En juin 2015, les militants de l'Etat Islamique (EI) autoproclamé ont attaqué un hôtel sur la plage à Sousse en Tunisie, tuant 38 personnes (CNN, 2015a). Quatre mois plus tard, l’EI a revendiqué l’abattage d'un avion de ligne russe, avec 224 morts, même si la cause officielle demeure indéterminée (CNN, 2015b). De même, Al Qaeda au Maghreb Islamique (AQMI) a tué 18 personnes sur les plages de Grand-Bassam en Côte d'Ivoire en mars 2016 et a attaqué quelques jours plus tard une installation d’hydrocarbures et de gaz au Sud de l’Algérie (Al Jazeera, 2016).
Les conflits et criminalité
Au cours des deux dernières décennies, la menace que constituent les groupes extrémistes violents qui embrassent des discours religieux fondamentalistes s'est considérablement développée à travers l'Afrique (Hallowanger, 2014). L'ère coloniale et les régimes non-démocratiques qui ont caractérisé beaucoup de gouvernements postindépendance ont produit des mouvements anti-Occident et djihadistes à travers le Moyen-Orient et plus généralement le monde islamique (Moore, 2016).
Deux nouveaux rapports d'Afrobaromètre se penchent sur ce que pensent les citoyens de l'extrémisme violent et des efforts anti-extrémisme dans des régions sensibles de l'Afrique.
Au Niger, la situation sécuritaire ces deux dernières années est prise en tenailles par le groupe djihadiste et terroriste Boko Haram installé à ses frontières. A plus de la moitié, les Nigériens se sentent exposés au risque des actions terroristes. En effet, selon le plus récent sondage d’Afrobaromètre, 59% des citoyens justifient l’exposition à une telle menace par la faible présence de l’état dans certaines parties du territoire.
UNIQUEMENT DISPONIBLE EN ANGLAIS
Findings from the Round 6 Afrobarometer survey in Nigeria.
For a more in depth report on this subject, see here: 'Security and armed extremism in Nigeria: Setting a new agenda'.
Do minority ethnic groups feel more victimized than the majority? Is psychological fear of crime influenced by race, gender, social class, prior victimisation or some other factors? Finally, what role, if any, does media exposure play in fear of crime? Finally, does fear of crime affect confidence in the government or the future of South Africa? An Afrobarometer public opinion survey conducted in late 2008 can provide answers to some of these questions. The data also permits comparisons of public opinion on crime across a number of countries in Africa.
One of the foremost responsibilities of any government is to provide a secure environment in which the general public can survive and thrive. But not all governments have met this obligation with the same degree of commitment or effectiveness. The purpose of this bulletin is to explore popular perceptions of the crime situation in Tanzania, and the government’s effectiveness in handling this issue. The findings presented here are based on three Afrobarometer surveys of public attitudes conducted in 2003, 2005 and 2008.
What do Africans think about violent social conflict, including its causes and preferred solutions? How do conflicts affect popular support for democracy?
The Afrobarometer introduced questions on conflict in a survey in Nigeria in August 2001. We chose to start with Africa’s most populated nation because it is a continental bellwether; as goes Nigeria, as a source of either chaos or stability, so goes the neighborhood.
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In the December 2012 Afrobarometer survey, Malians highlighted the primary causes of the serious sociopolitical crisis that their country was going through, as lack of patriotism on the part of the leaders and weakness of the State. At that time, most Malians had lost trust in the political class and in politicians. One year later (December 2013), however, a follow-up Afrobarometer survey revealed that foreign terrorists and corruption are rather the two primary causes of the Northern conflict and occupation.
While crime and insecurity remain a leading concern, most Mauritians feel safe in their neighbourhoods and homes, according to a new Afrobarometer survey.
Very few Mauritians report having been victims of theft or physical violence, and the proportion of survey respondents who identified crime and insecurity as the nation’s most important problem has declined, the 2014 survey findings show.
Namibians express increasing levels of support for women in political leadership, but Namibian women continue to trail men slightly in their interest in public affairs and participation in civic action, according to the latest Afrobarometer survey.
UNIQUEMENT DISPONIBLE EN ANGLAIS.
Widespread violence and crime made for a tense build-up to Nigeria’s recent elections, with large swaths of the country effectively under the control of terrorists and frequent headlines reporting armed robberies and kidnappings.
Change has been rapid and remarkable: Within the span of a few months, virtually all territories (and hundreds of captives) have been liberated from extremist groups, and in March and April 2015, elections conducted with minimal disruption turned the incumbent party out of office after 16 years.
Reporting a crime is an essential first step toward securing justice for the aggrieved. As Skogan (1977) notes, crime reports are also a basis for authorities to allocate limited resources for public protection. Not reporting crimes may therefore doubly disadvantage communities. It makes investigations of crime and access to justice difficult, which in turn can create room for perpetrators to continue victimizing others. It can also lead to skewed allocation of resources to the detriment of communities where crime experiences are high but incidents are not systematically reported.
An overwhelming majority of Zambian women and men disapprove of the use of physical force to discipline wives or children, Afrobarometer’s most recent survey has revealed.
Kenya has seen a dramatic rise in violent extremism: Between 1970 and 2007, the country experienced 190 terrorist attacks, an average of five per year; since 2008, the average has escalated to 47 attacks a year. The overwhelming majority of these incidents have been attributed to Al-Shabaab. Originating in Somalia in 2005, the group has since regionalized its operations and established an active presence in Kenya, where it has successfully recruited and radicalized Kenyan nationals and carried out numerous attacks on a variety of local targets (Botha, 2014).
Unemployment, a reliable supply of electricity, and poverty are the most important problems that Nigerians want their government to address, with crime/security following in fourth place, the latest Afrobarometer survey shows.
While incoming President Muhammadu Buhari must contend with immediate fuel, cash, and power crises, citizens’ expressed priorities can help inform the administration’s agenda for the next four years.
Most of us were taken by surprise when Mali – a budding democratic success story after three open elections and two peaceful transitions of power – imploded with a separatist insurgency, a military coup, and the breakdown of state control in 2012.
What did we miss? Were there signs of impending instability that political observers overlooked in the pre-crisis period? And if so, can such early-warning indicators help us predict political risks for other African governments and political regimes?
Popular Perceptions of the Causes and Consequences of the Conflict in Mali Round 5.5
We revisit the literature on modernization theory and note that the theory posits that both increases in wealth and increases in crime rates accompany modernization. This fact is often ignored by much of the scholarship on democratization, which generally focuses on economic conditions. Using 2003 survey data from the Afrobarometer and the Latinbarometer, we examine how victimization and perceptions of crime influence citizens’ attitudes toward democracy.
Vote buying and political intimidation are important, if epiphenomenal, dimensions of Nigerian election campaigns. According to survey-based estimates, fewer than one out of five Nigerians is personally exposed to vote buying and fewer than one in ten experiences threats of electoral violence. But when, as commonly happens, campaign irregularities are targeted at the rural poor, effects are concentrated. These effects are as follows: violence reduces turnout; and vote buying enhances partisan loyalty.
This paper analyzes the impact of corruption on the extent of trust in political institutions using a rich collection of comparable data provided by the Afrobarometer surveys conducted in 18 sub-Saharan African countries. More specifically, we set out to test the "efficient grease" hypothesis that corruption can strengthen citizens' trust since bribe paying and clientelism open the door to otherwise scarce and inaccessible services and subsidies, and that this increases institutional trust. Our findings reject this theoretical argument.
Political violence has emerged as one of Africa 's most pressing security issues and recent events in Kenya , Cote d'Ivoire and Nigeria point to the salience of the phenomenon. Existing studies argue that the weak and incapacitated nature of African states is a significant factor contributing to high levels of political violence. Yet this insight does not help us to understand which aspect of a weak state affects political violence.
We show that armed conflict affects social capital as measured by trust and associational membership. Using the case of Uganda and two rounds of nationally representative individual-level data bracketing a large number of battle events, we find that self-reported generalized trust and associational membership decreased during the conflict in districts in which battle events took place. Exploiting the different timing of two distinct waves of violence, we provide suggestive evidence for a rapid recovery of social capital.
This paper provides new insights into the link between the experience of violent conflict and local collective action. I use temporal and geographical information from four rounds of survey data from Nigeria to relate measures of cooperation to past and future incidences of communal conflict. I show that local collective action, measured in terms of community meeting attendance and volunteering, is highest before the outbreak of violence – higher than both post-conflict levels and the generally lower levels of cooperation in regions not affected by violence.
L’enquête Afrobaromètre de décembre 2012 a révélé que les trois quarts des citoyens maliens craignaient que le pays n’aille dans la « mauvaise direction ». À cette époque, plongés dans une crise nationale profonde, la plupart des Maliens envisageaient l’avenir avec pessimisme. Un an plus tard, cependant, une enquête de suivi dévoile un regain d’espoir dans l’avenir. En décembre 2013, les deux tiers des Maliens considèrent que le pays se dirige dans la « bonne direction ».
Dans l'enquête Afrobaromètre de décembre 2012, les maliens mettaient en avant comme étant les premières causes, de la grave crise sociopolitique que traversait leur pays, le manque de patriotisme des dirigeants et la faiblesse de l'Etat. En ce temps, la plupart des maliens avaient perdu confiance en la classe politique et en les politiciens. Une année plus tard, cependant, une enquête Afrobaromètre de suivi (décembre 2013) révèle que les terroristes étrangers et la corruption sont plutôt les deux premières causes du conflit et de l'occupation du Nord.