presidential: 55; 2007 Parliamentary: 55	83
Lesotho	2007 Parliamentary: 39	65
Liberia	2005 Presidential: 59; 2005 Parliamentary: 71	82
Madagascar	2007 Parliamentary: n.a.	69
Malawi	2004 Presidential: 58; 2004 Parliamentary: 55	82
Mali	2007 Presidential: 48; 2007 Parliamentary: 39	79
Mozambique	2004 Presidential: 36; 2004 Parliamentary: 36	80
Namibia	2004 Presidential: 81; 2004 Parliamentary: 80	79
Nigeria	2007 Presidential: n.a.; 2007 Parliamentary: n.a.	65
Senegal	2007 Presidential: 55; 2007 Parliamentary: 28	80
South Africa	2004 Parliamentary: 57	74
Tanzania	2005 Presidential: 68; 2005 Parliamentary: 65	90
Uganda	2006 Presidential: 61; 2006 Parliamentary: 60	73
Zambia	2006 Presidential: 56; 2006 Parliamentary: 56	64
Zimbabwe	2008 Presidential: 47; 2008 Parliamentary: 45	65

[1]Source of official turnout figures: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2010); [2]Refers to those of voting age at the year of the election.

Table A4: Voting estimations by country: group inequalities and resource differentials (probit marginal effects)

Panel A: Group affiliations

	Benin	Botsw.	Burk.F.	CapeV.	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madag.	Malawi	Mali	Mozam.	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	S.Afr.	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimb.
Groups																				
Rural	0.08***	0.07**	0.11***	0.01	0.03	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.07*	0.08**	0.09**	-0.01	-0.01	-0.01	-0.00	0.05*	0.02	0.00	0.02	0.19***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)
Female	-0.02	0.06*	-0.08***	0.02	-0.04**	-0.09***	0.02	-0.01	-0.09**	0.02	-0.08***	-0.00	0.01	-0.12***	0.06**	0.04	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.06*	-0.10***
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.01***	0.04***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	0.03***	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.04***	0.02***	0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age sq.	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00*	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Major eth	-0.02	0.00	-0.02	0.34	0.04*	0.04	0.01	0.01	0.07*	-0.03	0.00	-0.08*	0.07***	0.00	0.01	0.09***	-0.07*	-0.08**	-0.03	0.08**
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.32)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Panel B: Group affiliations + Resources

	Benin	Botsw.	Burk.F.	CapeV.	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madag.	Malawi	Mali	Mozam.	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	S.Afr.	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimb.
Groups																				
Rural	0.08***	0.08**	0.12***	0.03	0.02	0.05	0.06	0.07**	0.03	0.05	0.15***	-0.03	0.00	-0.01	0.01	0.06**	0.05*	-0.01	0.04	0.28***
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.05)
Female	-0.02	0.06*	-0.08***	0.03	-0.05**	-0.08***	0.02	0.01	-0.09**	0.01	-0.06*	-0.01	0.01	-0.12***	0.08***	0.04	-0.01	-0.07***	-0.05	-0.07*
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Age	0.01***	0.04***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	0.02***	0.02***	0.02**	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.03***	0.02***	0.05***
	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age sq.	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00*	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Major eth	-0.03	0.01	-0.02	0.37	0.04*	0.06*	0.00	0.00	0.07*	-0.03	-0.00	-0.09*	0.08***	-0.00	0.01	0.09***	-0.07*	-0.08**	-0.02	0.07
	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.31)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.12)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Resources																				
Poverty	0.01*	-0.03	0.01	0.02	-0.01	0.03*	0.01	-0.00	-0.04*	-0.01	0.00	0.02	-0.03**	-0.02*	0.02	-0.02	0.00	-0.00	0.02	0.03
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Full-time	-0.02	0.08**	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.00	-0.02	0.04	0.01	-0.06	0.07	0.03	0.03	0.10***	-0.02	-0.00	0.07**	-0.12**	0.02
	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ed_prim.	-0.01	0.04	-0.06	0.04	-0.09***	0.02	0.03	0.06	0.07	-0.05	-0.02	-0.06	0.16***	-0.00	0.05	-0.04	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.09
	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Ed_sec.	-0.02	0.04	-0.05	0.04	-0.11**	0.05	-0.07	0.09**	0.03	-0.12*	0.06	-0.07	0.18***	-0.03	0.08**	-0.05	0.00	0.04	0.10	0.16*
	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.09)
Ed_post.	-0.00	-0.01	0.04	0.03	-0.10	0.11***	0.08	0.02	-0.16	-0.13	0.05	-0.17	0.13**	-0.06	0.04	-0.02	-0.12	0.04	0.03	0.12
	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.13)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.09)
Info.	0.01	-0.04**	0.01	0.03**	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	-0.02	-0.00	0.06***	-0.02	0.00	0.02	0.00	0.01	0.04**	-0.02	0.03	0.04**
	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Obs.	1082	1000	1002	1057	919	987	1079	1009	1227	933	1120	731	927	1901	1065	1950	929	2146	1009	1067

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using within country weights adjusting the sample to be nationally representative with respect to region, urban-rural distribution etc.

Table A5: Meeting estimations by country: group inequalities and resource differentials (probit marginal effects)

Panel A: Group affiliations

	Benin	Botsw.	Burk.F.	CapeV.	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madag.	Malawi	Mali	Mozam.	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	S.Afr.	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbab.
Groups																				
Rural	0.06*	0.09***	0.18***	0.13***	0.18***	0.15***	0.15***	0.12***	-0.01	0.09**	0.06	0.10***	-0.05	0.10***	0.15***	0.11***	0.09**	0.07**	0.31***	0.27***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Female	-0.12***	-0.06**	-0.13***	-0.05	-0.16***	-0.10***	-0.06**	-0.17***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.17***	-0.04	0.02	-0.21***	-0.02	-0.07***	-0.05*	-0.08***	-0.12***	-0.04
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.01	0.03***	0.03***	0.01*	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.00	0.02***	0.02***	0.01**	0.04***	0.01***	0.01***	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age sq.	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00*	0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Major eth	-0.01	0.03	0.04	0.04	-0.10***	-0.09*	0.05	-0.07	0.00	0.01	0.03	-0.03	0.15***	-0.11***	0.01	0.10***	0.03	-0.11***	-0.08**	0.00
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.12)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)

Panel B: Group affiliations + Resources

	Benin	Botsw.	Burk.F.	CapeV.	Ghana	Kenya	Lesotho	Liberia	Madag.	Malawi	Mali	Mozam.	Namibia	Nigeria	Senegal	S.Afr.	Tanzania	Uganda	Zambia	Zimbab.
Groups																				
Rural	0.05	0.08***	0.20***	0.18***	0.17***	0.21***	0.13***	0.18***	-0.00	0.08*	0.12***	0.11***	-0.03	0.11***	0.15***	0.09***	0.13***	0.13***	0.35***	0.31***
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Female	-0.12***	-0.06**	-0.11***	-0.04	-0.16***	-0.08**	-0.06**	-0.12***	-0.03	-0.03	-0.14***	-0.03	0.02	-0.20***	-0.01	-0.08***	-0.04	-0.06**	-	
0.11***	-0.03																			
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Age	0.00	0.03***	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	-0.00	0.02***	0.02***	0.01*	0.04***	0.01*	0.01**	0.02***	0.02***	0.03***	0.02***	0.03***
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)
Age sq.	0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00*	-0.00***	-0.00	0.00	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00***	-0.00	-0.00**	-0.00***	-0.00***	-0.00***	-	
0.00***	-0.00***																			
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Major eth	-0.03	0.03	0.05	0.09	-0.10***	-0.10**	0.02	-0.10**	0.01	0.02	0.04	-0.01	0.15***	-0.09***	0.03	0.09***	0.03	-0.12***	-0.07*	-0.02
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.19)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.11)	(0.04)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)
Resources																				
Poverty	0.07***	0.06***	0.02	0.02	0.03*	-0.03	-0.02*	0.01	0.01	-0.03*	0.04**	0.03	-0.01	0.05***	0.07***	0.04***	0.01	0.01	0.04**	0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Full-time	0.14***	-0.05	-0.01	-0.08**	0.03	0.04	-0.15**	-0.02	0.04**	-0.07	-0.08	0.10**	-0.03	0.08***	0.02	-0.05	0.06*	0.00	-0.03	-0.01
	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.02)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.05)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Ed_prim.	-0.01	0.06	0.08**	0.08	-0.08*	0.17**	0.01	0.07*	0.04	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.05	0.16***	-0.02	-0.11	0.13*	0.06	-0.14*	0.04
	(0.04)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.05)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.09)	(0.07)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.07)
Ed_sec.	-0.05	0.10*	-0.01	0.22***	-0.11*	0.19**	-0.02	0.11**	0.01	0.04	0.10	0.05	0.09	0.16***	0.01	-0.13	0.15***	0.09**	-0.11	0.21***
	(0.05)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.04)	(0.03)	(0.04)	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.09)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Ed_post.	-0.07	0.10*	0.04	0.25***	-0.13	0.22***	-0.04	0.15***	0.02	0.08	0.02	-0.04	0.14	0.16***	0.08	-0.07	-0.09	0.08	-0.07	0.15**
	(0.09)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.08)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.04)	(0.06)	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.10)	(0.06)	(0.07)	(0.10)	(0.15)	(0.05)	(0.10)	(0.07)
Info	0.03	0.04**	0.03	0.04*	0.03	0.04*	0.01	0.07***	0.01	-0.00	0.08***	0.01	0.00	0.00	0.04*	0.03	0.02	0.04**	0.03	-0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)
Obs.	1147	1156	1068	1184	1092	1046	1152	1148	1283	1108	1184	1041	1188	2069	1126	2242	1037	2355	1126	1141

Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%. Observations are weighted using within country weights adjusting the sample to be nationally representative with respect to region, urban-rural distribution etc.

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