UNIQUEMENT DISPONIBLE EN ANGLAIS.
Citizenship is about the right to belong to a state and enjoy its rights while also fulfilling obligations. Without citizenship, a person can neither vote nor be voted into public office. Such statelessness has, in many an African country, been at the heart of numerous post-colonial conflicts. From Cote d'Ivoire in West Africa to Uganda and Kenya in East Africa through to Zambia and Zimbabwe in Southern Africa, the question of who is or is not a citizen is frequently a fiercely contested and unsettled issue.
D’après la plus récente enquête Afrobaromètre au Gabon, la grande majorité de Gabonais est favorable au droit à la citoyenneté pour un individu né au Gabon, la femme d’un Gabonais, une personne ayant vécu et travaillé pendant longtemps au Gabon, le mari d’une Gabonaise, mais pas pour un individu souhaitant avoir la double nationalité.
Résultats de l’enquête Afrobaromètre Round 6 à Gabon.
Le droit à la citoyenneté au Gabon: La grande majorité de Gabonais est favorable au droit à la citoyenneté pour un individu né au Gabon, la femme d’un Gabonais, une personne ayant vécu et travaillé pendant longtemps au Gabon, le mari d’une Gabonaise, mais pas pour un individu souhaitant avoir la double nationalité.
South Africa celebrates Youth Day every June 16 to commemorate the students who lost their lives during the Soweto Uprising in 1976. An estimated 3,000-10,000 students marched to protest the apartheid government’s directive to make Afrikaans a compulsory medium of instruction in public education, alongside English. The violent police response to this peaceful protest led to a widespread revolt against the government and exposed the brutality of the apartheid state to the international community.
Most Basotho, protective of their independence, are against intervention or assistance from neighbouring southern African countries to guarantee free elections and prevent human rights abuses in their country, according to the latest Afrobarometer survey.
Basotho are almost equally divided on whether the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) are helpful to Lesotho or not, survey results show.
In addition, a majority of Basotho say their country should continue to be independent of South Africa, despite the two countries’ close ties.
La politisation des Malgaches et la participation citoyenne à Madagascar (FR) [31 October 2013]
Recent political transitions around the world have cast doubt on arguments about the socioeconomic preconditions for democracy. A democratic political regime has long been regarded as an attribute of high-income, industrialized economies. Yet new scholarship has revised this law by observing that “third wave” democracies have been installed in both rich and poor countries. We can only do justice to this topic, however, by testing the same relationship at a micro-level. Are poor people any more or less attached to democracy than rich people?
Transitions to competitive, multiparty politics in African countries during the 1990s were jubilantly welcomed, both on the continent and internationally. Today, Africans enjoy unprecedented opportunities to vote, and many still revel in greater individual and political freedoms. But the full potential of democracy – including the promise of accountable governance – has yet to be fulfilled. Why has democracy – or, at least, multiparty elections – so far failed to secure better governance and greater accountability?
This compendium reports on the findings from new questions and topic areas explored in Round 3 of the Afrobarometer, involving public attitude surveys conducted in 18 countries from 2005-2006. The bulk of these new questions build upon the theme of citizen-state relations, exploring how well citizens know and understand their political system, how effectively the state is serving their most important needs, and how corruption shapes citizen assessments of state legitimacy.
In Africa, neoliberal reform has represented a major retrenchment in the public provision of health and education services. In terms of politics, this free or highly subsidized public provision of health and education had always been tightly linked to the expansion of citizenship at the end of colonial rule.
In democracies there is a trade-off between efficiency in the provision of public goods and the extent of political representation. Our paper shows how this trade-off plays out in translating intrinsic versus instrumental understandings of democracy into different levels of satisfaction with democratic outcomes. We use public opinion data in eighteen African countries to demonstrate that citizens who value democracy instrumentally report lower levels of satisfaction when fractionalization is high.
High levels of poverty along with underdeveloped infrastructure greatly inhibit Mozambicans’ ability to participate in politics and assess the quality of governance in their country. Particularly, low rates of formal education, high levels of illiteracy and limited access to news media reduce the flow of political information that would allow citizens to make informed opinions about the way democracy functions.
Africa is the poorest and most underdeveloped continent in the world. Among many political and social consequences, poverty and the lack of infrastructure place significant limitations on the cognitive skills of ordinary Africans, and thus their ability to act as full democratic citizens.
While sub-Saharan African states are not generally considered to be true nation-states, there is still considerable variation across countries in the level of nationalism expressed by their citizens. This paper explores the relative importance of national and ethnic identities in sixteen sub-Saharan African countries, using individual-level survey data, and tries to determine how much of that variation is explained by existing theories of nationalism and ethnic politics.
In Africa, it is often presumed that ethnicity shapes individuals' evaluations of politicians, and individuals would be particularly likely to rely on ethnic cues where violence or other personal experiences render ethnicity more salient. This paper examines whether individuals' ethnicity affects evaluations of politicians who use election violence or violate other democratic norms. The paper draws on data from a novel survey-embedded experiment conducted by the author in six slums in Nairobi, Kenya, in July 2009.
This paper reviews longitudinal survey data on South Africa’s political culture produced by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (1994-1998) and Afrobarometer (2000-2011) and finds that while there are real problems with democratic citizenship in South Africa, these problems are largely not peculiar to young people. Compared to other age cohorts, the youth (aged 18-25 years) of South Africa have the same conception of the role of citizen and are no more likely to endorse political violence or to hold negative views and intentions toward immigrants.
Dans l'enquête Afrobaromètre de décembre 2012, les maliens mettaient en avant comme étant les premières causes, de la grave crise sociopolitique que traversait leur pays, le manque de patriotisme des dirigeants et la faiblesse de l'Etat. En ce temps, la plupart des maliens avaient perdu confiance en la classe politique et en les politiciens. Une année plus tard, cependant, une enquête Afrobaromètre de suivi (décembre 2013) révèle que les terroristes étrangers et la corruption sont plutôt les deux premières causes du conflit et de l'occupation du Nord.
Selon une enquête de l’Afrobaromètre réalisée en décembre 2013 auprès de plus de 2 400 participants, la grande majorité des Maliens insistent sur le fait que leur pays doit rester une seule et même nation unifiée. Les citoyens rejettent fermement la tentative de groupes armés de créer un état dissident dans les territoires du Nord Mali en 2012.
Quelles sont les mesures que les citoyens peuvent prendre en réponse à la mauvaise performance du gouvernement? Quelles mesures devraient-ils prendre? Quelles mesures prennent-ils?