Media briefing event held by Afrobarometer to present research findings of Round 6 survey in Uganda on electoral reforms.
A la veille de leur deuxième élection présidentielle compétitive, les Guinéens se sentent libre de voter pour le candidat de leur choix, mais ils s’inquiètent à propos de l’environnement électoral et la fiabilité probable du décompte des voix, selon les résultats d’une nouvelle enquête Afrobaromètre.
Les Guinéens se dirigent vers leur deuxième élection compétitive depuis la fin de 24 ans de règne du Général Lansana Conté en 2010. L’élection oppose le Président Alpha Condé et son parti, le Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinée (RPG), à Cellou Dalein Diallo de l’Union des Forces Démocratiques de Guinée (UFDG) et six autres candidats. Lors de l'élection générale de 2010, le Président Condé a remporté de justesse au second tour, 52,52% à 47,48% de Diallo.
Ugandans support multipartism as a viable political system of governance but many are not satisfied with the way multi-party politics work in Uganda, the latest Afrobarometer survey shows.
A significant proportion of Ugandans say that competition between political parties often leads to violent conflict, that the opposition political parties and their supporters are often silenced by Government, and many fear becoming victims of political intimidation or violence during election campaigns.
The percentage of Zambian citizens who believe in the effectiveness of national elections in effecting change has nearly doubled in a space of 10 years. The most recentAfrobarometer survey has revealed that between 2005 and 2014, the percentage of Zambians who expressed confidence in the effectivess of national electionsto bring about changeincreased from 30% in 2005 to 59% in 2014.
As one of the first post-independence countries in Africa to effect leadership change through peaceful and competitive elections, Zambia has a history of multiparty politics dating back to 1991, when the United National Independent Party (UNIP) party was removed from power by the Movement for Multi-party Democracy (MMD). After ruling for 20 years, the MMD lost the elections in 2011, and the Patriotic Front (PF) was ushered into power.
The findings at a glance:
Tanzanian Members of Parliament (MPs) and political analysts describe the primary roles of MPs with a variety of phrases: benefactors, providers, executors, social workers, saviours, multi-faceted donors, even “walking ATMs". Indeed, in Tanzania, where a majority of citizens are poor and the government lacks resources and capacity to provide sufficient social services, MPs provide various kinds of financial and material assistance to their constituents to support their lives and cultivate their electoral support.
A Majority of Botswana Feel Close to a Political Party and Batswana Support a Direct Election of the President [18 November 2012]
This paper explores three different hypotheses about the role of ethnicity in voting behavior.
Does the introduction of proportionality in electoral systems help to boost popular evaluations of democracy? This article traces shifts over time in political support, using Afrobarometer data to measure mass satisfaction with democracy and public trust in political institutions in Lesotho. We find that electoral reforms have both direct and indirect effects. In the aggregate, Lesotho's transition from a majoritarian to a mixed electoral system is directly associated with increased levels of citizen support for the country's state and regime.
The question "Who votes in the United States?" has been largely answered by the political science scholarship devoted to this subject. In contrast, the question "Who votes in Africa?" has yet to receive significant attention. This paper focuses on electoral participation in 10 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. Afrobarometer survey data is used to assess the determinants of voting for over 17,000 voting age adults in 10 SSA countries. We find that variables associated with several approaches help explain who votes in Africa.
Elections are thought to bolster legitimacy by providing fair mechanisms for selecting leaders. In Africa, where competitive elections are often unfamiliar and imperfect, losers express much less support for their political institutions than do winners. Analysis of Round 1 Afrobarometer survey data from more than 20,000 respondents in 12 countries demonstrates that losers are less inclined than winners to trust their political institutions, consent to government authority, and feel that voting matters.
The 2000 presidential election in which Abdoulaye Wade defeated Abdou Diouf demonstrated that multiparty politics has created meaningful competition between incumbents and opposition political parties in Senegal. Moreover, this alternation suggests that political competition is sustainable and that citizen’s commitment to democracy is strengthening as demonstrated by their willingness to eject undesirable governments from office. Previous analyses of citizens’ perceptions of democracy in Senegal have largely focused on elite views.
Since the Third Wave of democratization swept the African continent in the early 1990s, a sufficient number of democratic elections have taken place on the continent to begin to analyze voting patterns. Benin, for example, has successfully held several rounds of free and fair presidential and parliamentary elections since 1991, but little is known about how the individual citizens of Benin cast their votes and why, or about the strategies of parties and candidates for appealing to voters.
Analysts of African political party systems frequently assert that political parties and party system development are central to the effective functioning and eventual consolidation of democracy on the continent. Due to both lack of data and elite bias, analysts have overlooked a critical link in the chain of party system evolution: mass attitudes toward political parties generally, and towards opposition parties in particular. Afrobarometer data reveals that there is, on average, a very large (20-percentage point) gap in levels of public trust between ruling and opposition parties.
Do Kenyans vote according to ethnic identities or policy interests? Based on results from a national probability sample survey conducted in December 2007, this article shows that, while ethnic origins drive voting patterns, elections in Kenya amount to more than a mere ethnic census. We start by reviewing how Kenyans see themselves, which is mainly in non-ethnic terms. We then report on how they see others, whom they fear will organize politically along ethnic lines. People therefore vote defensively in ethnic blocs, but not exclusively.
Vote buying and political intimidation are important, if epiphenomenal, dimensions of Nigerian election campaigns. According to survey-based estimates, fewer than one out of five Nigerians is personally exposed to vote buying and fewer than one in ten experiences threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated. These effects are as follows: violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty.
Although many studies find that voting in Africa approximates an ethnic census in that voting is primarily along ethnic lines, few studies have sought to explain such voting behavior using a rational choice framework. In this note, we use data of voter opinions from a survey conducted two weeks before the 2007 Kenyan presidential elections to evaluate the primary motivation for voting. We analyze voter responses on a number of issues and show that there are major differences in expected benefits across ethnic groups depending on the winning presidential candidate.
Does democratization lead to improved governance? This exploratory paper addresses this question with reference to a cross-section of sub-Saharan African countries using macro, micro and trend data. The results show an elective affinity between free elections and improved governance. But any democracy advantage is more apparent in relation to some dimensions governance than others. For example, while elections apparently boost the rule of law and control of corruption, they also seem to undercut the transparency of government procedures and the responsiveness of elected officials.
In this study I challenge the notion that personalism and clientelism structure voting behavior in Africa. Using a unique combination of data sources - survey responses from the Afrobarometer project merged with constituency-level election returns - I test the relative power of two interpersonal, clientelistic interactions between voters and members of parliament (MPs), vs. how often MPs visit their constituency, in predicting election outcomes.
Social scientists often attribute moderation of the political salience of ethnicity, in ethnically diverse societies, to the presence of cross-cutting cleavages-that is, to dimensions of identity or interest along which members of the same ethnic group may have diverse allegiances. Yet estimating the causal effects of cross-cutting cleavages is difficult.
Vote-buying has and continues to be pervasive in many electoral regimes. Yet the relationship between vote-buying and citizen behavior, particularly in the context of the secret ballot, remains largely unknown. In this paper I study vote-buying’s effect on voter turnout in Kenya, using a nationally representative survey that includes questions about the country's 2002 presidential and parliamentary elections.
In this paper we investigate voting behavior in Africa to ask what base of support presidents can count on. The most prevalent notion about electoral politics in Africa is that voters simply vote for co-ethnics. We find that assumption to be faulty. While voters tend to support a co-ethnic president, their support is not inevitable, and non co-ethnics can be swayed in a president’s favor in essentially the same fashion as co-ethnics. We show that, despite political parties lack of differentiable policy programs, party identification is what gives presidents their strongest support base.
The aim of this paper is to examine the role of individual resource endowments for explaining individual and group variation in African political participation. Drawing on new data for more than 27 000 respondents in 20 emerging African democracies, the empirical findings suggest surprisingly weak explanatory power of the resource perspective, both for explaining individual variation and observed group inequalities in participation. In several cases, the relatively resource poor groups participate to a greater extent than the relatively resource rich.