--------------------------------------- 1

 
A frobarometer Briefing Paper No. 105 
 
 
 TRENDS IN POPULAR ATTITUDES TO 
     MULTIPARTY DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA, 
 
 2000-2012 
  
 by Michael Bratton 
 
 
 October 2012 
 
 
Research Questions 
This paper addresses four research questions: 
 
· Do Africans want democracy? 
 
· Do they think they are getting it? 
 
· What trends over time are evident in popular demand for, and the perceived supply of, 
democracy? 
 
· What do Africans think about specific democratic institutions, notably, among others, 
political parties? 
 
Method 
Results are based on the Afrobarometer, an independent, African-led, cross-national public 
opinion research project. When complete, Round 5 of the Afrobarometer (2011-2013) will survey 
the opinions and behavior of some 53,000 citizens in 35 countries. At the present time, interim 
results are available for twelve countries from surveys conducted in late 2011 and early 2012 
(n=22,813). Although the Afrobarometer will soon include North Africa, the countries covered 
here are concentrated in the sub-Saharan sub-continent.  They are broadly distributed across West 
Africa (Benin, Cape Verde, Ghana and Liberia), East Africa (Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda) and 
Southern Africa (Botswana, Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa and Zimbabwe).   
 
Caveats 
The coverage of the Afrobarometer, however, is only partially representative of sub-Saharan 
Africa, let alone the continent as a whole (see Table 1). On one hand, the economies of the twelve 
countries surveyed so far are low- or lower-middle income; their average gross national income 
per capita is only slightly higher (US$2399) than for all of sub-Saharan Africa (US$2018). On the 
other hand, the same countries enjoy a much more open political atmosphere; 50 percent are 
free according to Freedom House compared to 18 -Saharpan Aercefricant as f a wholor sube.  
Thus, the preliminary results presented here are based on countries that are reasonably 
representative in terms of economic wealth but are well ahead of the pack in terms of 
democratization.   
 
 1 



--------------------------------------- 2

 
 
Moreover, some of the analysis that follows isolates just seven countries for which the 
Afrobarometer has comprehensive trend data from five rounds of surveys conducted between 
2000 and 2012. The seven countries are: Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, 
Uganda and Zimbabwe. In one respect, these countries are even less representative of Africa 
insofar as they are all English speaking. But they are somewhat more typical of the sub-Saharan 
region in terms of economic development (US$2276) and political freedom (43 percent are 
free´ ).  
 
Most important, within each country, survey respondents are selected carefully to provide an 
1
accurate cross-section of the adult population. This paper provides descriptive statistics of their 
attitudes with a margin of sampling error of less than plus or minus three percent.  
 
Demand for Democracy 
To determine whether Africans want democracy, the Afrobarometer asks four related survey 
questions. The first item measures popular expressions of support for democracy; the remainder 
measure mass rejection of one-party, military and one-man rule. Taken together, these items form 
a scale of demand for democracy. The logic of the scale is that effective demand requires more 
than lip service to democracy; it also implies that people abandon attachments to old autocratic 
regimes. 
 
Across twelve countries in 2012, some 79 percent of Afrobarometer respondents say that, 
democracy is preferable to any other form of government (see Figure 1). Overt support is 
highest in countries commonly seen as liberal democracies with competitive party systems such 
as Mauritius, Botswana, Ghana and Cape Verde (all over 80 percent).  But support is also high in 
Tanzania (83 percent), an electoral democracy with de facto one-party dominance.  By contrast, 
South Africans are somewhat more cautious about expressing support for democracy (72 
                                                      
1
 See http://www.afrobarometer.org/survey-and-methods/sampling-principles. 
 2 

Table 1:  Country Coverage
Sub-Saharan Africa and Afrobarometer Compared
Gross National ³ Free´
Income per Countries, 
capita, 201012
2011
(US$, mean) 
(percent)
Sub-Saharan Africa 
(N = 49 countries)201818
From Angola to Zimbabwe
Afrobarometer Round 5, 2011-13 
(N = 35 countries)
Phase 1, cross-sectional data (N = 12 countries)239950
Benin, Botswana, Cape Verde, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, 
Malawi, Mauritius, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, 
Zimbabwe
Afrobarometer, 5 Rounds, 2000-2012
Time-series data  (N = 7 countries)
Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa,Tanzania, Uganda, 227643
Zimbabwe
1.World Bank, World Development Indicators, 2012.
2.Freedom House, Freedom in the World, 2012.



--------------------------------------- 3

percent), perhaps because they feel elected governments have not met their high expectations for 
the delivery of improved living standards.  
 
 
 
 
But how deep are popular commitments to democracy?  Among citizens, democracy becomes 
the only game in town only ialsof  evrejecerts ayutone horitarian alternatives. There is little 
doubt that the Africans we interviewed now disassociate themselves from familiar forms of post-
colonial autocracy (see Figure 2). Across seven countries in 2012, 83 percent of respondents 
spurn military rule and 87 percent look down on one-man rule. Thus, as in earlier surveys, 
Africans feel even more strongly about the forms of government they dont want than express 
positive support for the form of government (democracy), they say they do want.   
 
But we detect a residue of popular nostalgia for one-party rule. Fewer people reject this form of 
government (77 percent) than personal or military rule. One might expect that Tanzanians would 
be most attached to a single-party system, but in fact they reject it at an average level (76 
percent).  Instead, at 68 percent rejection, South Africans are the most willing among all Africans 
interviewed in 2012 to entertain the possibility that only  one political party is allowed.
 
Of greatest interest, however, are trends over time. Figure 2 shows that, on average, popular 
resistance to military and one-man rule has remained roughly constant since 2000. People have 
long known that they dislike these forms of government and have not wavered even as fledgling 
democratic regimes in Africa have encountered growing pains. But popular rejection of one-party 
rule has gradually solidified, rising twelve percentage points from 2002. One possible 
interpretation of this trend, to be further explored as we proceed, is that African citizens are 
learning about the advantages of multiparty competition.  
 
 3 

y, ocracort for Dem  Suppure 1:Fig
012  tries, 2ounrican CAf12 
100
8583
82
90828181
797979
8076767372
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
sMauritiunzaniaTawanaBotshanaGeerdeCap VLiberiaUgandawZimbabeBeninliMaawKenyac South Afria
acyemocree drfrho pcet wPern
ean* mometerobarfrA
³Which of these three statements is closest to your own opinion?
A.Democracy is preferable to any other kind of government;  
B.In some circumstances a non-democratic government can be preferable;  
C.For someone like me, it doesn¶t matter what foe rmha vofe´ government w



--------------------------------------- 4

 
 
As stated, demand for democracy is calculated as an additive scale of both support for democracy 
and comprehensive rejection of all three authoritarian alternatives. Figure 3 show that almost 
everyone rejects at least one form of autocracy (97 percent). Three quarters reject all three (76 
percent). But, when coupled with support for democracy, just 57 percent of African citizens 
interviewed actually demand democracy as we define this sentiment.   
 
 
 
 4 

Figure 2:  Rejection of Autocracy:
Average Trends, 7 African Countries, 2000- 2012 
100
90
85
8287
83
8183
8083
82758177
71
706868
65
60
50
40
circa 2000circa 2002circa 2005circa 2008circa 2012
Reject one-party ruleReject military ruleReject one-man rule
Percentages rejecting authoritarian political regimes. 
V³7KHUHDUHPDQ\ZD\VWRJRYHUQDFRXQWU\:RXOG\RXGLDSSURYHor approve of the following alternative:  
A. Only one political party is allowed  B. The army comes in to JRYHUQWKHFRXQWU\&7KHSUHVLGHQWFDQGHFLGHHHU\WKLQJ"´Y
Countries covered are Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.

Figure 3:  Demand for Democracy,
Average Levels, 7 Arfican Countries, 2012
1009390
9076
80
7057
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
Reject at least 1Reject at least 2Reject all 3*Reject 3 + Support
Democracy
Number of authoritarian regimes rejected
* Military rule + one-party rule + personal dictatorship



--------------------------------------- 5

Temporal trends in African attitudes to political regimes, however, are quite positive (see Figure 
4). After dipping in the early 2000s, support for democracy has risen to an all time high in recent 
years. Rejection of all three autocratic alternatives jumped by 17 percentage points between 2000 
and 2012. And, in a landmark finding, Figure 4 shows that, for the first time in any 
Afrobarometer survey (and at least in the seven countries for which data are presently available), 
a majority of respondents (57 percent) can be described as committed democrats who demand 
democracy. 
 
 
 
Supply of Democracy  
Turning to the supply side of the political marketplace, we now ask whether Africans think they 
are getting democracy. In other words, to what extent do they regard political elites as supplying 
the form of government that most Africans want? To pursue this question, an additive construct 
of the perceived supply of democracy is assembled from two indicators.   
 
The first indicator measures satisfaction with the way democracy works in (your country).  
Figure 5 shows results for twelve countries in 2012. In this case, Tanzanians claim the top spot, 
with citizens of Ghana, Mauritius and Botswana close behind. Whatever one thinks about the 
quality of democracy in Tanzania (or the perspicacity of its citizens), there can be little doubt that 
Tanzanians like their form of government. By contrast, less than one third of Zimbabweans (31 
percent) pronounce themselves satisfied with a repressive regime still dominated by the ZANU-
PF party of President Robert Mugabe.  
 
 5 

Figure 4:  Demand for Democracy:
Average Trends, 7 African Countries, 2000-2012 
80
79
7575
70
72
67
65
61
61
60
59
57
5353
55
5049
50
49
45
41
40
36
35
circa 2000circa 2002circa 2005circa 2008circa 2012
Support democracyReject 3 authoritarian alternativesDemand for democracy
Percentage approving democracy or rejecting 3 authoritarian political regimes (military + one party + one man rule).
Countries covered are Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.



--------------------------------------- 6

 
 
The second indicator² the extent of democracy² measures citizen estimates of how much of a 
democracy their country is today-poi.  nt rThe espfonseour scale runs from a full democracy, 
through one with minor problems, to one with major problems, to not a democracy.  Figure 
6 reports proportions seeifnugl eil dtemheocrr a acy or a democracy with minor problems.  
Again, countries are distributed roughly as expert opinion might predict, for example with 
Botswana, Ghana and Mauritius at the top.  Notably, countries in which the last election 
descended into violence² namely Kenya and Zimbabwe² fall at the bottom. In both these cases, 
putative pow-shaerring arrangements were substituted for disputed electoral processes, causing 
2
citizens to question whether electoral democracy has been reliably installed.  
 
                                                      
2
 Citizen estimates of the extent to which the last election was frofee th e and fair are the best predictor 
perceived supply of democracy. See Michael Bratton (ed.) Voting and Democratic Citizenship in Africa 
(Boulder:  Lynne Rienner Publishers, forthcoming 2013). 
 
 6 

acy, mocr with De 5:  SatisfactionFiureg
012  tries, 2ounrican CAf12 
100
90
7574
72
80
70
70
606058
58
53
60
52
47
5045
40
31
30
20
10
0
Tanzania GhanaritiusMauBotswanaBeninuth AfricaSoLiberiaMalawidaUganKenyaCpe VerdeababweZim
edaisfiae stwho rPcent er
mean*eter aomobrAfr
³Overall, how satisfied are you with the way de(youmr cocraoucynt wroyr)k?s´ in 



--------------------------------------- 7

 
   
Popular satisfaction with democracy and citizen estimates of the extent of democracy are closely 
3
correlated (Pearsons r=. 526***). As shown in Tab ofl e res2p, somondentse 79 pe display rcent
consistent opinions along these two dimensions. The indicators can therefore be combined in 
order to measure the perceived supply of democracy. 
 
 
                                                      
3
 Add 30 percent in the upper left quadrant to 49 percent in the lower right quadrant.  Total percentages add 
to 100. 
 7 

, cyraocemf Dt otenx EivedcePer6:  re uFig
  12, 20iestrunCon ricaf A12
100
9079
7876
75
80
71706663
70
63
55
60
52
50
42
40
31
30
20
10
0
naotswaBnaGhausauritiMzaniaTannin BeriaLibericath AfSouerdepe VCaialawMdaUganaenyKbabweZim
acyocrem dllfuost m alr ollfuo see ht wcenPer
n*ea meteromarobfrA
³ In your opinion, how much of a democracy isa (y?y´our country) tod

lTabe 2 :  Cross- ocracyTabulation of Extent of Dem
ocracby Satisfaction with Demy, 2012
(n = 22,813 AB R5 respondents)
Not satisfied with democracySatisfied with democracy
W'RQ¶WVHHH[HQVLYH30%9%
democracy
Perceive extensive 14%49%
democracy
Pearsons r = .526***



--------------------------------------- 8

Variations over time in all these attitudes are displayed for seven African countries in Figure 7.  
Several conclusions follow. First, both satisfaction and extent increased over the period 2005-
2008, which coincided with a commodities boom in the world economy and growth in many 
African economies. Second, both political indicators stabilized thereafter, settling at a level in 
which three out of five citizens express satisfaction and a similar number perceive extensive 
democracy. Third, and not surprisingly, these trends are echoed in the combined index of supply.  
In a select group of countries in Africa, exactly half of all respondents now think that democracy 
is being supplied in 2012.   
 
 
 
Is the perceived supply of democracy therefore simply a function of the health of the economy?  
A multivariate analysis suggests otherwise. Figure 8 compares the relative effects of citizen 
attitudes about the availability of economic goods and political goods. It shows that both kinds of 
performance matter (all predictors are statistically significant). To be sure, citizens who think that 
the economy is doing well and is being capably managed are likely to think that democracy is 
being supplied. But the delivery of political goods matters more (compare beta values).  If people 
feel free to speak their minds and, especially, if they regard the last national election as free and 
4
fair, then they are especially likely to perceive a supply of democracy. These results suggest that 
Africans are gaining confidence that the institutions of civil liberty and open elections are 
beginning to take root.   
 
                                                      
4
 The explanatory preeminence of free and fair elections is robust to the inclusion of country fixed effects. 
 
 8 

Figure 7:  Supply of Democracy:
Average Trends, 7 African Countries, 2000-2012 
70
65
64
62
6060
59
5554
50
5050
4849
49
46
4547
40
40
38
37
35
ccira 2000ccira 2002ccira 2005ccira 2008ccira 2012
Satisfied wh eitdmocracyPercevei extesnive deomcracySply oupf democracy
3UFHDJVVWVGZGVESHQWHDDLILHLWK³WKHZD\HPRFUDF\ZRUN´HUFHLYLQJWKDWFRXQWU\KDV³IXOO´RU³DOPRVWIXOO´GHPFUDFR\
(c) both.
Countries covered are Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 



--------------------------------------- 9

 
 
Demand versus Supply 
On balance, however, demand exceeds supply. Across the twelve countries for which 2012 data 
are so far available, an average of 58 percent say they want democracy, but just 49 percent think 
5
that they are getting it. This 9-point gap signifies that, in general, African political elites are not 
delivering the amount of democracy that their citizens desire. Because ordinary Africans wish to 
increase the existing supply of democracy, they are primed arguably to maintain ongoing pressure 
for change.   
 
This general result obscures important country differences.  Consider several countries from 
Figure 9. 
 
· In Mauritius, demand for democracy is very high (76 percent), but the perceived supply 
lags some 11 points behind. Thus citizens may well keep pressing for an even higher 
quality of democracy. 
 
· In Ghana, demand and supply are in equilibrium, which implies popular satisfaction with 
the political status quo, albeit at a fairly high level of democracy.  Barring setbacks, one 
would not necessarily expect future demand-driven increases in democratic supply. 
 
· Demand and supply are also in balance at intermediate levels in Benin.  This 
configuration suggests that a hybrid regime² neither democratic nor autocratic² is 
undergoing consolidation in this country. 
 
                                                      
5
 Note that these figures differ slightly from means reported in Figures 4 and 7 for seven countries: 57 
percent and 50 percent respectively.  
 
 9 

Figure 8: Explaining the Perceived Supply of Democracy
Multiple Regression Analysis
BS.E.BetaSig
(Constant)-.459.033.000
Economic Goods
Country¶s present economic condition.067.006.096.000
Government¶s management of economy.115.008.129.000
Political Goods
Freedom to say what you think.167.008.174.000
Last election was free and fair.230.007.282.000
Ordinary least squares regression model. N = 13,498 survey interviews.  Adjusted R square = .194
B= unstandardized regression coefficient; S.E. = standard error;
beta = standardized regression coefficient; Sig = statistical significance



--------------------------------------- 10

 
 
 
· The mismatch between demand and supply is most marked in Zimbabwe (55 percent 
versus 25 percent).  A 30-point gap between citizen expectations and perceived regime 
performance indicates a population longing for a more democratic dispensation. 
 
· In South Africa popular demand (at 42 percent) and perceived supply (at 49 percent) are 
quite low, both absolutely and relative to other African countries.   
 
Most important, supply exceeds demand in South Africa, creating an inverted gap (8 points, 
second in size only to Tanzania at 12 points). This imbalance suggests that, even though South 
Africans are disappointed in the performance of their democratic regime, they are still getting 
more democracy than they say they want. As such, citizens in South Africa appear unusually 
vulnerable to the appeals of a strong populist leader who might promise material prosperity in a 
6
trade-off against civil liberties.  
 
Institutions 
Overall, however, countries like South Africa and Tanzania² where supply exceeds demand² are 
outliers in the group of African countries reviewed here. In most places, demand for democracy 
continues to rise even as the overall supply of democracy stabilizes (See Figures 4 and 7). 
 
But is a positive demand trend evident when we disaggregate the vague concept of democracy by 
considering particular democratic institutions?  In other words, do African citizens support open 
elections, a sovereign parliament, a presidency that is accountable, and multiple political parties?  
Figure 10 tracks temporal trends in demand for these institutions across seven countries as 
follows: 
                                                      
6
 See Lydia Polgreen, ³Unfulfilled Promises Are Replacing Prospects of a Better Life in South Africa, 
New York Times, October 14, 2012, p.5. This article cites Afrobarometer data to substantiate the headline. 
 10 

DEMOCRACYFigure 9
AUTOCRACY



--------------------------------------- 11

  
 
 
· Open Elections. Overwhelming majorities agree that, we should choose our leaders 
through regular, honest and open elections (83 percent) rather than some other 
method.  This high level of positive popular sentiment has  remained steady since 2000.
 
· Sovereign Parliament. Two-thirds of interviewed Africans now believe that parliament, 
rather than the president should make laws for this country, a proportion that has risen 
slightly over the past decade (from 62 to 67 percent). 
 
· Accountable President. An even larger proportion (70 percent, steady over time) insists 
on the rule of law wthe herpreebysident  must always obey the laws and the courts, even 
if he thinks they are wrong.  A rising proportion (now 77 percent) endorses presidential 
term limits.   
 
· Multiple Political Parties. A large observed shift has occurred in public opinion about 
multiparty competition.  In 2000, just over half (57 percent) of survey respondents agreed 
that many political parties are needed to make sure that (citizens) have real choices 
about who governs them.  By 2012, this proportion ha71d r isen by 14 points (to 
percent).  
 
These results allow several conclusions. First, among democratic institutions, elections attract 
most mass support, a finding consistent with the prevailing status of African regimes as electoral 
democracies or electoral autond, ocrtahcie peopuls.ar S coecnsolidation of other institutions 
lags behind that of elections. For example, one third of interviewed Africans are still unsure 
whether parliament should take the lead in making laws, a result that accurately reflects the 
continued dominance of the executive branch over the legislative process in most countries.  
Finally, Africans are gradually accepting multiparty competition; after initially viewing open 
 11 

Figure 10:  Demand for Democratic Institutions:
Averag2e Trends, 7 African Countries, 000-2012 
95
85
828183
80
75
7071
70
68
65
656567
62
55
57
45
35
ccira 2002circa 2005ccair 2008ccira 2012
Ope nElectionsSovereign Parliament
Accountable PreseidncyMtipleul Patiers
For question wordings see text.
Countries covered are Botswana, Ghana, Malawi, South Africa, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 



--------------------------------------- 12

political contests with considerable suspicion, people now place multiple parties in second place 
behind elections as the most strongly endorsed democratic institutions.   
 
But is demand for particular institutions matched by supply? Figure 11 dissects this question, 
showing (again) considerable gaps between high levels of demand and low levels of perceived 
supply.  Results refer to twelve countries in 2012.  
 
· Elections. Of those citizens who demand elections (86 percent), only about half think that 
electoral conduct is completely free and  fair (45 percent).
 
· Parliament. Of the 69 percent who want a sovereign legislature, far fewer (46 percent) 
think that the president never ³ignore(s) parli ament.´
 
· Presidency. The gap is even wider between demand for presidential accountability and 
perceptions that the president actually abides by the rule of law (i.e., never ³ignore(s) the 
courts) (28 points versus  23 points).
 
· Multiparty Competition. Despite high and rising levels of popular approval for multiple 
parties (70 percent), few citizens are confident that party competition never ³leas dto 
violent conflict (just  20 percent).
 
 
 
 
Thus the gap between institutional promise and performance is widest for political parties. This 
important result points to a core contradiction in public opinion about the democratic process in 
Africa. At the same time as popular demand for multiple parties is rising, fully three-quarters of 
survey respondents worry that multiparty competition may all too easily degenerate into discord, 
intimidation and violence.    
 12 

Figure 11:  Democratic Institutions, 
Comparison of Popular Demand and Perceived Supply 
12 African Countries, 2012
86
90
8071
70
69
70
6046
45
5043
40
3020
20
10
0
ElectionsParliamentPresidencyParties
Popular demandPerceived Supply
For question wordings, see text.



--------------------------------------- 13

For several reasons, opposition parties appear to be an especially weak link in institution building 
for democratic development in Africa. First, although one-third of interviewees report feeling 
very close´ to a preferred political party, an enafquafililat pred.  Second,oporti on remains u
popular trust in opposition parties is lower than for any other institution² including the 
7
presidency, parliament, and ruling parties² averaging just 42 percent.  Finally, perhaps for fear 
of partisan violence, many more people think that opposition parties should concentrate on 
cooperating with the government (59 percent) rather than examin(ing) and criticiz(ing) its 
policies and actions (37 p ercent).  
 
Thus, not only is a tradition of loyal opposition missing in African politics, but no sign is present 
in public opinion that such an institution is about to emerge. Absent capable opposition parties, it 
is difficult to see how the growing popularity of democracy in Africa will be translated into truly 
effective demand for further democratization.  
 
Conclusion 
The analysis in this paper provides firm empirical footing for concluding that: 
 
· Ordinary Africans want democracy and reject authoritarian alternatives. Over time, they 
increasingly demand their preferred political regime. 
 
· In most countries, citizens dontge tttihngi nkan a tdeheyquat are supple y of democracy. 
 
· Public opinion data point to a great diversity of regime forms and trajectories in Africa, 
ranging from Ghana¶s stable liberal democracy to Zimbabwel s contested electora
autocracy.  Perhaps surprisingly, democracy is looking shaky in South Africa.  
 
· While Africans are beginning to embrace multiparty competition, they do so with 
reservations about the risks of violent conflict and the fecklessness of opposition parties.   
 
· The institutional deficit of weak opposition parties hinders the conversion of popular 
preferences for democracy into effective demand for further democratization. 
 
These generalizations will be further tested and refined as results become available from 
additional Afrobarometer surveys during the course of 2012 and 2013. 
                                                      
7
 For a fuller discussion see Carolyn Logan, Rejecting the Disloyal Opposition? The Trust Gap in Mass 
Attitudes Toward Ruling and Opposition ParAfrtiesobaro metein rAf Worrica,king P aper No. 94 (2008), 
www.afrobarometer.org. 
 13 



--------------------------------------- 14

 
  
About the Afrobarometer 
 
The Afrobarometer is a collaborative survey research project conducted by a network of social 
scientists from more than 30 African countries.  The Center for Democratic Development (CDD-
Ghana) provides overall project direction.  At the sub-regional level, the following Core Partners 
coordinate survey and other activities: the Institute for Democracy in South Africa (Idasa), the 
Institute for Empirical Research in Political Economy (IREEP) in Benin, and the Institute for 
Development Studies (IDS) at the University of Nairobi, Kenya.   Michigan State University and 
the University of Cape Town provide analytic and technical support services.  The Afrobarometer 
Network gratefully acknowledges generous contributions from the UK Department for 
International Development (DfID), the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA), the 
United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the World Bank, and the Mo 
Ibrahim Foundation.  Grants from these donors support research, capacity building and outreach 
activities in Afrobarometer Rounds 5 and 6, 2010-15.  For more information, see: 
www.afrobarometer.org 
 
 
 14