Ethnic diversity is generally associated with less social capital and lower levels of trust. However, most empirical evidence for this relationship is focused on generalized trust, rather than more theoretically appropriate measures of group-based trust.
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La Grande île appartient-elle à l’Afrique? A cette question, la moitié des citoyens malgaches déclarent qu’ils se sentent fiers d’être appelés Africains, alors que la même proportion n’est pas fier ou est indifférent, selon le plus récent sondage Afrobaromètre.
D’après la plus récente enquête d’Afrobaromètre en Côte d’Ivoire, la majorité des ivoiriens optent pour le pardon, la confession et l’amnistie comme solutions à la réconciliation nationale.
Résultats de la 6ème série des enquêtes Afrobaromètre en Côte d’Ivoire (2014).
La dernière enquête Afrobaromètre à Madagascar indique que 9 Malgaches sur 10 (90% de la population) sont d’accord sur le fait que la réconciliation nationale devrait constituer une priorité pour le pays. Par ailleurs, une majorité pense que cette réconciliation devrait être conduite par les autorités religieuses.
South Africa celebrates Youth Day every June 16 to commemorate the students who lost their lives during the Soweto Uprising in 1976. An estimated 3,000-10,000 students marched to protest the apartheid government’s directive to make Afrikaans a compulsory medium of instruction in public education, alongside English. The violent police response to this peaceful protest led to a widespread revolt against the government and exposed the brutality of the apartheid state to the international community.
Les Togolais sont célèbres pour leur hospitalité. Ce constat est-il encore vrai de nos jours? Qu’en est-il de la tolérance envers les personnes de religion différente, d’un autre groupe ethnique, d’une autre nationalité, d’orientation sexuelle différente, et de ceux qui vivent avec le VIH/SIDA?
Afrobarometer’s latest survey shows that Mauritians seem to accept the multi-ethnic and multicultural character of their society and have strong feeling of belonging to the Mauritian nation.
Moreover, the majority of Mauritians do not have any resentment with regards to living in an ethnically and religiously heterogeneous neighbourhood. Most Mauritians did not exhibit xenophobic attitudes and stated that they would live next to immigrants or foreign workers easily
and without fear.
Despite their multiplicity of ethnic/cultural (European, African, Indian, Chinese) and religious (Hindu, Christian, Muslim, Buddhist) backgrounds, Mauritians have experienced few incidents of ethnic or religious violence. The last major incident dates back to 1999, when the popular Creole musician Kaya was found dead whilst in police custody, triggering riots against the mostly Hindu police and fights between Creoles and Hindus. Since then, the country has lived in relative harmony through three successive national elections.
About half of Zambians (50%) have strong feelings of belonging to their ethnic group (tribe) while at the same time feeling a part of Zambia, according to the most recent Afrobarometer survey.
A small but growing number of Zambians place their tribal identity above national identity, according to the survey, which was conducted in October 2014.
The data is being released against a backdrop of public debates about the extent of tribalism in Zambia. It demonstrates that Zambians are, indeed, tribal and tribal feelings are growing in intensity.
Most Basotho, protective of their independence, are against intervention or assistance from neighbouring southern African countries to guarantee free elections and prevent human rights abuses in their country, according to the latest Afrobarometer survey.
Basotho are almost equally divided on whether the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the African Union (AU) are helpful to Lesotho or not, survey results show.
In addition, a majority of Basotho say their country should continue to be independent of South Africa, despite the two countries’ close ties.
The most recent attacks on foreigners in Soweto and Kagiso that resulted in the deaths of 6 people and the looting of over 70 foreign owned shops, raises critical questions about the security of foreigners in a country that prides itself in the philosophy of Ubuntu. In the latest round of the South African leg of the Afrobarometer Survey, a substantial majority (88%) of respondents reported distrust of foreigners living in their country.
The Afrobarometer has been tracking public attitudes towards foreigners resident in South Africa since 2008 because of a vigorous public debate on immigration controls, attacks on foreigners from other African states and accusations of xenophobia. This bulletin reports response to the questions asked in Afrobarometer Round 5 which explores these attitudes as well as drawing public perception on this issue from the 2008 survey for comparison purposes.
Violence against foreigners has become common since the transition to multi-party rule in 1994. During this period, South Africa’s borders have become more porous, and individuals from several African countries – especially Zimbabwe – have migrated to the country in search of security and opportunities for social mobility. Prior to the transition to democracy, members of the ruling National Party (NP) tightly controlled South Africa’s borders .
What do Africans think about democracy and development?
The Afrobarometer provides some answers. The Afrobarometer is a pioneering effort to systematically measure public opinion in a dozen African countries using survey research methods. This brochure summarizes 11 key findings from Round 1 surveys, completed in mid-2001.
This paper reviews longitudinal survey data on South Africa’s political culture produced by the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (1994-1998) and Afrobarometer (2000-2011) and finds that while there are real problems with democratic citizenship in South Africa, these problems are largely not peculiar to young people. Compared to other age cohorts, the youth (aged 18-25 years) of South Africa have the same conception of the role of citizen and are no more likely to endorse political violence or to hold negative views and intentions toward immigrants.
South Africa has seen a significant increase in the size of its black middle class in the post-apartheid period, but the attitudinal consequences of indicators of the middle class, as of 2011, are inconsistent and modest in size. While members of the middle class are no more likely to hold democratic values than other black South Africans, they are more likely to want government to secure higher-order, rather than basic, survival needs.
This paper provides new insights into the link between the experience of violent conflict and local collective action. I use temporal and geographical information from four rounds of survey data from Nigeria to relate measures of cooperation to past and future incidences of communal conflict. I show that local collective action, measured in terms of community meeting attendance and volunteering, is highest before the outbreak of violence – higher than both post-conflict levels and the generally lower levels of cooperation in regions not affected by violence.
Scholarly literature has recently advanced our understanding of why citizens prefer or reject free trade. Empirical results based on OECD countries confirm the Heckscher-Ohlin model of trade. The paper shifts the focus towards Sub-Saharan Africa and tests the determinants of individual support toward foreign investors. It proposes a model that explains why foreign direct investment reinforces policy making along ethnic cleavages and predicts that individual trade attitudes are mainly formed by individuals’ politically relevant ethnic group identity.
Does living in close proximity to members of other ethnic groups make people more or less tolerant of ethnic differences? How does local electoral competition interact with ethnic demography to affect ethnic tolerance? This paper examines these questions by combining survey data with new measures of local ethnic composition and political competition in Kenya. People living in ethnically diverse areas report higher levels of interethnic trust and residentially segregated people are less trusting of members of other ethnic groups.
This paper offers a first comprehensive account of popular voting intentions in Africa’s new electoral democracies. With reference to comparative aggregate and survey data from 16 countries, we show that competitive elections in Africa are more than mere ethnic censuses or simple economic referenda. Instead, Africans engage in both ethnic and economic voting. Not surprisingly, people who belong to the ethnic group in power intend to support the ruling party, in contrast to those who feel a sense of discrimination against their cultural group.
In Africa, it is often presumed that ethnicity shapes individuals' evaluations of politicians, and individuals would be particularly likely to rely on ethnic cues where violence or other personal experiences render ethnicity more salient. This paper examines whether individuals' ethnicity affects evaluations of politicians who use election violence or violate other democratic norms. The paper draws on data from a novel survey-embedded experiment conducted by the author in six slums in Nairobi, Kenya, in July 2009.
Much of the research on ethnicity, development and conflict implicitly assumes that ethnic groups act collectively in pursuit of their interests. Collective political action is typically facilitated by political parties able to make credible commitments to pursue group interests. Other work, however, emphasizes the lack of political credibility as a source of adverse development outcomes. Evidence presented here uses partisan preferences across 16 Sub-Saharan African countries to distinguish these positions.