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Afrobarometer Briefing Paper No. 113 
 
CRISIS IN MALI: AMBIVALENT POPULAR 
ATTITUDES ON THE WAY FORWARD 
 
 by Massa Coulibaly and Michael Bratton  
 
February 2013 
 
Mali faces a political crisis of multiple dimensions. A military coup has seriously set back the 
country¶s progress towards democracy and an escalating armed conflict has undermined the 
sovereignty of the state.   
 
This briefing paper assesses public attitudes about democracy and governance in Mali at a 
difficult time in the country ch¶als hlengie ofstor rebuy. Theilding an effective and accountable 
government will require visionary national leadership. But it also will require citizens who 
demand that the country return to a path of sustainable political development. Hence it is 
important to enquire about what Malians are thinking about the causes and status of² and 
possible solutions to² their country¶s polit ical crisis. 
 
An Afrobarometer survey in Mali, conducted at the end of 2012, finds the electorate in an 
apprehensive and ambivalent mood. A large majority thinks that the country is moving in the 
wrong direction. They attribute this negative momentum mainly to the incompetence of civilian 
politicians and the frailty of state institutions. They are split on whether warfare or negotiations 
are the best way to put an end to armed insurgency. In searching for solutions, Malians express 
declining faith in democracy as well as high (but diminishing) trust in the military. In a sign of 
democratic resilience, however, a large majority continues to believe that elections are the best 
way to reconstitute a government. 
 
The Survey 
The Afrobarometer is an African-led, independent, comparative survey research project that 
documents the public mood on issues of democracy and governance in 35 African countries. The 
project employs national probability samples representing the adult population of each country.  
Survey respondents provide answers to questions posed by trained enumerators in face-to-face 
interviews in the language of the respondene wetsight ed choto rieprce. esentDat eaca ah r
respondent and each country equally.   
 
Three features should be noted about the Round 5 Afrobarometer survey in Mali: 
 
(a) Fieldwork was conducted from December 16 to 31, 2012. The survey therefore followed the 
military takeover of the government (March 22, 2012) and after the fall of northern Mali to 
insurgents (April), an attack on the civilian president (May), and the arrest of the prime minister 
(December 10, 2012). But the survey preceded the military advance of jihadi fighters on Konna 
and Diabaly and the French-led intervention that repelled them (January 2013). The results 
reported here therefore represent a snapshot of public opinion at one particular moment amid a 
tumultuous period of change.   
 
 



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(b) The sample was truncated. Due to armed hostilities in the north, the geographical scope of the 
survey was restricted to the six southernmost regions of the country (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, 
Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso). Excluded were Gao, Kidal and Tomboctou regions, which 
encompass more than 50 percent of Mali¶s land area but less than 10 percent of its population.   
One consequence is that ethnic Tauregs and speakers of Tamasheq were not interviewed.  
Otherwise, the sample is representative of the adult population, aged 18 and older, in the six 
southern regions.  
 
(c) The Afrobarometer¶s comparative advantage is to provide information on mass political 
attitudes towards the regime and the state. The five AB surveys since 2000 allow analysts to track 
trends over time in these attitudes. But the surveys have less to say about the sources and 
trajectory of civil conflicts and the role therein of armed forces, whether national or international.  
 
Attitudes to Democracy 
· Are Malians democrats?  As of December 2012, a clear majority (62 percent) said that 
they prefer democracy to other forms of political regime. But the proportion that 
expressed allegiance to democracy was down by ten percentage points from 2008 (See 
Figure 1). 
 
· At the same time, Malians recognize that the task of democracy building is hardly 
complete in their country. True, the proportion seeing Mali as a full democracy rose 
gradually between 2000 and 2008. But by the end of 2012, following the military coup 
and the partial collapse of the state, just 12 percent saw their country as fully democratic.  
 
· This downturn in public opinion is also reflected in popular satisfaction with the way 
democracy works. After peaking in 2002, this indicator began to decline. By 2008, that 
is, even before the coup, less than half of Malians expressed satisfaction, in part because 
of growing discontent with perceived corruption within the Amadou Toumani Traore 
(ATT) administration.  By 2012, contentment with democratic practice plummeted 
even further to less than a third of the electorate.  
 
 
 
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Figure 1: Attitudes to Democracy,
Mali 2000-2012* 
100
86
90
82
8182
80
7172
7068
606362
5760
5949
50
40
30323331
30
24
20
12
10
0
20002002200520082012
Prefer democracyPerceive a full democracy
Satisfied with democracyAttached to elections
Percentage of adults who offer this opinion.  For question wordings , see text.
*Six regions only in 2012 (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso).  All nine regions 2000-8.



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· Despite losing confidence in the performance of democracy in their country, Malians 
remain attached to elections. In 2012, fully 82 percent continued to favor choosing 
leaders through regular, open and honest elections rather than some other method.  
Indeed, elections have become an institutionalized feature of Malian political life, with 
more than eight out of ten respondents supporting elections in every survey since 2002. 
 
Attitudes to the Military 
· How, then, do Malians feel about military rule? A majority (58 percent) rejects this form 
of government.  But the proportion of the adult population who approve of a regime in 
which the army comes in to govern the country rose from 25 percent in 2008 (before 
the coup) to 34 percent in 2012 (after the coup) (See Figure 2). 
 
· Relative to other African countries, popular support for military rule in Mali has always 
been high. In twelve other African countries in 2012, just 11 percent of the electorate said 
they would approve a military takeover of government. The high level of expressed 
support for military rule in Mali is puzzling in the light of the evident ineptness² on the 
battlefield and in governance² of the armed forces led by Captain Amadou Sanogo.  
 
· Malians have always placed a considerable degree of trust in military institutions.  
Around eight out of ten expressed quite a lot or a very great deal of trust in the army 
from 2000 onwards (question not asked in 2008). This faith was somewhat shaken by the 
coup of March 2012 because, thereafter, popular trust fell by 20 percentage points (to 67 
percent in December 2012). But two out of three Malians still trusted the military.  
 
· Mass attitudes to civilian politicians help to put this result in perspective. In December 
2012, fewer than half (43 percent) expressed trust in the interim civilian president 
installed following the military coup. A similarly low proportion trusted the National 
Assembly.  
 
  
 
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Figure 2: Attitudes to the Military,
Mali 2000-2012* 
100
9087
79
808081
7170
7065726762
60
61
50
43
42
40
34
302425
24
19
20
10
0
20002002200520082012
Approve of military ruleTrust the army
Trust the PresidentTrust the National Assembly
Percentage of adults who offer this opinion.  For question wordings see text.
*Six regions only in 2012 (Bamako, Kayes, Koulikoro, Mopti, Segou, and Sikasso).  All nine regions 2000-8.



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· Asked whether the crailsii hs iad cn Mhanged your perceptions of the army, twice as 
many survey respondents offered a positive response (55 percent) as a negative one (27 
percent). 
 
Attitudes to the State 
· Despite the fact that insurgents have challenged Mcialtiizens¶s t erritorial integrity, 
continue to confer legitimacy on state institutions. The 2012 survey reveals a rally round 
the flag effect, at least among the residents of the southern regions of the country. These 
citizens indicate a greater willingness to obey court decisions, police orders and requests 
for tax payment than they did before.  
 
· Moreover, an overwhelming majority of Malians (88 percent) believes that it is 
important to obey the government in power, no matter who you voted for. This result 
contrasts with the 11 percent minority who contend that it is not necessary to obey the 
laws of a government that you did  not vote for.
 
· In attributing causes to the multifaceted crisis in Mali, citizens are prone to blame 
politicians (See Figure 3). They poacki ontf  pafirtsrti totoi asm am l ong leaders, 
perhaps implying that civilians are too complacent when it comes to defending the 
integrity of the state.  In a similar vein, respondents also point to the incompetence of 
the political class. The second monostse i coms mton rhe weakesp ness of the state, by 
which they may mean the inability of state institutions to respond to challenges, including 
armed attacks, from its political environment. Only third do they mention foreign 
terrorists as a cause ofs.     po litical crisi
 
· Among all political institutions in Mali² state and non-state² the weakest of all are 
political parties. Almost three out of five Malians (58 percent) do not identify with (feel 
close to) any political party. As a result, tagthe e ofcoun demandtr-ysi sde uffers a shor
institutions that can link citizens to the state.   
 
 
 
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Figure 3:  The Perceived Causes of Political Crisis
100
90
80
70
60
503136
40
3016
20116
10
0
Lack of patriotism amoWngea leakndeesrss of the state Foreign terroristsIncompetence of the polOittihcaerl class
Causes identified by Malian survey repondents
³What , according to you, is the principalc rciasusise  iofn M taheli c?´urrent 
Open-ended question, one answer allowed, coded in the field by interviewers.  



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Which Way Forward?  
· Malians are disturbed by their country¶s political distress. In December 2012, three 
quarters (75 percent) said their country was moving in the wrong direction. This single 
statistic alone indicates that citizens perceive a crisis and seek a way out. 
 
· But Malians are undecided about the best way forward. Asked about solutions to the 
current crisis, they express amIn Dbivecalementber 2012, a p views. lurality (38 
percent) wanted war against the armed groups in the North though, within this group, 
twice as many preferred that any retaliatory strike be led by the Malian army rather than 
by ECOWAS (the survey did not ask about France). On the other hand, 29 percent 
preferred dialogue between combatants. And 12 percent called for a return to a strong 
state.    
 
 
 
 
· A related question asked, What is the best way to move bey ond a regime that is corrupt
and incompetent? Clearer answers emerge here. Almost half of all survey respondents 
(48 percent) opt for elections. And 15 percent want respect for the Constitution. Only 7 
percent recommend a military coup.  
 
· Importantly, therefore, Malians demand a fresh round of elections that installs a 
constitutionally legitimate government. They recognize that the restoration of democratic 
rule is an essential component in the recovery of a stable and sovereign state.   
 
· As such, Malian citizens tend to agree with The Economist that, stabilization requires an 
electiona fair poll is as important as the army¶s reconquest of the country¶s northern 
half (February 2, 2013, p.39). But, at the same time they continue to harbor doubts about 
the competence and probity of civilian politicians, especially in relation to the army, 
whose leaders they tend to trust more. 
 
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Figure 4:  Proposed Solutions to Political Crisis
100
90
80
70
60
5038
4029
3018
2012
103
0
Warfare with armed grouDpsialogue with armed grouAp sstrong stateCivic educationOther
Solutions proposed by Malian survey repondents
³In your opinion, through what means can one mrovenet be cryionsid ts?´he cur
Open-ended question, one answer allowed, coded in the field by interviewers.  



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About the Afrobarometer 
 
The Afrobarometer is a collaborative survey research project conducted by a network of social 
scientists from more than 30 African countries.  The Center for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana) provides overall project direction.  At the regional level, the several Core Partners 
coordinate survey and other activities: the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the 
Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) in Benin, and the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi, Kenya.   Michigan State University and 
the University of Cape Town provide analytic and technical support services.  The Afrobarometer 
Network gratefully acknowledges generous contributions from the UK Department for 
International Development (DfID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation.  Grants from these donors support research, capacity building and outreach 
activities in Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6, 2010-15.  For more information, see: 
www.afrobarometer.org 
 
 
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