Thème de la présentation: Les institutions au Cameroun Yaoundé.
Les camerounais n'approuvent pas la politique économique de leur gouvernement. Ils critiquent cette politique dans les domaines ci-après: les inégalités, l'énergie, l'eau, création des emplois, l'insécurité alimentaire, la corruption et les infrastructures. Par contre, ils approuvent les efforts de leur gouvernement dans les secteurs de la santé, de l'éducation et l'insécurité.
Snapshot of the findings:
Government performance: Government performance rated as poor on key issues, rated positively on welfare distribution.
Leadership performance ratings: Premiers enjoy the highest levels of public approval, while rating those for President Zuma, MPs, and local government councillors have declined since 2011.
The African National Congress (ANC) has won every national election since South Africa’s transition to universal suffrage in 1994. But while the ANC’s victory in 2014 – its fifth in a row – confirmed the party’s electoral dominance, its share of the vote declined from 66% in 2009 to 62%. New public opinion data from Afrobarometer indicate that the party’s leader, President Jacob Zuma, has lost significant citizen support since 2011.
2015 has been a tumultuous year for South Africa’s democracy. A number of key government officials have been embroiled in corruption scandals, most notably the alleged mismanagement of state funds in the construction of President Jacob Zuma’s private residence in Nkandla, KwaZulu-Natal. An investigation led by the Public Protector found that state funds were employed for non-security installations and determined that the president should repay “a reasonable percentage” of these costs (Public Protector of South Africa, 2014).
UNIQUEMENT DISPONIBLE EN ANGLAIS.
For two decades, South Africa has been grappling with the agonizing triple challenges of poverty, unemployment, and inequality. President Jacob Zuma’s State of the Nation address in February 2015 called upon the nation to be united in advancing economic freedom. Most South Africans would acknowledge that despite gains in political freedom, much remains to be done to overcome poverty and bring economic justice to the Rainbow Nation.
If one picks up an annual economic and social report on Malawi, it will indicate how the government has performed on various fronts, including sectoral growth, overall gross domestic product (GDP) growth, inflation, exchange and interest rate movements, provision of health and education services, social security, and improved water supply, among others. Such reports are generally derived from data that has been professionally collected from administrative records.
Local governance has been glorified as a panacea for development, with a number of authors highlighting its positive attributes in development. It is embedded in the decentralization debates, policies and programmes which have been sweeping across the African continent. Conceptually, there is a belief that decentralization will improve not only the relationship between citizens and the state in Africa, but also the mobilization and distribution of wealth and ultimately, the quality of democracy (Mitullah 2004 ).
In May 2012, a display of art entitled “Hail to the Thief II” caused a national controversy because of a single element hung on a separate wall. This was a pastiche of a well-known image of Lenin with the face of the President of South Africa, Jacob Zuma. The piece was entitled “Spear of the Nation”. Are there ways to understand this apparent gap between the image of the President in the media and apparently amongst political, business and civic elites, and that revealed by public opinion by looking at the Afrobarometer results alone?
Over the past twenty years, approaches to development in Africa have undergone a fundamental change. Practitioners no longer regard development as a largely technical exercise. Economic growth and social wellbeing are now rarely seen as simple matters of, say, getting the prices right for maize production or finding a medical cure for guinea worm disease. Instead, we now understand that technical fixes only work well if embedded in a political and organizational infrastructure that generates broad support for policies and ensures the reliable delivery of goods and services.
Ideally, a country’s constitution is that society’s contract with its citizens and should be an expression of the aspirations and values of the people. Zimbabwe’s constitution has a chequered history. It was crafted in London in 1979 as an elite ceasefire pact among warring parties and has been amended no less than 19 times in 30 years. Few have regarded this document as a national supreme law and many have agitated for its replacement.
At the end of 2010, Zimbabwean citizens remained broadly supportive of power sharing as an antidote to political crisis. But they were increasingly critical of the halting performance of their country’s coalition government. Most people also perceived declining civil liberties and feared resurgent political violence. Yet clear majorities called for constitutional reforms to limit the powers of the presidency and seemingly even for free elections in 2011 to return the country to legitimate rule.
Kenya held its fourth multi-party elections in 2007. It turned out to be Kenya’s most closely contested election, but also the most poorly managed, since the return to multipartyism in 1992. Although the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK) declared the incumbent and Party of National Unity (PNU) candidate Mwai Kibaki the winner, this was immediately disputed by the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), which averred that their presidential candidate, Raila Odinga, was the winner.
This Briefing Paper analyses the extent to which ordinary Mozambicans feel the rule of law actually exists in their country. It employs 2005 and 2008 data from the Mozambique Afrobarometer public opinion survey to understand people’s perceptions of the extent to which ordinary people are treated equally by the state, whether the state enforces the law equally against both state officials and ordinary people, and the extent to which the president ignores the constitution.
After protracted political negotiations to resolve Zimbabwe’s chronic political impasse, which were facilitated by former South African President Thabo Mbeki under the auspices of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), a tripartite agreement was signed by incumbent President Robert Mugabe of the Zimbabwe African National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF), Morgan Tsvangirai of the main Movement for Democratic Change (MDC-T) and Arthur Mutambara of the splinter MDC-M formation.
For many Zimbabweans, life in the last few years has been nasty, brutish and sometimes short, but there is now a flicker of light at the end of a dark and long tunnel. Things started really falling apart in 2008 with the unprecedented cholera outbreak that claimed more than 4 000 lives and infected over 100 000 others. Zimbabwe stood at the edge of a precipice with health centres and schools closed, shops displaying empty shelves, acute shortages of food and other basic essentials, and rampant politically-motivated violence and human rights violations.
Nigeria is a federation of thirty-six States and the Federal Capital Territory. The federation consists of 774 local government areas. Local governments are intended to serve as the lowest tier of governance that will be most responsive to the needs of the people. Local governments in Nigeria are also expected to enhance political participation at the grassroots. Due to these expectations, there is persistent agitation for the creation of local governments by different groups across the country.
Ghana embarked on a comprehensive program of local government decentralization in the late 1980s. The program launched by the Provisional National Defence Council (PNDC) represents the most comprehensive effort at decentralization in the country’s post-colonial era. Proposals launched in 1987 culminated in the introduction of the District Assemblies Law (PNDC Law 207) in 1988. Its provisions for the structure and functions of the District Assemblies (DAs) were subsequently incorporated into the 1992 Republican Constitution.
Four rounds of Afrobarometer surveys have been conducted in Ghana since 1999. Round 2 was conducted in 2002 when the administration of President John Kufuor and the New Patriotic Party (NPP) had barely settled in office; Round 3 was conducted in 2005 when the government had recently renewed its electoral mandate. The current Round 4 survey (March 2008) coincides with the year in which the Kufuor-NPP administration is ending its second term in office and heading for the polls (in December 2008).
Unemployment, housing, crime, poverty and HIV/AIDS are rated by South Africans as their top five priorities for government action.
This is one of the many important results revealed by the recent Afrobarometer survey of a representative sample of 2,400 South Africans, conducted in January and February 2006 by Citizen Surveys.
President Thabo Mbeki has reached new heights of public popularity with current job approval ratings matching the best ratings given to Nelson Mandela. These findings stand in stark contrast to the current crisis within the ANC and its alliance partners as manifested in sharp divisions over the treatment of former Deputy President Jacob Zuma, and the selection of the Party’s next candidate for President, as well as unprecedented attacks on Mbeki’s policies and leadership style by the South African Communist Party and the Congress of South African Trade Unions.
This briefing, describes changes in democratic attitudes in Lesotho and is based on a survey of 1,161 Basotho who are 18 years of age or older, administered between 6 July 2005 and 17 August 2005. The survey was conducted in 145 villages, in census enumeration areas selected by a random process proportional to population, with the help of Lesotho’s Bureau of Statistics. Every district was represented in proportion to its population. A precise method was developed for finding random households within each village.
Tanzanians are unhappy with the country’s economic conditions and their own living conditions, and they still experience high levels of lived poverty. Indeed, poverty at the individual level is a good part of the explanation for economic dissatisfaction. These are some of the key findings of the most recent Afrobarometer survey conducted in Tanzania between 21 July and 13 August, 2005.
The controversy over presidential term limits is at the center of public discussion in Nigeria. The most recent national opinion survey by the Afrobarometer finds strong support among the Nigerian public for term limits, free elections, competitive politics, and constitutional government. This survey shows widespread popular disapproval for an indefinite tenure of the chief Executive, and firm support for the present constitutional limit of two terms for elected officials.
In 2008, Madagascans tended to hold a somewhat mixed and increasingly dim view of the state of their national economy. 28% of Madagascans thought their economy was in a poor state and 24% viewed it as healthy – 11 percentage points lower than in 2005. The remaining 48% had no definite opinion, indicating a degree of perplexity concerning the general state of the economy. An even greater cause for concern is Madagascans’ distinctly negative view of their personal living standards.
La démocratie nécessite qu’un certain nombre de libertés soient respectées, telles que la libertéd’expression, la liberté de presse ou encore la liberté d’organisation. Interrogés sur ces libertés, lesMalgaches se montrent dans leur très grande majorité attachés à leur respect.
This brief addresses the state of the Parliament in Tanzania. In particular, we ask how Tanzanians themselves prioritize the various responsibilities of an MP. And we explore how well their MPs are doing at fulfilling these diverse roles.
In 1999 Zamfara became the first state to institute Shari’a law and soon afterwards eleven other northern states followed suit. The literature on Shari’a has been mixed in the assessment of its impact (Last 2000; Miles 2000, 2003; Marshall 2002, 2005; Harnischfeger 2004; Paden 2005, 2008; Loimeier 2007). Characterizations of Shari’a have ranged from it being labeled a form of militant religious extremism to a toothless legal system that is at best ineffectual and frequently discriminatory towards the poor and women.
La perception de la population de l’ampleur de la corruption témoigne d’un bilan assez mitigé. Lesrésultats montrent une corruption endémique qui affecte tous les rouages de l’administration et de lasphère politique. Toutefois, l’évolution de l’état de l’opinion en la matière pourrait permettre d’avancerl’hypothèse d’un recul de la corruption. La proportion de la population qui dénonce l’étendue de ce fléauest en baisse en 2008 par rapport à 2005. Parallèlement, l’incidence réelle de la corruption (pourcentagede victime) a nettement diminué.
Who are the African National Congress (ANC) and the Democratic Alliance (DA)? Together with party membership figures and election results, there is one additional reliable measure—party identification.