- A slim majority (52%) of Malians say the African Union takes Mali’s needs and interests into account in its decision making, compared to only 41% for ECOWAS. But almost nine out of 10 (87%) think their country’s interests are adequately recognised in the decisions of the Alliance of Sahelian States. o Seven in 10 Malians (70%) say African countries should have a greater say in international decision-making bodies such as the United Nations.
- More than half (55%) of citizens prefer free trade over limiting international trade to protect domestic producers, but 45% disagree.
- Only 8% of respondents say they have heard of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA).
- Large majorities welcome the economic and political influence on their country of Russia (88%) and China (79%), but only about half as many see the influence of the AU (42%) and the United States (40%) as “somewhat” or “very” positive. France (9%), ECOWAS (18%), and the European Union (30%) receive the coolest welcome.
- Asked who helped Mali most during the COVID-19 pandemic, respondents cite Europe (17%), China (16%), and Russia (15%) as the most helpful partners.
- The share of citizens who see China’s economic influence on Mali as substantial has declined sharply since 2014, from 91% to 65%. Positive assessments of China’s influence are also significantly lower than they were a decade ago.
- Among Malians who are aware of the Russia-Ukraine war, nearly three-quarters (72%) say Mali should side with Russia, while 24% prefer neutrality and only 1% favour Ukraine.
Mali has in recent years experienced profound political and geopolitical transformations. Following two military coups in 2020 and 2021 – framed as responses to the failure of civilian governments to contain armed groups – a transitional, military-led government adopted a “sovereignist” agenda aimed at reducing foreign influence and reasserting national control over security and governance (International Crisis Group, 2024).
Relations with international partners have shifted dramatically. The United Nations peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA), deployed since 2013, was asked to leave in 2023 after Malian authorities criticised its inability to address the country’s security crisis and restore territorial control (United Nations, 2023). Ties with France, Mali’s former colonial power and key military ally, also broke down after the 2021 coup. French forces, present since 2013 to combat armed groups in northern Mali, completed their withdrawal in August 2022 at the request of the transitional authorities (Al Jazeera, 2022).
In search of new partners, Mali turned to Turkey (Yochai, 2025), the United Arab Emirates (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2024), and most notably Russia (Thompson, Doxsee, & Bermudez Jr, 2022). Starting in late 2021, the Russian private military company Wagner operated alongside Malian forces before being replaced in June 2025 by the Kremlin-controlled Africa Corps (Nossiter, 2025).
Mali’s domestic political changes have also reshaped its regional ties. Along with Burkina Faso and Niger, Mali announced in early 2024 its withdrawal from the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the creation of the Alliance of Sahelian States (AES) (BBC, 2024). This decision, according to some analysts, carries significant implications: Like its two neighbours, Mali is landlocked and far less industrialised than coastal states, leaving it heavily dependent on regional trade corridors and Gulf of Guinea ports for livestock exports and imports of essential goods (Walther, 2024).
As reported by Traoré (2025), Afrobarometer’s survey in December 2024 found that Malians overwhelmingly approve of their country’s withdrawal from ECOWAS, think that the AES will improve security in the region, and support dropping the West African franc and adopting a new national or regional currency.
The current dispatch examines how Malians perceive their country’s political and economic relations with the rest of the world. Survey findings show that while most Malians welcome the economic and political influence of Russia, China, and the AES in their country, they are divided when it comes to the United States and the African Union and overwhelmingly reject the influence of France and ECOWAS. Strikingly, nearly three-quarters of Malians say their country should side with Russia in the Russia-Ukraine war.
While a majority of Malians endorse free international trade, a large minority prefer limiting trade in order to protect domestic producers, and awareness of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) is very low.
Most Malians say the AES recognises their country’s needs and interests in its decision making, but far fewer say the same about the AU and ECOWAS. Looking beyond the continent, seven in 10 say African countries should have a stronger voice in international bodies such as the United Nations.
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